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PART BI
TASK ASSIGNMENT
Panel i was assigned the task to develop a detailed and accurate
chronology of mission events directly related to the flight of Apollo 13.
This event sequence would then form a baseline of data for analytical
use by Panel i, other Panels, and the Review Board.
To provide such a chronology, Panel i worked to produce a consoli-
dated sequence of all data whether derived from telemetry records, crew
observations, inflight photographs, air-to-ground communications, or
other sources of information. Of special significance to Panel i was
the requirement to correlate data taken from different sources, such
as crew observations and telemetry, in order to provide greater assur-
ance of the validity of data wherever possible.
In order to provide meaningful boundary conditions for its work,
Panel i divided its effort into three areas:
i. Preincident events, which covered the flight from countdown
to the time of the inflight accident.
2. Incident events, which covered the flight from approximately
55 hours and 52 minutes to the conclusion of immediately related data
events.
3. Postincident events, which covered the subsequent mission
period to splashdown.
In each of the three areas the main purpose of the Panel was to
provide the most efficient presentation of events for the Board's use
in reviewing, evaluating, and interpreting the significance of mission
events. Consequently, Panel I devoted a considerable portion of its
time to the task of data interpretation and verification. As was
intended from the Charter of the Board, the primary focus of the Panel's
work was the period of time during which the service module encountered
serious inflight difficulties, and its presentation of data reflects
this particular emphasis.
B-I
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PART B2
PANEL ORGANIZATION
Panel i was chaired by Mr. Francis B. Smith, Assistant Adminis-
trator for University Affairs, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
The Board Monitor was Mr. Neil Armstrong from the Manned Spacecraft
Center. Additional Panel Members were:
Mr. John J. Williams, Kennedy Space Center, for preincident events
Dr. Thomas B. Ballard, Langley Research Center, for incident events
Mr. M. P. Frank, Manned Spacecraft Center, for postincident events
Although each of the above specialized in one phase of the Panel's
total assignment, the Panel acted as one unit in the review and assess-
ment of data and in the analysis and interpretation of those events
identified with the accident.
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PART B3
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
Apollo 13 was launched on schedule from Kennedy Space Center at
2:13:00 e.s.t, on April ii, 1970. The crew consisted of James E. Lovell,
Commander (CDR); John L. Swigert, Command Module Pilot (CMP); and Fred W.
Haise, Lunar Module Pilot (LMP). The preflight countdown was routine and
although some malfunctions and anomalies occurred during boost and earlier
portions of the flight, none except the premature cutoff of one of the S-II
engines was considered at the time to be of a serious nature.
At about 55:54, the crew had just completed a television broadcast;
CMP Swigert was in the left seat of the command module, LMP Haise was in
the lunar module, and CDR Lovell was in the CM lower equipment bay, when
all three heard a loud bang. At about the same time in Mission Control
in Houston, the Guidance Officer (GUIDO) noted on his console display that
there had been a momentary interruption of the spacecraft computer. He
told the Flight Director, "We've had a hardware restart. I don't know
what it was." At almost the same time, CDR Lovell, talking to Mission
Control, said, "I believe we've had a problem here." Also at about the
same time, the Electrical, Environmental, and Communications Engineer
(EECOM) in Mission Control noticed on his console display the sudden
appearance of limit sensing lights indicating that a few of the telem-
etered quantities relating to the spacecraft's cryogenic, fuel cell, and
electrical system had suddenly gone beyond pre-set limits. Astronaut
Swigert in the command module, noting a master alarm about 2 seconds
after the bang, moved from the left seat to the right seat where he could
see the instruments indicating conditions of the electrical system, and
noticed a caution light indicating low voltage on main bus B, one of the
two busses supplying electrical power for the command module. At that
time, he reported to Mission Control, "We've had a problem. We've had
a main B bus undervolt." At the same time, however, he reported the
voltage on fuel cell 3, which supplied power to main bus B, looked good
and assumed that the main bus B undervolt condition had been a transient
one. However, 2 or 3 minutes later, when another master alarm sounded,
LMP Haise moved into the right-hand seat to recheck the fuel cells and
noted that two of the three fuel cells (no. i and no. 3) were showing no
hydrogen or oxygen flow and no electrical output and that fuel cell 2 was
carrying the command module's total electrical load through bus A. Bus B
was dead. In addition, several other electrical and cryogenic system ab-
normalities were evident.
Detailed studies and analyses of telemetry records made since the
flight indicated that during the 90 seconds before the "bang", several ab-
normal events occurred. At about 55:53:23, within a few seconds after the
crew had turned on two fan motors which stir the supercritical cryogenic
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oxygen in oxygen tank no. 2, electrical "glitches" (transient high-
amplitude current and voltage fluctuations) occurred which could be in-
dicative of momentary electrical short circuits. Analyses of telemetry
data also indicate that first one fan motor and then the other probably
became disconnected from the electrical bus concurrently with the glitches.
Thirteen seconds after the first glitch (16 seconds after the fans were
turned on) the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2 started to rise; during the
next 24 seconds it increased from a normal value of 891 psia to 954 psia;
it remained at that pressure for approximately 21 seconds and then again
increased to a maximum value of 1008 psia (approximately the pressure at
which the relief valve was set to open), at which point the relief valve
apparently opened and pressure began decreasing. During the last 23 sec-
onds of this period, during the second oxygen pressure increase, telem-
etry indicated that oxygen tank no. 2 temperature also began to increase
sharply; and concurrently with the sudden temperature rise, the oxygen
tank no. 2 quantity gage, which had been inoperative for the previous
9 hours, began to show fluctuating readings. At about 90 seconds after
the start of the pressure rise, telemetry transmission from the space-
craft was suddently interrupted for a period of 1.8 seconds.
Putting all of this and other information together with the service
module photographs taken later by the crew and with subsequent changes in
the condition of the spacecraft system leads to a determination that
immediately before and during this 1.8-second interval the following
things happened:
i. The oxygen tank no. 2 system failed, leading to loss of all
oxygen pressure.
2. The service module panel covering bay 4 blew off, possibly
producing the "bang" heard by the crew.
3. The spacecraft's velocity changed by 0.5 fps.
4. Transmission of telemetry from the spacecraft was interrupted
(possibly caused by the panel striking and damaging the high-gain antenna
through which data were being telemetered).
5. Various valves in the reaction control systems (RCS) were shocked
closed (contributing to some difficulties in maintaining automatic atti-
tude control).
6. Valves controlling oxygen flow to fuel cells _ and 3 were shocked
closed (leading to failure of both fuel cells 2-1/2 minutes later for lack
of oxygen).
7. Oxygen tank no. i started leaking oxygen.
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8. Venting of oxygen produced forces on the spacecraft which the
automatic stabilization system counteracted by firing opposing spacecraft
reaction control thrusters.
9. Various sensors or their wiring were damaged to cause subsequent
erroneous readings.
These changes occurred so rapidly, of course, that neither the crew
nor the mission controllers could have had a clear picture of specifi-
cally what had happened.
In the Mission Control Center, after the 1.8-second data loss, the
EECOM first suspected an instrumentation failure since earlier in the
flight (46:40) the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage had failed and since
other pressures, temperatures, voltages, and current readings were so
abnormal (e.g., more than i00 percent or less than 0 percent of fu_
scale) as to appear unrealistic. They appeared more indicative of an
instrumentation failure than of real quantities. The Flight Director
also initially believed, from the information available to him in the
Control Center, that the difficulty was electrical or electronic in
nature. Consequently, Mission Control Center's initial efforts during
the first 3 or 4 minutes after the malfunction were to validate instru-
ment readings and to identify a possible instrumentation failure. Dur-
ing the next several minutes, both the flightcrew and the ground con-
trollers worked at switching fuel cell bus power configurations in an
attempt to understand what had happened and to get fuel cells I and 3
back on line. They determined that fuel cell i had no output and dis-
connected it from the bus. Later they also disconnected fuel cell 3
for the same reason. For several minutes they connected the command
module's entry battery to bus A to aid fuel cell 2 in supplying elec-
trical power and to insure against further failures due to low voltage.
Shortly after the malfunction, while the Apollo 13 crew and the
EECOM were trying unsuccessfully to restore electrical power output from
fuel cells i and 3, the Guidance and Navigation Officer (GNC) reported
an unusually high level of attitude control thruster activity on the
spacecraft. This added to their problems, since it indicated other
abnormal conditions aboard the spacecraft and used excessive thruster
fuel. Consequently, during the next hour the ground control and the
crew were required to pay a great deal of attention to maintaining
attitude control of the spacecraft and to identifying and eliminating
the cause of the instability. At the same 'time, the Flight Director
began to suspect that the genesis of the problem might lie in the RCS,
rather than in the high-gain antenna or instrumentation.
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During this period (about 14 minutes after the accident) CDR Lovell
reported, "...it looks to me, looking out the hatch, that we are venting
something. We are venting something out into space ...... it's a gas of
some sort." He subsequently described this venting as extremely heavy
and unlike anything he had seen in his three previous space flights.
For about i hour 45 minutes after the accident, the crew and ground
controllers wrestled with electrical problems caused by oxygen supply
and fuel cell failures and with attitude stability problems caused by
the venting of oxygen, the shock closing of thruster system valves, and
electrical system failures. During this period they went through a
series of control system reconfigurations until automatic control
was finally established at 57:32. In the meantime, as it became more
apparent that the loss of oxygen from oxygen tank no. i could not be
stopped and that fuel cell 2 would soon expire, the LM was powered up
(57:40), LM telemetry was turned on (57:57) and attitude control was
transferred from the CM to the LM (58:34). At 58:40, 2 hours 45 minutes
after the accident, the CM was completely powered down.
One of the main concerns then was to make the trajectory changes
that would return the spacecraft safely to Earth within the lifetime
of the onboard consumables--water, oxygen, thruster fuel, and electric
power. At the time of the accident the spacecraft was on a trajectory
which would have swung it around the Moon (about 21 hours after the ac-
cident) and returned it to Earth where it would have been left in a
highly elliptical orbit about the Earth with a perigee (nearest approach
to Earth) of about 2400 miles. Four trajectory correction burns were
made during the remainder of the flight as illustrated in figure B6-9.
61:30 - A 38 fps incremental velocity (delta V) burn using the
descent propulsion system (DPS) engine and the LM primary guidance and
navigation system (PGNS). This burn was performed 16 hours before they
swung around the Moon, and was targeted to place the spacecraft on a
trajectory which would return it to the atmospheric Earth reentry corri-
dor rather than the 2400-mile perigee.
79:28 - A 861 fps delta V burn using the DPS 2 hours after swinging
around the Moon to speed up return to Earth by about 9 hours (143 versus
152 g.e.t.) and to move the landing point from the Indian Ocean to the
Pacific Ocean where the primary recovery forces were located.
105:18 - A 7.8 fps delta V burn using DPS to lower perigee altitude
from _-7 miles to about 21 miles.
137:40 - A 3.2 fps delta V final burn using LM RCS thruster to cor-
rect for small dispersions in previous burns and assure that the space-
craft would reenter in the center of its entry corridor.
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During the remainder of the flight there were several other unusual
situations which the crew and Mission Control successfully contended with.
The use of electrical power aboard the LMhad to be managedvery carefully
to conserve not only the LMbatteries but also the water supply, since
water was used to dissipate heat generated by the electrical equipment.
The LMLiOH was not adequate to remove carbon dioxide for three men for
the duration of the return trip, so a method was devised to circulate
the LMcabin oxygen through the CM's Li0H filters. Since the CMhad to
be used for reentry, its main bus B had to be checked out very carefully
to assure that there were no electrical shorts and the CMentry battery
which had been used earlier to supply power for the ailing CMhad to be
recharged from the LMbatteries.
Several actions essential to reentry and landing were undertaken
during the last 9 hours of the flight as illustrated in figure B6-10.
The SMwas jettisoned a few minutes after the last midcourse correction,
about 4-1/2 hours before reentry. In viewing and photographing the SM,
the crew realized for the first time the extensiveness of the physical
damage(panel blown off, Mylar strips hanging from antenna, etc.). At
about 2-1/2 hours before reentry, the CM's inertial platform was powered
up and aligned and the LMwas jettisoned about 1/2 hour later. Reentry
was at 142:40 and splashdown at 142:54 g.e.t.
B-9
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PART B4
PRELAUNCH AND MISSION EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT
This section of the report contains significant events prior to
the accident with emphasis placed on the spacecraft and particularly
on the cryogenic system. It starts with the launch count (T - 98:00:00)
and ends prior to the significant events of the accident (55:52:00).
LAUNCH COUNTDOWN
Countdown operations for both the command service module (CSM)
and lunar module (LM) were started at approximately i0:00 a.m.e.s.t.
on Monday, April 6, 1970. The start of the countdown was delayed
approximately 8 hours because of a pad clear operation involving a
special test of the LM supercritical helium (SHe) system. A timeline
of significant countdown milestones is shown in figure B4-1.
Mechanical Build-up and Gas Servicing
Following completion of CSM powerup, water servicing, and securing
of the LM SHe operation, installation of the CSM heavy ordnance initi-
ators was started at approximately 3:00 p.m.e.s.t. The ordnance
operation and remote resistance checks of the launch escape rocket
initiators were completed by 9:30 p.m.e.s.t., April 6, after being
slightly delayed to correct a mechanical interference problem (incorrect
thread depth) with the initiator in the launch escape rocket motor.
Combined CSM and LM helium and gaseous oxygen (GOX) servicing was
started at 2:00 a.m.e.s.t, on April 7, and was successfully completed
by noon that day. At this time, both the CSM and LM were functional
at T - 66:00:00, at which point a built-in hold of 12 hours had been
originally planned. As a result of the late countdown start, both the
LM and CSM spacecrafts experienced only a 6-hour built-in hold.
From noon Tuesday, April 7, through ii:00 a.m. Thursday, April 9,
mechanical build-up operations (panel closure, LM thermal blanket in-
stallation, etc.) were conducted on the CSM and LM. The CSM fuel cells
were activated and preparations were completed for CSM cryo loading,
that is, filling the cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tanks. Details of
this operation are covered below. During this time the LM SHe tank was
initially loaded and a 24-hour cold soak period started. All of these
operations were completed without a significant problem, with the
B-II
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spacecraft progressing functionally from T - 66:00:00 to T - 41:00:00;
including completion of the built-in hold at T - 66:00:00 and another
planned 16-hour built-in hold at T - 48:00:00.
Cryogenic Servicing
CSM cryo loading or flowing liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen was
scheduled to be performed from ii:OO a.m.e.s.t, through 7:00 p.m.e.s.t.
Thursday, April 9, 1970. A timeline of significant milestones, including
preliminary preparations, is shown in figure B4-2. (See Appendix A,
Part A5 for a description of the fuel cell and cryogenic systems.) The
configuration of the cryogenic and fuel cell systems was as follows:
i. The fuel cell gaseous oxygen and hydrogen systems were at a
pressure of 28 psia with oxygen and hydrogen gases. The fuel cells had
been operated in the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) and were left
pressurized with reactant gases (gaseous oxygen and hydrogen) to main-
tain system integrity between CDDT and countdown.
2. The oxygen and hydrogen tanks were at a pressure of 80 psia
with oxygen and hydrogen gases. The tanks had been evacuated (less than
5mm Hg for 2 hours minimum) and serviced during CDDT, with reactant gas
left in the system after detanking to maintain system integrity between
CDDT and countdown.
3. The ground support equipment (GSE) lines were connected to the
spacecraft and had been previously evacuated, pulse purged, and then
pressurized with reactant gas to 80 psia. Purity samples taken of the
gases from the GSE were within specification. The pressure-operated
disconnects (POD's) that connect the GSE to the spacecraft had been leak
checked at 80 psia with reactant gas and indicated no leakage.
4. The portable oxygen dewar used to service the spacecraft oxygen
tanks was serviced on April 7, 1970. Liquid samples taken from the vent
line of the dewar during servicing were within specification. All of the
preceding activities were accomplished without undue delay or difficulty.
The first activity for the fuel cell and cryogenic system in the
countdown started at approximately 3:00 p.m.e.s.t, on April 8, 1970.
The move of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen dewars from the cryo-
genic buildings to the pad had been completed. The primary oxygen_
backup oxygen, and backup hydrogen dewars were located on the pad at the
base of the mobile service structure (MSS) while the primary hydrogen
dewar was moved to level 4A of the MSS. The hydrogen and oxygen GSE
configuration is shown in figures B4-3 and B4-4, respectively.
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Pictures of the servicing dewars, valve boxes, and pressurizing equipment
are shown in figures B4-5 through B4-10.
Dewpoint samples of the oxygen and hydrogen spacecraft tanks were
obtained. This was accomplished by pressurizing the tanks with reactant
gas to 80 psia through the vent line and then venting the tank back
through the vent line and obtaining a moisture sample at the vent line
sample valve. Both the oxygen and hydrogen tanks met the requirements
that the moisture content be less than 25 parts per million (ppm).
Oxygen tanks no. i and no. 2 read less than 2 ppm.
After the dev_oint samples of the tanks were obtained, sample bot-
tles were installed on the tank vent lines. The sample bottles were
flow purged with reactant gases at 80 psia for 5 minutes, followed by
i0 pulse purges ranging in pressure from 80 psia to 20 psia.
The hydrogen dewar was then connected to the servicing GSE. The
fill line between the dewar and the spacecraft was flow purged with
55 psia of helium gas for 15 minutes, and a moisture sample taken from
the fill line. A sample result of 2 ppm was obtained. An additional
flow purge using gaseous hydrogen at 55 psia was then performed for
i0 minutes, followed by 13 pulse purges ranging in pressure from 55 psia
to 20 psia (Note: This cleans the dead-end areas at the manifold).
The fuel cells were then pressurized to their operating pressure
(62 psia oxygen and hydrogen). Heat was applied electrically to the
fuel cells from external GSE to melt the potassium hydroxide. Fuel
cell 3 heater current, supplied from GSE for heatup, was slightly low
(1.2 amps vs. 1.4 amps). This heater current was adjusted after the
heatup and calibration of the fuel cells was completed.
With the fuel cells at operating temperature (420 ° F) and pressures,
a calibration test on each fuel cell was performed. Fuel cells were
calibrated by applying loads in approximately lO-amp increments until a
maximum current of 60 amps was reached while monitoring the output volt-
age. The fuel cell loads were supplied by GSE load banks. After cali-
bration_ the fuel cells were connected to the spacecraft busses and
40-amp GSE load applied to each cell for fuel cell water conditioning
(approximately 4 hours). After these loads were removed from each fuel
cell, 6-amp in-line heater loads with a 50-percent duty cycle were ap-
plied. With the fuel cells in this configuration a visual engineering
inspection of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen loading systems was
performed with the exception of the liquid oxygen dewar_ not yet con-
nected.
Immediately prior to flowing liquid hydrogen, the spacecraft hy-
drogen and oxygen tank fans and quantity probe circuit breakers were
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Figure B4-5.- Liquid hydrogen dewar. 
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Figure B4-6.- Liquid oxygen dewar. 
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Figure B4-7.- Hydrogen valve box at Launch Complex 39. 
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Figure B4-8.- Oxygen valve box at Launch Complex 39 . 
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Figure B4-l0 .- Oxygen transfer unit at Launch Complex 39 . 
closed. (SeeAppendix A, Part A5, for description of the oxygen and
hydrogen tanks.) The hydrogen dewar waspressurized to approximately
30 psia prior to servicing. Hydrogen was flowed through both tanks for
i0 minutes (normal) prior to obtaining an increase in tank quantity.
This period is required to chill the system. The flow rate during
servicing was approximately 2.1 pounds per minute for 22 minutes (both
tanks). The flow was stopped for 30 minutes whenthe tank quantity
reached 85-percent and the dewar and spacecraft tanks vented to ambient
pressure. The fans were turned off during this period. This time
period is required to chill the hydrogen tank. The dewar was again
pressurized to approximately 30 psia, and flow (at normal rates) began
through the fill manifold detank line for 2 minutes to chill the GSE
prior to then opening the spacecraft fill POD's. Whenthe quantity gage
stabilized (about 98-percent) the dewar pressure was increased to approx-
imately 35 psia and the vent POD's closed, followed closely by the
closure of the fill POD's. The GSEvent valve was closed simultaneously
with the closing of the spacecraft vent POD's. This operation traps
cold gas between the spacecraft vent POD's and the GSEvent valve. As
the cold gas warmsand expands, it is vented into the two sample con-
tainers connected to the vent line sample valve. The samples were
analyzed for helium, nitrogen, and total hydrocarbons. Both samples
were within specifications.
The hydrogen dewar was removedand the prime oxygen dewar was
brought up to level 4A of the MSS. The oxygen dewar was connected to
the servicing GSE. The fill line between the dewar and the spacecraft
was flow purged with 55 psia of oxygen gas for 15 minutes, and a mois-
ture sample taken from the fill line. A sample result of less than 2 ppm
was obtained. After sampling, 13 pulse purges from a pressure of 55 psia
to a slight positive pressure to maintain flow were performed. The
spacecraft oxygen tank fans were turned on prior to oxygen flow. The
oxygen dewar was pressurized to approximately 45 psia. Oxygenwas flowed
through both tanks for approximately 2 minutes (normal) before an indica-
tion was noted on the quantity probe. The flow rate during servicing was
25 pounds per minute for approximately 25 minutes (both tanks). After
the tank quantity reached i00 percent, flow was continued for an ad-
ditional i0 minutes, to further chill the tanks. The spacecraft vent
POD's and the GSEvent were then closed, followed immediately by the
closure of the fill POD's. The spacecraft tank fans were turned off at
this time. The cold gas trapped in the vent line was sampled. The
oxygen is sampled for helium, nitrogen, and total hydrocarbons. Both
samples were within specification. The service module supply valve was
opened to allow the CMsurge tank to pressurize for flight.
While pressurizing the surge tank, fuel cell i was connected
to dc bus A to minimize the usage of liquid hydrogen. A constant
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flow from the liquid hydrogen tanks equal to the heat gained by the tank
results in minimumliquid hydrogen usage. The load on the fuel cell was
approximately 20 amps. This configuration was maintained until 4 hours
before launch, at which time fuel cells 2 and 3 were connected to the
busses. Fuel cells i and 2 were connected to bus A with fuel cell 3
supplying power to bus B. The fuel cells supplied power to the space-
craft from this time through launch.
Ground electrical power was supplied to the tank heaters to bring
the tanks to flight pressure. The liquid oxygen system pressurization
to approximately 935 psia and the liquid hydrogen system to approximately
235 psia was completed by 6:40 p.m. on April 9, 1970. The fuel cells
were supplied by onboard reactants from this period through launch. Fan
motor checks were performed, and the GSEand airborne systems closed out
for flight.
The entire CSMcryo loading operation was normal except that liquid
hydrogen tank no. i was loaded to 98.7 percent instead of the desired
minimum99 percent (reason for this is still under study by both the
MannedSpacecraft Center and the KennedySpace Center) and a slight leak
developed through the liquid oxygen tank no. 2 vent quick disconnect.
The leak was stopped by the installation of the flight cap prior to tank
pressurization. These conditions were determined to be acceptable for
flight.
Spacecraft Closeout and Terminal Count
Following completion of the cryo loading operation the countdown
proceeded normally from T - 32:00:00 through such milestones as: LM crew
provision stowage and final closeout; LMSHeservicing; launch vehicle
battery installation and electrical systems checks; CSMcrew provision
stowage; backup astronaut crew checks; and ALSEPfuel cask installation.
At 7:00 p.m.e.s.t, on April i0, 1970, the countdown clock was held
at T - 9:00:00 for a planned built-in hold of 9 hours and 13 minutes.
Following resumption of the countdown at 4:13 a.m.e.s.t, on April ii,
1970, final launch vehicle cryogenic loading preparations were completed
and launch vehicle cryogenic loading was successfully conducted through
9:30 a.m.e.s.t.
The remainder of the countdown activities, including flightcrew
ingress_ final CSMcabin closeout, and the space vehicle terminal count,
progressed normally with the exception of a minor problem with a broken
key in the CSMpyro guard, and a stuck open no. 2 liquid oxygen vent
valve in the S-IC stage. Both problems were satisfactorily resolved with-
in the planned countdo_¢ntime, v_hich included a final built-in hold of
i hour at T - 3:30:00 minutes.
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LAUNCHANDTRANSLUNARCOASTPHASEPRIORTOTHEACCIDENT
Launch and Flight Summary
The space vehicle was launched at 2:13:00 e.s.t., April ii, 1970.
The only unexpected occurrence during the boost phase was an early
shutdownof the S-II inboard engine. Low frequency oscillations
(approximately 16 hertz) occurred on the S-II stage, resulting in a
132-second premature center engine cutoff. Preliminary analysis indi-
cates that an engine pressure sensor detected a varying engine thrust
chamberpressure resulting from a large pressure oscillation in the
liquid oxygen system and turned the engine off. The four remaining
engines burned approximately 34 seconds longer than normal, and the
S-IVB orbital insertion burn was approximately 9 seconds longer to
achieve the required velocity. The cause of the liquid oxygen system
oscillation is presently being studied by the Marshall Space Flight
Center. A parking orbit with an apogeeof 100.2 nautical miles and a
perigee of 98.0 nautical miles was obtained.
After orbital insertion, all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems
were verified and preparations were madefor translunar injection. The
second S-IVB burn was initiated on schedule for translunar injection.
All major systems operated satisfactorily and conditions were
nominal for a free-return circumlunar trajectory. With the spacecraft
in a free-return trajectory, and with no further major propulsion
burns, the spacecraft would pass around the Moonand reenter the
Earth's atmosphere.
The commandservice module (CSM)separated from the service module
LMadapter (SLA) at 3:06:39. The spacecraft was maneuveredand docked
with the lunar module (LM) at 3:19:09 and the LMseparated from the
SLA at 04:01:00. The S-IVB was then maneuveredusing residual pro-
pellants to impact the lunar surface. The first midcourse correction
(23.1 fps), performed at 30:40:50 using the service propulsion system,
inserted the spacecraft into a non-free-return trajectory with a peri-
cynthian altitude close to the planned value of about 60 miles. Under
these conditions, with no further propulsion engine burns, the spacecraft
would orbit the Earth in a highly elliptical orbit. These trajectories
are discussed in more detail in Part B6 of this Appendix.
The mission was routine and generally proceeded according to the
timeline. Because the crew was ahead of schedule and midcourse cor-
rection number3 was cancelled, an early entry into the lunar module
was madeat 55:00:00. A scheduled television broadcast to the Earth
was madebetween 55:15 and 55:46, and at the time of the accident,
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both the Commanderand CommandModule Pilot were in the commandmodule
while the Lunar Module Pilot was just entering the commandmodule from
the lunar module.
Spacecraft Systems Operation
This section of the report will deal only with problems and events
in the various systems encountered with the CSMduring the powered
phase, parking orbit, and translunar coast phase of the mission up to
the time of the accident. The systems will be treated separately
except that electrical current and voltage fluctuations associated with
the operation of the fans to stir the supercritical oxygen and hydrogen
will be covered under the cryogenic section.
CSM structural-mechanical.- Structural loads during boost phases
of the flight were within acceptable limits. Command module structural
oscillations of less than 0.1g at 16 hertz in all directions were
measured during the period of S-II longitudinal oscillations (POG0)
prior to the center engine cutoff. The levels of these oscillations
were comparable to those measured during ground test and on previous
Apollo missions.
At approximately 00:25:00 minutes, a computer program was entered
into the computer to align the inertial measuring unit. During this
alignment, the sextant is rotated, which in turn releases the external
ablative optics covers. The optics covers are spring loaded, and held
in place by clips. When the sextant is rotated, an arm located on the
sextant engages a cam that releases the clips and jettisons both covers.
Minor difficulty was experienced in jettisoning the two covers. The
optics were rotated twice manually to 90 degrees according to the
checklist, but the covers did not jettison. The optics were then
rotated in the automatic mode (past 90 degrees) and the covers Jetti-
soned. The cause of the covers not jettisoning was that the sextant
was not rotated far enough in the manual mode to completely engage the
cam.
After CSM/LM docking, the crew reported that two docking latches
were not fully engaged. Both latches were opened and reset. There
are 12 docking latches on the command module. Each latch has a trigger
that is engaged when the lunar module docking ring comes in contact
with the CSM docking ring. The handle has a red indicator that indi-
cates when the latch is engaged. On several spacecraft during ground
checkout one or two of the latches had to be reset manually, as in the
case of Apollo 13. The prime cause is not having the two docking rings
perfectly parallel at the time of engagement. The manual resetting of
one or two of the latches is considered satisfactory.
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The crew reported a slight "burnt" smell in the tunnel area between
the CSM/LM when entering the tunnel, which is normal.
Electrical power.- The electrical power distribution and sequen-
tial system, except for the fuel cells, operated as expected until the
time of the accident. The electrical parameters associated with the
fan turnon and turnoff times will be discussed in Part B9.
At about 30:45:00 the fuel cell 3 condenser exit temperature
pattern was observed to change to a sinusoidal ripple with a frequency
of i cycle every 30 seconds and a peak-to-peak amplitude of 6.2 ° F.
The oscillations continued for approximately 9 hours and then stopped.
Similar oscillations had been observed on Apollo I0 during lunar orbit,
and subsequent analyses and tests showed that the oscillations were not
detrimental to the performance or life of the fuel cells. These tran-
sients are attributed to slugs of cold water leaving the condenser.
Instrumentation.- Four discrepancies in the instrumentation sys-
tem were noted. At 46:40:06 the Oxygen quantity measurement located
in oxygen tank no. 2 indicated i00 percent. This anomaly will be
discussed in detail in Part B9. The cabin pressure indicated 1/2 psi
above the suit pressure until powerdown of the CSM after the incident.
(Should be approximately the same with the crew out of the suits.)
During the boost phase, when the cabin vented the transducer did not
follow the cabin pressure and operated erratically for the remainder
of the flight. This erratic operation was very similar to the erratic
operation of the identical transducer on Apollo 12. Failure analysis
of the Apollo 12 transducer indicated contamination inside the
transducer.
Early in the mission (22:38 and 37:38) the potable water quantity
transducer acted erratically for a brief period. This instrument has
operated erratically on other spacecraft during ground checkout and
flight due to oxidation of electrical winding on the transducer poten-
tiometer. This oxidation causes intermittent contact between the
wiper arm and the wiring on the potentiometer, thus giving erratic
readings.
At approximately T + 32 hours, the crew reported that the space-
craft panel meters indicating fuel cell hydrogen versus oxygen flow
were not exactly matched for fuel cell 3. All indications on the
ground were normal. Prelaunch ground data once indicated a mismatch
in panel indication on fuel cell 2. Since the instrumentation data
in both cases were correct, the most probable cause was an inter-
mittent fault in the meter circuitry causing the shift.
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Communications.- At 55:05:32 the crew reported that they could not
operate the high-gain antenna (HGA) in narrow beamwidth auto track or
reacquisition modes. A maneuver to the passive thermal control (PTC)
attitude was prescribed and as the maneuver was initiated, the crew
manually positioned the antenna and acquired automatic tracking in
the narrow beamwidth mode. The antenna operated normally until the
accident. When troubleshooting (before lockup) both the primary and
secondary electronics and both the automatic and reacquisition tracking
modes were unsuccessfully attempted. Analysis indicates an effective
misalignment existed between the boresight of the wide and narrow
beams. The beam effective misalignment could have been caused by a
defective radio frequency (RF) stripline coaxial cable, mechanical
failure, or RF feed lines. A boresight shift was not indicated during
antenna acceptance testing or during KSC ground checkout.
Service module propulsion and reaction control.- The service
module propulsion system was used only once during the mission at
30:40:50 to place the spacecraft into a non-free-return trajectory.
The engine burned for 3.6 seconds, and all parameters were nominal.
The thrust chamber pressure seemed about 4 percent below preflight
prediction, but within acceptable limits.
Guidance and control.- Guidance and control system performance was
satisfactory, with the exception of small fluctuations of the optic
shaft when in the zero optics mode and in establishing passive thermal
control (PTC). At approximately 7:30:00 the crew reported difficulty
in establishing PTC. The attempt resulted in a very wide and diverging
coning angle. It was determined that the digital autopilot was in-
correctly loaded and all roll thrusters were not enabled. The checklist
did not call out the correct autopilot load and the thruster enabling
was a late pen-and-ink change to the onboard checklist. Using the
revised procedure, the PTC mode was successfuly established.
At about 40:00 the ground controllers noticed small fluctuations
of the optic shaft when in zero optics mode. As on Apollo 12, the
ground data showed a slight jitter in the optics shaft angle from
0 to 0.6 degree. A special test was conducted at 49 hours to verify
the shaft oscillations. The crew compared the shaft and trunnion
angles to the mechanical counters on the optics. The oscillation was
evident from both sources and occurred in the optics zero mode only.
The optics jitter presented no constraint to the operation of the
optical system; however, at 49:51:37 the ground requested the crew to
turn off optics power to guard against possible degradation of the
system.
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Environmental control.- No anomalies were noted in the environmental
control system operation.
Thermal control.- The thermal control system of the CSM performed
normally until the incident.
Cryogenic system.- Both the liquid hydrogen and the liquid oxygen
systems operated satisfactorily up to the time of the accident as far
as the fuel cells and environmental control systems were concerned.
Because of the unbalance in hydrogen quantities during loading, and
unequal usage during launch pad operation, several hydrogen low-pressure
master alarms were detected on the caution and warning system. (A
description of the caution and warning system is contained in Appendix A,
Part A2.10.) At 46:40:08 the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity measurement
indicated i00 percent quantity and remained at this value until the
pressure rise at 55:53:35. With the exception of the above, system
operations were normal to the time of the accident.
The following sections will describe the low hydrogen pressure
master alarm and supercritical liquid hydrogen and oxygen destratifica-
tion up to the time of the accident.
Hydrogen Low Pressure Master Alarm
The caution and warning system, upon receipt of a malfunction or
out-of-tolerance signal, simultaneously identifies the abnormal condi-
tion and alerts the crew to its existence. Each signal (both oxygen
and hydrogen pressure are on one indicator) will activate the system
status indicator, light the master alarm light, and place an audio tone
in the crew's headsets. The crew can turn off or reset the master
alarm; however, the particular system status malfunction indicators
remain lit, blocking further master alarms on this indication, until
the malfunction is cleared.
At lift-off, the quantity readings for the hydrogen tanks no. i
and no. 2 were 91 percent and 93.4 percent, respectively. This was due
to initial loading values (98.7 percent for tank no. i and 99.4 percent
for tank no. 2) and the difference in usage during countdown.
At approximately 32:00 g.e.t., a quantity unbalance of 2.38 percent
existed between the hydrogen tanks, and a quantity balancing procedure
was conducted to prevent tank no. i low-pressure master alarms during
the sleep period. In the "auto" mode the tank heaters are turned on and
off by pressure switches connected in series. When the pressure in
either tank reaches about 260 psi, the heaters in both tanks are switched
off. The heaters remain off until the opened pressure switch closes at
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approximately 225 psi. Since one tank pressure switch normally remains
closed, the tank that controls the upper pressure will also control at
the lower pressure. During the flight, tank no. 2 was controlling.
Tank no. i pressure was almost reaching the caution and warning low
pressure point (224.2 psia) prior to tank no. 2 reaching its pressure
switch activation point of 233.6 psia to turn on the heaters.
Since tank no. 2 had the greater quantity, at 32:00 the tank no. i
heaters were manually turned off by the crew while tank no. 2 re_[ned
in auto. This condition would allow the fuel cells to obtain hydrogen
from tank no. 2 because of its higher pressure and in turn reduce its
quantity of hydrogen. Several master alarms occurred immediately after
this change (33:10, _3:41, 34:01, and _4:32).
At 36:48 the hydrogen tank no. i heater was placed back to auto
for the sleep period. On the first "down" pressure cycle a master
a_arm occurred (38:00) due to hydrogen tank no. i pressure dropping
lower than 224.24 psia, awaking the crew. The crew reset the alarm,
and no master alarms occurred through the sleep period although the
heaters cycled several times. To obtain a balanced condition for the
next sleep period, the ground controllers devised the following plan
for the next day's operation:
i. After crew wakeup, turn hydrogen tank no. 2 heater to off and
leave hydrogen tank no. i in auto for two to three pressure cycles to
determine if this will transfer heater control to tank no. i in antici-
pation of using this configuration for sleep.
2. If successful, tank no. i heaters will be turned off during the
day and tank no. 2 heaters left in auto to create a quantity unbalance
in favor of tank no. i.
3. During the next sleep period, the tanks will be balanced by
placing tank no. i heaters in auto and tank no. 2 heaters to off.
This plan was executed when the crew awoke the next day. At the
time of the accident, tank no. i was in off and tank no. 2 was in auto,
and the caution and warning master alarm was reset with a low hydrogen
pressure indication present at 55:52:30. This hydrogen low pressure
indication locked out the master alarm during the time of the increasing
pressure in oxygen tank no. 2.
Cryogenic Tank Destratification
To prevent stratification in the oxygen and hydrogen tanks, two
fans are located in each tank. A diagram of the oxygen tank showing
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the two fans and quantity gaging probe is shown l.n figure B4-11. The
flight plan called for the fans to be operated in both the hydrogen and
oxygen tanks at the following times: 3:40, 12:09, 23:12, 29:40, 37:30,
and 46:39 g.e.t. The ground controllers requested the oxygen tank no. 2
fans to be operated at 47:54 and both the oxygen and hydrogen fans be
operated at 51:07.
Review of cryogenic and electrical instrumentation data does not
indicate that the fans were switched on at 3:40 and at 29:40. No
changes in cryogenic pressures and quantities, and no indications of an
increase in spacecraft current were noted. The operation of the fans
during the other destratification periods were normal; however, three
oxygen tank no. 2 differences were noted: (i) transients on pitch and
yaw thrust vector control gimbal command parameters at fan turnon and
turnoff, (2) quantity gaging probe malfunctioned just after or at the
time the fans came on, and (3) ac main bus 2 indicated a 1.8-volt nega-
tive transient when the fans were turned on at 47:54.
The pitch and yaw thrust vector control gimbal command (TVC command)
parameters are an excellent transient detector on ac main bus 2 when
the stabilization and control system is turned off because of its sensi-
tivity and high sampling rate (i00 samples per second). The sensitivity
of the system is determined by the position of the rate high/low switch
and the attitude deadband maximum/minimum switch. The TVC command sig-
nals are not transmitted to the ground when the instrumentation system
is in low bit rate mode.
The system was in the low sensitivity mode during two destratifi-
cation periods. When oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on during tank
destratification periods, a negative initial transient was detected and
when the fans were turned off, a positive initial transient was detected
on the TVC command parameters. These transients are readily detectable
in the high sensitivity mode and barely detectable in the low sensitiv-
ity mode. Examination of the Apollo ii records indicates that the system
was in the high sensitivity mode once during the fan destratification
periods and a similar transient occurred when the Fans were turned on.
The data indicate that the transients are normal for fan turnon and
turnoff, and only indicate a relatively large current change on ac main
bus 2.
At 47:40:08 the oxygen quantity changed from approximately 82 per-
cent to i00 percent, or full-scale high. This change in reading or
quantity system malfunction occurred just after or at the time the
oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on. Because of the way the system
recovered at the time of the accident, the data indicate that the probe
or its associated wiring shorted. Since the instrumentation system was
in low bit rate, it is possible to determine exactly when the oxygen
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Figure B4-11.- Arrangement of components within oxygen tank.
tank no. i and no. 2 fans were turned on. The electrical data indicate
that the oxygen tank no. i and no. 2 fans were turned on between the
times of 47:40:05 and 47:40:08. A plot of cryogenic pressures, quanti-
ties, total CSM current, and ac main bus 2 is shown in figure B4-12.
Therefore, the oxygen tank no. i and no. 2 fans were turned on in a period
of time between 3 seconds prior to the probe malfunction and the time
that the probe malfunctioned.
When the oxygen tank no. 2 fans were turned on the next time at
47:54:50, the ac main bus 2 decreased 1.8 volts for one sample (O.i sec-
ond). At the same time the TVC command parameters indicated a negative
initial transient. Because of the sampling rate (i0 samples per second)
of the instrumentation system and the small number of fan cycles examined
in the high bit rate mode, it cannot be determined if this negative ini-
tial transient is characteristic of other fan turnon's or is an indica-
tion of a deteriorating fan or wiring.
The complete oxygen and hydrogen tank destratifJcation history
prior to the accident is shown in table B4-1. Changes in oxygen and
hydrogen pressures and quantities indicate normal destratification of
the tanks during all fan cycles. The next destratification period
occurred at 55:53:18, or when the events started leading to the accident.
References i through 6 and instrumentation records were used as a
source of information and data in the preparation of this part of the
report.
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PART B5
INCIDENT EVENTS
INTRODUCTION
This part of the report covers the significant events which took
place at the time of the accident. The period covered is 55:52:00 g.e.t.
to 56:00:05 g.e.t. Prior to this period, spacecraft operation had been
essentially according to plan and neither the ground controllers nor the
crew had any warning of the events about to occur. The first indication
of a problem was a loud bang heard by all three crew members which was
followed by a master caution and warning. The immediate indications in
the spacecraft were that this warning had been triggered by an electrical
transient. Several minutes later two fuel cells failed in the power
system, and the crew became fully occupied trying to reconfig_ure the
spacecraft electrical system. Fourteen minutes later they noticed vent-
ing and began to understand what had actually happened in the cryogenic
oxygen system.
On the ground, the flight controllers first noticed that the space-
craft computer had been automatically restarted. Shortly afte_¢ards,
indication of a master caution and warning caused the flight controllers
to scan their data for a problem. Since many telemetry measurements had
by this time departed from their nominal values, the ground controllers'
immediate reaction was to suspect an instrumentation failure. Steps were
undertaken to sort the false telemetry readings from the true ones; and,
simultaneously, instructions were given to help the crew handle new prob-
lems. About an hour later the ground personnel had sorted out the facts
sufficiently to know that it would only be a short time before the cryo-
genic oxygen system would fail completely.
Reconstruction of the mission events in the detail presented in the
following pages has required several hundred man-days of data analysis.
Consequently, the crew and mission controllers could not possibly have
understood the situation in the same depth at the time the events were
actually happening. The primary sources of data for the analysis have
been telemetry records, transcripts of voice communications, crew de-
briefings, and interviews with personnel on duty in Mission Control.
Table B5-1 is a detailed chronology of the events during this time
period_ and figure B5-1 shows the sequence of events grouped according to
spacecraft systems. For events obtained from telemetry data, where time
is shown to a fraction of a second_ this refers to the time at which the
parameter in question was actually sampled by the telemetry system. As
discussed in Part B7 of this Appendix, the characteristics of the
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telemetry system place an uncertainty on the time of an event. The un-
certainty is a function of the telemetry system sampling rate.
The remainder of this section is a discussion of the events at the
time of the accident, grouped according to the spacecraft systems involved.
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TABLEB5-1.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGYFROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENTO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT
Time, g.e.t. Event
Events During 52 Seconds Prior to First Observed Abnormality
55:52:31
55:52:58
55:53:06
55:53:18
55:53:19
55:53:20
55:53:20
55:53:21
Master caution and warning triggered by low hydrogen
pressure in tank no. i. Alarm is turned off after
4 seconds.
Ground requests tank stir.
Crew acknowledges tank stir.
Oxygen tank no. 1 fans on.
Oxygen tank no. I pressure decreases 8 psi.
Oxygen tank no. 2 fans turned on.
Stabilization control system electrical disturbance
indicates a power transient.
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure decreases _ psi.
55:53:22.718
55:53:22.757
55:53:22.772
55:53:36
55:53:38.057
55:53:38.085
Abnormal Events During 90 Seconds Preceding the Accident
Stabilization control system electrical disturbance
indicates a power transient.
1.2-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage.
ll.l-amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one
sample.
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins rise lasting
for 24 seconds.
ll-volt decrease in ac bus 2 voltage for one
sample.
Stabilization control system electrical disturbance
indicates a power transient.
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TABLE B5-1.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Continued
Time, g.e.t. Event
55:53:41.172
55:53:41.192
55:5h:00
55:54:15
55:54:30
55:54:31
55:54:43
55:54:45
55:54:48
55:54:51
55:54:52
55:54:52.70_
55:54:52.763
55:54:53.182
55:54:53.220
22.9-amp rise in fuel cell 3 current for one sample.
Stabilization control system electrical disturbance
indicates a power transient.
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure rise ends at a pressure
of 953.8 psia.
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure begins to rise.
Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity drops from full scale
for 2 seconds and then reads 75-3 percent.
Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins to rise
rapidly.
Flow rate of oxygen to all three fuel cells begins
to decrease.
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reaches maximum value
of 1008.3 psia.
Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature rises 40 ° F for one
sample.
Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity jumps to off-scale high
and then begins to drop until the time of telemetry
loss.
Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads -151.3 ° F.
Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature suddenly goes off-
scale low.
Last telemetered pressure from oxygen tank no. 2
before telemetry loss is 995.7 psia.
Sudden accelerometer activity on X, Y, and Z axes.
Stabilization control system body rate changes
begin.
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TABLEB5-1.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGYFROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENTO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT- Continued
Time, g.e.t. Event
55:54:53.323
55:54:53.5
55:54:53.542
Oxygen tank no. i pressure drops 4.2 psi.
2.8-amp rise in tota_ fuel cell current.
X, Y, and Z accelerations in CM indicate 1.17g,
0.65g and 0.65g, respectively.
55:54:53.555
55:54:53.555 +
55:54:54.741
55:54:55.35
1.8-Second Data Loss
Loss of telemetry begins.
Master caution and warning triggered by dc main
bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 6
seconds. All indications are that the cryogenic
oxygen tank no. 2 lost pressure in this time period
and the panel separated.
Nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i is off-scale low
indicating failed sensor.
Recovery of telemetry data.
55:54:56
55:54:56
55 :54 :56
55:54:56
55:54:56
Events During 5 Minutes Following the Accident
Service propulsion system engine valve body tem-
perature begins a rise of 1.65 ° F in 7 seconds.
Dc main bus A decreases 0.9 volt to 28.5 volts
and dc main bus B decreases 0.9 volt to 29.0 volts.
Total fuel cell current is 15 amps higher than the
final value before telemetry loss. High current
continues for 19 seconds.
Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature reads off-scale high
after telemetry recovery.
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure reads off-scale low
following telemetry recovery.
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TABLEB5-1.- DETAILEDCHRONOLOGYFROM
2.5 MINUTESBEFORETHEACCIDENTO 5 MINUTESAFTERTHEACCIDENT- Continued
Time, g.e.t. Event
55:54:56
55:54:57
55:5h:59
55:55:01
55:55:02
55:55:02
55:55:09
55:55:20
55:55:35
55:55:h9
55:56:10
55:56:38
Oxygen tank no. i pressure reads 781.9 psia and
begins to drop steadily.
Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity reads off-scale high
following telemetry recovery.
The reaction control system helium tank C temperature
begins a 1.66 ° F increase in 36 seconds.
Oxygen flow rates to fuel cells I and 3 level off
after steadily decreasing.
The surface temperature of the service module
oxidizer tank in bay 3 begins a 3.8 ° F increase
in a 15-second period.
The service propulsion system helium tank temperature
begins a 3.8 ° F increase in a 32-second period.
Dc main bus A voltage recovers to 29.0 volts; dc
main bus B recovers to 28.8 volts.
Crew reports, "I believe we've had a problem
here. "
Crew reports, "We've had a main B bus undervolt."
Oxygen tank no. 2 temperature begins steady drop
lasting 59 seconds.
Crew reports, "Okay right now, IIouston. The
voltage is looking good, and we had a pretty large
bang associated with the caution and warning there.
And as I recall, main B was the one that had had
an amp spike on it once before."
Oxygen tank no. 2 quantity becomes erratic for
69 seconds before assuming an off-scale-low state.
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TABLE B5-1.- DETAILED CHRONOLOGY FROM
2.5 MINUTES BEFORE THE ACCIDENT TO 5 MINUTES AFTER THE ACCIDENT - Concluded
Time_ _.e.t. Event
55:57:04
55:57:39
55:57:40
55:57:44
55:57:45
55:57:59
55:58:02
55:58:06
55:58:07
55:58:07
55:58:25
56:00:06
Crew reports, "That jolt must have rocked the
sensor on--see now--oxygen quantity 2. It was
oscillating down around 20 to 60 percent. Now
it's full-scale high again."
Master caution and warning triggered by dc main
bus B undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in
6 seconds.
Dc main bus B drops below 26.25 volts and continues
to fall rapidly.
Ac bus 2 fails within 2 seconds.
Fuel cell 3 fails.
Fuel cell i current begins to decrease.
Master caution and warning caused by ac bus 2
being reset. Alarm is turned off after 2 seconds.
Master caution and warning triggered by dc main
bus A undervoltage. Alarm is turned off in 13
seconds.
Dc main bus A drops below 26.25 volts and in the
next few seconds levels off at 25.5 volts.
Crew reports, "ac 2 is showing zip."
Crew reports, "Yes, we got a main bus A undervolt
now, too, showing. It's reading about 25-1/2.
Main B is reading zip right now."
Master caution and warning triggered by high hydrogen
flow rate to fuel cell 2. Alarm is turned off in
2 seconds.
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STATUSOFTHESPACECRAFTPRIORTOTHEACCIDENT
At 55:52:00, Just prior to the accident, the electrical system was
configured as shownin figure B5-2. Fuel cells i and 2 were supplying
main bus A; fuel cell 3 was supplying main bus B. The power for the
fans in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 was being supplied by ac bus 2, as
was power for the quantity sensor in that tank. The stabilization control
system thruster vector control system was receiving its power from ac
bus 2. Twoquantities in this system, the pitch and yaw thrust vector
control gimbal commands,though not intended for measurementof electri-
cal system currents and voltages, are sensitive indicators of electrical
transients on ac bus 2. These quantities are telemetered to the ground
with a sampling rate of i00 samples per second. At 55:52:00 the telemetry
system was operating in the high-bit-rate modeand the narrow beam antenna
was in use.
The cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gage had failed to a 100-
percent reading in the 46th hour of the flight. (See Part B4, the sub-
section entitled "Spacecraft Systems Operation.") All other cryogenic
oxygen instrumentation was operating normally.
The cryogenic hydrogen tank i pressure decreased sufficiently to
trigger the master caution and warning at 55:52:31. (For a description
of the master caution and warning system, see Part 2.10 of Appendix A.)
The ground then requested a fan cycle, and the crew acknowledgedthe
request. A fan cycle consists of the crew turning on the stirring fans
located in both the cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tanks and allowing
them to run for approximately I minute. Normally, the hydrogen fans
are turned on first, followed by the fans in oxygen tank no. i and a
few seconds later by the fans in oxygen tank no. 2.
FANTURNONANDASSOCIATEDELECTRICALANOMALIES
At 55:53:18 whenthe two fans in cryogenic oxygen tank no. i
were turned on by the crew, a drop in ac bus i voltage (fig. B5-3)
and an increase of i amperein total commandmodule current indicated
that the fans had been electrically energized. (Total commandmodule
current, plotted in figure B5-4, is obtained by adding the current
outputs of all three fuel cells and subtracting the current drain of
the lunar module. ) A subsequent decrease in tank pressure and oscillations
in the fuel cell flowmeters indicated that the fans had begun to stir
the oxygen (fig. B5-3).
At 55:53:20 the crew turned on the cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 fans.
An increase in fuel cell current of 1-1/2 amperes, a drop in ac bus 2
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voltage of 0.6 volt, and a glitch in the stabilization control system
telemetry indicated that the fans had been electrically energized.
These events are shown in figures B5-4 and B5-5. However, it is not
certain that the fans began rotating at this time, since the tank no. 2
pressure showed a minimum observable drop and the fan motor stall current
does not significantly differ from the running current. The quantity
gage in tank no. 2 was already in a failed condition, and the fuel cell
flowmeters were already being affected by the fan operation in tank no. i
so that neither of these instruments could positively veri_y rotation
of the fans in tank no. 2. During the next 20 seconds a series of
electrical anomalies occurred which cannot be explained as a result of
known loads in the spacecraft. These anomalies are shown in figure B5-4.
The first, at 55:53:23 was an ll-amp positive spike in the output current
of fuel cell 3. Several events were associated with this spike:
(a) The command module current decreased approximately 1/2 ampere
immediately afterward.
(b) The ac bus 2 voltage had a transient decrease and then began
to alternate between 115.7 and 116.3 volts, whereas it had been main-
taining a steady value of 115.7 volts since fan turnon.
These events indicate that at the time of the ll-amp spike, a load
may have been disconnected from ac bus 2. This could have been one of
the fan motors in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2.
At 55:53:38 another abnormal electrical disturbance occurred, a
3-amp spike of current and variations in ac bus 2 voltage. The ac bus 2
voltage first increased 2 volts and then dropped suddenly from 116 to 105
volts. The ac bus 2 is a three-phase electrical system, although the
only voltage telemetered is phase A. The operation of the inverter
which generates ac bus 2 is such that it attempts to maintain a constant
average voltage among the three phases ; if one phase becomes heavily
loaded, the inverter will increase the voltages of the other two phases.
Consequently, it is possible that the voltage rise in ac bus 2 at
55:53:37.8 was caused by a heavy load applied to phase B or phase C.
The decrease in voltage immediately afterward was probably caused by
loading of phase A.
At 55:53:41 a 23-amp spike occurred on fuel cell 3 output current,
after which the total command module current returned to a steady value
within 0.3 ampere of the value prior to turnon of cryogenic oxygen
tank no. 2 fans. Also, the voltage of ac bus 2 returned to the value it
had shown prior to fan turnon. At the same time transients appeared in
the stabilization control system, as shown in figure B5-5.
The most probable cause of the electrical disturbances between
55:53:22 and 55:53:42 is that a short circuit occurred in the electrical
B-50
system of the cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 fans. The short circuit was
sufficiently severe to result in loss of part of the fan load at
55:53:22 and the remainder at 55:53:41. Reduction of the load could
have been caused by fuses blowing or by wires opening.
It should be noted that the nature of the telemetry records makes
it difficult to define the exact parameters of the electrical disturbances.
Since the value of fuel cell 3 current is sampledby the telemetry system
at i0 times per second, the duration of the observed current spikes is
in question by 0.2 second. Also, the peak values of the spikes may well
have exceeded the maximumrecorded values. For similar reasons a large
current spike could possibly have occurred at 55:53:38 simultaneous
with the ll-volt decrease of ac bus 2. If the spike were very short,
less than 0.i second duration, it could have occurred between the times
of successive telemetry samples and thus not have been recorded.
The electrical anomalies endedby 55:53:42 and no further electrical
disturbances were observed for the next minute.
OXYGENTANKPARAMETERS
FROM55:53:30 UNTILLOSSOFTELEMETRY
Thirteen seconds after the ll-amp spike and 6 seconds before the
23-ampspike, the pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 began a
steady increase at an abnormally rapid rate. The increase began at
55: 53:35 and lasted 19 secondsbefore the pressure reached a plateau of
954 psia for 21 seconds. At 55:54:15 the pressure rise resumed, reaching
a maximumvalue of 1008 psia 9 secondsbefore loss of telemetry. During
this rise the master caution and warning trip level of 975 psia was
exceeded, but a master alarm was not generated because of the existing
cryogenic pressure warning occasioned by low hydrogen pressure. After
reaching 1008 psia, the pressure decreased to 996 psia Just before loss
of telemetry. The oxygen flow rate for all three fuel cells declined
for about I0 seconds and then began to rise just before loss of telemetry.
The pressure transducer for cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 is not
located in the tank but is connected to the tank along with a pressure
relief valve through 19 feet of tubing. The relief valve is set to open
fully at 1008 psia. (See figure B7-4 for a diagram of this portion of
the cryogenic oxygen system and Part B7 of this Appendix for a more
complete description of the cryogenic oxygen pressure sensing system).
The remote location of the oxygen pressure transducer causes sometime
lag in the telemetered pressure data but unless there are unknown
restrictions, such as clogging of the filter at the tank end of the line,
this lag will not cause serious errors in the pressure reading under the
conditions observed.
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The quantity gage for oxygen tank no. 2, which had been in a failed
state ever since the 46th hour, suddenly dropped to 6.6 percent and
then to off-scale low at 55:54:30. These readings do not correlate
with other telemetered data and are, consequently, thought to be
erroneous. The gage then jumped to a 75-percent reading, which may be
reliable data since it is about the value to be expected. Afterwards
the quantity decreased gradually for 19 seconds until 3 seconds before
telemetry loss, at which time an erratic gage output occurred. The
behavior of this type of gage when a short across the capacitor probe
is removed is to drop to zero for several seconds and then return to
a correct reading. However, the gage has other failure modes which
result in a wandering false indication. See Part B7 of this Appendix
for a discussion of the quantity gage. Because of the gage's erratic
behavior, it cannot be stated with complete confidence that the
75-percent reading obtained at 55:54:32 is reliable.
The temperature in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 remained at -190o F
+2 ° until 55:54:31 when a steady rise in temperature commenced. At
55:54:48 a single data sample indicated a reading 40 degrees higher than
the adjacent readings. The last data sample before loss of telemetry
was off-scale low, probably indicating a short circuit in the gage or
wiring. As discussed in Part B7 of this Appendix, the time constant of
the temperature sensor is in the order of at least tens of seconds, which
means that the 40-degree Jump in reading at 55:54:48 and the final off-
scale reading were both due to sensor failure or telemetry system errors.
Also, because of the slow gage response, the indicated rate at which
the temperature rose between 55:54:31 and 55:54:52 could have been caused
by an actual temperature rise of greater magnitude.
The temperature and quantity of cryogenic oxygen tank no. i remained
steady until telemetry loss. The pressure remained nominal until
0.2 second prior to telemetry loss, when a slight drop was observed.
LOSS OF TELEMETRY
At the time of the accident the spacecraft telemetry signal was
being received on both a 210-ft-diameter and an 85-ft-diameter antenna
at the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility in Goldstone, California.
The carrier level on the Goldstone 85-ft antenna was -i00 dBm. At
55:54:53 the signal strength dropped abruptly below -160 dBm, the lower
limit of the signal strength recorder, and began an erratic increase.
Figure B5-6 is a plot of the carrier strength received at the 85-ft
antenna, corrected by 8 dB to show the carrier strength received at the
210-ft antenna. The 210-ft antenna was not equipped with a signal
strength recorder.
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Telemetry data recovered completely 1.8 seconds after the loss of
carrier power. Sporadic telemetry data are available within the
1.8-second period.
The recorded input signal to the PCM bit detector provides an
indication of the rapidity with which the telemetry signal was lost.
There appears to be some degradation in signal-to-noise ratio in the
time period from 55:54:53.51 to 55:54:53.555. This may have been the
result of attitude changes of the spacecraft causing mispointing of the
high-gain antenna. At 55:54:53:555 an abrupt change in the character of
the signal occurred, and the signal-to-noise ratio rapidly decreased in
a period of i millisecond. The limitations in the available records
make it impossible to definitely determine the speed with which the loss
occurred, but an estimate is I millisecond.
Although figure B5-6 indicates that the signal required 0.3 second
to decrease 60 dB, the actual time was probably much shorter. The
decrease of 60 dB in 0.3 second is the same as that obtained when the
input signal is abruptly removed from the receiver. This slow response
is caused by long time constant circuitry in the automatic gain control.
When the telemetry signal was reacquired, the spacecraft had
switched from the narrow-beam antenna to the wide-beam antenna. This
has been verified by signal-strength calculations and comparisons of
antenna patterns with spacecraft attitude. The spacecraft is designed
to automatically switch to the wide-beam antenna if the pointing error
of the narrow-beam antenna exceeds 3 degrees.
If a power supply interruption larger than 0.4 second occurs in
the communication system, the system design is such that the power output
will automatically drop 19 dB for a 90-second period. This power
reduction cannot be observed in the received signal strength after
recovery of telemetry.
SPACECRAFT EVENTS AT THE TIME OF TELEMETRY LOSS
A large number of spacecraft events took place approximately at
the time of telemetry loss. These events are discussed in detail in
the following sections as they relate to the various spacecraft systems.
This section describes the events as an aid in understanding their
interrelationship.
Within the last second prior to telemetry loss, several indications
of spacecraft motion appeared on the telemetry records of body accelerom-
eters, and roll, pitch, and yaw rate. The total fuel cell current in-
creased by 3 amperes at the last data sample.
B-56
When telemetry data were restored at 55:54:55.35, a large number
of channels associated with the electrical system, stabilization control
system, and cryogenic system showed marked changes (fig. B5-3). Both
dc main A and main B had dropped 0.9 volt and the master caution and
warning had been triggered because of an undervoltage on main bus B.
The undervoltage triggering level is 26.25 volts and the initial voltage
on main B registered 28.1 volts. All three fuel cell currents had
increased by 5 amperes over the values before telemetry loss. Both
ac bus voltages had maintained their previous values. All telemetry
readings from cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 showed off-scale readings.
The temperature was off-scale in the high temperature direction, the
quantity gage read i00 percent, and the pressure gage read off-scale
low. The capability of the gage is to read pressures as low as 19 psia.
Cryogenic oxygen tank no. i had not changed temperature or quantity.
However, the pressure had decreased from 879 psia to 782 psia. The
regulated nitrogen pressure in fuel cell i dropped to zero during telem-
try loss and remained at zero. The continued operation of this fuel
cell indicates a sensor malfunction. As shown in figure B5-7, the
wires from the nitrogen pressure sensor to the telemetry system pass
along the front of the shelf which supports the fuel cells, in close
proximity to the panel covering bay 4. It is quite possible that
damage to these wires caused the change observed in the nitrogen pres-
sure reading.
Approximately at the time of telemetry loss all three crew members
heard a single loud bang. One or two seconds later they noted the master
caution and warning caused by main bus B undervoltage and at 55:55:00
turned off the alarm. They also verified that fuel cell currents were
normal at this time. Figure B5-8 is a photograph of the command module
control panel showing the type of displays provided the crew. At
55:55:20 the crew reported, "! believe we've had a problem here," and
at 55:55:35, "We've had a main B bus under_olt." Later they reported
that a computer restart had occurred at the time of the bang, which
had already been noted in Mission Control.
Photographs later taken by the crew show the panel covering bay 4,
the bay containing the cryogenic oxygen tanks, cryogenic hydrogen tanks,
and fuel cells, to be missing. One of these photographs is reproduced
in figure B5-9 and a photograph prior to launch is shown in figure B5-10.
The high-gain antenna located adjacent to bay 4 shows a misalignment
of one of the four dishes. The photographs also show that the axes of
fuel cells I and 3 have shifted 7 degrees in such a way that the tops
of the fuel cells point outward. It is not possible to determine
conclusively from the photographs whether or not cryogenic oxygen tank
no. 2 is present, partially missing, or totally missing. It is probable
that the loud bang heard by the crew was caused by the separation of
the panel from the spacecraft approximately at the time of telemetry
loss.
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CHANGES IN SPACECRAFT DYNAMICS
At 55:54:53.182, less than half a second before telemetry loss,
the body-mounted linear accelerometers in the command module, which
are sampled at i00 times per second, began indicating spacecraft mo-
tions. These disturbances were erratic but reached peak values of
1.17g, 0.65g, and 0.65g in the X, Y, and Z directions, respectively,
about 13 milleseconds before data loss.
At 55:54:53.220 the pitch, roll, and yaw rate gyros indicated
low-amplitude variations in output. These gyros are body mounted in
the command module, have a full-scale range of +I degree per second_
are sampled i00 times per second, and provide a fairly sensitive
indication of spacecraft motions. They are also sensitive to electrical
disturbances not necessarily associated with the gyros; however, the
characteristics of the output at 55:54:53.220 are believed to have
resulted from low-amplitude dynamic forces acting on the spacecraft.
These channels were, of course, lost at 55:54:53.555, along with all
other telemetered data. Figure B5-11 is a record of all three rate
gyro outputs.
When telemetry was recovered at 55:54:55.35, these channels
definitely indicated that moments had been applied to the spacecraft.
The total change in angular moment was:
Roll
Pit ch
Yaw
-1535 ft-lb-sec
-6482 ft-lb-sec
-5919 ft-lb-sec
The roll, pitch, and yaw rates were automatically compensated for by
the attitude control system, as shown in figure B5-11.
The inertial platform on the command module contains three
mutually orthogonal integrating accelerometers, whose outputs are
telemetered with an increment value of 0.2 fps. After telemetry was
recovered, a change of two increments was observed in one axis, one
increment in the second axis, and zero increments in the third axis.
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When transformed from platform coordinates to spacecraft coordinates,
this represents a velocity change of 0.4 to 0.6 fps. The uncertainty
in this measurement is due to the fact that the PCM system has an
increment value of 0.2 fps. The velocity change was combined with
the observed roll, pitch, and yaw rates; and a single equivalent im-
pulse acting on the spacecraft calculated. The impulse components
are:
X 500 !b-sec
Y 800 ib-sec
Z -900 ib-sec
This indicates that the force was directed generally normal to the
panel covering bay 4 of the service module. The extremely coarse data
upon which this calculation is based makes it impossible to better
define the force acting upon the spacecraft.
After recovery of data, the integrating accelerometer on the space-
craft stable platform also began to show an abnormal output. Calcula-
tions show that the force producing the acceleration amounted to about
60 pounds in the -X direction (retro thrust) over a period of about 8
minutes. At about the same time Commander Lovell reported seeing ex-
tensive venting of gases from the service module which definitely was
not a normal or expected part of the spacecraft operation at that time.
He later described the venting as continuous, looking like, " ...... a
big sheet with the sun shining on it--very heavy--like fine spray
from a water hose," unlike gases and liquids vented during other planned
spacecraft operations.
The radial velocity of the Apollo spacecraft relative to the Earth
can be accurately determined by measuring the doppler shift of the S-band
signal transmitted to Earth. Spacecraft velocity components normal to
the line between the spacecraft and Earth cannot be determined by this
method. The doppler velocity measurement is routinely made every
i0 seconds and has an equivalent noise level of 0.015 fps.
Between 55:5L:45 and 55:55:05 doppler measurements indicated a
radial velocity increment of 0.26 fps. This is shown in figure B5-12.
Following this abrupt change in velocity at approximately the time of
telemetry loss, additional velocity changes were observed, as shown
in figure B5-13. These velocity increments were caused in part by
venting from the spacecraft and in part by firings of reaction control
system jets.
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The Jet firings caused velocity increments rather than pure rotation
rate changesbecause the jets did not always fire in opposedpairs. This
resulted from the power system configuration in the spacecraft and closure
of the quad C valves. (See Part B6 of this Appendix. )
TEMPERATURECHANGESOBSERVEDIN SERVICEMODULE
Following the recovery of telemetry data there were a numberof
temperature changesobserved at various locations in the service module.
The locations of all temperature sensors in the service module are shown
in figure B5-14, and telemetered records from these sensors for the time
period of 55:53:40 to 55:56:10 are shownin figure B5-15. Fromthese
temperature records the following conclusions can be drawn:
i. Both temperature measurementsin bay 3, the bay adjacent to
bay 4, increased after 55:54:55, whereas they had been steady prior to
that time.
2. The corresponding temperature measurementsin bay 5 showed
muchsmaller increases. Bay 5 is adjacent to bay 4.
3. A changewas observed in the service propulsion valve body
temperature. This sensor, unlike manytemperature sensors in the lower
part of the service module, is not covered by multiple layers of
insulation.
4. Four sensors located in close proximity on the separator
between bay 4 and bay 5 showedrapid temperature rises of small
magnitude immediately after the recovery of telemetry data. These
sensors measurethe temperatures of fuel cells i and 3 radiator inlets
and outlets.
5. The temperature of quad C and D reaction control engines
continued the samerate of rise after data loss as before data loss.
FAILUREOF CRYOGENICOXYGENSYSTEM
The telemetered quantities from cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 were
all off-scale following the recovery of telemetry at 55:54:55. Since
no accurate assessment of the damageto this tank has been possible,
the readings of the sensors within it are in doubt. The temperature
was reading full-scale high and continued this way until 55:55:49,
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Service module temperature measurements , 
.." 
Number Measurement Title Remarks 
Inumber 
1 SC2090 Fuel cellI radiator inlet 
2 SC2091 Fuel cell 2 radiator inlet 
3 SC2092 Fuel cell 3 radiator inlet 
4 SC2087 Fuel cell 1 radiator outlet 
5 SC2088 Fuel cell 2 radiator outlet 
6 SC2089 Fuel cell 3 radiator outlet 
7a SA2377 Bay 2 oxidizer tank surface Opposite 9 
8 SA2378 Bay 3 oxidizer tank surface 
9 SA2379 Bay 5 fue I tank surface 
lOa SA2380 Bay 6 fuel tank surface OpPosite 8 
11 SPOO02 Helium tank 
12 SP0045 Service propulsion valve body 
13 SP0048 Service propulsion fuel feed line 
14 SP0049 Service propulsion oxidizer feed line 
15 SP0054 Service propulsion oxidizer line 
16 SP0057 Service propulsion fuel line 
17a SP0061 Service propulsion injector flange 1 Opposite 18 on flange 
18 SP0062 Service propulsion injector fJ:lnge 2 
19a SR5013 Reaction control helium tank quad A Bay 6 opposite 21 
20a SR5014 Reaction contro I he Iium tank quad B Bay 2 opposite 22 
"(7)8 21 SR5015 Reaction control helium tank quad C Bay 3 
22 SR5016 Reaction control helium tank quad D Bay 5 
23a SR5065 Reaction control engine package quad A Bay 6 oppos ite 25 
24a SR5066 Reaction control engine package quad B Bay 2 oppos ite 26 
25 SR5067 Reaction control engine package quad C Bay 3 
~ (3nJ'-~ 
26 SR5068 Reaction control engine package quad D Bay 5 
27 SC0043 Hydrogen tank 1 
28 SC0044 Hydrogen tank 2 
29 SC2084 Fuel cell 1 skin Internal 
30 SC2085 Fuel cell 2 skin Internal 
31 SC2086 Fuel cell 3 skin Internal 
32 SC2081 Fue I ce II 1 condenser exhaust Internal 
33 SC2082 Fuel cell 2 condenser exhaust Internal 
34 SC2083 Fuel cell 3 condenser exhaust Internal 
--------­
35 SF0260 Environmental control primary 
radiator inlet 
36 SF0262 Environmental control secondary 
37a SF0263 
radiator inlet 
Environmental control secondary Bay 6 opposite 
radiator outlet 
.. 38 ST0840 Nuclear particle detector 
39 ST0841 Nuclear particle analyzer 
40 SC0041 Oxygen tank 1 
41 SC0042 Oxygen tank 2 
.. 
a Located on opposite side of vehicle and not shown in the view . 
Figure B5-l4.- Temperature sensor location in Apollo service module. 
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Figure B5-l5 .- Servi ce module temperature histor y . 
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when it began a steady decrease which ended at 55:56:48 in an off-scale-
low reading. This behavior is a possible result of a failure of the
sensor. For an explanation of possible failure modesof this sensor,
see Part B7 of this Appendix. The pressure of cryogenic oxygen tank
no. 2, sensed remotely, read off-scale low and continued to showthis
reading. Off-scale low for this sensor represents a pressure of 19 psia
or below.
The quantity gage read full-scale high after telemetry recovery
and continued in this state until 55:56:38 whenit began oscillating in
an erratic manner. The oscillation continued until 55:57:47 whenthe
gage assumedan off-scale-low reading. The quantity gage and its fail-
ure modesare described in Part B7 of this Appendix.
The pressure in cryogenic oxygen tank no. i had dropped from 879
psia to 782 psia during telemetry loss. This pressure continued to drop
at a slow rate for about 2 hours until it was insufficient for operation
of the last remaining fuel cell.
The heaters in both cryogenic oxygen tanks were off prior to te-
lemetry loss as a result of the high pressure in tank no. 2. After
telemetry recovery the total fuel cell current indicated an increase of
about 5 amperesafter knownloads had been accounted for. The low pres-
sure levels in both oxygen tanks should have causedboth heaters to be
on at this time. The total current drain by the heaters in any one tank
is about 5 amperes. It therefore appears that the heaters in one tank
had comeon since telemetry loss and were operating at this time. It is
possible that the heaters in cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 were either
physically open-circuited before or at the time of the bang.
Additional evidence that the heaters in only one tank were on can
be obtained by observing that at 56:19:03 the spacecraft dc current
decreased 5 amperes. This is the time at which the crew began to power
down the spacecraft according to the emergencypowerdownchecklist. If
heaters in both oxygen tanks had been on at that time, the current should
have decreased approximately ii amperes instead of the observed 5 amperes.
OPERATIONOFTHEELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEM
Following the period of telemetry loss, a high-current condition
existed on the fuel cell outputs for 19 seconds. In the sametime
period, the two dc main voltages were approximately 0.9 volt lower than
their previous values. By 55:55:14 the voltages and currents had become
normal. The observed currents during the 19-second period have been
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correlated with reaction control system jet firings and an inertial
measurementunit heater cycle. The excellent correlation indicates that
no unaccountable loads were added to the power system during this time
period.
The crew observed a master caution and warning signal i or 2 seconds
after the bang, along with an indication of undervoltage on dc bus B.
The master caution and warning was turned off at 55:55:00.
Within 5 seconds after the resumption of telemetry data, the oxygen
flow rates to fuel cells I and 3 had decreased to approximately 20 per-
cent of their prior values. These flow rates remained at a sufficiently
low level to cause failure of fuel cells i and 3 at approximately 55:58.
The most probable explanation for the reduced oxygen flow rates is that
at the time of the bang a sufficiently intense shock occurred to close
the valves in the oxygen lines feeding fuel cells i and 3.
There is sufficient volume in the oxygen lines between the supply
valves and the fuel cells to maintain fuel cell operation for the ob-
served time of about 3 minutes. The intensity of the shock is indicated
by the fact that the reaction control system valves on quad C were
closed. Tests on these valves have shown that 80g for i0 milliseconds
will cause them to close. Tests on the oxygen supply valves have shown
that a shock of 86g for ii milliseconds will cause them to close.
The crew was not alerted to the abnormally low flow rate of oxygen
to fuel cells i and 3 because the hydrogen supply valves had not been
closed. The valve closure indicator is only activated when both the
oxygen and hydrogen supply valves to a fuel cell are closed. The first
indication to the crew that the power system was failing came at 55:57:39
when the master caution and warning was triggered by a main bus B under-
voltage, occasioned by the failure of fuel cell 3. Main bus B voltage
dropped to an unusable level within 5 seconds, causing ac bus 2 to drop
to zero at 55:57:45.
The crew quickly checked the ac and dc voltage levels, recognized
that ac bus 2 had failed, and responded by switching ac loads from
ac bus 2 to ac bus i. This heavier load on ac bus i was reflected as
a heavier load on dc main A, causing it to drop in voltage. At 55:58:O6_
a dc main A undervoltage master caution and warning was triggered as the
main voltage dropped to between 25 and 26 volts. Shortly afterwards,
at approximately 55:58:06, fuel cell i failed, placing the entire load
of dc main A on fuel cell 2. Fuel cell 2 was now called upon to supply
a current of 50 amperes.
Fuel cell 2 remained the major source of electrical power in the
command module for the next 2 hours. During this time, telemetry
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continued to indicate a decreasing cryogenic oxygen pressure in tank no. i.
At 58:04 battery A was connected to main bus A and fuel cell 2 was removed
from operation when oxygen flow becameinsufficient.
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PART B6
POSTINCIDENT EVENTS
The description of postincident events is presented in two sections.
The first, entitled "Immediate Recovery," describes the flightcrew and
flight controller actions during the 2-1/2-hour period following the in-
cident. This section is primarily concerned with actions of the flight-
crew and flight controllers during this period in response to the im-
mediate problems caused by the spacecraft failures. The long-term prob-
lems addressed by Mission Control are described in the second section,
entitled "Plans and Actions Taken to Return the Crew to Earth."
IMMEDIATE RECOVERY
The first indication in the Mission Control Center of any problem in
the spacecraft came from the Guidance Officer who reported that he had
observed a "hardware restart." This term describes the action of the on-
board computer when certain computer electrical problems occur, such as a
reference voltage or an oscillator frequency getting out of tolerance.
When this occurs, the computer stops its computations and recycles to a
specified location in the program. Computations will not resume until
the out-of-tolerance condition is cleared. At 55:55 this event occurred
so rapidly that the flight controllers did not observe the computer halt;
they only saw that it had occurred.
The report of the hardware restart was followed almost immediately
by the crew's report, "I believe we've had a problem here." This was
followed quickly by a statement from the crew that they had a main bus B
undervolt indication from the master caution and warning (MC&W) system.
Flight controllers responsible for the electrical, environmental control,
and instrumentation systems immediately searched their displays, but at
that time there were no indications of any electrical problems, all
voltages and fuel cell currents appeared normal. Apparently, the main
bus B undervolt problem was a transient that had cleared up, for the crew
next reported the bus voltages were "looking good." However, the flight
controllers knew that all was not well because the oxygen tank measurements
indicated some major problems in this system, or its instrumentation.
The next report in Mission Control was from the flight controller
responsible for the communication systems. He stated that the high-gain
antenna on the spacecraft had unaccountably switched from narrow beam
width to wide beam width at approximately the same time the problem had
occurred.
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In sorting out these pieces of information, the flight controllers
initially suspected that there had been an instrumentation failure. How-
ever, with the subsequent failure of main bus B and ac bus 2 it became
more obvious that a serious electrical problem existed. The flight con-
trollers considered the possibility that a short had occurred, and that
this was in some way related to the unusual behavior of the high-gain
antenna. The rapid rate at which so many parameters in the electrical
and cryogenic system had changed state made it impossible to tell which
were causes and which were effects.
The Mission Control Center response to the situation is described in
this section of the report. The time interval covered is from 55 hours
58 minutes ground elapsed time (55:58 g.e.t.) to 58:40 g.e.t., when all
power was removed from the command module (CM). The major portion of the
activities of both the flightcrew and the flight controllers in this time
period was directed toward (i) evaluation and management of the electrical
and cryogenic oxygen problems; (2) maintenance of attitude control; and
(3) activation of the lunar module (LM). A chronological listing of all
significant actions is presented first. This is followed by a more de-
tailed description of the three categories of activities mentioned above.
Chronology of Spacecraft Reconfiguration Actions
This listing was obtained from transcripts of air-to-ground voice
records (ref. 2) and the "Flight Director" loop in the Mission Control
Center. Additional information was obtained from interviews with members
of the flight control team. Some editing has been done to eliminate the
description of routine actions which obviously have no significance to
this investigation: examples are omni antenna switching and the loading
of weight and inertia information in the digital autopilot. The times
at which specific actions are listed are only approximately correct,
(±i minute) since there was no precise time correlation available.
55:59 - Fuel cell main bus connection.- Mission Control requested
the crew to connect fuel cell i to main bus A and fuel cell 3 to main
bus B. Although there was no direct evidence the crew had changed the
fuel cell and main bus configuration, the flight controller believed that
this _ight be the case. The configuration prior to the loss of main bus B
was as follows: fuel cell i, main A; fuel cell 2, main A; and fuel cell 3,
main B.
56:03 - Entry battery on line.- The crew placed entry battery A on
main bus A to increase the bus voltage. Mission Control was just about
to ask that this be done. The bus voltage was approximately 25 volts,
which is about 1-1/4 volts below the MC&W trip limit.
B-84
56:08 - Open circuit fuel cell i.- Mission Control requested the crew
to open circuit fuel cell i. Flight controllers did not understand
the problems with the fuel cells; the data were confusing and incomplete.
In an effort to get some new information, the controllers decided to take
all loads off fuel cell i to see if it would behave any differently.
It was not putting out any power so there was no reason to leave it con-
nected to the main bus.
56:11 - Power RCS jets from main bus A.- Mission Control requested
the crew to position some RCS jet select switches to main A power. All
of the quad C jets and B-3 and B-4 jets had been powered from main bus B
and since that bus had no power on it, they could not fire except by the
"Direct" coils. By switching these jets to main bus A, there was at least
one jet available for automatic control in each direction about each axis.
56:14 - Start emergency powerdown.- Mission Control advised the crew
to use page i-5 of their Emergency Powerdown Checklist, part of the Flight
Data File (ref. 7) carried by the crew. Mission Control wanted to get the
current on main bus A reduced by at least i0 amps, and then take the entry
battery A off-line. The list down to "BMAG #2-off" was to be turned off;
it included the following: all cryo tank heaters and fans, G&N optics
power, potable water heater, SPS line heater, SPS gaging, suit compressor,
all fuel cell pumps, SMRC heaters, ECS radiator heaters, and SPS gimbal
motors.
56:23 - Power AC bus 2 with inverter (INV) i.- The crew was requested
to power both ac busses with inverter no. i. The primary purpose was to
get telemetry data from oxygen tank no. 2 which is powered by ac bus 2
only.
56:24 - Turn fuel cell no. 2 pump on.- The crew had turned the pumps
off in following the emergency powerdown list. The pumps circulate glycol
and hydrogen for internal cooling in the fuel cells. They could have been
left off for an hour or more, but fuel cell performance would have been
degraded.
56:30 - Select main bus A power to RCS jet A-3.- The spacecraft was
drifting in pitch without any apparent control. Quad C, which should have
been controlling pitch, did not seem to be firing at all. To try to re-
gain control in pitch, the quad A-3 jet was switched to main bus A power.
56:33 - O_en circuit fuel cell no. 3.- Same reason as for open cir-
cuit fuel cell no. i.
56:33 - Regonfi_ure quad B and D thrusters.- Flight control felt that
a quad B thruster might be causing the spacecraft attitude deviations, and
asked the crew to take off all power to the quad B jets. To compensate
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for quad B being off, all jets in quad D were selected to be powered from
main bus A.
56:34 - Battery A taken off line.- The bus loads had been reduced
sufficiently to allow fuel cell 2 alone to keep the bus voltage up.
It was highly desirable to use the battery as little as possible, because
there was no guarantee it could be recharged.
56:35 - Isolate the surge tank.- The crew was directed to isolate
the CM oxygen surge tank. The purpose was to preserve an oxygen supply
for reentry.
56:38 - Oxygen tank no. I heaters and fans.- Mission Control requested
the crew to turn on the heaters in cryogenic oxygen tank no. I in an effort
to build up the tank pressure. The current was observed to increase about
5 amperes, indicating they did come on. About 2 minutes later, since there
was no increase in pressure, the crew was asked to turn on the fans in this
tank.
56:45 - BMAG 2 off.- In an effort to further conserve power, the
second BMAG was powered down.
56:51 - Turn off thruster C-I.- Thruster C-I seemed to be firing very
frequently without any apparent reason. The crew was requested to turn
off all power to this thruster. The attitude disturbances were noted to
have been virtually ended at about 56:40.
56:57 - Fuel cell no. 3 shutdown.- Fuel cells I and 3 had been open
circuited earlier because they were not putting out any power. With the
cryogenic oxygen leaking at its present rate, there would be no reactants
for the fuel cells within a short time. Because there was a possibility
that the oxygen was leaking down stream of one of the fuel cell reactant
valves, it was decided to shut off these valves in an effort to save the
oxygen remaining in tank no. i. Fuel cell 3 was selected because it had
been the first of the two to fail.
57:03 - Main bus A power to thruster A-4.- The crew was told to put
power to thruster A-4 by connecting to main bus A. The spacecraft had a
positive pitch rate and the crew was unable to stop it with quad C thrus-
ters. With A-4 activated, pitch control was regained.
57:18 - Fuel cell no. i shutdown.- Shutting down fuel cell 3 did
not effect the oxygen leak rate, so the reactant valves to fuel cell i
were closed in an effort to try to stop the leak.
57:22 - Charge battery A.- The crew was directed to charge battery A.
The fuel cell 2 was maintaining main bus A voltage at an adequate level
to support the battery charger. Mission Control decided to charge battery A
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for as long as possible. Since the oxygen was still leaking, it was ob-
vious that all fuel cell operation would be lost within about an hour.
57:29 - Disable power to _ua d C.- It appeared that quad C was not
thrusting, although it was receiving firing signals. The explanation of
this was that the propellant isolation valves had been closed by the "bang"
at 55:55 and no propellant was being fed to the thrusters. Since these
valves are powered by the main bus B, they could not be opened without
getting power to this bus. The firing signals to quad C therefore were a
useless drain of power on bus A, and the crew was directed to disconnect
the thrusters from it.
57:39 - Fans on in oxygen tank no. 2.- In a final effort to try to
increase the pressure in oxygen tank no. 2, the crew was directed to turn
on the fans in that tank.
57:40 - LM power on.- The crew reported, "I've got LM power on."
57:49 - Stopped charging battery A.- In order to be ready to bring
battery A on-line when fuel cell 2 failed, it was decided to terminate
the charge. A total of about 0.75 amp-hours had been restored.
57:53 - CSM glycol pump off.- To reduce the main bus A loads, the
crew was directed to turn off the glycol pump and to bypass the environ-
mental control system radiators.
57:55 - Turn off oxygen tank no. 2 fans.- To further reduce the load
on main bus A, the pumps in fuel cell 2 and the fans in oxygen tank no. 2
were turned off.
57:57 - LM data received.- Low-bit-rate telemetry data were received
in the Mission Control Center at this time.
58:04 - Battery A on.- The crew powered main bus A with battery A in
anticipation of the loss of fuel cell 2. The pressure in oxygen tank no. i
was approximately 65 psi at this time.
58:07 - CSM communication reconfiguration.- The Command Module Pilot
(CMP) was directed to turn off the CSM S-band primary power amplifier and
to select low bit rate and down-voice backup. This was to reduce the load
on battery A and maintain adequate circuit margins on the communication
downlink.
58:18 - CSM _uidance and navigation powerdown.- The CSM inertial
platform (IMU) alignment had been transferred to the LM and verified by
Mission Control. The crew was directed to turn off the CSM computer, the
IMU, and the IMU heaters.
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58:21 - Powerdown CM attitude control.- In an effort to reduce elec-
trical power requirements in the CM, the CMP was directed to turn off
"SCS Electronics Power," and "all Rotational Control Power Off." This
completely removed all attitude control capability from the CM.
_8:22 - LM RCS activation.- The LM crew was advised to pressurize
the RCS, turn on the thruster heaters, and power up the attitude reference
system.
58:27 - Activate "Direct" attitude control.- It was discovered that
neither module was configured to provide attitude control. The quickest
way to regain it was to have the C_ power up the rotational hand con-
troller and the Direct coils.
58:36 - Fuel cell 2 shutdown.- The pressure of the oxygen being
fed to this fuel cell had dropped below the operating level at 58:15 and
it had stopped supplying current. As part of the CSM "safing," the fuel
cell was disconnected from the bus and the reactant valves were closed.
58:40 - CSM powered down.- Battery A was disconnected from main bus A
at this time, removing all power from the CSM.
Evaluation of Electrical and Cryogenic Oxygen Problems
The failure of fuel cell 3 resulted in the interruption of elec-
trical power to several components in the spacecraft, including part of
the telemetry signal conditioning. Main dc bus B was being powered only
by fuel cell 3, so when its output dropped from about 25 amperes to
less than 5 amperes, the bus voltage dropped from the normal 28 volts to
less than 5 volts (fig. B5-2). Inverter no. 2, supplying power to ac
bus 2, was being driven by main bus B and dropped off the line when the
bus B voltage fell below about 16 volts. The bus failures, coupled with
the cryogenic oxygen tank indications and some questionable instrumentation
readings in fuel cells i and 3 (nitrogen and oxygen pressures)_ caused
some initial uncertainty in the Mission Control Center.
The initial reaction was that there possibly had been a problem with
major related instrumentation discrepancies. It was not clear that the
telemetry quantities of cryogenic oxygen tank measurements or the fuel
cell parameters were valid indications of conditions. For instance, the
indication of no reactant flow and no fuel cell currents was compatible
with fuel cells i and _ having become disconnected from the main busses.
Therefore, there was no reason to believe that they could not be recon-
nected. The lack of power output from the fuel cells could not be ex-
plained by the available information, i.e., the rapidity with which the
fuel cells had failed. An additional factor that had to be considered
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_as that the high-gain antenna had unaccountably switched from narrow to
wide beam width at about this same time. Some trouble had been experienced
earlier in getting this antenna to "lock on" in narrow beam width, and the
possibility of a short in the antenna electronics could not be ruled out.
The first direction given to the crew was at 56:00 to return the bus
power configuration to the normal operating mode; that is, fuel cell i
powering bus A and fuel cell _ powering bus B. The primary purpose of
this direction was to get the spacecraft in a known configuration and
determine if the fuel cells could be reconnected to the main busses.
There are no telemetry parameters which show which fuel cells are supplying
power to which busses, but the flight controllers were of the opinion that
some reconfiguration might have been done by the crew.
In operating with split busses, that is, with two fuel cells powering
main bus A and one fuel cell powering main bus B, the amount of equipment
tied to bus A represents approximately twice the load as that to bus B.
When fuel cell i failed, fuel cell 2 had to take up the additional load on
bus A. In doing so, the voltage dropped to about 25 volts, which is low
enough to cause a caution and warning indication. There was no particular
harm in the bus voltage being this low, but if it dropped any lower the
performance of some of the telemetry equipment would be affected and the
flight controllers and crew were concerned. Normal bus voltage is above
27 volts, and the master caution and warning indication is triggered at
26-1/4 volts or less. Had fuel cell 2 been tied to both main busses as
on previous missions, the total spacecraft current of 73 amperes would
have driven both busses as low as 21 volts. The crew put entry battery A
on bus A at 56:03 to bring the bus voltage up. Mission Control concurred
in this action.
In an effort to obtain more data for troubleshooting the situation,
the crew was asked to read out the onboard indications of oxygen pressure
and nitrogen pressure in fuel cells 3 and i, respectively. At 56:08 the
crew was requested to disconnect fuel cell i. This fuel cell was not
supplying any power, so to disconnect it should have no effect on the bus
voltage, but there was a possibility that it might give some different
indications in the fuel cell telemetry parameters. There was no change
in the fuel cell parameters when it was disconnected and the onboard
readouts of nitrogen and oxygen pressure were the same as those on the
ground, which did not add to the understanding of the situation.
Efforts to sort out the various telemetry indications and crew re-
ports continued for the next several minutes. The next direction given
to the crew was to proceed with the emergency powerdown of the electrical
system, using page EMER 1-5 of the CSM Emergency Checklist which is part
of the Flight Data File carried in the CSM (ref. 7). It was important to
reduce the electrical loads to a low enough value for the single operating
fuel cell to be able to supply all the necessary power. Mission Control
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was anxious to get entry battery A back off line to preserve as many amp-
hours as possible.
The next step in the attempt to determine what was happening was to
get power back to ac bus 2. Flight controllers considered powering ac
bus 2 with inverter 3 driven from main bus A. Further consideration,
however, led to the decision to simply tie ac bus 2 to inverter no. i
which was already powering ac bus i. Mission Control was interested in
getting power to ac bus 2, since this is the only bus that powered the
cryogenic oxygen tank no. 2 quantity and temperature telemetry. A tem-
perature measurement was needed to confirm the zero pressure indication.
The indications from oxygen tank no. i were that pressure and quantity
were decreasing at a relatively high rate and it was imperative to im-
mediately establish the condition of tank no. 2. It was not until after
ac bus 2 had been powered up and oxygen tank no. 2 indicated empty, that
the extreme seriousness of the situation was clear.
In proceeding through the emergency powerdown, the crew had placed
the fuel cell pump switch to the "off" position in the one remaining good
fuel cell; however, the pumps actually went off with loss of main bus B/ac
bus 2 power. At 56:24, the Lunar Module Pilot (LMP) pointed this out to
Mission Control, who in turn directed him to turn the pump back on. The
only problem associated with leaving it off as much as an hour is that
the fuel cell power output would start to degrade and no harm was done.
But in the situation that existed, it is not inconceivable that had the
crew not advised Mission Control of the fuel cell pump being off it would
have been overlooked until a rise in the fuel cell 2 loop temperatures
gave this indication.
Further direction in the management of the electrical system was not
given until about 56:33. At this time the crew was directed to open cir-
cuit fuel cell _ for the same reason as fuel cell i was open circuited
earlier. At 56:35 the crew was requested to isolate the surge tank and
at approximately this same time Mission Control also directed the crew
to remove battery A from main bus A. The emergency powerdown had re-
sulted in a load reduction such that the fuel cell alone could maintain
bus voltage above 27 volts.
It had become apparent that the operation of fuel cells I and 3
probably could not be regained under any condition, and that with oxygen
tank i quantity decreasing at its then present rate, the service module
would soon become incapable of providing any life support or electrical
power. The heaters and fans in this tank were turned on at 56:38 in an
effort to increase the pressure, but to no avail. Because there was a
possibility that a rupture had occurred in one of the inoperative fuel
cells and the oxygen was leaking through it, Mission Control decided to
shut down the cryogenic inputs to fuel cell 3 to see if this would stop
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the leak, and the reactant valves to it were closed at 57:00. It should
be pointed out that this is an irreversible step; once a fuel cell is
shut down, it cannot be restarted in flight. Fuel cell 3 was shut
downfirst since its internal oxygen pressure indication was zero; there
was no change in the oxygen tank pressure decay rate, however, and the
reactant valves to fuel cell i were closed at 57:18, with equally negative
results. Mission Control madeone last attempt to increase oxygen pressure
by directing the crew to turn on the fans in tank no. 2. At about 57:22,
the crew was directed to initiate charging of battery A. By this time
it becameclear, with the leaking oxygen tank no. I, that fuel cell 2
could continue to operate only for a short period of time. Since the
fuel cell was maintaining an adequate bus voltage and could provide the
additional power to operate the battery charger, it was decided to charge
battery A as long as possible. The charging of battery A was stopped after
22 minutes. At this time the oxygen tank no. i pressure had decayed to
a point where continued operation of fuel cell 2 was questionable. Battery
A was to be connected to main bus A at the first indication that the
output of the fuel cell was decaying. Since the battery cannot be connect-
ed to power a bus while it is being charged, it was necessary to terminate
the charging in anticipation of the fuel cell failure.
In preparation for using the entry battery to power main bus A, a
further reduction of the loads on this bus was performed. The following
equipment was turned off: glycol pump, oxygen tank no. 2 fans, and fuel
cell no. 2 pumps.
The pressure in oxygen tank no. i was approximately 65 psi at 58:04
whenthe crew connected battery A to main bus A. This is below the mini-
mumoperating pressure for the fuel cell. This battery continued to power
main bus A until about 58:40. By this time, the LMhad been activated
and the inertial platform alignment transferred from the commandmodule.
The attempts to determine the cause of the problem in the electrical
power system were confused by the misleading symptomsthat resulted from
the cryogenic tank failure. The failure in the electrical power system
and cryogenic oxygen was so massive that by itself it would have created
someinitial confusion and madethe flight controllers skeptical of the
data, but in addition to fuel cell output dropping to zero and bus voltages
dropping to zero, there were other indications that had to be considered.
The attitude excursions (now presumedto have been causedby escaping
oxygen) and the peculiar RCSthruster firings added to the confused sit-
uation. The RCSproblems are discussed in more detail in the following
section, but regardless of how quickly the problem in the electrical
power system was resolved, there was nothing that could have been done to
correct it. The only thing the crew and Mission Control could do under
the circumstances was to preserve as muchcapability as possible for re-
entry and to power downin an orderly manner to allow time for LMactiva-
tion.
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Maintenance of Attitude Control
Within 3 minutes after reporting the large bang, the Commander(CDR)
reported someof the "talkback" indicators for the service module reaction
control system (SMRCS)were showing "barberpole." His report indicated
that the helium isolation valves to quads B and D were closed, and the
secondary propellant fuel pressurization valves to quads A and C were
closed (fig. B6-1). Thesevalves have a history of inadvertant closure
when the spacecraft is subjected to a large "jolt" in flight, such as the
spacecraft separation from the S-IVB. This phenomenonwas first en-
countered on Apollo 9. To reopen a valve that has closed in this manner,
it is necessary to cycle the position selector switch to "close" and then
back to the "open" position. All of the switches in this system have
momentary"open" and "close" positions, and are springloaded to a center
neutral position.
The valve position indicators in the spacecraft are the flag type
which show gray whenthe valve is open and gray-and-white stripe ("barber-
pole") whenclosed; there is no telemetry indication of the valve position.
Each valve and its respective indicator are powered from the samemain dc
bus and cannot be selected to the other bus. The valves in the propellant
system for quads B and D are powered from main bus A and quads A and C are
powered from main bus B. Therefore, there wasno way to determine the
status of the RCSpropellant and pressurization systems of quads A and C,
and there was no way to reposition the valves without powering up main
bus B. The ability to open the isolation valves in quads B and D was not
affected by the loss of main bus B.
Jet-firing signals, received at each individual thruster, open fuel
and oxidizer valves by energizing a coil. There are two coils at each
thruster. One, called "Auto," receives its signal from either the computer
or the two rotational hand controllers (RHC's) and can be powered from
either main dc bus, selected by the "Auto RCSSelect" switches. There are
16 switches; one for each individual thruster that can be positioned to
"off," "main A," or "main B." The other coil at the thruster is called
"Direct" and receives its signal from the rotational hand controllers when
they are rotated sufficiently far from the null detent. There are several
ways of configuring the RHC's to power the Direct coils. Each RHCis
limited as to which main bus and thruster combination it can be tied.
Typically, the RHC's are powered so that half the jets are fired by main
bus B and the other half by main bus A. As per normal procedure, the auto
RCSselect switches were configured so that single-jet authority in roll,
pitch, and yaw attitude control would be available without reconfiguring
if either main bus were lost. This protection can only be obtained if all
four quads are functional. The loss of capability resulting from the
failure of a main bus would be compoundedby the concurrent closing of
propellant isolation valves. Control about one or more axes would be lost
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until some reconfiguration could be accomplished. Because power to the
talkback indicators would also be lost, it would take some effort to de-
termine the status of the control system.
At the time of the accident, the spacecraft was performing a computer-
controlled roll maneuver and maintaining pitch and yaw attitude hold. The
digital autopilot began firing RCS thrusters to counteract the attitude
perturbations presumably caused by the oxygen tank no. 2 failure, and
attitude was completely controlled until main bus B was lost. Soon after
the loss of main bus B, Mission Control noted the spacecraft began to ro-
tate about the pitch and yaw axes. It was also noted that the fuel and
oxidizer pressures in quad D were decreasing and the crew was asked to
verify that they had opened the helium isolation valves which had pre-
viously been reported as closed. Although the crew did not acknowledge
this request, the pressures were observed to increase to the normal
operating values shortly thereafter. The pressures had decreased in this
quad because the helium pressurization valves had been jolted closed and
subsequent firings of the thrusters had used some of' the propellant. This
increased the ullage volume and resulted in a noticeable decrease in tank
pressures. The flight controllers correctly diagnosed the cause and were
not mislead into thinking the tanks were leaking.
At 56:07 Mission Control noted that the crew had turned off all
Auto RCS Select switches, because they were concerned that unwanted
thruster firings were causing the continuing spacecraft attitude ex-
cursions. At about 56:19 the spacecraft was observed to be approaching
gimbal lock of the inertial platform. Gimbal lock is a condition in
which the inertial platform loses its reference alignment. To prevent
a gimbal lock, the spacecraft attitude relative to the inertial platform
must be kept out of certain regions. Mission Control advised the crew
of this situation, and in an effort to achieve positive control about all
axes of the spacecraft, the crew was directed to reconfigure the RCS Auto
Select switches for thrusters 3 and 4 in quad B and all thrusters in
quad C to be powered from main bus A. This would provide single-jet con-
trol authority about each axis (fig. B6-2). The other jets were not
switched to main bus A power in order not to drag down the main bus A
voltage any more than necessary. The LMP acknowledged and the drift
toward gimbal lock was arrested, although all rotations were not stopped.
At 56:22 the CMP reported that the spacecraft was being subjected to
pitch and yaw rates and that he had to use direct control with the rota-
tional hand controller to stop them. The rates would start to increase
again as soon as he stopped the direct control. He asked if the ground
could see any spurious jet firings that might be causing the rates. Al-
though the data available in Mission Control were not complete (the
position of the propellant system valves in quads A and C was unknown
and firing signals to the Direct coils are not on telemetry), it appeared
to the flight controllers that the jet firings were not causing the
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spurious rates. It was observed that thruster 3 in quad C was receiving
firing signals almost continuously, but was having no success in stopping
the negative pitch rate. In an effort to gain control over the negative
pitch rate, at 56:32 Mission Control requested the crew to put the Auto
RCS Select switch of thruster 3 of quad A on main bus A. It was suspected
that C-3 thruster was not really firing because there was no }erceptable
reduction in quad C propellant.
At about 56:35 the crew was requested to remove all power from the
quad B thrusters auto coils and to power all quad D thrusters from main
bus A. This request was made in an effort to determi_le if quad B thrus-
ters were causing the unwanted pitch and yaw rates. Mission Control con-
tinued to monitor the RCS thruster firings and the spacecraft attitude
response, trying to determine the status of the system. During the next
IO minutes, the crew pointed out that the quad temperature indications
for A and B were out of the normal operating range, and Mission Control
assured the crew that they were within acceptable operating limits. In
this same time period the ground had noticed numerous firing signals of
thruster C-I. Since the flight controllers could se{_ no explanation for
this, the crew was requested to remove all power from the C-I auto coil
at 56:53. About i0 minutes later, the CMP reported no negative pitch
capability, and requested clearance to enable thruster A-4. Mission Con-
trol responded immediately to "bring A-4 on," and t_e pitch rate was
stopped within a few seconds. At 57:20, Mission Control noted a dis-
crepancy in the roll control jet configuration. _e autopilot was con-
figured to use quads A and C ['or roll control, but the auto coils for
these jets were turned off. ;Fne crew was directed to configure the auto-
pilot to use quads B and D for roll control.
Based on a close observation of firing signals to q_ad C and the
resulting spacecraft response, the flight controllers thought that the
quad C propellant isolation valves had been jolted closed by the incident
that caused the loud bang. lhe computer was still sending firing signals
to the auto coils, but they were apparently having no effect and pro-
pellant was not being used by this quad. Therefore, to save the small
amount of electrical power that was being spent by sending firing signals
to the coils, at 57:29 Mission Control directed the crew to turn off the
auto coils to this quad.
Complete attitude control appeared to be establlshed at this time
and all further attitude control support to the CSM was directed toward
transferring control to the LM. The overall LM activation support is
described in more detail in the following section; however, establishment
of the attitude control of the LM is briefly summarized as follows:
i. Mission Control referred the crew to specific pages in the LM
Activation Checklist (part of the Flight Data FSle, ref. 7) for the
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procedure to transfer the inertial platform alignment from the CSM to
the LM.
2. The CMP was directed to power down all of the guidance, naviga-
tion, and control systems after the LM platform had been properly aligned.
9. Mission Control assisted the LM crew in getting attitude control
established by pointing out specific circuit breakers that needed to be
closed and switches that needed to be positioned.
It was appro_imagely 1-1,/2 hours after the initial incident before
complete automatic attitude control was established, although the crew
had manual control capability at all times. The information on the
ground was incomplete and was confused by the intermixing of automatic
control and manual direct control. Furthermore, the major concern was
the electrical and oxygen problems_ and the only mandatory action in the
control system area was to maintain a safe posture in the systems and
avoid gimbal lock. These mandatory tasks were accomplished and in due
time complete attitude control was established.
Lunar Module Activation
It was recognized at about 45 m_nutes after the accident that the
LM might have to be used to provide the necessary life support, and the
154 activation was started about 1-9/4 hours after the crew first reported
the loud bang in the CSM. The first hour and 45 minutes were spent in
regaining positive attitude control in the CSM, in troubleshooting the
electrical problems in the CSM, and in attempting to halt the loss of
oxygen from the service module. Since LM activation did not begin until
the lifetime of the one functioning fuel cell was predicted to be about
15 minutes, there was a strong motivation to complete the LM activation
and CSM powerdown as soon as possible.
The first order of business for LM activation was to get electrical
power and the communications sytems operating. A specific procedure for
this was read to the LMI° at 57:_7. Although three checklists for LM
activation were available as part of the Flight Data File in the space-
craft, Mission Control did not direct the crew to follow any of them.
These checklists were designed for three different situations at LM
activation. The first, entitled "Apollo XIII LM-7 Activation Checklist"
(contained in ref. 7), contains the nominal mission sequences from initial
LM manning to undocking prior to the lunar landing. The other two activa-
tion checklists are in the "LM Contingency Checklist" (contained in
ref. 7). They were written to cover the situations of having to use the
LM to perform an Earth-return abort maneuver for the docked CSM/LM con-
figuration. One checklist includes activation of the primary guidance
and navigation system (inertial platform alignment, etc.) and is called
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the "2-Hour Activation List" because it was designed to be completed at
a comfortable pace in time to execute a descent propulsion system maneu-
ver in 2 hours elapsed time. The other contingency list is called the
"_O-Minute Activation List," and serves the samepurpose, except that
manysteps, including the GANactivation, are omitted. There was no LM
activation checklist available which wasdesigned to cover the specific
situation resulting from this incident. The features that were different
are as follows:
i. The need to get the LM totally activated as soon as possible--
including attitude control as well as supplying life support, communica-
tions, and electrical power.
2. The desire to power downthe CSMas soon as possible in order
to preserve all available battery power for reentry.
9. The LMwas to serve as a "lifeboat" supplying oxygen, water,
electrical power, and attitude control for 80 or 90 hours.
This presented a paradoxical situation in which almost total LM
capability was required, but at the sametime its consumableshad to be
conserved as muchas possible. In responding to the situation, the flight
controllers referred the crew to specific pages in the normal "194Activa-
tion Checklist," augmentedwith additional instructions. The purpose was
to bypass all steps that were not absolutely necessary for getting the LM
power, communication, and environmental control system in operation. The
total instructions given to the crew referred to only _ pages of the 59
in the checklist. 'I_ere were three single instruction additions to this
shortly afterward which completed the 154configuration for supplying oxygen
to the cabin. Although this particular contingency had never been simu-
lated in the training exercises in preparation for the mission, similar
cases had been considered, and Black Teampersonnel_ including the Flight
Director, Glynn Lunney, had prepared procedures and criteria for using
the LMto augment the CSM. The simulations had been limited to cases
where the LMascent stage was to be retained following rendezvous in lunar
orbit. These samepersonnel had participated in these simulations for the
preceeding missions of Apollo iO, ii, and 12, and therefore were familiar
with the problems.
The next procedure given to the crew was designed to get the LM
guidance and navigation system operating and to get the LM inertial plat-
form aligned to a knownreference. Again, Mission Control referred the
crew to specific pages in the "LMActivation Checklist," along with
certain necessary circuit breaker closures which were not listed on those
pages. Although the necessary circuit-breaker panel configuration for LM
activation is shownon two pages in the checklist, the crew was not re-
ferred to those pages by Mission Control. In order to save time, only
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the necessary circuit breakers were given as part of each set of special
instructions. The omission of a necessary circuit breaker closure later
caused some delay in establishing 194 attitude control.
Throughout this period of LM powerup, the CMP was given frequent in-
structions on the CM configuration to reduce power requirements. The crew
completed an alignment of the LM IMU to the CSM IMU at 58:09. The platform
gimbal angles for both spacecraft were read to the ground for computation
of the fine-align torquing angles for the LM. As soon as the LM IMU was
aligned, the CMP was directed to power down the CM computer and the IMU,
including the IMU heaters.
At about 58:17 the temperature of the coolant loop in the 194 began
to rise and the LM crew was advised to activate the sublimator, referring
to the appropriate page in the "LM Activation Checklist." During the
next 2- to 3-minute period there was an unusually high density of conver-
sation, both in the Mission Control Center and on the air-to-ground fre-
quency between the CAPCOM and crewmen in both spacecraft modules. The
CMP reported powering down the CM control system; the CDR reported he had
no attitude reference system and requested permission to "close the FDAI
circuit breakers so we could have a ball to see if we go to gimbal lock";
both the CMI° and the LMP reported conditions and asked question, s regarding
configuration items; and on the ground the CSM flight controllers were
trying to get their systems powered down as much as possible while the LM
flight controllers were trying to "get through" to the LMP to pressurize
the LM RCS and to turn the thruster heaters on.
At approximately 58:21, the CMI° was told to continue his powerdown
by turning off the power to the rotational hand controller almost simul-
taneously with the LM crew being directed to power up the FDAI and the RCS
heaters, pressurize the RCS, and open the main shutoff valves. After about
5 minutes, when it became clear that neither spacecraft had control of
the attitude, the CMI° was directed to reactivate the CSM Direct attitude
control capability. This was done and the LM crew then proceeded, following
instructions from the ground, to pressurize the RCS and to perform the
steps necessary to get the attitude reference system operating in the LM.
Mission Control at 58:32 gave the LM crew the inputs for the onboard com-
puter which set the proper system gains for the LM autopilot to control
the docked spacecraft configuration. The LM achieved complete automatic
attitude control capability at 58:34, when the crew received direction
from Mission Control to close an essential circuit breaker that had been
previously overlooked. The position of this circuit breaker is not in-
dicated on telemetry, but the flight controller correctly diagnosed the
problem when the crew stated they still did not have automatic control
at 58:33.
After it was definitely established that the LM had attitude control,
the CMP was given final instructions for completely powering down the CM,
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and work toward getting the LM configured for the long trip home proceeded.
Mission Control gave the crew the LM IMU torquing angles to get the plat-
form fine aligned to the reference orientation. Discussions were held
between the ground and the spacecraft concerning the ability of the crew
to use the stars as a reference for platform realignment. It was con-
cluded that this would be difficult if not impossible to do, and the
current alignment should be preserved until after the abort maneuver.
An abnormally high pressure reading was noted in one of the LM ascent
stage oxygen tanks shortly after telemetry data were received in Mission
Control, and the crew was directed to use oxygen from this tank instead
of the descent tank. Later it was diagnosed that the shutoff valve leaked,
allowing the higher pressure oxygen from the manifold to leak into this
ascent tank. The condition in itself was not a problem_ the net effect
was that this ascent tank was raised to a slightly higher than normal
pressure which was well within the tank limits. 'Fmis degraded the system
redundancy, however, and had a subsequent leak developed in this tank, the
LM oxygen supply would have been depleted (fig. B6-_).
The next phase of activity was devoted to reducing the power drain
from the LM batteries to as low a value as practical. This included
turning off many of the displays in the LM and put Mission Control in
the position of monitoring system parameters for the crew. The crew was
also given all the information required to execute a return-to-Earth abort
maneuver 2 hours after passing the point of closest approach to the Moon
(pericynthion). Providing this data well in advance is a normal procedure
which gives the crew the capability to perform the abort if communications
are lost with the ground.
PLANS AND ACTIOI',JS TAKt_N TO RETURN r_ C_W TO EARTH
After the crew had powered down the CM and activated the LM, the
immediate situation had stabilized, and Mission Control could direct its
full resources to the long-term problem of getting the crew safely home.
The first item of concern was to determine an expected LM consumables
lifetime and to develop a trajectory plan that would return the spacecraft
to Earth within this lifetime. Also it was mandatory to reduce the ex-
penditure of battery power and water as much as practical.
Subsequent efforts by Mission Control in support of the crew were
varied and extensive. Much of this activity, however, is normally part
of the routine functions of Mission Control. Such items as monitoring
systems performance via telemetry parameters; keeping accurate records
of consumables usage, and predicting future consumption rates; scheduling
crew rest periods; and orbit determination are only some of the examples
of this normal activity. However, only the special activities which were
unique to this mission failure or which were of major importance to the
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successful return of the crew will be described. Theseactivities are
grouped in three categories in this report and described as independent
subjects. These categories are consumablesand system management,return-
to-Earth trajectory control, and definition of procedures and checklists
for reentry preparation. No attempt is madeto describe the events
chronologically. The Mission Operation Report (ref. 5) contains a com-
prehensive documentation of these events.
Consumablesand SystemsManagementActions
Consumablesand systems managementof both the LMand the CMwere of
vital importance and generated muchactivity in Mission Control.
Lunar module.-
Electrical power system: All LM electrical power is supplied by
batteries. There are four in the descent stage with a total rated ca-
pacity of 1600 amp-hours and two in the ascent stage with a total rated
capacity of 592 amp-hours. After the LM activation, analyses of power
requirements and lifetime capability were completed. These analyses
showed that after the abort maneuver at 61:30, the LM could be powered
down to a total current requirement of about 27 amps and still keep the
inertial platform aligned. This was extremely important because it made
it possible to perform a guidance-controlled abort maneuver at 79:30 which
could be used to reduce the return time back to Earth from 152 hours to
143 hours g.e.t. The analyses also indicated that if the guidance system
was completely powered down after 79:30, the total power requirement could
be reduced to about 17 amps_ stretching the battery lifetime to approxi-
mately 165 hours g.e.t. This was a comfortable margin, even if the return
time could not be reduced below 155 hours.
The flight controllers provided the crew with a list of specific
switches to close and circuit breakers to open which would reduce the
electrical load to the minimum possible consistent with safe operation.
The fact that virtually all of the onboard displays were turned off is
an indication of how extensively the spacecraft was powered down. Mission
Control kept an accurate account of the switch and circuit breaker con-
figuration, and was able to insure that the necessary equipment was powered
up again when the subsequent trajectory maneuvers were made. The full
powerdown configuration actually required only 12 amperes, instead of 17.
The basis for this powerdown was contained in the LM Contingency Checklist
(ref. 7). The Emergency Powerdown Checklist was developed for the case of
the LM in lunar orbit awaiting rescue by the CSM. Some additions to this
listing of turned-off equipment were made by Mission Control.
As soon as the electrical power system configuration was established
and apparently performing well, Mission Control began planning for what
actions to take if a LM battery failure were to occur. _ese p_ans
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included listing the few remaining items of equipment which could be
taken off line in the powered-downcondition. Since the current was
already downto less than 17 amperes, there was not muchleft that could
be removedexcept the communications equipment, but certain equipment
could have been operated on a periodic, basis rather than continuously.
A schedule for this kind of operation was planned in case it became
necessary.
At 97:14:26 the LMPcalled Mission Control to report an anomaly
that he had observed in the LM. This anomalywas a "little thump" that
was heard but not felt, and it seemedto comefrom the vicinity of the
LM descent stage. The LMPalso observed a "new shower of snowflakes
comeup that looked like they were emitted from dow_that way." The
venting appeared to be going radially outward, perpendicular to the
X-axis in the +Y, +Z quadrant, and it continued for approximately 2 min-
utes. Neither the flight controllers nor the LMPobserved any anomalous
behavior in the data. The LMPclosed the essential display circuit
breakers in order to scan his instruments. The flight controllers
searched the various displays of telemetry data. Since no unusual read-
ings were noted, the investigation of the "thump" incident was not pur-
sued further at that time. A postflight review of the data indicates
that at about the time of the "thump," a large, momentaryincrease in
LMbattery output occurred. The surge was of 2 to 3 seconds duration,
and was experienced by all four descent batteries. The behavior of
the four battery currents is summarizedin the table:
Battery
I
2
3
4
Current output, amps
Before After
Peak
surge surge
37.5 3
2 Off-scale 6
high 60 amps
3 36.8 Z
3 30.5 1
The MSC investigation of this anomaly is still in progress, and the
exact cause of the current increase, the "thump," and the venting :is
not known. It does appear that they were all related, but not connected
with the previous service module failure.
At 99:51 g.e.t, a descent battery no. 2 malfunction warning light
illuminated. Because the display system on board was powered down except
for the caution and warning panels, the analysis of the problem was done
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in Mission Control where telemetry was available. There were three
possible valid causes of the warning light: an overcurrent, a reverse
current, or a battery overtemperature condition. The troubleshooting
systematically eliminated all three, and Mission Control concluded the
problem was a faulty temperature sensor. The crew was advised to recon-
nect the battery about an hour later. No problems with the battery ever
developed_ but the sensor indication later became erratic, causing several
MC&W alarms. A plot of total usable amp-hours remaining in the LM
batteries is contained in figure B6-4.
Coolant system: It was as essential to power down the LM as much as
possible in order to reduce the cooling requirements as it was to reduce
the battery amp-hours expended. The LM coolant loop uses the action of
ice sublimination to take heat away from the spacecraft. Feed water for
the sublimator is stored in tanks, and the rate of water usage to provide
this cooling is proportional to the amount of electrical power expended
because of the heat generated. The analysis showed that for the above-
mentioned electrical power requirements, the LM water supply was most
critical and would be depleted about 155 hours g.e.t. This analysis was
based on data obtained several hours after the initial LM activation.
Estimates based on the usage rate immediately after activation indicated
the LM would be depleted of water by 94 hours g.e.t. As expected, the
rate reduced drastically, however, after the initial cooling down was
accomplished.
During the mission period before the postpericynthion abort, when
the spacecraft was on a trajectory with a 155-hour g.e.t, landing time,
efforts were made to find a method of increasing the _ water margin by
means other than a further powerdown. Two procedures were developed as
a result of this effort. The first allowed the crew to get drinking water
from the CM potable water tank, and the second was a method of trans-
ferring water to the LM tanks for use in the LM coolant loop. _e latter
procedure involved the use of the portable life support systems (PLSS)
water tanks as an intermediate container for transporting the water from
the CM waste tank. Although it did not become necessary to use the
second procedure, it was tested on the ground by engineering personnel
at MSC, and was available in Mission Control. A plot of the usable water
remaining in the LM is shown in figure B6-5.
Oxygen supply and carbon dioxide removal: The oxygen supply in the
LM was adequate for more than 200 hours g.e.t., and was of no concern
(fig. B6-6). This included a supply in the systems normally used for the
lunar extravehicular activity (EVA). The initial problem with the ascent
oxygen tank 2 had stabilized to the condition that the pressure in the
tank was about i00 psi above the normal operating range. Engineering
support personnel had advised Mission Control that this was no problem,
and no further actions were taken in this area.
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The problem of removing carbon dioxide from the cabin oxygen was
a serious one. The LM, like the CSM, uses lithium hydroxide (Li0H)
cartridges to scrub the recirculated oxygen to remove odors and carbon
dioxide. The Li0H cartridges are rated for a specified total man-hours
capacity, and eventually must be replaced when they become saturated.
The LM cartridges were not adequate for carbon dioxide removal for
three men for the duration of the Earth-return trip. There were more
than adequate cartridges in the CM, but they would not fit in the LM
canisters. There were several methods suggested for solving the
problem, including powering up the CM system to circulate cabin oxygen
through its LiOH canisters. The method that was actually used was
developed by Crew Systems Division personnel at MSC. It consisted of
using tape, flight data file cards, and plastic bag material to connect
the CM Li0H canisters to the LM oxygen circulation system. The crew
implemented the modification and it worked very well. The partial
pressure of carbon dioxide reading indicated by the onboard gage dropped
rapidly from 8mm Hg to 0.1mm Hg soon after the rig was completed at 94
hours g.e.t. The modification was not tried until this time in order
to get maximum use from the LM cartridges. About 20 hours later, the
carbon dioxide partial pressure reading had increased to l. Smm Hg, and
a procedure for putting two additional cartridges in series to those in
the CM canisters was given to the crew. This procedure was also
developed by engineers at MSC (fig. B6-7). After this second modifica-
tion was completed, the carbon dioxide partial pressure remained below
2mm Hg for the rest of the mission, without any further modifications
necessary.
The modifications to the oxygen circulation systems were evaluated
in the simulators at MSC before they were accepted by mission operations
personnel. This included tests in the pressure chamber. As mentioned
earlier, there were other methods that could have been adopted had this
one proved to be unacceptable.
Reaction control system: The LM reaction control system (LMRCS)
propellants were another consumable that had to be managed carefully.
Maintaining attitude control of both the CSM and the 154, with a total
weight in excess of 90,000 pounds, can be done by the LMRCS, but is a
particularly taxing job. The 154 control system was not designed to
perform this task, and does not do it efficiently in terms of propellant
expenditure. This was aggravated by the fact that there is some control
moment loss and some cross coupling when the LM is in control due to
thrust plume deflectors designed to protect the LM descent stage from
extended thruster firings.
Shortly after the LM assumed attitude control, Mission Control gave
the crew a procedure which increased the attitude excursion tolerance
in the computer. This increased the attitude error tolerance and caused
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less thruster firings to be commanded by the computer which was maintain-
ing automatic attitude control. The simulators at KSC and MSC were used
to evaluate different techniques for maneuvering the spacecraft under
manual control as well as automatic. Manual maneuvers became necessary
after the LM inertial platform and computer were powered down after the
post-pericynthion abort maneuver. Backup and support crews performed
the evaluations and recommended certain techniques.
Mission Control kept a close watch on the RCS propellant consumption
and was prepared to have the crew revert to an uncontrolled, drifting
flight mode if necessary. This would have been requested if the RCS
propellant decreased below the "red line" value. The flight controllers
had computed a "red line" which provided enough propellant for meeting
the midcourse correction maneuver requirements and the requirements to
maneuver in preparation for the reentry sequence.
Command service module.- After the CM powerdown at 58:40 there was
very little system management that could be or needed to be done. The
electrical power system, however, did require some attention. The first
action was to get the CM into a known configuration. So much had hap-
pened so quickly during the period following the accident, that neither
the crew nor Mission Control had a complete knowledge of the switch con-
figuration in the CM. Therefore, a checklist was developed which listed
the desired position of every switch, circuit breaker, and actuator han-
dle in the spacecraft. The lift-off configuration in the CSM launch
checklist portion of the Flight Data File served as the baseline for this
list, and the modifications were read to the crew. The crew then config-
ured the CM as defined by this list.
The next task was to determine the status of main dc bus B.
Because power had not been applied to the bus since the failure of fuel
cell 3 at 55:58, it was not certain that a major short did not exist
on it. Mission Control defined a procedure which used entry battery B
to apply power to the bus. The procedure contained 12 steps, and the
displays the crew should monitor were defined, along with the expected
indications. The baseline configuration described in the preceding
paragraph insured that all loads were isolated from the bus. The proced-
ure was implemented at 94:21 hours and verified that there were no shorts
on the bus.
After the CM had been powered down for about 24 hours, it began to
cool down to a temperature well below the minimum expected operating
temperatures. Engineering support personnel became concerned about the
motor switches which are normally used to connect the battery busses to
the main dc busses. _en it was realized that the CM was going to get
unusually cold before the initiation of the entry sequence, the ability
of the batteries to provide sufficient potential to drive these switches
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was questioned. The analysis of the situation was difficult because of
the uncertainty as to how cold the battery compartment would get, and it
could not be proven that a problem would exist. However, to circumvent
the situation, it wasdecided to close the bus tie motor switches after
the main bus B checkout. Subsequently, the appropriate circuit breakers
would have to be used as switches to connect and disconnect the batteries
from the busses (fig. B6-8). A step-by-step procedure was defined and
read to the crew and the bus tie switches were closed at 94:21 g.e.t.
A procedure was also developed for charging the CMentry batteries
with the LMelectrical power system. Approximately 20 amp-hours of tl_
40 amp-hours capacity had been used from entry battery A during the
period immediately following the accident; a muchsmaller amount had
been taken from battery B since that time. Since the 124battery capacity
provided a comfortable power margin for the return to Earth, Mission
Control decided to invest someof that power in charging the CMbatteries.
Preliminary examinations of an entry preparation sequence indicated that
in order to not rush the crew, the CMpowerup should be initiated about
6 hours before entry. To do this demandedthat all three CMbatteries
be fully charged. The procedure to charge the CMbatteries was defined
in complete detail by Mission Control. In its most basic terms, it was
simply a procedure that used the LM/CMelectrical umbilical to get
power to the CMmain bus B. Then the CMbattery charger was tied to
this bus and the battery to be charged. The procedure as read to the
crew consisted of four typewritten pages of notes and a step-by-step
switch position definition. The battery charging was initiated at
about 112 hours g.e.t, to demonstrate that it could be done and was
completed at 128 hours after 18 of the 20 amp-hours had been replaced.
This was done well before the reentry preparation, to allow the entry
planning to proceed with the assurance that all batteries would be
fully charged at the beginning of the entry preparations.
Return to Earth Trajectory Control
All trajectory determination and maneuver targeting for getting
the crew back to Earth wasperformed by the Mission Control Center. This
is the normal procedure, but usually the crew also has the capability to
do this. This serves as a backup in case communications are lost with
the ground. However, with the commandmodule G&Nsystem completely
shut down, the crew was totally dependent on Mission Control for naviga-
tion, and abort and midcourse correction maneuver targeting. There was
no backup.
There were four trajectory changemaneuversperformed to return
the spacecraft to the recovery area in the mid-Pacific Oceanfollowing
the commandmodule powerdown(fig. B6-9). The first, performed at
61:_0 g.e.t., placed the spacecraft on a safe reentry trajectory. The
second_performed at 79:28 g.e.t._ adjusted the Earth landing point to
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the mid-Pacific recovery area. The last two maneuvers, performed at
105:18 and at 137:40 g.e.t., were course corrections which adjusted the
entry conditions to be in the middle of the safe entry corridor. These
maneuversand the decisions related to the choice of specific course
changes are described in the following paragraphs.
Abort maneuver at 61:30 hours.- Soon after the failure in the CSM
it became obvious that the lunar landing mission could not be achieved
and that all effort would have to be focused on getting the crew back
to Earth as soon as possible. At the time, the spacecraft was not on a
trajectory that would return to a safe reentry of the Earth's atmosphere
--so a trajectory change was mandatory. The following questions needed
to be answered: What path should be followed back to Earth? When
should the trajectory-changing maneuver be executed?
Because the spacecraft was on its way to the Moon, there were two
basic types of abort paths that could have been followed: (i) a direct
abort in which the trajectory would be turned around and the spacecraft
returned to Earth without circumnavigating the Moon; and (2) a circum-
lunar abort in which the spacecraft would follow a path around the Moon
before it returned to Earth. The disadvantage of the circumlunar abort
path is that the flight back to Earth takes a longer time than for direct
aborts. However, circumlunar aborts require much less velocity change
and consequently much less propellant to perform, and part of the flight
time can be made up by executing an additional "speedup" maneuver after
the spacecraft has passed the Moon.
The direct abort was ruled out for Apollo 13 because the propellant
requirements were so large. It would have been necessary to jettison
the LM in order to reduce the spacecraft weight so that the service
propulsion system (SPS) engine could make the necessary velocity change.
The LM was essential to the crew's survival, and must not be jettisoned.
Therefore, the choice was narrowed to the circumlunar abort which could
be executed with the LM descent propulsion system (DPS), but there were
still some decisions to be made. The options were as follows:
i. Do nothing until after the spacecraft passed the Moon; then
execute a maneuver to place it on an Earth-return trajectory.
2. Execute a maneuver as soon as practical to place the spacecraft
on an Earth-return trajectory and power down the LM immediately there-
after.
3. The combination of both the above: Get on an Earth-return
trajectory as soon as practical, and after the spacecraft passed the
Moon, perform a maneuver to speed up the return to Earth.
B-II4
Option 2 was selected. The principal reason was that the LM
systems necessary for executing the maneuverwere working at the time,
and they might not be working 20 hours from then when the spacecraft
was in position to do option i. Another consideration was the fact
that the velocity requirement to get on an Earth-return trajectory
would increase from 40 fps to 160 fps, making it impossible to perform
with the RCSsystem if this becamenecessary. So even though option i
would have allowed an immediate partial LMpowerdown,saving someelec-
trical power and water, it was decided that the risk was not worth the
savings. Also, option 2 left option 3 available if the guidance and
navigation system could be powered up to perform the second maneuver.
The decision having been madeto perform a circumlunar abort, and
to perform as soon as possible the maneuverto place the spacecraft on
a safe reentry trajectory, the only question remaining open was what
Earth landing point to target for. Because of the LM consumablesstatus,
getting back to Earth as soon as possible was the overriding factor.
The quickest return resulted in a landing in the Indian Oceanat 152
hours g.e.t. This meant giving up the ability to bring the spacecraft
downin the vicinity of the prime recovery force in the Pacific, although
at least a water landing was provided. This was considered to be accept-
able because the abort maneuverafter passing the Moonprobably could
be used to decrease the flight time and to land in the prime recovery
area.
Post-pericynthion abort maneuver.- Although the spacecraft was
placed on a reentry trajectory by the abort maneuver at 61:30 with a
landing at 152 hours g.e.t, in the Indian Ocean, it was decided that
a post-pericynthion abort maneuver (PC + 2) should be performed. There
were two reasons: (i) to reduce the return time to increase the LM
consumable margin (the prediction at the time indicated only a 3-hour
margin); and (2) to change the landing point to the mid-Pacific where
the recovery force could be on station.
During the first few hours after LM activation, detailed analysis
of LM consumable usage had shown that the guidance and navigation system
could be kept powered up until after the PC + 2 abort maneuver at 79:30
g.e.t. It was predicted that all consumables would last at least until
155 hours g.e.t, even if the LM powerdown to 15 amperes total current
were delayed until after 80 hours g.e.t.
There were several options available for decreasing the flight
time, but only the three listed in the following table provided a landing
in the mid-Pacific.
B-if5
Option Engine
used
i
2
3
Delta V,
fps
85O
4OOO
4OOO
DPS
DPS
SPS
Landing time,
hours g.e.t.
142
118
118
Option i was selected even though it resulted in the longest flight
time, because of some very undesirable characteristics of options 2 and
3. The problem with option 2 was that it would be necessary to jettison
the service module in order to be able to get a 4000 fps velocity change
with the 124 descent propulsion system. Such a maneuver would almost
deplete the descent propellant, leaving a very limited capability should
subsequent maneuvers be necessary. There was a high probability that a
large course correction would have to be made later. Option 2 was
seriously considered, but eventually rejected because it left the CM
heat shield exposed to the space environment for such a long period of
time, and the possible thermal degradation that might result from this
was an unknown risk. The heatshield capability to withstand reentry
might be compromised by the prolonged period of cold temperature it
would experience. Option 3 was rejected because of the unknown status
of the SPS; it was thought that the SPS or the SM might have been
damaged by whatever had caused the "bang" and that the SPS should not
be used unless absolutely necessary.
Since option i provided a comfortable consumables margin and
allowed retention of the service module, it was selected. Option i
also allowed a descent propulsion system delta V capability of approxi-
mately i000 fps to be retained after the abort maneuver.
Part of the preparation for each mission is the establishment of
"ground rules" and maneuver monitoring criteria for each planned
maneuver. The "ground rules" are general statements which define what
should be done if certain events occur. The maneuver monitoring
criteria define explicitly the conditions under which the crew will
deliberately terminate the maneuver early. The criteria are not the
same for all maneuvers because there is a wide variation in the serious-
ness of the effect of dispersions, and in the seriousness of the effects
of early or late engine shutdown. The trajectory and mission situations
for the post-pericynthion abort burn were different from any of those
for which criteria had been defined; therefore, Jt was necessary to
establish these "rules."
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The pertinent characteristics that would affect the rules were as
follows:
(a) The spacecraft was on a safe reentry trajectory, although
small course corrections probably would be required before reentry.
(b) The primary purpose of the maneuverwas to place the landing
point in the vicinity of the recovery force.
(c) The secondary purpose of decreasing the flight time was of
major importance.
(d) The LM inertial platform had not been fine aligned for
approximately 20 hours.
(e) The maneuvercould be delayed for 2 hours with an increase in
delta V of only 24 fps.
(f) The LMdescent propulsion system was to be used.
The following ground rules based on these characteristics were
established by the Mission Control team and were given to the crew:
(a) If the engine does not light, do not attempt any emergency
start procedures.
(b) If the primary guidance and navigation system (PGNS)has
failed, do not perform the maneuver.
(c) Do not attempt to null the indicated velocity errors after
engine shutdown.
(d) If an engine shutdownoccurred, a subsequent midcourse correc-
tion would be performed no sooner than 2 hours later.
The criteria for early termination of the maneuverwere defined as
follows:
i. Propulsion SystemParameters
(a) Engine chamberpressure
(b) Inlet pressure
(c) Delta P fuel/oxidizer
psi (TM)
_77 percent thrust (on board)
<i o psi
_160 psi (on board)
>25 psi (ground monitored)
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2. Guidance and Control SystemParameters
(a) Attitude rate >i0 deg/sec (except during start
transient)
(b) Attitude error >i0 degrees
(c) Engine gimbal light
(d) Inertial platform failure with a program alarm
(e) Computerwarning light
(f) Control electronics system dc fail light
A final rule that was defined stated that if an early engine shutdown
was experienced not due to any of the above, a relight should be
attempted, using the engine-start pushbutton and the Descent Engine
CommandOverride switch.
A contingency LMactivation checklist had been defined prior to
the mission and waspart of the crew's Flight Data File. This checklist
was designed to prepare the LMfor a docked descent propulsion system
burn from a completely dormant state. The majority of this checklist
had been accomplished with the initial LMpowerup at 58 hours g.e.t.
The flight controllers reviewed the list in detail and defined a modi-
fied list of steps necessary to prepare the 124for the abort maneuver.
The modification wasbasically a deletion of steps already accomplished
or not necessary; however, there was one change which revised the time
at which the helium regulator shutoff valve was to be closed. This was
done to preclude the possibility of a shift in the regulator operating
pressure causing a freezing of the propellant lines after this burn.
Suchan event would prevent further use of the descent engine and it was
mandatory to maintain this engine for probable subsequent trajectory
changes.
Midcourse correction maneuver.- Postmaneuver tracking data indicated
that the second abort maneuver had placed the spacecraft grossly on the
right path. However, because the LM inertial platform could not be fine
aligned prior to the maneuver, the execution errors were larger than
normal and the spacecraft was not on a safe reentry trajectory. This
was expected and subsequent corrections were planned for in the LM
consumables budget. The correction delta V magnitude was projected to
be about 7 fps if executed at 104 hours g.e.t. Unlike the abort maneuver,
the course correction maneuvers are not extremely sensitive to pointing
accuracy, and with the delta V of only 7 fps it could probably be executed
with sufficient accuracy without the inertial guidance system. A special
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team_ composedof off-duty flight controllers and membersof the backup
flightcrew_ was formed to define the maneuverground rules and procedures
to be followed for the course correction maneuver. A detailed crew
checklist was to be developed also. Noneof the procedures or checklists
in the Flight Data File were applicable because of the unique situation
that existed for this case.
The major issues addressed by this team were as follows:
i. Howto get the spacecraft aligned in the proper direction for
the maneuver? Wasit necessary to power up the inertial platform?
2. Which engine should be used, descent propulsion system or LM
RCS?
3. W%latburn monitoring criteria should be used?
4. _at attitude control modesshould be used?
The team determined that it wasunnecessary to use the inertial
platform for the maneuver. The spacecraft could be oriented in the
proper pitch direction by sighting on the center of the Earth with the
Crew Optical Alignment System (COAS)fixed along the LM +Z axis. The
approximately correct azimuth could be achieved by aligning the sunset
terminator parallel to the LMY-axis. This procedure had been developed
in the preparation for Apollo 8 whenit was discovered that course
correction maneuverscould best be madein a local horizontal attitude
(that is, perpendicular to a vector from the center of the Earth to the
spacecraft). It could easily be applied to the LH-active maneuver, and
would give adequate thrust pointing accuracy, so it was not necessary
to power up the LMG&Nsystem and try to align its inertial platform.
It was decided to use the descent propulsion system for the maneuver
instead of the RCS engines, because the engine-on time for an RCS maneuver
would exceed a constraint which protects the LM RCS plume deflectors.
The engine was to be left at the low throttle point (about 12.6 percent
of full thrust) to give the crew more time to monitor the burn and the
lower acceleration should increase the shutdown accuracy. The engine
shutdown criteria were the same as for the previous burn. It was
decided to monitor the delta V with the backup guidance system acceler-
ometers, but to shut the engine down at a fixed delta time specified by
Mission Control. Studies had shown that the burn time computed by
Mission Control was very accurate. Since the accelerometers had not
been maintained at their proper temperature (heaters had been turned off
to reduce consumables expenditure), their status was questionable and
the team decided to not use the backup guidance system as an engine
shutdown cue. However, if this system appeared to perform nominally
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during the maneuver, it would be used to null the velocity residuals in
the X direction. Velocity errors in either Y or Z direction had an
insignificant effect on the entry conditions and were not to be nulled.
Attitude control of the docked vehicle with the backup system
required both the CDR and the LMP to actively participate, and Y- and Z-
axis translation thrusters had to be used to get adequate control torque.
The team defined the modes and procedures to be used in getting the
spacecraft in the correct attitude and in controlling the attitude during
the engine burn. A procedure to return the spacecraft to the passive
thermal control condition was also defined.
All plans were completed after two lengthy sessions. A subgroup
from the team defined a detailed crew checklist to be followed in
preparing for the maneuver and in preparing for the coasting flight
following the maneuver. The checklist was evaluated by members of the
backup crew in mission simulators at MSC and some minor modifications
were made as a result. The checklist and the procedures were reviewed
by the on-duty Mission Control team and then read to the crew approxi-
mately 5 hours prior to the scheduled course correction. This allowed
the crew ample time to study them and to rehearse their roles.
Entry Procedures and Checklist Definition
After the situation in the spacecraft was stabilized, one of the
several parallel activities that was initiates _as the definition of
procedures for the pre-reentry phase. The total loss of electrical
power in the service module forced some major revisions to the activities
and the crew procedures for this part of the mission. The most signifi-
cant consequences of this loss were the following: (i) SM RCS engines
would not continue to fire to separate it from the CM after jettison;
and (2) LM electrical power and RCS should be used to conserve the CM
batteries and RCS propellant as much as possible. This meant that the
LM should be retained through as much of the pre-entry sequence as
possible, and that a plan for jettisoning the SM and the LM had to be
worked out.
A first iteration plan for the pre-entry phase was available as
early as 12 hours after the LM activation. This plan called for CM
powerup 2 hours before arrival at the entry interface (El - 2 hours),
and required the total remaining capacity from the CM entry batteries,
98 amp-hours. After the plan was thoroughly reviewed by all elements
of the operations team, including mission planning and flight crew
support personnel, several modifications and additions were considered
necessary. The principal difficulty was that the crew would probably
be rushed, and there was little or no extra time allowed for contingen-
cies. It was evident that the timeline needed to be extended and the CM
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batteries would have to be recharged to at least 115 amp-hours. The
recharging was accomplished and the procedure is described in Part A2
of Appendix A.
The White Team, one of the four flight control teams assigned to
the mission, was taken off its normal rotation of duty in order to
devote full attention to developing the reentry preparation sequence
of events, crew procedures, and checklists. With this flight control
team as the lead element, all MSCorganizations normally involved in
this type of premission activity were enlisted in this effort. In the
course of defining the procedures, extensive use wasmadeof the space-
craft simulators at MSCand KSC. These simulations_ performed by members
of the backup crews, served two essential purposes. The first was
simply to evaluate them--to determine if they were practical, safe,
efficient, and adequate. The second purpose was to determine the time
required to complete certain parts of the procedures. The latter was
important because a completely defined timeline had to be given to the
crew in order to insure that everything wasaccomplished on time. It
was essential that this timeline be realistic because the crew could
not afford to get behind and fail to complete it, but neither could
they start too early and use too much power from the CM batteries.
Another source of data used to develop the procedures was a series
of contingency separation studies that was performed prior to the flight
by mission planning personnel. These studies had examined the trajectory-
related considerations for several different methods of jettisoning the
SM and the LM. They had defined the effects of different attitudes,
time, and velocity of jettison on the subsequent separation distances.
It was only necessary to verify that these studies were valid for the
Apollo 19 conditions, and then select the one with the most optimum
characteristics.
The planning and evaluation of the pre-entry activities continued
for approximately 2 days. At the end of this time, a complete plan
had been defined and thoroughly reviewed. It was read to the crew at
about 120 hours g.e.t., which gave them about a day to study and rehearse
their procedures.
The pre-entry sequence plan (fig. B6-10) called for initiating the
powerup at El - 6½ hours, with the LM supplying power to main bus B in
the CM and entry battery C supplying power to main bus A. A total of
115 amp-hours was required of the CM entry batteries, including a 2] amp-
hour allowance for contingency after splashdown. A detailed expected
battery current profile was plotted and used during the actual prepara-
tion to verify that a safe power margin was maintained throughout the
reentry preparations. Battery utilization was planned so that all
three entry batteries would be available throughout the entry phase. It
B-121
o-p©r-I©(1)
+
._q)I(1)h!
dIb.O.f-Ir_
B
-122
was predicted that battery C would be depleted after deployment of the
main chutes, and in fact it was. This left the redundant capability of
two batteries available to inflate the uprighting bags after splashdown.
The initial part of the reentry preparations, LM powerup, was
performed about _ hours earlier than planned. The crew was not resting
comfortably due to the cold environment, and sin_e there was ample
margin in the LM batteries and water tanks, it was decided to turn on
some equipment to try to warm up the spacecraft.
After activating the LM guidance and control system, the first
major milestone in the entry sequence was to execute the final course
correction to place the spacecraft on a trajectory that was in the center
of the safe entry corridor. Prior to the final course correction, the
trajectory had an entry angle error of about +0.5 degree, which is a
safe condition, but slightly shallow (fig. B6-11). It is a standard
practice to perform a final trim maneuver a few hours prior to entry to
try to remove any entry angle error greater than ±0.i degree, and this
course correction was incorporated in the timeline before it was known
whether or not it could be required.
The planned procedures for the final course correction were the
same as for the earlier one performed at about 104 hours g.e.t.,
including the alignment procedure which only required sighting the
Earth through the COAS. Manual control of the actual delta V maneuver
was also planned. However, since the LM powerup was started 3 hours
earlier than originally expected, it was decided to use part of this
time to align the LM inertial platform. This was done with the crew
sighting on the Moon and the Sun for orientation determination. A
further modification to the planned procedures of using the primary
guidance system to perform the course correction had to be abandoned,
because the attitude error indications did not behave properly. It was
suspected that there might be something wrong with the guidance computer,
so the crew performed the maneuver manually, following the original plan.
Subsequent analysis has shown that the attitude error indications were
not indicative of a system problem, but were a result of the guidance
system activation procedures. These same indications did not show up
in the simulator evaluations performed before the crew was given the
procedures because of the limitations of simulator initialization.
The service module jettison was the next major milestone in the
pre-entry sequence. It was performed at about 4-1/2 hours prior to
reentry. The techniques used and the attitude and delta V requirements
for it were obtained from premission studies. Basically, the technique
was very similar to that used by a railroad switch engine to get rid of
the end boxcar. The spacecraft was given an impulse with the LM RCS
that caused a velocity change in the desired direction of about 0.5 fps;
the CM/SM separation pyrotechnics were fired, physically disconnecting
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the two modules; and a velocity change of the LM and CM was accomplished
by reverse thrust from the LM RCS. The service module continued to
translate relative to the manned modules, and separated from them at a
rate of 0.5 fps. The normal method of using SM RCS jets to drive the
SM away would not work because there was no way to get electrical power
to keep the jets firing after CM/SM separation. The fuel cells which
normally perform this function were inoperative.
The next major step was to get the CM inertial platform aligned.
An automatic guidance controlled reentry was planned, which meant that
the platform needed to be aligned to a known reference direction. There
were several methods that could have been used to accomplish this, and
a considerable amount of time was spent by the White Team in determining
the best one. The selected plan used the docked align transfer proced-
ure to get the CM platform coarsely aligned to the LM platform. The CM
platform was then very accurately aligned to the desired direction by
optical sightings with the CM sextant. Mission Control was standing by
with an alternate procedure in case stars could not be seen through the
CM optics; however, this was not necessary.
There was much interference on the voice and telemetry communica-
tion signals during this time period, which was later diagnosed to be
due to the spacecraft attitude. Apparently the spacecraft was oriented
so that the LM structure was blocking the signal from all of the omni
antennas arrayed around the CM, and the received signal strength was very
low. The antenna blockage problem was not recognized and several recon-
figurations of the communication equipment were made to try to correct
the problem, none of which were successful. In order to maintain
adequate signal strength, it was necessary to receive data at the low
bit rate only. This was not a major handicap, but it did cause some
delay in completing the preparation of the CM guidance system for reentry.
The LM jettison from the CM was accomplished at about i hour prior
to reentry. The attitude was based on premission studies, but no tech-
nique had been defined for achieving the actual separation with LM
jettison from the CM only (no service module). The technique was defined
by the White Team and consisted of using pressure in the LM/CM tunnel to
impart a relative velocity to the two modules when the final separation
pyrotechnics were fired. This method of separation had inadvertantly
occurred at the LM final jettison on Apollo i0 and was known to give
sufficient separation velocity.
It was planned to jettison the LM in a direction 45 degrees south
of the spacecraft plane of motion; however, the crew maneuvered the
spacecraft to an attitude 65 degrees north of this plane. Mission
Control was monitoring the spacecraft attitude, but did not realize the
mistake until the crew was in the process of final closeout of the LM.
Flight controllers quickly analyzed the situation and determined that,
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although the 65 degrees north attitude did not give as muchseparation,
it was acceptable. The major problem in being in error by ii0 degrees
was that it placed the CMin an attitude muchcloser to gimbal lock than
is normally done. The crew had to be especially alert during the
jettison and to use manual control of the CMto avoid gimbal lock.
The remainder of the sequence, from LMjettison to splashdown,
followed normal procedures. The only difference was that the CMwas
completely independent of other spacecraft componentsat i hour prior
to reentry instead of the usual 15 minutes.
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PART B7
INSTRUMENT SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
Part 7 provides additional technical information of systems design
and characteristics _hich are pertinent to interpretation of data pre-
sented in earlier parts of this Appendix. The following systems are
discussed:
Oxygen Tank Temperature Instrumentation
Oxygen Tank Quantity Instrumentation
Oxygen Tank Pressure Instrumentation
Apollo PCM Telemetry System
Mission Control
OXYGEN TANK TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT
The temperature measurement is made with a platinum resistance
thermometer (R/T) encased in an Inconel sheath attached to the Teflon
insulator part of the quantity probe (fig. B7-1). The resistance of
the R/T and the transducer output voltage increase with temperature.
The signal conditioner which serves as a reference voltage generator
and amplifier is located on the oxygen tank shelf. An electrical sche-
matic of the transducer is shown in figure B7-2.
The system electrical and performance parameters can be summarized
as follows:
Data sample rate one per second
Range -320 ° F to +80 ° F
Corresponding R/T values 71 to 553 ohms
Output voltage 0 to 5 V dc
Accuracy ±2.68 percent or ±ii ° F
Output impedance 5000 ohms
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Power 1.25 watts, 115 V ac, 400 cps
Time constant in liquid
nitrogen or alcohol
Approximately 20 seconds
The 20-second time constant was measured by plunging the sensor
first into liquid nitrogen at -317 ° F and then into dry ice/alcohol at
-91 ° F. Tests were made under one-g and i atmosphere and are not appli-
cable to supercritical oxygen and zero-g.
Telemetry would indicate the temperature of the sensor itself, but
under rapidly changing conditions the sensor could remain almost un-
affected by local temperature changes in other parts of the tank. The
effect of various failure modes on the transducer and its output signal
are presented in table B7-1.
OXYGEN TANK QUANTITY INSTRUMENTATION
The oxygen tank quantity gage is shown in figure B7-1. This gage
senses the average dielectric constant of oxygen in the cylindrical
annular volume between two concentric aluminum tubes. The dielectric
constant is proportional to density, which in turn is proportional to
the quantity of oxygen in the tank. The gage is approximately 2 feet
long; the outer tube is about 0.85-inch ID and the inner tube is about
O.65-inch OD to form two plates of a capacitor with O.lO-inch spacing.
The gage mounts in the center of the tank.
The gage capacitance is connected in series with a reference
capacity to form a capacitive 400-cycle ac voltage divider as shown in
figure B7-3 and is adjusted to apply zero volts input to the amplifiers
when the tank is empty. As the tank is filled, the gage capacity in-
creases, applying a voltage to the amplifier input. This voltage is
amplified and rectified to provide an output signal voltage which
increases to 5 volts dc when the tank is full.
The reactive voltage developed across the probe capacitance will
change as rapidly as capacitance changes. The rectifier filter on the
output of the signal conditioner introduces a time constant of about
0.022 second in the instrument response.
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TABLEB7-1.- FAILUREMODESOFTHEOXYGENTANKTEMPERATURETRANSDUCER
_Failure mode Indication Resulting damage
Any of the four temperature
sensor leads shorted to 115
V ac line (i, 2, 3, 4)
Temperature sensor shorted
to the density probe
element
Temperature sensor shorted
to ground (either side)
Dc power shorted to temper-
ature sensor
Either or both sensor
leads open
400 Hz power input
to power supply discon-
nected.
Temperature sensor leads
shorted to each other
Any one of leads i, 3, or
4 broken (open) (fig. B7-2)
Openlead 2 (fig. B7-1)
Full scale
output followed
by zero output
*No change
in output
*Zero output
signal
Full scale
output
Full scale
output
Output drifts
to zero as
charge in
power supply
filter capac-
itors dis-
charge.
*Zero out-
put
Zero out-
put
* Immediate rise
to full scale
followed by a
linear decay
to zero in
approx, i0 msec
Would fail signal condi-
tioner amplifier, sensor
element, and pulse code
modulation gate
Probably no circuit
element damage
No circuit damage
Would fail signal condi-
tioner output
None
None
None
No circuit damage
No circuit damage
*Indication verified by test
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Gage parameters are as follows:
Tank condition Empty
Density 0
Dielectric
Constant 1.0
Capacitance 121
Output voltage 0
Output impedance
Power
Supply voltage
Accuracy
Value of fixed
capacitance
Data sampled
Full
69.5 ib/ft 3
1.45
175 picofarads
5 V dc
500 ohms
2-1/2 watts
115 V, 400 cycles
2.68 percent full scale
i000 picofarads
Once per second
This method of gaging works well for single-phase fluids in any
gravity environment so long as the fluid is uniformly mixed with no sig-
nificant density variations. But under zero-g, density and temperature
variations can exist in the fluid, especially when heat is added with-
out any fluid movement (convection). Under these conditions, the gage
measures the average density of the oxygen between the two tubes which
may or may not be representative of the average density in the tank.
If the gage is either opened or shorted, the signal conditioner
is overdriven and a greater-than-lOO-percent quantity is indicated.
Other malfunction characteristics follow.
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Failure Mode
Elements of probe shorted to
each other
Wire to either element
disconnected from probe
Outside element of probe
or its lead wire shorted
to ground
Inside element of probe
or its lead shorted to
ground
5. Clear shorted probe
6. Clear open probe fault
e Intermittent shorts, any
combination
Effect
Full scale output
Full scale output
Measurement indicates
some value between zero
and full scale
Random output tending
towards zero
Output decreases to zero,
remains 0.7 second, then
increases to correct value
in about 1-1/2 second
Output assumed correct
value within 1/2 second
Output becomes irregular
sawtooth
OXYGEN TANK 2 PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION
The location of the oxygen tank pressure measuring instrumentation
is shown schematically in figure B7-4. Pressure transducers for both
tanks are located in a valve module assembly along with the pressure
switches and pressure relief valves as shown in figure B7-5. The valve
module assembly is connected to the oxygen tanks by 19-foot lengths of
i/4-inch and 3/16-inch OD tu0ing.
The pressure transducer consists of a diaphragm 0.2 inch in diameter
and O.015 inch thick to which are attached 4 chips of strain-sensitive
semi-conductor materials electrically connected into a bridge circuit.
When pressure is applied, deflection of the diaphragm changes the electri-
cal resistance of the semi-conductor clips to unbalance the bridge and
develop an electrical output proportional to the applied pressure.
This output is amplified so that full-scale pressure of 1050 psia gives
a 5 V dc output which is indicated on the CM instrument panel and tele-
metered to the ground through the PCM telemetry system.
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Pressure 
transducer 
Rei ief value 
Pressure switch 
for cycling 
heaters 
Figure B7-5.- Pressure transducer, relief valve, and pressure switch. 
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Other pressure transducer parameters are as follows:
Range
Accuracy
19 to 1080 psia
±2.68 percent fuel range
Output voltage 0 to 5 V dc
Output impedance 500 ohms
Power 1.5 watts
Voltage supply 28 V dc
Data sampled Once per second
Under normal operating conditions oxygen flow through the 19 feet
of tubing is about 1.5 pounds per hour and the pressure drop through
the line is negligible.
The physical dimensions and electronic characteristics of the
pressure transducer are such that its time lags are negligible as com-
pared with acoustical lags of the tubing. If the relief valve opens
(normally set at 1008 psia) or if the pressure in the tank changes
suddenly, the delta P is communicated through the tube at sonic velocity
(813 fps at 288 ° R) so that a delay of about 23 msec would be expected
exclusive of pressure drops due to flow through the tubing. Tests run
at MSC show that when a step pressure increase is applied at the tank
end of the system, pressure indicated by the transducer begins to change
in about 16 msec and reaches 63 percent of the pressure change in about
40 msec.
PULSE CODE MODULATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The instrumentation system on the Apollo spacecraft interfaces
with a pulse code modulation (PCM) telemetry system. In such a system,
measurements are not presented continuously, but are sampled in time and
quantitized in amplitude. Signal conditioners standardize the outputs
from all sensors to a range of O to 5 volts. This voltage is fed into
the PCM system where it is sampled and encoded for transmission to the
ground.
The PCM system basically consists of a number of electronic input
switches and an analog-to-digital encoder, all of which are controlled
by a programmer. The analog switches, through programmer control, are
sampled sequentially with a sample period of 40 microseconds for each
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input. The sampled voltage is then converted by the encoder into an
$-bit binary word which is subsequently transmitted to the ground. The
sampling rate for each channel is selected on the basis of the rapidity
with which that channel value changesunder normal operation. Programmer
sampling rates are 200, i00, 50, i0, and I sample per second. The end
result of this operation when the system is in the high-bit-rate mode
is a serial stream of data consisting of 128 eight-bit words in each
frame with 50 frames transmitted each second. This corresponds to a
bit rate of 51,2OObits per second. In the low-bit-rate mode, 1600 bits
per second are transmitted and the measurementsare madeat a reduced
sampling rate.
In evaluating telemetry data, consideration must be given to the
fact that the system samples data in time and quantitizes in amplitude.
Figure B7-6 depicts an analog signal and its equivalent digital
representation to illustrate several limitations of PCMtelemetry
systems.
!. Fast transients which happen to occur between the sample times
will not be recorded.
2. A long transient whose peak amplitude occurs between sample
times will be recorded with an incorrect peak amp]itude.
3. A low-amplitude transient maygo completely unrecorded even if
its peak amplitude occurs at a sample time.
4. A change of one count in a parameter does not necessarily mean
that the analog quantity has changedby an amount equal to the differ-
ence in count values. If the analog quantity happens to be very close
to the switchover point between counts, a small change can cause the
count to change.
5. If the analog quantity remains for a long time close to the
switchover point from one count to the next, the output may toggle
(jump back and forth) from one count to another. This does not indicate
that the analog value is actually changing this rapidly but is charac-
teristic of the system when noise is present.
6. In addition to the phenomena illustrated in figure B7-6, it
must be recognized that noise in the RF link may cause erroneous data to
be received on the ground. Such errors usually appear in the data as
values which differ greatly from adjacent outputs from the same channel.
Table BT-II lists the measurements telemetered from the Apollo 13
command and service modules as well as their ranges, sampling rates,
and value of one count.
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TABLE BT-II.- CI)MMAND AND SERVICE MODULE TEI_IMET_Y IZTA DE_$Fd_Y
Number
CAI820T
CAI821T
CAI822T
CA1823T
SAI830T
SAI831T
SAI832T
SAI833T
SA2377T
SA2378T
SA2379T
SA2380T
SC0030Q
SC0031Q
SC0032Q
SC0033Q
sco037P
SC0038P
SC0039P
SC0040P
SCO041T
SC0042T
SC0043T
SC0044T
CC0175T
CC0176T
CC0177T
CC0200V
CC0203V
CC0206V
CC0207V
Meas uremen t
Approx. Range
Title Unit
Low High
TEMP CREW HS ABL °F -300 +850
SUR LOC IA
TEMP CREW HS ABL °F -_00 +850
SUR LOC 4A
TEMP CREW HS ABL °F -300 +85C
SUR LOC 7A
TEMP CREW HS ABL °F -300 +850
SUR LOC 10A
TEMP SM SKIN OF -120 +2'/0
SURF LOC IA
TEMP SM SKIN °F' -120 +270
SURF LOC 4A
TEMP SM SKIN °F -120 +270
SURF LOC 7A
TEMP SM SKIN °F -120 4270
SURF LOC IOA
TEMP BAY 20X °F' -i00 +200
TANK SURFACE
TEMP BAY 30X °F -i00 +200
TANK SURFACE
TEMP BAY 5 FUEL °F -i00 +200
TANK SURFACE
TE_4P BAY 6 FUEL °F -i00 +200
TANK SURFACE
QUANTITY }{2 TANK i PCT 0 i00
QUANTITY H2 TANK 2 PCT 0 i00
QUANTITY 02 TANK i PCT 0 i00
QUANTITY 02 TANK 2 PCT 0 i00
PREss 02 TANK i PSIA 20 1080
PRESS 02 TANK 2 PSIA 20 1080
PRESS H2 TANK i PSIA © JSO
PRESS H2 TANK 2 PSIA 0 550
TEMP 02 TANK i °F -325 +80
TEMP 02 TANK 2 OF -325 +80
TEMP H2 TANK i °F -425 -200
TEMP H2 TANK 2 °F -425 -200
TEMP STATIC °F +32 +248
INVERTER i
TEMP STATIC °F +32 +248
INVERTER 2
TEMP STATIC °F +32 +248
INVERTER 3
AC VOLTAGE MAIN VAC 0 +150
BUS i PHASE A
AC VOLTAGE MAIN VAC 0 +150
BUS 2 PHASE A
DC VOLTAGE MAIN VDC 0 +45
BUS A
DC VOLTAGE MAIN _)C 0 +45
BUS B
NL - Non Linear
Samples/Second
High Bit Low Bit
Rate }{ate
i
1
i
i
i
i
i
I
i
1
1
1
i 1
i i
i i
1 1
1 I
i 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 l
1 1
1
l
1
i0 1
i0 1
i0 i
i0 1
Un its/Count
4 - *NL
4 - NL
4 - NL
4 - NL
1.5 - NL
1.5 - NL
1.5 - NL
1.5 - NL
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
o.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
4.0
4.o
1.5
1.5
1.6
1.6
i.o
1.0
1
1
1 - NL
0.6
0.6
0.18
0. i8
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TABLE B7-11.- CO_,_4AND AND SERVICE MODULE TEn.EMEry DATA SUMMARY- Continued.
Number
CC0210V
CC0211V
CC0215C
CC0222C
CC0223C
CC0224C
CC0232V
SC2060P
SC2061P
SC2062P
SC2066P
SC2067P
SC2068P
SC2069P
SC2070P
SC2071P
SC2081T
SC2082T
SC2083T
SC2084T i
SC2085T
SC2086T
SC2087T
SC2088T
SC2089T
SC2090T
SC2091T
SC2092T
SC2113C
Measurement
Title
Samples/Second
[ Approx. Range
I High BitUnit
Low High Rate
DC VOLTAGE BAT- VDC 0 +45 i0
TERY BUS A
DC VOLTAGE BAT- VDC 0 +45 i0
TERY BUS B
DC CURRENT BATT AMP 0 +5 i0
CHARGER OUT
DC CURRENT AMP 0 +100 i0
BATTERY A
DC CURRENT AMP 0 +i00 i0
BATTERY B
DC CURRENT AMP 0 +i00 l0
BATTERY C
DC VOLTAGE BAT- VDC 0 +45 l0
TERY RELAY BUS
N2 PRESSURE FC i PSIA 0 75 l0
REGULATED
N2 PRESSURE FC 2 PSIA 0 75 l0
REGULATED
N2 PRESSURE FC 3 PSIA 0 75 lO
REGULATED
02 PRESSURE FC i PSIA 0 75 i0
REGULATED
02 PRESSURE FC 2 PSIA 0 75 i0
REGULATED
02 PRESSURE FC 3 PSIA 0 75 l0
REGULATED
H2 PRESSURE FC 1 PSIA 0 75 I0
REGULATED
}{2 PRESSURE FC 2 PSIA 0 75 i0
REGULATED
H2 PRESSURE FC 3 PSIA 0 75 i0
REGULATED
T_P FC 1 COND °F +145 +250 1
EXHAUST
TEMP FC 2 COND °F +145 +250 I
EXHAUST
TEMP FC 3 COND °F +145 +250 1
EXHAUST
TEMP FC i SKIN °F +80 +550 i
TEMP FC 2 SKIN OF +80 +550 i
TEMP FC 3 SKIN °F +80 +550 1
TEMP FC i RADIATOR OF -50 +300 1
OUTLET
TEMP FC 2 RADIATOR OF -50 +300 i
OUTLET
THUMP FC 3 RADIATOR °F -50 +300 i
OUTLET
BAD INLET TEMP FC i OF -50 +300 i
RAD INLET TEMP FC 2 OF -50 +300 i
RAD INLET TEMP FC 3 °F -50 +300 I
DC CURRENT FC 1 AMP 0 +I00 i0
OUTLET
Low Bit
Rate
Units/Count
0.18
0.18
0.02
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.18
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
2
2
2
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
0._
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TABLE BT-II.- <70f_[v_Al_LA_ib S!_<V[CE MODULE TELE_TRy [_%qy_ g'_;AAY - Continued.
Measurement Samples/Second
Number Title Unit
SC2114C DC CURRENT FC 2 AMP
OUTPUT
SC2115C DC CURRENT FC 3 A]_
OUTPUT
SC2139R FLOW RATE H2 FC i LB/HR
SC2140R FLOW RATE H2 FC 2 LB/HH
SC2141R FLOW RATE }{2 FC 3 LB/HR
SC2142R FLOW RATE 02 FC 1 LB/tIR
SC2143R FLOW RATE 02 FC 2 LB/HR
SC2144R FLOW RATE 02 FC 3 [_/HR
SC2160X PH FACrOR WATER
COND FC i
SC2161X PH FACTOR WATER
COND FC 2
SC2162X PH FACTOR WATER
COND FC 3
CC2962C CSM TO LEM CURRENT A_
MONITOR
CDOOO5V DC VOLTAGE PYRO VDC
BUS A
CDO006V DC VOLTAGE PYRO VDC
BUS B
CDOO23X CM-SM RELAY CLOSE A
CDOO24X CM-SM SEP RELAY
CLOSE B
CD0123X SLA SEPARATION
RELAY A
CDOI24X SLA SEPARATION
RELAY B
CDOI30X HAND CONTROLLER
INPUT A
CD0131X HAND CONTROLLER
INPUT B
CD0132X EDS ABORT LOGIC
INPUT NO i
CDOI33X EDS ABORT LOGIC
INPUT NO 2
CD0134X EDS ABORT LOGIC
INPUT NO 3
CDOI35X EDS ABORT LOGIC
OUTPUT A
CD0136X EDS ABORT LOGIC
OUTPUT B
CD0170X RCS ACTIVATE SIG A
CD0171X RCS ACTIVATE SIG B
CD0173X CM RCS PRESS SIG A
CD0174X CM RCS PRESS SIG B
CDO200V DC VOLTAGE LOGIC VDC
BUS A
NL - Non Linear
Approx. Range
Low Hi gh
0 +i00.0
0 +i00.0
0 .2
0 .2
0 .2
0 i.?
0 1.7
0 i.'_
NORM HIGH
NoRM HIGH
NORM HIGH
0 +i0
0 +40
0 +40
SEP
SEP
SEP
SEP
ABORT
ABORT
VOTE/ ARM
OFF
VOTE/ ARM
,OFF
VOTE/ ARM
i OFF
ABORT
ABORT
ENABLE
ENABLE
i PRESS
PRESS
0 +40
High Bit Low Bit
Rate Rate
i0 i
i0 i
i0
i0
i0
i0
i0
i0
i0 1
i0 1
i0 1
i0 ]
i0
i0
i0 ]
i0 1
i0 I
i0 ]
i0 1
I0 1
i0 1
i0 1
i0 I
i0 ]
I0 ]
i0 1
i0 1
i0 1
i0 1
i0
Units/Count
O.4
0._
..001 - NL
.001 - NL
.001 - NL
.005 - NL
.005 - NL
.005 - NL
O.Oh
O.15
o.15
o.15
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TABLE B7-11.- C0}_ND AND S_VICE MODULE TELF}_ETRY DA'I_{ SU_},9_RY - Continued.
Number
CDO2OIV
CDO230X
CDO231X
CDII54X
CDII55X
CEOOOIX
CEOOO2X
CEOOO3X
CE0004X
CE0321X
CE0322X
CF0001P
CF0002T
CF0003P
CF0005P
CFO006P
CF0008T
CFOOO9Q
CFOOIOQ
CFOOI2P
CF0015P
CFOO16P
CFOOI7T
CFOO18T
CF0019Q
CFOO20T
CFOO34P
CFOO35R
CFOO36P
Measurement Samples/Second
IApprox. Range
Title Unit
! Low High
DC VOLTAGE LOGIC VDC 0 + 40
BUS B
FWD HS JETTISON A JETr
FWD HS JETTISON B JETT
CSM-LEM LOCK RING SEP
SEP RELAY A
CSM-LEM LOCK RING SEP
SEP RELAY B
DROGUE DEPLOY RELAY DEPLOY
CLOSE A
DROGUE DEPLOY RELAY DEPLOY
CLOSE B
MAIN CHafE DEPL DRG DEPLOY
REL RLY A
MAIN CHU'?E DEPL DRG DEPLOY
REL RLY B
MAIN CHUTE DISCON- DISC
NECT RELAY A
MAIN CHUTE DISCON- DISC
NECT RELAY B
PRESSURE CABIN PSIA 0 17
TEMP CABIN °F +40 +]25
PRESS 02 SUIT TO IN -5 +5
CABIN DIFF H20
PRESS CO2 PARTIAL MM HG 0 30.00
PRESS SURGE TANK PSIA %0 !080
TEMP SUIT SUPPLY °F +20 +95
MANIF
QUANTITY WASTE PCT 0 i00
WATER TANK
QUAN POTABLE H20 PCT 0 i00
TANK
PRESS SUIT DEMAND PSIA 0 i7
REG SENSE
PRESS SUIT COM- PSID 0 1.00
PRESSOR DIFF
PRESS GLYCOL PUMP PSIG 0 60
OUTLET
TEMP GLYCOL EVAP °F +20 +95
OUTLET STEAM
TEMP SLY EVAP °F +25 +75
OUTLET LIQUID
QUANTITY GLYCOL PCT 0 107
ACCUM
TEMP SPACE RADI- °F -50 +i00
ATOR OUTLET
BACK PRESS GLYCOL PSIA 0 0.25
EVAPORATOR
FLOWRATE ECS 02 LB/H]_ 0.16 I
PRESS OUTLET 02 PSIG 0 150
REG SUPPLY
High Bit Low Bit
Rate Rate
i0
i0 i
i0 1
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
] 1
1 i
i0
1 i
i0 1
1 1
i 1
1 1
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i
i 1
I0 i
1 1
1
i0
i0 1
Units/Count
0.15
0.067
0.3 - NL
o.o_
O. 12 - NL
0.3
0.4 - NL
O.3 - NL
O.07
0.0035 - NL
O.24
0.3
0.2
0.5 - NL
0.6 - NL
0. 0008
0.003 - NL
0.6
NL - Non Linear
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TF_BLE B7-II.- COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE TELEKW/_Y DA'_ SU_@@d_Y - (;ontD:ued.
Number
CFO070P
CF007IT
CF0072Q
CF0073P
CFOI20P
CF0157R
CF0181T
SF0260T
SF0262T
SFO263T
SFO266X
CFO460T
CF0461T
CGI040V
CGIIIOV
CGI2OIV
CGI331V
CG1513X
CGI523X
CGI533X
CG2112 V
CG2113V
CG2117V
CC2142V
CG2143V
CG2147V
CG2172V
Measurement Samples/Second
Title Unit
PRESS SEC GLYCOL P[;IG
Pt_P OUTLET
TEMP SEC EVAP °F
OUTLET LIQUID
QUANTITY SEC GLYCOL FCT
ACCUM
PR SECONDARY EVAP t>:;IA
OUT STEAM
PRESS H20 AND PSIA
GLYCOL TANKS
RATE GLYCOL FROM LB/HR
THERMAL LOAD
TEMP GLYCOL EVAP °F
INLET
TEMP PRIMARY RADI- °F
ATOR INLET
TEMP SECONDARY °F
RADIATOR INLET
TEMP SEC RADIATOR °F
OUTLET
RADIATOR FLOW CONT
SYS 1 OR 2
TEMP URINE DUMP
NOZZLE
TEMP WASTE WATER
DUMP NOZZLE
o F
° F
120 VDC PIPA SUPPLY VDC
DC LEVEL
2.5 VDC TM BIAS '_)C
IMU 28V .8KC i PCT VRMS
3.2KC 28V SUPPLY VRMS
28V IMU STANDBY
28V CMC OPERATE
28V OPTX OPERATE
IG 1X RESOLVER O_f- VRMS
PUT SIN
IG 1X RESOLVER OUT- FRMS
PUT COS
IGA SERVO ERROR IN VRMS
PHASE
MG IX RESOLVER OUT- VRMS
PUT SIN
MG IX RESOLVER oUT- VRMS
PUT COS
MGA SERVO ERROR IN VRMS
PHASE
OG IX RESOLVER OUT- VRMS
PUT SINE
Approx. Range
Low Hi gh
0 6O
+25 +75
0 I00
0.05 0.25
0 5O
45 330
+ _5 +i00
+55 +120
+55 +120
+30 +70
SYS I SYS 2
0 +i00
0 +i00
+84 +135
0 5
0 30
0 30
OFF :','i'BY
OFF OPR
OFF OPR
-21 +21
-2 ] +21
-3 +3
-2] +21
-20 +40
-J +3
-21 +21
High Bit I,ow Bit
Rate Rat_
i0 I
10 i
10 i
i
i
i0
i
i i
i i
1 i
I0 I
i ]
1 i
i
i
1
10 I
i0 1
i0 i
I0
i0
i00
I0
i0
lO0
i0
Units/Count
0.24
0.2
0.8 - NL
0.0008
0.2
0.9 - NL
0.3
0.25
0.25
0.Z5
O.4
0.4
0.2
0.02
0.12 - NL
0.12 - NL
0.17
0.17
0.025
o.16
0.16
O. 024
o.]6
NL - Non Linear
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IABLE B7-11.- CO_@ZND AND SERVICE MODULE TELE_I]{y DATA St_94%RY - Continued.
Measurement Samples/Second
Number
CG2173V
CG2177V
CG2300T
CG3721V
CG3722V
CG5040X
CH3500H
CH350IH
CH3502H
CH3503R
CH3504R
CH3505R
CH3517H
CH3518H
CH3546X
CH3547X
CH35hSX
CH3549X
CH3550X
CH3551X
CH3552X
CH3553X
CH355hX
CH3555X
Title
OG IX RESOLVER OUT-
PUT COS
OGA SERVO ERROR
IN PHASE
PIPA TEMPERATURE
SHAP_ CDU DAC O_F-
PUT
TRUNNION CDU DAC
OUTPUT
CMC WARNING
FDAI CM/SM ATT DEG
ERROR PITCH
FDAI CM/SM ATT DEG
ERROR YAW
FDAI CM/SM ATT DEG
ERROR ROLL
FDAI SCS BODY RATE DEG/
PITCH SEC
FDAI SCS BODY HATE DEG/
YAW SEC
FDAI SCS BODY RATE DEG/
ROLL SEC
GIMBAL POSITION DEG
PITCH 1 OR 2
GIMBAL POSITION DEG
YAW i OR 2
RCS SOLENOID ACT
C3/13/X
RCS SOLENOID ACT
A41Z_/X
RCS SOLENOID ACT
A3/23/-X
RCS SOLENOID ACT
c_/e4/-x
RCS SOLENOID ACT
D3/25/X
RCS SOLENOID ACT
Bh/261X
RCS SOLENOID ACT
B3/15/-X
RCS SOLENOID ACT
D4/16/-X
RCS SOLENOID ACT
BI/II/Z
RCS SOLENOID ACT
D2/22/Z
MM - Multiple Mode Calibration
Unit
VRMS
VRMS
o F
VRMS
VRMS
Approx. Range
Low High
-2 ] +2 ]
-3 +3
+119 +140
-12 +12
-] 2 +12
WARN
-15 _15
-5 _5
-i5 +15
-5 _5
- 50 _5o
-] _i
-5 _ 5
-10 +] 0
-i +l
-5 +5
-i0 +i0
-! +i
-5 _5
- 50 _ 50
-5 +5
-5 +5
FIRE/ ARM
OFF
FIRE/ ARM
OFF
FIRE/ ARM
OFF
FIRE/ ARM
OFF
FIRE/ ARM
OFF
FIRE/ ARM
OFF
FIRE/ ARM
OFF
_IRE/ AP_
OFF
FI RE ARM
OFF
FIRE/ ARM
OFF
High Bit Low Bit
Rate Rate
10
I00
i i
i0
i0
i0 i
50
5o
IO0
i00
i00
i00
i00
i00
200
200
2O0
2O0
2O0
2OO
2O0
200
2OO
2OO
Units/Count
0.16
O.O25
O.08
O.09
O.09
MM
MM
MM
MM
0.04
o.oh
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'U_I:LE BT-fi.- Cu]_?,Z.ND AII[/ _:F_,V_CE }4C,I)[JLE TELEME'I_Y bATA S[$94ARY - Continued.
Number
CH355oX
CHJ55'(X
CH3558X
CH3559×
CH35b0X
CH3561X
CHB574X
CH3575X
CH3576X
CH3577X
CH3578X
CH3579X
CH3582V
CH3583V
CH3585H
CH3586H
CH3587H
CH3588X
CH3590X
CH3592X
CH3593X
CH3600X
CH360IX
CH3602X
CH3604X
CH3605X
Measurement Samples / S_cond
Title
RCS SOLENOID ACT
D1/21/-Z
RCS SOLENOID ACT
B2/Z2/-Z
RCS SOLENOID ACT
A1/Y
RCS SOLENOID ACT
c2/Y
RCS SOLENOlb ACI'
CI/-Y
RCS SOLENOID ACI'
A2/-Y
TRANSLATIONAL
CONTROLLER XC MD
TRANSLATIONAL
CONTROLLEH-XC M]]
TRANSLATIONAl,
CONTROLLER YC MD
TRANSLNfIONAL
CONTROLLER -YC Y/)
TRANSLATIONAL
CONTROLLER ZC MD
TRANSLATIONAL
CY)NTROLLER -SC _)
SCS TVC AUTO COM-
_t_D PITCH
SCS TVC AUTO G)M-
MAND PITCH
ROT CONTEOL/MTVC
PITCH
ROT CONTROL/Mff_C
YAW CMC
ROT CONTROL/MTVC
ROLL CMC
ATTITUDE DFADBAND
MINIMUM
HIGH PRO RATE LIMIT
FDAI SCALE ERROR 5,
RATE 5
FDAI SCALE ERROR
5o/15, RT50/10
SCS DELTA V
CG-LM/CSM POS
DIR RCS SW NO 1
ENABLE POS IDIR RCS SW NO 2
ENABLE POS
SPS SOLENOID
DRIVER NO i
SPS SOLENOID
DRIVER NO 2
[]nit
VDC
YDC
VDC
DEG
Approx. Range
Low High
F1t{Et ARM
OFF
FIRE/ ARM
O _T
FIRE/ ARM
OFF
FI_/ ARM
o_T
FIRE/ ARM
0 FF
FIRE/
OFF
0 FF
OFF
OFF
0 FF
0 FF
OFF
-10
-10
-i0
-10
-li
.MAX
I/) W
OFF
<)FF
CSM
OFF
()FF
_'i_/
() FF
FI_/
OFF
High Bit Low Bit
Rate Rate
200
200
200
200
200
Units/Count
ARM 200
ON I0
ON i0
ON I0
ON i0
ON I0
ON i0
+i0 i00
+i0 i00
+i0 50
+i0 50
+ii 50
MIN i0
H I GH i0
ON l0
ON IO
124/ I0
CSM
ENABLE i0
ENABLE i0
ARM i0
ARM i0
i
i
I
1
i
i
0.08
0.08
0.078
0.08
0.087
i
1
i
1
i
1
i
1
i
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TABLE B7-11.- COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE TELEbGTTRY DATA SUMM_RY - Continued.
Number
CH3606X
CH3607X
CH3609X
CiI3610X
CH36i2X
CH3613X
CH3615X
CH3616X
CH3623X
CH 3624 X
CH3635X
CH3636X
CH3638X
CH3639X
CH3641X
CI13642X
C_13666C
CR3667C
CJ0060J
CJO061J
CJ 0062J
CJO200R
CJO201R
CJO202R
CKOO26A
CKOO27A
Me as ur ement
Approx. Range
Title Unit
Low H i @h
LIMIT CYCLE SW ON OFF
OFF POS
SC CONTROL SOUHCE CMC SCS
SWITCH
ROLL MAN ATT SW OFF ON
ACCEL CMD P0S
R MAN ATT SW MIN OFF ON
IMP CZ_I) POS
PITCH MAN ATT SW OFF ON
ACCEL CIMD POS
P MAN ATT SW MIN OP}' ON
IMP CMD POS
YAW MAN ATT SW OFf' ON
ACCEL CMD POS
YAW MAN ATT SW OFF ON
MIN IMP CMI) POS
GYRO i COM]3 SPIN LOW NORM
_fRS RUN DET
GYRO 2 COMB SPIN LOW NORM
MTRS RUN DET
BMAG MODE SW-ROLL OFF ON
ATT i RT 2
BMAG MODE SW-ROLL OFF ON
RATE 2
BMAG MODE SW-PITCH OFF ON
ATT i F{P 2
BMAG MODE SW-PITCH OFF ON
RATE 2
BMAG MODE SW-YAW OFF ON
ATT i RT 2
BMAG MODE SW-YAW OFF ON
HATE 2
TVC PITCH DIFF MA_ -800 +800
CURRENT
TVC YAW DIFF MAMP -800 +800
CURRENT
EKG COMMANDER LH MV NA NA
COUCH
EKG CO_94ANDER CTR MV NA NA
COUCH
EKG LM PILOT MV NA NA
RH COUCH
RESP RATE CMD, OHM HA NA
CM/1/_ PILOT
RESP RATE CM OHM NA NA
PILOT OTR COUCH
RESP BATE LM PILOT OHM NA NA
RH COUCH
(]M ACCEL X-AXIS G -2 +i0
CM ACCEL Y-AXIS G -2 +2
Samples/Second
High Bit Low Bit
Rate Rate
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i0 I
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i0 i
i0 I
I0
i0
i0
i0
i0
i0
200
i00
200
200
200
50
50
50
i00
i00
Units/Count
0.05
0.016
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'IZBLE By-11.- COMMAND AND S_IVICE MODULE TELEME'IgY DA'IF; S[}g,g_iQ[- ('ont[nu{_d.
Number
CK0028A
CKI051K
CKI052K
CKIO53R
CKI043
CKI044
SPOOOIP
SP0002T
SPOOO3P
SPOO06P
SPO022H
SP0023H
SPO024H
SP0025H
SPOO45T
SP0048T
SP0049T
SP0054T
SPO057T
SPOO61T
SPO062T
SP0600P
SP0601P
SP0655Q
SP0656Q
SP0657Q
SP0658Q
SP0661P
SPO930P
SP0931P
Measurement
Title Unit
CM ACCEL Z-AXIS
RADIATION DOS-
IMETER i
RADIATION DOS-
IMETER 2
DOSIMETER RATE
CHANGE
70mm HASSELBLAD
70mm LUNAR PHOTOG-
RAPHY
HE PRESS TANK
HE TEMP TANK
PRESS OXIDIZER
TANKS
PRESS _IJEL TANKS
POSITION FUEL/OX
VLV 1 POT B
POSITION FUEL/OX
VLV 2 POT B
POSITION FUEL/OX
VLV 3 POT B
POSITION FUEL/OX
VLV 4 POT B
TEMP ENG VALVE BODY
TEMP ENG FUEL FEED
LINE
TEMP ENG OX FEED
LINE
TEMPi OX DISTRI-
BUTION LINE
TE_P i FUEL DISTRI-
BtrfION LINE
ENG INJEC'rOR FLANGE
TEMP NO i
ENG INJECTOR FLANGE
TEMP NO 2
ENG VLV ACT SYS
TANK PR PRI
ENG VLV ACT SYS
TANK PR SEC
QUAN OX TANK i
PRI-TOTAL AUX
QUAN 0X TANK 2
QUAN FUEL T,MIK i
PHI-TOTAL AUX
QUAN FUEL TANK 2
PRESS ENGINE
CttAMBER
PRESS FUEL SM/ENG
INTERFACE
PRESS 0X SM/ENG
INTERFACE
G
VDC
VbC
VDC
PS i A
o ],
PSIA
PSIA
DEC
DEG
DFG
DEG
° F
° F
op
o F
o F
Op
oF
PSIA
PSIA
PCT
PCT
PCT
PCT
PSIA
PSIA
PSIA
Approx. Range
Low High
-2 +2
0 5
0 5
0 5
OFF ON
OFF ON
o. 5000
-io@ +200
o 250
o 250
0 pO
0 90
o 90
o 9O
0 +200
0 L+200
0 +200
0 +200
0 +200
o 600
0 6OO
0 5000.
0 5OOO.
0 5O
0 6o
o 5o
0 6o
0 150
o 300
0 300
Samples/Second
High Bit l,ow Bit
Rate Rate
100
i0
i0
i
i00
i00
Units/Count
0.016
0.02 - NL
0.02 - NL
0.02 - NL
i0
1
I0
lO
I0
I0
i0
i0
I
1
1
i
1
I
1
i
i
i
I
i
1
i00
i0
i0
21
1.2
1
0.h6
0.46
0._6
o.46
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
2.3
2.3
21
21
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.6
1.3
1.3
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TABLE B7-11.- cOMMAND AND sF/IVICE M(IDUI_ TELEMETRY DATA SUMMARY - Continued.
Number
CR00OIP
CR0002P
CR0003T
CR0004T
CR0035P
CR0036P
SRS001P
SR5002P
SR5003P
SR500hP
SR5013T
SR501hT
SR5015T
SR5016T
SRS025q
SR5026Q
SR5027Q
SR5028Q
SR5065T
SR5066T
SR5067T
SR5068T
SR5729P
SR5733P
SR5737P
SR5776P
SR5780P
SR578hP
SR5817P
SR5820P
SR5821P
Measurement
Title Unit
Approx. Range
Low High
HE PRESS TANK A PSIA 0. 5000
HE PRESS TANK B PSIA O. 5000
HE TEMP TANK A °F 0 +300
HE TEMP TANK B °F 0 +300
PRESS CM-RCS HE PSIA 0 400
MANIFOLD i
PRESS CM-RCS HE PSIA 0 bOO
MANIFOLD 2
HE PRESS TANK A 0 5000
HE PRESS TANK B 0 5000
HE PRESS TANK C 0 5000
HE PRESS TANK D 0 5000
HE TEMP TANK A 0 +i00
HE TEMP TANK B 0 +iO0
HE TEMP TANK C 0 +i00
HE TEMP TANK D 0 +i00
QUAN S_ RCS PRO 0
SYS A
QUAN SM RCS PRO 0 5
SYS B
QUAN SM RCS PRO 0 5
SYS C
QUAN SM RCS PRO 0 5
SYS D
TEMP ENGINE PACK- 0 +300
AGE A
TEMP ENGINE PACK- 0 +300
AGE B
TEMP ENGINE PACK- 0 +300
AGE C
TEMP ENGINE PACK- 0 +300
AGE D
A HE MANIFOLD PRESS 0 400
OX MANIFOLD PR 0 300
SYS A
FJEL MANIFOLD PR 0 400
SYS A
B HE MANIFOLD PRESS 0 400
OX MANIFOLD PR 0 300
SYS B
FUEL MANIFOLD PR 0 400
SYS B
C HE MANIFOLD PRESS C 400
OX MANIFOLD PR 0 300
SYS C
OX MANIFOLD PR O 300
SYS D
Samples/Second
High Bit Low Bit
Rate Rate
i i
i i
i0 1
I0 i
i0 1
iO i
i i
i i
1 1
1 1
i0 i
lO 1
i0 1
i0 1
i i
1 i
1 1
i 1
1
1
1
i
i0 1
i0
i0 1
i0 1
i0
i0 1
i0 1
i0
i0
Units/Count
21
21
1.2
1.2
1.7
1.7
21
21
21
21
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.7
1.3
1.7
1.7
1.3
1.7
1.7
1.3
1.3
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TABLE B7-I]7.- COM},IANb i\ND LU,_<V[CE MODULE TE_{Y DATA gUb_%¾RY - Continued.
Number
SR5822P
SR5823P
SR5830P
BS0080X
BS0081X
CS0150X
LS0200H
CS0220T
CT0012X
crOOl5V
crool6v
ur0017V
CT0018V
ur0120X
CT0125V
OT0126V
C_0262V
CTO340X
CT0620E
fff0640F
STO820K
STO821K
STO822K
STO823K
STO830K
STO831K
Measurement
Approx. Range
Title Unit
Low High
_UEL MM_IFOLD PI_ PSIA 0 400
SYS C
FUEL MA]_IFOLD PR PSIA 0 400
SYS D
D HE MANIFOLD PRESS PSIA 0 400
EDS ABORT REQUEST A NORM ABORT
EDS ABORT REQUEST B NORM ABORT
MASTER CAUTION- WARN/ NORM
WARNING ON OFF
ANGLE OF ATTACK PSID C_ 5
TEMP DOCKING PROBE °F -i00 +300
DSE TAPE MOTION OFF MOTION
MONITOR
SIG COND POS SUPPLY VDC _ 22
VOLTS
SIG OOND NEG SUPPLY VDC -22 C,
VOLTS
SENSOR EXCITATION VDC O 5-P
5 VOLTS
SENSOR EXCITATION VDC 0 ii.
i0 VOLTS
PCM BIT RATE CHANGE LOW HIGH
8 BIT
PCM HI LEVEL 85 VI)C 0 +5
PERCENT REF
PCM HI LEVEL 15 VDC (, +5
PERCENT REF
UDL VALIDITY SIG NA NA
4-BIT
PCM SYNC SOURCE EXT INT EXT
OR INT
S-BAND REC 1-2 AGC COUNTS i 254
VOLTAGE
S-BAND RCVR 1-2 COUNTS i 254
STATIC PH ERR
PROTON COUNT RATE K]iz 0 !©0
CHANNEL 1
PROTON COUNT RATE K]iz 0 1,<
CHANNEL 2
PROTON COUNT RATE Kiiz 0 J 0
CHANNEL 3
PROTON COUNT RATE KHz 0 1%
CHANNEL 4
ALPHA COUNT RATE KHz 0 l_
CHANNEL I
ALPHA COUNT RATE KHz 0 lO
CHANNEL 2
Samples/Second
High Bit Low Bit
Rate Rate
i0 i
i0 i
i0 1
i0 1
i0 i
i0 i
i0
i
i0 i
10 i
i0 I
l0 i
l0 1
i 1
i0 1
i0 i
50 iO
i0
i0 I
i0
i0
i0
i0
i0
IO
i0
Units/Count
1.7
1.7
1.7
0.017
1.7
0.09
0.09
0.02
0.04
0.02
O. 02
i - NL
i - NL
0.015 - NL
0.0015 - NL
0.0015 - NL
0.0015 - NL
0.0016 - NL
0.0015 - NL
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'iTdtLE BY- fl •- <;(3,_,_,_r,,) AI'gD S]_{VICE MOD] ILE TELEMf_{Y DATA NL_,g@,I{Y - C,on,::lud _'<].
Number
ST0832K
ST0838K
ST08hOT
ST0841T
Measurement
Title
ALPHA COUNT RATE
CHANNEL 3
PHOTON-ALPHA INTEGH
C_UNT RATE
TEMP NUCLEAR PAR-
TICLE bET
TEMP NUCLEAR PAR-
TICLE ANALYZER
Unit
KHz
KHz
o F
o F
Approx.
LOW
0
0
-120
-120
Range
High
10
i00
+200
+200
Samples/Second
High Bit Low Bit
Rate Rate
i0
i0
1
1
Un i t s / Count
0.0015 - NL
0.015 - NL
1.2 - NL
1.2 - NL
NL - Non Linear
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MISSIONCONTROL
The Flight Director in Mission Control is supported by a team of
specialists who are responsible for different aspects of spacecraft
operation. These specialists are located in Mission Control and sit in
front of console displays which provide real-time telemetry data. Each
specialist is in voice contact with a group of support personnel in
adjacent rooms who also have access to real-time telemetry data. See
Appendix A, Part A4 for a description of the organization of Mission
Control.
The display console for the CSMElectrical and Environmental
Engineer (EECOM)is shownin figure B7-7 and is representative of the
type of displays available to all the specialists in the Mission Con-
trol Center. The two television monitors on the console are used to
display real-time telemetry data. Although various data formats are
available to the EECOM_the two displays most frequently in use are
shownin figures B7-8 and B7-9. These displays are updated once per
second.
As an aid in recognizing out-of-tolerance parameters and space-
craft events, three groups of event indicators are provided at the top
of the console. The lights on these panels which alert the EECOMto
out-of-tolerance parameters are referred to as limit sense lights. A
limit sense light comeson whenever the parameter in question falls
outside of high and low limits which are manually set by the EECOMfor
that particular parameter. Amongthe 72 lights on panel 3, there are
a total of 12 limit sense lights for pressure, temperature, and quantity
in each cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen tank. In normal operation, the
EECOMsets fairly tight limits on the limit sense lights in order to
get an immediate indication of parameter variations. Consequently, it
is not unusual for several limit sense lights to be burning.
Besides the limit sense lights, there are lights which indicate
spacecraft events. Oneof these_ located in the _pper row of panel 9,
indicates the presence of a master caution and warning in the spacecraft.
The following is a list of the system specialists in Mission Control:
(a) Retrofire Officer (RETRO)- responsible for abort planning,
deorbit/entry times, and landing point prediction.
(b) Flight DynamicsOfficer (FIDO) - responsible for coordinating
and participating in mission planning and the control of the trajectory
aspects of the mission, including powered flight trajectory, abort, and
orbital GO/NOGOdecision.
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(c) Guidance Officer (GUIDO) - responsible for the utilization of
the guidance and navigation system_ correlation of inertial alignment,
and evaluation of terminal phase actions in support of rendezvous.
(d) CSM Electrical, Environmental, and Communications Engineer
(EECOM) - responsible for monitoring and evaluating the performance of
the electrical power, environmental control, instrumentation, and sequen-
tial systems of the command and service modules.
(e) CSM Guidance and Navigation Officer (GNC) - responsible for
monitoring and evaluating the performance of the guidance and navigation,
propulsion, and stabilization and control systems of the command and
service modules.
(f) LM Electrical, Environmental, and EMV Officer (TELMU) - respon-
sible for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the primary
guidance and navigation, abort guidance, control electronics, ascent
propulsion, descent propulsion_ and reaction control systems of the
lunar module.
(g) LM Control Officer (CONTROL) - responsible for monitoring and
evaluating the performance of the electrical, communications, instru-
mentation, sequential, and environmental control systems of the lunar
module.
(h) Instrumentation and Communication Officer (INCO) responsible
for monitoring and evaluating the performance of spacecraft communica-
tions systems.
(i) Procedures Officer (PROCEDURES) responsible for the detailed
procedures implementation of Mission Control.
(j) Flight Activities Officer (FA0) - responsible for the detailed
implementation of the flight plan and its revision.
(k) Aeromedical Officer (SURGEON) - directs all operational medical
activities concerned with the mission.
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The following table lists the membersof the White and Black
Mission Control teams. The White Teamwas on duty at the time of the
accident_ and manyof the Black Teammemberswere in Mission Control
preparatory to their going on duty about an hour later.
Position White Black
Flight Director
Asst. Flt. Dir.
RETRO
FIDO
GUIDO
EECOM
GNC
TELMU
CONTROL
INCO
PROCEDURES
FAO
SURGEON
E. F. Kranz
J. M. Leeper
B. T. Spencer
W. M. Stoval
W. E. Fenner
S. A. Liebergot
B. N. Willoughby
R. H. Heselmeyer
L. W. Strimple
G. B. Scott
J. R. Fucci
E. B. Pippert
W. R. Hawkins
G. S. Lunney
L. W. Keyser
T. E. Weichel
W. J. Boone
J. G. Renick
W. C. Burton
J. A. Kamman
W. M. Merritt
H. A. Loden
T. L. Hanchett
E. W. Thompson
T. R. Lindsey
G. F. Humbert
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PART CI
TASK ASSIGNMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
Panel 2 was assigned the responsibility of reviewing manufacturing
and testing associated with spacecraft equipment involved in the flight
failure as determined from the review of the flight data and the analysis
of the design. In particular, the Panel was to examine discrepancies
noted during the fabrication, assembly, and test of components of the
oxygen portion of the cryogenic gas storage system within the service
module in order to determine any correlations between such preflight
discrepancies and the actual inflight events.
Members of the Panel observed actual assembly of an oxygen tank
and the oxygen shelf at various stages of assembly at the contractor
facilities and reviewed documentation relating to the course of Apollo
13 equipment from manufacturing through test to launch. In addition,
the Panel reviewed parts and material qualification data, inspection
reports, reliability and quality control records_ and preflight test
and checkout procedures and results. Throughout the course of its
review, Panel 2 concentrated on determining whether manufacturing or
test procedures could adversely affect reliable conduct of flight. The
steps in the manufacturing and testing of the suspected components were
studied so as to evaluate various equipment acceptance procedures.
Finally, the Panel attempted to relate observed flight events back to
individual points in the manufacturing and testing process in order to
determine if any correlation was probable.
C-I
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PART C2
ORGANI ZAT ION
Panel 2 was chaired by Mr. H. M. Schurmeier, Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, and the Board Monitor was Dr. J. F. Clark, Goddard Space
Flight Center. Panel members were:
Mr. E. F. Baehr, Lewis Research Center
Mr. K. L. Heimburg, Marshall Space Flight Center
Mr. B. T. Morris, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Specific assignments covering such areas as subsystem testing,
fabrication process, and reliability and quality assurance were given
to each Panel Member. In reaching Panel conclusions, however, all
Members participated in the weighing and evaluation of data.
This page left blank intentionally.
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PART C3
SUMMARY
The basic tank provides a thermally isolated pressure vessel struc-
ture that is relatively straightforward to manufacture. The manufactur-
ing process has reasonable controls and provides tanks of high structural
quality.
The manufacture of the internally mounted equipment is somewhat
more complex because of the large number of parts that are required to
make these assemblies. The careful use of jigs, fixtures, and the
detailed Manufacturing Operations Procedures (MOP) adequately controls
these steps and provides hardware fully meeting the structural design
requirements as stated on the engineering drawings.
The most noteworthy manufacturability shortcoming of the design
is the routing of the wires from the electrical devices within the tank.
The passageways are small, adjacent metal corners are relatively sharp,
and the condition of the insulation cannot be inspected after assembly.
The assembly process is very difficult and even though detailed MOP's
are provided and the technicians are skilled and experienced in these
operations, the resultant product is of questionable quality because of
the many opportunities to damage the insulation on the wires. Even in
the assembled condition_ the wires can be damaged because of the lack
of support and restraint and the exposure to turbulent fluid during
tanking, detanking_ and purging operations.
Another notable shortcoming of the design is the very loose toler-
ances specified for the tank fill tube connecting parts. The tolerance
range permitted by the engineering drawings can result in a fill tube
assembly that can fall out of place if the parts are at or near the low
tolerance limits. The parts cannot be assembled if their size averages
much larger than nominal. Even with all parts of the fill tube assembly
near the nominal sizes specified, adequate diametral clearance exists
for a sizable gas leakage path.
The Globe Industries, Inc., fan motors have had a history of numer-
ous problems. Many design changes were introduced to overcome these
problems. The most prevalent problem was dielectric breakdown within
the stator windings. Process changes and the addition of 300 volts rms
phase-to-phase dielectric tests during stator assembly greatly reduced
the incidence rate of this problem.
The standard acceptance procedures adequately cover all functional
requirements for normal flight use but do not check the ability of the
heater thermostats (thermostatic switches) to function under load,
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nor do they state a requirement for proper functioning of the fill tube
assembly, which must function as a dip tube during detanking operations.
The manufacturing history of tank no. 2 of Service Module 109
(10024XTA0008) before delivery from Beech was unusual only to the extent
that the tank was reworked twice after initial closure, once to replace
a heater tube assembly including both motor fans and once to replace
pinch-off tube assemblies used in evacuation of the annulus volume
between the tank shells.
The test history was unusual only to the extent that the high but
acceptable heat leak characteristic caused months of delay in tank
acceptance. No direct evidence of any particular characteristic of
this tank at delivery from Beech, as distinguished from any other
Block II oxygen tank, was found that would correlate with the Apollo 13
flight accident.
The normal procedure at the conclusion of the heat leak tests at
Beech Aircraft Corporation, Boulder_ Colorado, calls for expelling the
last 25 pounds of the remaining liquid oxygen through the "fill" line
by applying pressure to the vent line with gaseous nitrogen. Although
the tank assembly is on a weighing system which has a resolution of
0.3 pound, and the procedure calls for continuing the application of
vent line pressure until both the weighing system and quantity probe
indicate the tank is empty, no data were recorded that verify that
remaining oxygen was expelled as a liquid. At the time no one indicated
that the response of the tank to the procedures was anything but normal,
and today careful review of existing data, discussions with the responsible
Beech Aircraft and North American Rockwell personnel, and a special test
at Beech Aircraft indicates that the detanking of the 0008 tank was most
probably normal.
The manufacturing and test procedures and activities for inte-
grating the oxygen storage tanks into the service module were thoroughly
detailed and closely monitored with respect to procedures. They involved
checkouts with dry gas only, until cryogenic oxygen reaches the tanks
during the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) at Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
a few weeks before launch. Between the tank acceptance and CDDT only
pressure vessel integrity and electrically observable phenomena of the
inner tank elements are tested. No tests are performed to check the
ability of the thermostats to interrupt either the spacecraft-supplied
heater power (about 2.8 amps at 28 V dc) or the GSE power (about 6 amps
at 65 V dc).
In August 1968, oxygen shelf assemblies at North American Rockwell
(NR), Downey, were scheduled to be modified to add potting to the
dc-to-dc converters of oxygen tank v_-ion pumps for electromagnetic
interference prevention. During factory procedures with the oxygen
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shelf assembly incorporating tank 10024XTA0008 in the tank no. 2 position
in Service Module 106 at NR, Downey, a handling fixture incident (ini-
tiated by failure to remove an unnoticed shelf bolt) subjected this tank
to unexpected Jolts. These included the apparent shelf damaging contact
of the tank with the fuel cell shelf and drop of the tank with the shelf
to the normal oxygen mounts. Such elements as the fill tube segments
appear vulnerable to this incident. No record of investigation into the
internal condition of the tank other than pressure and electrical circuit
test could be found. Manufacturing and test records do not show engineer-
ing assistance related to conditions internal to the oxygen storage tank.
Service Module 106 was promptly repaired and fitted with a different
oxygen shelf already modified (ultimately it flew as Apollo I0). The
tank and the oxygen shelf now under review were re-inspected and retested
during the first 3 weeks of November 1968. They were then installed in
Service Module 109 (used in the Apollo 13 flight). This service module
was completed, tested, and checked out normally thereafter, so far as
the oxygen system was concerned, and transported to KSC in mid-1969.
During integrated test and checkout at KSC, no major anomaly
occurred until the tank-emptying phase of the CDDT, March 23, 1970.
After this first cryogenic oxygen loading since February 1967, expulsion
of liquid oxygen through the "fill" line under gas pressure applied
through the vent line was not achieved. Evidence supporting the
assumptions of leakage or dislodgment of the fill line segments (two
Teflon elbows and one short Inconel tube) in the top of the quantity
probe assembly within the oxygen tank was produced at KSC in the
processes of emptying the tank.
Special methods used for emptying on March 27 and 28, 1970, and
again on March 30, involved protracted operation of the tank heaters
and fans for many hours and at maximum heater voltage. In conjunction
with this heating, cyclic gas pressurization and blowdown was used to
achieve rapid boiling to remove oxygen from the tank. Analyses of
data taken during the early portion of these procedures confirm boiling
as sufficient to detank the observed quantities.
These methods were not supported by previous comparable operations
with any other Apollo CSM cryogenic oxygen storage tank. Thus it was
not demonstrated separately that such operation could be accomplished
without degradation or hazard in the subsequent flight use of the tank.
A review of all the evidence available indicates that this tank
(at least the fill line segments) most probably arrived at the CDDT in
a different condition than that in which it was last tested at Beech
Aircraft Corporation.
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Tests were conducted at the Manned Spacecraft Center to evaluate
the effects of the sustained heater operation during the special de-
tanking operation at KSC on March 27, 1970. These tests demonstrated
that the thermostats would weld closed when they attempted to interrupt
the 5.9 amps, 65 volts dc GSE power (a condition for which they were
neither designed nor qualified) resulting in their failing to limit
the temperature inside the tank. The tests also showed that with the
heaters on continuously and as the cryogenic liquid boiled away,
temperatures in the 700 ° to i000 ° F range would exist on portions of
the heater tube in contact with the motor wires. These temperatures
severely damaged the Teflon insulation even in the nitrogen atmosphere
of these tests. Small-scale tests subjecting Teflon insulated wires
to 700 ° to i000 ° F temperature oxygen atmosphere indicated even more
severe damage to the Teflon insulation.
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the special detanking
procedures employed on tank 0008 at KSC prior to launch of Apollo 13
severely damaged the insulation of the motor wiring inside the tank.
A more complete test is being conducted at Beech Aircraft,
Boulder, Colorado, to simulate the special detanking operations used
at KSC on March 27-28 and 30, 1970. This test will utilize a flight
configuration tank, simulated KSC ground support equipment, and will
be conducted using oxygen.
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PART C-4
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
MANUFACTURE AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING
OF THE CRYOGENIC OXYGEN STORAGE TANKS
The cryogenic oxygen storage tanks are manufactured by the Beech
Aircraft Corporation, Boulder Division_ located north of Boulder, Colorado.
The tank consists of a spherical high-pressure inner vessel wrapped with
multiiayer insulation contained within a thin external metal vacuum jacket.
Inside the pressure vessel are a heater and fan assembly (two heaters and
two fans), a quantity measuring probe_ and a temperature sensor. Many of
the parts and subassemblies that comprise this tank are purchased by Beech
from subcontractors and vendors located throughout the United States.
The detailed instructions for the manufacture and assembly of these
tanks and their subassemblies at Beech are controlled by Manufacturing
Operations Procedures (MOP). In addition to instructing the technicians_
the MOP also calls out the presence and activities of the inspectors.
Summary of the Standard Tank Manufacturing Process
The inner pressure vessel is made from two forged hemispheres of
!nconel 718 alloy. The rough-machined heat-treated forgings are supplied
by the Cameron Iron Works, Houston, Texas. The physical, chemical, and
metallurgical properties (X-ray, ultrasonic scan, and microstructure) of
these forgings are tested and certified by Cameron. The Airite Division
of Electrodata Corp., Los Angeles, California_ does the final machining
and electron beam welding. Prior to welding a very thorough inspection
is made of each hemisphere. About 430 thickness checks are made to assure
compliance to dimensional accuracy requirements. Each hemisphere is
thoroughly X-rayed and dye-penetrant inspected for defects. The internal
parts that support the heater probe assembly are made by Beech and supplied
to Airite for installation prior to making the electron beam equatorial
weld. A rather elaborate five-step welding process is used in making this
equatorial weld (figs. C4-I and C4-2). The first step is a series of tack
welds. The second step is a seal weld of shallow penetration. The third
step is a deep-penetration weld. The fourth step is a shallower and wider
weld to blend surfaces. The fifth weld is called a cover pass which is
still wider and shallower for final surface blending. The completed vessel
is X-rayed and then pressure tested. A hydrostatic proof pressure of
+00
i_51 psig -55 is applied for _ minutes using water. The volumetric ex-
pansion during the proof-pressure test is determined by measuring the
weight increase of water contained within the test specimen. A leak test
c°9
Joint configuration _ _. 020+'005
I I -- _O.D. surface
-- .... P//'I_TX - - .... T+
.111_.oo2,. .1_±.oo2 o_jl 0o2
s ,, ce
.012 •1:. o04-_+.oOoO  
L "I . Weld reinforcement
P/M th ickness
L T
1.000
2.000
3.000
+.002
,084
+,002
.067
+ 004
.059_ 000
Tank radius Dimensions
O,D, I.D.
+005
14.808 refar c 12.528 -0 Sphrad
+005
14.808 refar c 12.528 -0 Sphrad
+005
12.587 refarc 12.528 -0 Sphrad
Parameter
Voltage- Kv
Amperes - MA
Beam deflection - in.
Travel- in./min
Vacuum -mm hg
Weld schedule (Electron beam weld)
Pass sequence
1-tack 2-seal 3-pene. 1 4-pene .2 5-c over
80 80 115 95 85
1.5 1.5 6.0 4.0 3.0
0.012 0.012 .024/.036 .040/.080 0.110
18 --"_- --"- _"
2 X I O-4 _,- --_- I_ II
Notes: (1) 0.002" gap, 0,00_3" offset (maxtyp)
(2) No weld repairs allowed
(15) Typical weld sequence shown on attached sketch
Figure C4-i,- Girth weld joint configuration and schedule.
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I.D. surface
___ass 1 and 2 (tack and seal)
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eld joint
3 (penetration 1)
Fusion zone _ IF Pass 4 (penetration)
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Figure C4-2.- Weld sequence.
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is madeat 925 psig ±15 using helium. These tests are performed by the
Beech Test Department before acceptance. The completed vessels, along
with substantiating data, are shipped to Beech for assem01y.
The inner pressure vessel is cleaned for oxygen service and sealed
in plastic. Whenscheduled for application of insulation, the vessel,
the insulation, and the other necessary piece parts and supplies are moved
to a small room annex to an area knownas the Respectable Room. (The
Respectable Room, its annexes, a_d the Ultra Clean Roomtogether are
knownas the Apollo Assembly Area.)
All assembly operations performed in these rooms are in accord with
standard clean room techniques, _.e., lint-free gowns, caps, and gloves.
A simple entrance airlock has a motorized shoe brush and vacuumcleaner
but the brushes are disabled so as not to rotate under motor power. There
is no air scrub.
The insulation is applied to the inner vessel in gore panels, a layer
at a time. The insulation consists of many layers of Dexiglas Insulation
paper (C. H. Dextar & Son, Inc.), fiberglass, mats, aluminum foil, and
aluminized Mylar. Each layer is carefully applied to the vessel, tem-
porarily held in place with tape, trimmed for fit, and then finally held
in place by thin nylon threads. After the threads are in place the tape
is removed. The joints in succeeding layers are shifted so as to effec-
tively block the flow of heat. _he aluminum foil layers are checked with
an ohmmeterto assure no electrical contact with inner vessel or adjacent
foil layers. About halfway thro_gh the insulation process, a tube is in-
stalled which goes from the vacuumdomearea to the equator, around the
equator, and back to the domearea. This is called the vapor cool shield(VCS). (See fig. C4-3.)
After all the insulation is applied, the external metal jacket is
installed. These parts are madeby Chemtronics, Inc. The main upper and
lower hemispheres are deep drawn and chem-milled. The equatorial flange
is machined from a ring forging (fig. C4-4). All parts are madeof
Inconel 750 alloy. An assembly of the lower hemisphere and equatorial
flange is madeby Heli-arc welding. A shield is placed over the in-
sulation in the region of the final closure weld between the lower
hemisphere-flange assembly and t_Leupper hemisphere shell. After these
parts are positioned over the in;ulated pressure vessel, the circum-
ferential weld to join them is madeby the automatic Heli-arc welding
process using argon gas for iner_ing the weld zone. The welds in the
vacuumjacket are then X-ray inspected to insure integrity.
Figure C4-5 shows the major subassemblies required to complete the
oxygen tank assembly. A]I componentsand piece parts required to build
subassemblies are cleaned for liquid oxygen service, grouped as required
C-12
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Figure C4-4.- Installation of vacut_m jacket.
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Figure C4-5.- Major subassemblies required for tank assembly.
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for each subassembly (kitted), and sealed in a clear nylon plastic bag
which is then sealed in a clear polyethylene bag. These kits are stored
for the subassembly and assembly operations which are performed in various
rooms of the Apollo Assembly Area.
The heater and fan assembly is made from numerous small parts welded,
brazed, riveted, or bolted together (fig. C4-6). The first operation in-
stalls the lower pump nozzle assembly into the lower motor housing. These
parts are positioned in a jig and then fusion welded in place. After this
weld is X-rayed, the part is turned to trim the inside diameter and to
assure roundness. The lower motor housing is then positioned and welded
to the central tube. The weld zone is X-rayed and the entire assembly is
pickled and passivated. The two helically preformed stainless-tube-encased
nichrome heating elements are then slid in place. Before proceeding the
heaters are tested for resistance and isolation from ground. The upper
motor housing tube is then positioned and welded to the central heater
tube. After this weld is X-rayed, the heaters are positioned and silver
soldered in position. After the heater tube is thoroughly cleaned to re-
move any silver solder flux, the tube (conduit) that routes the wires from
the lower motor past the heater elements is installed by riveting the two
small clips to the inside of the central tube. Small aluminum shims are
riveted to the inner surface of the heater tube to provide a flat surface
for the mounting of the thermostats. The unit is then vacuum baked at
200 ° F to remove any moisture from the heater assembly. The resistance
and insulation tests are again run to assure that the brazing has not
damaged the heaters and that the units are thoroughly dry.
At this point the heater tube is ready for the installation of the
thermostats. The thermostats are purchased from the Spencer Thermostat
Division of Metals and Controls, Inc., Attleboro, Massachusetts. Each
thermostat is subje_'ted to detailed acceptance testing by Metals and
Controls, Inc., and these data are supplied to Beech with the serialized
switches. The acceptance testing consists of a I000 V ac dielectric
test for I minute, a visual check for workmanship, a dimensional check
to drawing size callouts, a 5-rminute soak in liquid nitrogen, the open-
ing temperature, the closing temperature, a second 5-minute soak in
liquid nitrogen, a recheck of the opening temperature, a recheck of the
closing temperature, a leak test to check hermetic seal, a megohm test,
the final inspection marking, a recording of number of cycles on the
unit as shipped, the actual weight of unit, and visual packing and ship-
ping inspection. Throughout all testing by Metal and Controls, the
thermostats are checked by using 6.5 V ac and a small lamp drawing ap-
proximately I00 milliamps. Incoming inspection at Beech is limited to
a visual examination.
The thermostats are inserted into the tube with their hook-type
terminals extending to the outside of the heater tube and bolted in
place. This heater tube assembly is then cleaned and bagged for future
assembly operations.
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The electric motor fans are purchased from Globe Industries, Inc.
These motors go through a thorough acceptance test at Globe before
delivery to Beech. In addition to the normal visual and mechanical in-
spection, the motors are functionally tested at both ambient and cryo-
genic conditions. A i000 V dc dielectric strength test is applied be-
tween the windings and case. The isolation must be at least 2 megohms.
The motor is then operated on 115 V ac 400 cycles, and the following
characteristics are measured and recorded: (i) speed and current of
motor when operating with a calibrated test fan, and (2) line current
and total power both running and still. The motors are then operated in
liquid nitrogen. These checks are limited to assuring that the motor
starts and runs smoothly and that coastdown time is at least 30 seconds.
At Beech the normal visual incoming inspection was performed and
then these parts were stored until ready to be incorporated into the
heater and fan assembly.
The kits of parts and components required for the heater and fan
assembly are moved to an annex room of the Respectable Area where this
assembly operation is performed on a laminar flow bench. The necessary
tools are cleaned and laid out for ease in the assembly process. An
assembly aid is used to support the fan and heater tube in the hori-
zontal position.
The lower electric motor is now installed. The electrical leads
are provided by the motor supplier (four 26-gage nickel with Teflon
insulation twisted i0 turns to the foot with a 2-inch-long Teflon sleeve
adjacent to the motor) (fig. C4-7). These leads are routed parallel to
the motor shaft through a shallow groove milled half in the motor end
cap and half in the motor support tube (figs. C4-8 and C4-9). From
this channel the wires are routed against the inner surface of the
motor tube in the region of the impeller. The wires then emerge through
a hole in the motor housing tube (ungrommeted). The motor is inserted
in the end of the tube (fig. C4-I0) and the motor end plate is installed.
Shims are used as required under this motor end cap to provide 0.090-inch
to O.040-inch end clearance between the impeller and the nozzle. _en
ti_e proper shims are selected and installed, the four end cap screws
are torqued to the required value (fig. C4-II). The end cap is bolted
to the support tube by four radial countersunk machine bolts, small
segment-shaped shims, and self-locking nuts (all metal).
When the location of the lower motor is verified as having the
correct impeller-to-nozzle clearance, the wire routing task continues.
The wires travel axially about 2 inches (fig. C4-12) where they go in-
board through a Teflon grommet into the inner conduit and travel the
length of the heater section to a symmetrical location where they again
emerge to the exterior through a Teflon grommet. A single insulated
wire is used to pull the motor leads through this conduit route.
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Figure C4- l2 .- Installing lower motor lead wires in heater conduit . 
• f ... ..
... 
The installation of the upper motor follows the same general sequence
except that once the leads emerge from the tube they do not reenter the
heater tube but remain as a twisted bundle of four wires encased in a
Teflon sleeve.
Next a small copper band is formed around the upper and lower motor
wire bundles in the areas where the impellers of the fans are located to
assure that the wires maintain the required clearance with the impellers
(approximately 0.030 inch) (figs. C4-13 and C4-1h). The ends of these
bands are sweat soldered together to retain the wires. The motor leads
external to the heater tube are then encased in Teflon shrink tubing.
White tubing is used for the lower motor leads and clear tubing is used
for the upper motor leads.
The leads are then installed for the heaters. One wire from each
heater is soldered to its thermostat. The lead wires (20-gage silver-
plated copper with Teflon insulation) are soldered, one to the other
terminal of the thermostat and the other wire to the second lead of the
nichrome heater element. Separate leads (four total; two for each
heater) are provided to extend to the electrical connector fitted out-
side the dome at the top of the vacuum jacket. Again a cleaning operation
is performed to remove any solder flux. Standard 60-percent tin and
40-percent lead solder is used for all electrical connections.
The entire heater and fan probe assembly is subjected to a detailed
component acceptance test to assure proper operation. The unit is placed
in a controllable temperature oven. Starting from about i00 ° F, the
oven temperature is slowly lowered until the closing of each heater therm-
ostat is noted by means of a Wheatstone bridge. While in this closed
position, the resistance value of each heater element is measured and re-
corded. The oven temperature is then slowly raised to detect the opening
temperature for each thermostat. With the unit removed from the oven,
the resistance value of each motor winding is measured and recorded. The
heaters and motors are subjected to a dielectric strength test at 500 V dc
with a maximum allowable leakage current of 0.25 milliamps permitted.
The insulation resistance of both heaters and both motors is measured and
must indicate a minimum of 2 megohms isolation. The proper operation of
the motors is verified in two vertical orientations at full voltage and
at two vertical and one horizontal orientations at reduced voltage
(80 + 2 Vac). The time in tenths of hours and number of motor starts are
recorded for each test sequence and this is added to the previous history
for continuity. The entire assembly is then cleaned for liquid oxygen
service, bagged, and stored for future use.
The upper coil assembly as shown on figure C4-5 consists of five
coiled tubes to provide the necessary resistance in the heat flow path,
an adapter to fit the tank neck, a seal-off plate for the side of the
coil housing (vacuum dome), end fittings for the feed lines (that connect
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Figure C4-14.- Forming copper band to retain motor T,.,ri res. 
to the vapor cool shield), and a connector adapter fitting. These tubes 
are formed by a subcontractor in Denver. The material for all tubes is 
Inconel 750. All bending is performed using a flexible chain mandrel of 
Ampco bronze and Dcon lubricant (water soluble). The various piece parts 
are carefully cleaned and jigged for Heli-arc welding into an assembly. 
The supply line filter is installed and safety wired. The assembly is 
X-rayed, recleaned, and bagged for future use. 
The quantity probe is a purchased item which is procured from 
Simmonds Precision complete with leads and temperature sensor installed 
with leads attached (fig. C4-l5). This unit is made of two concentric 
aluminUm tubes for the capacitance-type quantity (density) probe with 
Teflon spacer buttons located in drilled holes in the inner tube to pro­
vide centering action. The lower ends of the concentric tubes terminate 
in a glass-filled Teflon bushing. This bushing acts as a lower pilot 
support and also provides a nonconducting extension of the inner tube 
which is also utilized as a dip tube for the filling and detanking 
operations. The axial relationship of the inner and outer aluminum 
tubes is controlled by a single rivet installed through Teflon bushings 
near the upper end of the assembly. 
The upper end of the outer aluminum tube is supported in a large 
glass-filled Teflon bushing which is riveted to an Inconel tube for final 
support to the tank adapter. This upper bushing has two axial holes to 
provide routing for the motor and heater leads. The temperature sensing 
element is mounted on the side of this bushing. Axially aligned pins 
through two 0.44-inch cross-drilled holes are used as junction points be­
tween the short leads from the temperature sensor and the 48-inch-long 
extension leads. Two 22-gage wires are used for each extension lead of 
the sensor (a total of four wires). The capacitance element leads consist 
of a shielded 20-gage wire for the inner tube and an unshielded 20-gage 
wire for the outer. Two channel-shaped clips are riveted to the upper 
ends of the aluminum tubes to solder the lead wires on. The quantity 
sensor leads are encased in a clear Teflon shrink sleeve. The temperature 
sensor leads are encased in a separate clear Teflon shrink sleeve. All 
solder joints are made with 60-percent tin, 40-percent lead solder. 
After incoming inspection of this Simmonds-manufactured assembly 
verifies conformance to the purchase specifications, the unit is cleaned 
for liquid oxygen service, bagged, and. stored for future use. 
The parts required for the complete assembly of the quantity probe 
are then drawn from storage. The first operation is the installation of 
two insulated pull wires through the holes provided in the quantity probe 
to route the heater and motor leads. The quantity probe wires, temperature 
sensor wires, and two pull wires are pulled through the electrical conduit 
by first pushing a single wire through. All wires are attached to this 
pull wire to be pulled into the conduit (figs. C4-l6 through C4-l9). The 
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Vent I ine and electrical 
conduit also pass Fill 
through th is adapter 
, 
Teflon adapter 
Inconel tube 
Teflon adapter 
.224 dO hit
.232 la 0 es, wo 
p laces for heater 
and motor wiring 
Probe is manufactured 
bv Simmonds Precision 
Products Inc. 
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• 
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Figure C4-15.- Cross section of quantity probe. 
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Figure C4-l7.- Feeding quantity probe wires 
into upper coil assembl y . 
C- 3l 
Figurec4-l8.- View showing the feeding and pulling used to install wires. 
., ~ ..., " .. 
~• ., ,- .. ~ 
.~~-
Fi gure C4- l 9 .- Quant ity probe and coil a ssembl y r eady to i nstall 
ill t ube connecting parts . 
next items to install are the Teflon adapters and the connecting tube 
for the fill tube (figs. C4-20 through C4-22). With these parts in 
place, the quantity probe is bottomed in the counter-bore of the tank 
tube adapter (fig. C4-23). The fill tube parts are then checked to 
assure that they are in the proper position by use of a blunt probe 
through the side holes in the outer tube (fig. C4-24). The electrical 
feedthrough holes are aligned by eye with the electrical conduit and 
the entire unit is clamped into a jig for welding (figs. C4-25 through 
C4-21). Four 1/4-inch-long welds are positioned away from wires and 
the Teflon fill tube adapter to secure the assembly (figs. C4-28 and 
C4-29). The Unit is then inspected, cleaned, and bagged for future 
assembly into the tank. 
Prior to final assembly of the tank, all major subassemblies are 
subjected to component acceptance tests. Specifically these major 
components are the following: pressure vessel, motor heater fan assembly, 
coil assembly, probe assembly, and the electrical connector. These 
tests check all functional aspects that are possible at that level of 
assembly, electrical isolation, pressure integrity, etc., as appropriate 
for particular components. These components are then moved to an area 
referred to as the Ultra Clean Room (a class 100,000 laminar flow clean 
room) for the final assembly. Operations in this area are performed 
in full lint-free nylon suits, boots, caps, and rubber gloves. Entry 
to this clean room is from the Apollo Assembly Area with a simple dress­
ing room airlock for changing clothes. All equipment moves into and 
out of the area through airlocks. 
The actual final assembly starts with opening the tank by removing 
the temporary shipping plug from the tank neck (fig. c4-30). Through­
out the entire assembly operation, a vacuum cleaner nozzle is positioned 
adjacent to the tank to help reduce the possibility of dust or lint 
entering the tank. The heater assembly is then lowered part way into 
the tank (figs. c4-3l and c4-32). With the assembly held about halfway 
into the tank, the wires are fed in beside the heater until they are 
completely inside the tank. The heater is then lowered until the lower 
motor adapter pin is in the lower support bracket (fig. c4-33). The 
last portion of this lowering is accomplished by use of duckbill pliers 
(fig. c4-34). The top portion is then positioned for the upper bolt 
to be installed. The bolt is inserted by means of a wire holding loop 
and started by hand (figs. c4-35 and c4-36). This bolt is tightened 
with an open-end wrench with final torquing achieved by a combination 
of the open-end wrench and a standard torque wrench. The torque value 
is adjusted to account for the combined lever arm effect of the wrenches. 
At this point the wires are fished from the tank with hook (fig. c4-31). 
The wires are then checked and any tangles are removed. A small stain­
less safety wire is attached to the wires and they are lowered into 
the tank again (fig. c4-38). 
Next a probe support fixture is attached to the tank neck and the 
probe is lowered about two thirds of the way into the tank (fig. c4-39). 
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Figure C4-2l.- Installing fill tube connecting parts . 
;J ~ 
" .~ 
~ ,. .. 
-. 
Figur e C4- 22 .- Holding fill tube connecting parts in place . 
Figure C-4.23 - Final mating of quantity probe and tank adapter . 
.. io ~ • 
,f( ~ . wi J.. 
Fi gure C4-24 .- Probing to assure that fill tube parts 
are in proper pos ition . 
Figure C4-25.- Quantity probe and coil assembly in welding j i g . 
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Figure C4- 2S .- Weldi ng the ~uantity probe to coi l assembly. 
Figure C4-29.- The completed quantity probe to coil as s embly welds . 
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Figure c4-31.- Inserting fan and heater probe . 
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Figure C4-32. - Feeding wi r es into tank 
beside heat e r probe . 
c-47 
Figure c4-33 .- View inside tank showing heater 
probe in lower support . 
c- 48 
Figure C4-34 .- Fin al l owering of heater probe . 
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T 
Figure c4-35 .- Wire loop used to install 
heater probe retaining bolt . 
c- 50 
Figure c4-36.- View ins ide tank showing heater probe 
upper retaining bolt. 
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Fi gure c4 - 37 .- Pulling wires f r om t ank . 
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Figure c4-3B.- Lowering wires into t ank with fixture 
to hold quant ity probe installed. 
Figure c4-39 .- Quantity probe being installed in fixture 
and heater probe wires being pulled from the tank . 
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At this point the wires are once again withdrawn from the tank. Again 
any possible tangles are removed. Then the pull wires previously in­
stalled in the probe are soldered to the motor and heater lead bundles. 
The solder joints are thoroughly cleaned and taped to made a smooth 
transition from each single pull wire to each bundle of six leads. 
These wire bundles are pulled into the conduit one bundle at a time 
with one man feeding the wires at the feedthrough hole in the Quantity 
probe and the other man pulling approximately 25 to 35 pounds on the 
pull wire (figs. c4-40 through c4-42). The bundles are pulled through 
until the slack is t~en out of the wire bundle with the probe in this 
elevated position (about 9 inches of slack when probe is lowered into 
into tank) (fig. c4-43). Then holding the probe assembly, the fixture 
is removed from the tank neck and the probe is lowered into the tank 
(fig. c4-44). The probe assembly is then rotated counterclockwise 
approximately one turn. The unit is then very carefully rotated clock­
wise to start the Quadruple thread and pilot the lower end of the probe 
into the ring provided at the bottom of the tank. If the probe assembly 
in the tight position does not result in alignment of the supply tube, 
then the probe assembly is re-indexed in 90-degree increments to achieve 
alignment. These procedures are carried out to a specific Manufacturing 
Operations Procedure and in the presence of Quality control inspectors. 
(Figures c4-45 and c4-46 show the typical routing of wires from the 
heater and fan probe assembly into the Quantity probe. ) 
The electrical connector is then installed so that a complete 
checkout can be performed on the electrical operations. The lead wires 
are cut about 3 inches beyond the connector adapter flange. At this 
point a 3-inch length of large-diameter Teflon sleeving is installed 
in the neck of the conduit. About 2 inches is slid into the conduit 
with about I inch protruding into connector space. The wires are 
thermally stripped, tinned, and soldered into the connector. After a 
thorough cleaning with alcohol, the connector is inspected with black 
light to assure complete removal of flux. After the resistance, isola­
tion, and functional tests are completed, the metal sleeve is slid in 
place and welded. The connector proper is protected during the welding 
process by a set of copper chills which have cooled in liQuid nitrogen. 
Even so, the weld is made in a series of short segments to limit the 
heat. 
The next operation is the welding of feed line connections and 
the tank neck adapter. A helium leak test is run on the weld joints 
using a mass spectrometer leak detector. After satisfactory comple­
tion of these checks, the welds are all X-rayed. 
Next, insulation is installed in the vacuum dome area. Two layers 
of aluminized Mylar are applied over the outer shell material that 
extends under the dome. The tank adapter flange is covered with four 
layers of aluminized Mylar. All the tubes in the dome area are wrapped 
with I-inch aluminized Mylar strips held in place with nylon thread. 
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Fi gure c4-40 .- Pulling first bundl e of heater and fan motor leads 
into upper coil assembly . 
,, ~ ~ 
' ", 
•
' 
.. ,4" ? 
r i gure c4-4l .- Pull wire used to route heater and fan motor leads 
into upper coil assembly. 
Figure c4-42.- First bundle of heater and fan motor leads pulled 
through upper coil assembly. 
;,. .. 
-I. i.-~
-"" 
Figure C4-43.- Heater and fan motor lead 
routing i nto quantity probe . 
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Figure c4-44.- Lower i ng quantity pr obe 
assembly into tank. 
c- 60 
Figure c -4.45 - View inside of tank of typical wire routing 
from heater probe to quantity probe. 
C- 6l 
Figure c- 4 .46 - Vie,·, inside of tank of typical wire routing 
of heater probe wires into quantity probe . 
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The coil housing (dome) cover is now welded in place. The housing 
contains the vacuum pumpdown tube, the blowout disc, and the vat-ion 
pump bracket (fig. Cb47). In addition, a pumpdown tube is welded to the 
lower hemisphere to speed the pumping process. After the welds are X- 
rayed, a preliminary pumpdown is made. 
After a check is made to insure vacuum integrity, the vacuum is broken 
and additional insulation is stuffed into the dome area through the vacuum 
pumpdown tube. This insulation consists of 40 square feet of 0.0005-inch 
gold-coated Kapton which has been crinkled and cut into small pieces with 
pinking shears. (This represents about 5760 individual pieces approxi- 
mately l-inch square with pinked edges. This represents 2.3 ounces of 
Kapton. ) 
The actual pumpdown is accomplished in an oven at 190' to 220' F to 
speed the pumping and to assure a low final pressure. Because of the many 
layers of insulation, a complete pumpdown requires 20 to 28 days. At the 
completion of the pumpdown, the vacuum pumpdown tubes are pinched and 
sealed and protective caps are installed. The installation of the vat-ion 
pump completes the fabrication process of the tank assembly. 
Acceptance Testing 
End-item acceptance testing is a long and elaborate process controlled 
by a detailed written test procedure. The sequence consists of the 
following: (1) A dielectric strength test of the following wires or 
groups of wires shorted together. The test is run at 500 V dc and leak- 
age current to ground (tank assembly) shall not exceed 0.25 milliamp; 
the four temperature sensor wires, the quantity gage outer tube lead, 
the quantity gage inner tube lead, the quantity gage inner tube lead 
shield, the eight wires from the two fan motors, the four wires from the 
two heaters, and the low-voltage input wires to the vat-ion pump; (2) 
Dielectric strength test of vat-ion converter output to ground (tank 
assembly) at 400 V de. Leakage shall be no more than 0.8 milliamp; (3) 
Insulation resistance test to check that every wire or group of wires 
that should be isolated from other wires or ground shows a minimum of 
2 megohms isolation at 500 V dc; (4) The isolation between the vat-ion 
pump electrical terminals and ground is tested at 500 V dc and must be at 
least 50 megohms; (5) Th e isolation between the vat-ion converter elec- 
trical output terminals and the tank assembly (ground) is tested at 
500 V dc and must be 50 megohms or greater; (6) The vat-ion pump is 
functionally tested; (7) Th e inner vessel is pumped down for 4 hours to 
assure that the inner vessel is dry; (8) Helium leak test at 500 psi and 
a helium proof-pressure test at 1335 + 20 psi; (9) A heater pressurization 
test and heat-leak test (vessel filled with liquid oxygen and 65 V ac 
supplied to heaters); (10) Cryogenic proof-pressure test at 1335 + 20 psi 
(heaters powered by 65 V ac to raise pressure of liquid oxygen); 
c-63 
Weld seal-off assemblies
_,_,_..._ Install and weld coil housing cover
I I i I
I I i I
I I I i
I
Install elect conn sleeve
I i
Weld seal-off assemblies
Figure C4-47,- Final vacuum closure operations.
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(ii) Heat-leak test; (12) Inerting of the vessel with iOO ° to 160 ° F
nitrogen gas; (13) Check to see that thermostats are open when nitrogen
purge temperature of iOO ° to ii0 ° F flows from exit of tank (30 V ac
applied momentarily to verify that thermostats are open); (14) Vac-ion
pump final functional test; and (15) Final motor run verification and
coastdown. The heat-leak tests consist of many runs to cover a range of
ambient conditions and outflow rates. Total testing involves 40 to 60
hours with liquid or supercritical oxygen in the tank. Data sheets on
cryogenic performance specified in the procedure are furnished to North
American Rockwell in the end-item acceptance data package which accom-
panies each tank on delivery to North American Rockwell.
At the conclusion of the heat-leak test, approximately i00 pounds
of oxygen remain in the tank which must be emptied and purged for de-
livery. Approximately three-fourths of the mass of oxygen in the tank
is released from the tank through the supply line in the process of
reducing tank pressure from the initial 925-935 psia to the final pres-
sure of 25-35 ps_a. To complete emptying, the portion of this oxygen
which remains liquid after the pressure bleeddown is expelled through
the fill l_ne. The application of warm gas at 30 psia through the vent
line to accomplish this expulsion approximates the normal detanking pro-
cedure used by KSC at the completion of the CDDT. The CDDT is the next
time, after del_very of the tank by Beech Aircraft to North American,
that cryogenic oxygen is loaded into and expelled from each tank.
Summary of Significant Aspects of the Manufacture and Acceptance
Test of Cryogenic Oxygen Storage Tank Serial No. IO024XTAO008
The manufacturing and test flow for cryogenic oxygen storage tank
serial no. IO024XTAO008 is shown in figure C4-48. The item of particular
significance is the recycle that was required in the manufacturing
process brought on by motor failures.
The manufacturing history of the fan motors installed before or
during 1966 contains many incidents of failures encountered in motor
tests which resulted in design or fabrication process changes.
failure modes experienced were categorized as:
The
(a) Contamination failures
(b) Bridge ring (stator laminations) failures
(c) Bearing failures
(d) Phase-to-phase (stator windings) dielectric breakdown or shorts
C-65
(e) Grounds (of stator wiring)
(f) Lead wire damage(primarily at Beech)
(g) (Motor fan) speed
(h) Coastdownfailures (less than 30 seconds in air or gas)
Design and manufacture process changes to minimize the effect of
someof these failure modeswere initiated during Block I motor manufac-
ture. Most others were initiated before the motors used in tank 10024XTA0008
were assembled at Globe Industries. Failure mode (d) was the basis for
the most recent changes affecting these particular motors. Corrective
actions to employ extreme care in stator winding and to use phase-to-
phase dielectric checks at 300 V rms were incorporated in the winding
process. These were followed by a phase-to-phase dielectric check at
250 V rms after the winding was complete and before the terminals were
soldered. Effectivity of these actions caught the lower motor in re-
work and the upper motor in original stator winding. After installation
of the heater tube assembly, including the motor fans, Beech tested the
motor wiring, shorted together, with 500 V dc to ground.
A listing of the inspection discrepancies issued against serial
no. 10024XTA0008are listed in table C4-I. In the Beech nomenclature
these discrepancies are known as Withholding Forms. As stated previously,
the motor problem is considered the significant item. The heat-leak
problem was not considered serious because manymissions required use
rates above the minimumflow capability of tank 0008.
The oxygen storage tank assembly is normally handled and tested at
Beech Aircraft in the upright position. Vertical motions may compact the
tube set to minimumlength so as to contribute to dislodgment by minimizing
overlap with the upper stub tube nipple of the tank adapter.
Shortly before shipment from Beech, the tank is rotated (tumbled)
while in a handling fixture, "to determine if all parts are secure." Since
this is the only known source of side forces applied to the fill tube com-
ponents and since the detanking was apparently normal in the Beech tests,
it lends evidence to the assumption that the fill tube componentswere in
the proper position at that time.
Investigation of Manufacturing Process and Supporting Analysis
To gain a first-hand appreciation of the manufacturing process, a
visit was arranged to the Beech Aircraft Corporation, Boulder Division,
to observe key assembly operations. In addition to a detailed discussion
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of the step-by-step process, three assembly examples were witnessed within
the clean room areas. Specifically, the installation of a lower motor
into the heater tube was observed. The assembly of the quantity probe to
the tank tube adapter fitting was witnessed. In this particular case, two
attempts were required to properly position the small fill tube parts.
The entire wire routing process was witnessed. A tank with a large hole
in the side provided visibility to the witnesses but not to the assembly
technicians. The installation of the heater fan assembly and then the
quantity probe provided an appreciation of the real challenge to workmen,
that of avoiding damage to the insulation of the wires. This could not
have been learned from a study of the drawings alone.
A lO-times-size layout was made of the fill tube connection situation
with the parts at the various limits of size permitted by the engineering
drawings. In addition to the length tolerances permitted by the drawing
dimensions, the diametral clearance also permits the parts to assume angles
beyond the ranges stated on the drawings. As an aid to check all the
various positions to which these parts could move, individual cutout paper
parts were made for the two Teflon bushings and the interconnecting Inconel
tube. Figure C4-49 shows that the worst-case short tolerance parts can
fall out of position as the tank is moved about. At the other extreme,
parts that are at the high end of the permitted tolerances will not
assemble. This is shown on the left-hand view. The nominal case provided
little or no axial clearance but still does not provide gas-tight seals at
the various diameters.
In addition to the tolerance condition that can exist for the fill
tube connecting parts, the center tube of the quantity probe could move
downward due to Teflon cold flow. The center tube is supported in the
axial position by two Teflon bushings installed in the center tube and a
semi-tubular rivet. Prolonged heating, such as the vacuum pumpdown cycles
(three cycles for this tank assembly resulting in a total of 1532 hours at
190 to 220 ° F), could result in the thin walls of the center tube slowly
cutting into the Teflon bushings.
Table C4-II shows the range of diametral clearances that can exist
at ambient conditions (73 ° F) and at a typical detanking condition
(-278 ° F, which corresponds to the saturation temperature of liquid oxygen
at 40 psia). The fit between the Teflon bushing and the tank adapter
fitting can result in a maximum O.O03-inch interference. The only other
clearance that results in an interference fit occurs if the minimum size
holes are provided where the Teflon bushings slide on the 3/8-inch Inconel
tube. Tests at liquid nitrogen temperature (-320 ° F) indicate that the
Teflon is not overstressed and does not crack when subjected to inter-
ference fits of this type.
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Throughout the normal manufacture and test of a cryogenic oxygen
storage tank_ no intentional procedure calls for the thermostats to
interrupt a load. The acceptance testing by the thermostat vendor uses
approximately 6.5 V ac to power a small lamp bulb which draws about i00
milliamperes. The fan and heater assembly componentacceptance test by
Beech uses the thermostats to complete the circuit of Wheatstone bridges
to measurethe heater resistance values. All other testing by Beech
applies power (65 V ac) when tank conditions are such that the thermostats
should be closed and remain closed_ or momentarily applies a lower power
(90 ± i0 V ac) to verify that thermostats are open.
INTEGRATION_ SYSTEM TESTING_ AND PRELAUNCH
CHECKOUT OF TH_ CRYOGENIC OXYGEN STORAGE TANKS
Summary of Nominal Processes and Procedures
North American Rockwell_ Downey_ California.- The build-up of an
oxygen shelf assembly at NR begins* many weeks before insertion of the
cryogenic oxygen tanks with the fabrication of a pie-shaped aluminum
honeycomb sandwich structural shelf with large circular cutouts matching
the equatorial girth rings of the spherical tanks. On this shelf are
next mounted the valves, pressure transducers, flowmeters, and tubing to
interconnect these with the fill and vent panel and the storage tanks.
Then the tanks are inserted_ no. i inboard and no. 2 in the outboard
position to the left of the fill panel and the valve module (fig. C4-50).
To complete the shelf assembly_ more tubes and the electrical cabling
are added. The Beech signal conditioner assembly for each tank is
mounted underneath the shelf.
All oxygen system tubing joints brazed by NR are subjected to X-ray
inspection and reheated if necessary to achieve satisfactory joints.
Pressure and leak checks are conducted as are electrical checks of
tank circuit elements_ i.e._ the vac-ion pump_ the heater_ motor fans_
thermostats_ and temperature sensor under dry gas conditions within the
oxygen tanks. The thermostats are tested for both opening and closing
temperatures by use of nitrogen gas purge with variable temperature con-
trol and monitoring each thermostat with a digital volt meter. Essen-
tially no current is interrupted in these tests. Such tests are repeated
in accordance with detailed Operational Checkout Procedures (OCP's) un-
til all gas leaks or electrical wiring problems have been isolated and
corrected and the oxygen shelf assembly is ready for installation in the
*Use of the present tense in this section of the Panel report
implies current practices as of 1967-68.
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Figure c4- 50 .- Oxygen shelf with tanks l 0024xTAOOo8 
and l 0024xTA0009 installed . 
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service module. A proof gas pressure of 1262 psi is used, followed by
leak testing at 745 psi. The vac-ion pumps of the oxygen storage tank
vacuum jackets are turned on at least twice during typical oxygen shelf
checkout and oxygen system checkout at NR. These tests are conducted
with an NR test engineer, manufacturing test conductor, technicians, and
quality control personnel, and a NASA quality control representative
present. No cryogenic oxygen is used in any of these tests.
After the oxygen shelf assembly is installed in the service module,
various gas tubing and electrical connections are completed. The oxygen
tank, tubing, and valves thereafter participate in oxygen subsystem
testing of the service module, fuel cell simulator tests, and fuel cell
interface verification in accordance with Detail Checkout of Systems
(DCS's) requirements. Liquid nitrogen is used to introduce a cold nitro-
gen gas into the oxygen tank to cause the thermostats to close so that a
heater circuit continuity test can be conducted. Spacecraft bus power
(30 V dc) is applied to the heater circuits and an increase in current
is used to verify thermostat closure. After water/glycol system test
and final shelf inspection, cryogenic oxygen System Summary Acceptance
is accomplished with NASA/MSC participation and recorded in the System
Summary Acceptance Document ("SSAD book").
The discipline at NR, Downey, is that of controlled procedures and
hardware traceability from the controlled material and equipment stores
through assembly and test operations. This discipline produces requests
for review or assistance from design engineering for instances of quality
or test discrepancy considered to be significant.
Transportation from North American Rockwell to KSC.- Shipment of
the service module from NR, Downey, is made on a pallet which holds the
axis horizontal in the fore and aft direction of trucks and aircraft
(fig. C4-51). The sector in which the oxygen shelf is installed is on
the underside in this orientation so that the shelf centerline points
vertically down. Shock and vibration instrumentation of various service
module flights in the Pregnant Guppy and Super-Guppy special aircraft of
Aero Spacelines have shown no peak vibration loads exceeding one-g for
vibration-isolated movements of the service module.
Kennedy Space Center.- After command and service module mating, at
the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building-KSC, the oxygen shelf assembly
as a part of the service module participates in combined system test,
altitude chamber test, systems integrated test, and flight readiness
test in accordance with established Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP's).
These tests are conducted as dry gas pressure and electrical function
verifications similar to those of the factory OCP's and DCS's at Downey.
No specific test is run to verify thermostat operation; however, during
the conduct of a pressure switch test sequence, the thermostats may open
the 28 V dc heater load.
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The vac-ion pumps of the oxygen storage tank vacuum jackets are
normally turned on during three test periods at KSC including countdown.
The circuit breakers to the vac-ion pumps are opened before launch.
After integration of the CSM with the Saturn launch vehicle in the
Vertical Assembly Building, the complete vehicle is moved to Pad 39. As
a part of the CDDT_ which normally occurs 14 days before launch_ the CSM
storage tanks are fully loaded with liquid oxygen. The functioning of
the fans is checked and heater operation verified by using a ground sup-
ply of 65 V dc to raise the tank pressure to about 900 psi. Shortly
thereafter it is necessary to partly empty the oxygen tanks through a
process known as "detanking." Two or three days later, at the conclu-
sion of the CDDT, detanking is again used to empty the tank.
Initial detanking consists of two sequences. First_ the internal
pressure of the tank (residual to the CDDT) is vented through the vent.
Next, warm gaseous oxygen is fed through the tank vent lines at 80 psia
to expel liquid through the fill lines down to 50-percent full. Detank-
ing for tank emptying proceeds similarly at the end of CDDT. Then warm
gas is blown through to verify that the thermostats remain closed up to
at least -75 ° F. This step employs the application of only i0 to 15
V dc to the heater circuit.
This loading_ checkout, and detanking is the first time the cryo-
genic functions of the oxygen storage tanks are evaluated since the
acceptance test at Beech Aircraft_ Boulder, Colorado.
The oxygen tanks are filled to capacity during actual countdown in
order to prepare for launch.
During the CDDT and during the final countdown, as long as the
Mobile Service Structure (MSS) is connected to the launch Umbilical
Tower (LUT), the heaters are powered from the ground supply system. The
power distribution station from where the heaters are powered is located
at the base of the LUT. The voltage from this power supply is automati-
cally regulated at 78 _ 2 V dc and recorded. There is approxi_tely
13 volts line drop along the connecting leads, resulting in about 65 V dc
across the heaters, producing a current of about 6 amps through each
heater element. This higher power operation is used to more rapidly
raise the tank pressure to the operating range.
The MSS is disconnected from the LUT at about 18 hours before T - 0
in both the CDDT and the final countdown. For operational reasons the
power supply to the heaters is switched at this time to the busses of the
spacecraft with 28 to 30 V dc (about 2.8 amperes through each heater
element) which are powered through the umbilical from the ground supply
system. At T - 4 hours, during the launch preparation, the busses of the
spacecraft are switched to the fuel cells. The destratification fans are
independent from the heaters and at all times powered from the spacecraft.
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Summaryof Significant Aspects of Serial No. 0008 Tank
Prelaunch Integration Test and Checkout History
North American Rockwell, Downey, California.- Oxygen storage tank
IO024XTAO008 was installed in the no. 2 (outside) position of oxygen
shelf S/N 06362AAG3277 at North American Rockwell, Downey, California,
soon after receipt in May 1967. Two disposition reports were written
during October 1967 to require reheat and reinspection of brazed tubing
joints on the oxygen shelf found unacceptable in reading of X-rays. These
joints were reheated and accepted. Completion of oxygen tank installa-
tion, including tank IO024XTAO009 in the no. i position, was accomplished
March Ii, 1968. Manufacturing and test flow for the oxygen shelf is dis-
played chronologically in figure C4-52.
Two disposition reports noting an "indentation" and a "ding" in the
tank outer shell were filed and accepted--use as is--in March and
April 1968.
During April and May 1968, ii disposition reports were written to log
tank no. 2 anomalies found during proof-pressure, leak-check, and func-
tional checkout of the assembled oxygen shelf. Eight of these were as-
cribed to test procedure problems, two to a valve module (check valve)
tubing leak and one to an electrical connector pin. The leak was rewelded
by a Parker technician and passed leak test. The pin was repaired by NR
and checked.
In accordance with the normal OCP and after leak and electrical re-
pairs, the shelf assembly was completed and tested. It was installed in
CSM 106 June 4, 1968. Thereafter, in compliance with several DCS's for
subsystem test, a fuel cell simulator test, and fuel cell interface
verification, the oxygen shelf participated in service module detailed
checkout steps.
After installation of this oxygen shelf in SM 106, eight disposition
reports were written during installation, additional tubing connection
and subsystem line proof-pressure and leak check, and electrical cabling
checking. Of these, two problems with a hydrogen relief line mounted ad-
jacent to the oxygen shelf were solved by making up new tubing and later
reheating a brazed joint to meet X-ray control requirements. Three oxygen
subsystem leaks were solved by retorquing caps and a "B" nut on oxygen
lines leading to fuel cell no. 2. The three remaining disposition records
expressed questions concerning leak and electrical function testing of the
oxygen shelf assembly which were held open pending the next opportunity
for shelf assembly testing.
On October 21, 1968, in response to directives requiring rework of
the vac-ion pump dc-to-dc converters to reduce electromagnetic
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interference problems (a supplementary potting operation performed by
Beech personnel at North American Rockwell), an attempt was made to re-
move the oxygen shelf from SM 106.
In preparation for this attempt, the i0 bolts attaching the shelf to
the adjacent beams were removed. The existence of a small, llth bolt in-
troduced from underneath and behind tank no. i was overlooked by all
persons involved. The factory crew brought into position a lifting fixture
particularly dew[sed for inserting tanks and shelves into sectors of the
service module (fig. C4-53).
This fixture is composed of two parts joined at a bolted flange. The
universal part is an adjustable counterbalance. The weights of this
counterbalance are movable from the factory floor through endless chains.
The particular part for handling to the oxygen shelf is a two-tined fork
welded together from large thick-walled aluminum tubes. The tine tips
are padded where they contact the underside of the shelf to support its
inner portion. The outer edge of the shelf is fastened to the lifting
fork by means of two screws passing through tabs on the top of the fork
cross-member.
Under the particular circumstances of October 21_ 1968, the unnoticed
llth bolt into the shelf served as a tie-down beyond the tips of the lifting
fork such that raising the fixture produced rotation of the entire assembly,
most noticeably the counterbalance. The llth bolt still was unobserved.
Attempts were made to balance the fixture by moving a weight and to lift the
assembly by operating the overhead bridge crane. In these steps sufficient
load was placed on the fixture to break it above the cross-arm of the fork.
The oxygen shelf moved and came to rest on the supporting beams
through what was at the time described as a "2-inch drop" Observation of
adjacent portions of SH 106 identified minor damage_ including a dent in
the underside of the fuel cell shelf above.
Figure C4-54 shows the repair patch over this dent immediately above
the vacuum pinch-off cover can of tank no. 2 in the oxygen shelf that re-
placed the one undergoing the "shelf drop" incident in SM 106.
Further attention to the oxygen shelf containing tank IO024XTAO008
in the no. 2 position after its removal from SM 106 involved a number of
quality_ test_ and repair actions. These were logged on ii separate Dis-
position Records (NR numbered forms recording discrepancies observed
through manufacturing inspection and test activities at Downey). One
other such form was initiated at the time of the "shelf drop" and was
treated primarily as a requirement to inspect, repair, and re-inspect the
adjacent portions of SM 106, including specifically the dented fuel cell
shelf.
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Figure c4- 54 .- Replac ement oxygen shelf installed in 

Service Module 106 . Note repairs to fuel cell 

she l f ove r oxygen tank no . 2 . 
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Of the 11 DR's, five report anomalous conditions of detailed portions 
of the shelf assembly observed and recorded from November 1 to November 19, 
1968. In response to these DR's, EMI tests and leakage tests were con­
ducted, results were accepted, and some repairs were made. The leak tests 
of bent tubing carrying tank no. 1 pressure, upstream from valves, were 
accepted in material review. The latter involved polishing out tank outer 
shell scratches, adjusting several electrical connectors, replacing 
damaged cable clamps, and coating damaged potting. It is not certain but 
it is possible that some of these conditions relate to the "shelf drop" 
incident. 
The remainder of the DR's of the period relate to testing the oxygen 
shelf to revalidate it for installation into SM 109. A shortened version 
of the normal pre-installation OCP, including pressure and external leak 
testing and verification of electrical functions of most of the tank 
elements, was conducted. Fan motor, heater, fuel cell reactant valve, 
relief valve, pressure switch, and motor switch functional checks were 
omitted. Coupling leak checks and check valve internal leak valve checks 
were omitted. Signal conditioner checks, for density and temperature sig­
nals, were omitted. Verification of these matters was left for and accom­
plished in oxygen system tests at higher levels of CM and SM integration. 
The shelf was then installed (fig. c4-55). The upper one of the two 
accepted bent tubes shows at the extreme right of the figure. The lower 
one, bent 7 degrees as it joins the back of the fuel cell valve-module, 
is in the lower right corner. 
In December 1968, after concern for a possible oil contamination of 
facility lines, GSE hose connections were checked for contamination and 
found acceptable. Vent line samples taken later, at KSC during cryogenic 
tanking", verified that no contaminants reached the spacecraft interfaces. 
Engineering requests for recalibration of the oxygen system pressure 
instrumentation and the oxygen quantity signal conditioner of the assembly 
were responded to in January and February, 1969. 
Final inspection and cleanup of the shelf in the service module was 
accomplished on May 27, 1969. The oxygen SSAD book was signed off June 6, 
1969, and SM 109 was shipped to KSC. 
Transportation from North American Rockwell to KSC.- Shipment of 
SM 109 from Downey to KSC was accomplished by the normal means, horizontal 
mounting on a vibration isolating pallet carried on ground vehicles and a 
Super-Guppy aircraft. No shock was observed in the instruments carried. 
Kennedy Space Center.- The oxygen tank and shelf assembly participated 
in normal service module tests beginning with the Combined Systems Test. 
Test and checkout flow at KSC are shown chronologically in figure c4-56. 
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A leak check was performed July 18, 1969, using helium at 94 psia 
in oxygen tank no. 2. Tank no. 2 was pressurized to 1025 psia to estab­
lish the relief valve cracking pressure and to verify the pressure switch 
operation. The pressure was decreased to 870 psia and then increased to 
954 psi a during the first integrated test with the launch vehicle simu­
lator. The oxygen tanks no. 1 and no. 2 were evacuated to less than 5mm 
Hg, to dry the tanks, then pressurized to about 80 psia with reactant 
grade gaseous oxygen. Instrumentation was verified and fan motors were 
checked out. 
A progress photograph (fig. c4-57) taken at KSC on November 14, 1969, 
shows the visible condition of the oxygen shelf with tanks, valves, tubing, 
and cables. 
During the Flight Readiness Test in early February 1970, the pres­
surization cycle was repeated; vacuum to 5mm Hg and oxygen pressure to 
about 80 psia. 
At the CDDT in March after activation of the fuel cells, the same 
cycle was followed: vacuum of the oxygen tanks to 5mm Hg followed by a 
gaseous oxygen pressure of about 80 psi. After the cooling of the fuel 
cells, cryogenic oxygen loading was normal and tank pressurization to 
331 psia by using heaters powered from 65 V dc ground power supply was 
completed without abnormalities. 
During these CDDT operations on March 23, tank no. 1 was detanked to 
the normal 50 percent within less than 10 minutes. Over the space of 
45 minutes, tank no. 2 did not detank normally but was observed to retain 
more than 90 percent of its oxygen. Detanking was suspended until the 
completion of CDDT. 
On March 27, detanking of tank no. 2 was again attempted. The tank 
had self-pressurized to 178 psia with a quantity of 83 percent indicated. 
By opening the fill line valve the pressure was depleted to approximately 
36 psi a in about 13 minutes. The quantity indication went down to about 
65 percent (see fig. c4-58). 
Next, during detanking attempts for both tanks, a comparison of 
tank no. 1 and tank no. 2 performance was made. The indicated oxygen 
quantity of tank no. 1 depleted from 48 percent to zero in less than 
10 minutes. The indicated quantity in tank no. 2 remained above 60 percent 
over a 20-minute period. 
Attempts were made over an 80-minute period to deplete the oxygen 
content of tank no. 2 by cycling up to various pressures and down, but 
did not reduce the indicated quantity below 54 percent (fig. c4-59). An 
attempt was made to expedite oxygen expUlsion through the use of the tank 
heaters operated at maximum voltage and the fans. These were turned on 
for nearly 6 hours while the vent port remained open (fig. C4-60). Still 
the indicated quantity remained above 30 percent. 
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Figure c4- 57 .- Progr ess photograph of oxygen shelf taken at KSC 
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Then a pressure cycling technique was employed over a 2-1/2 hour
period with maximum power being applied continuously to both tank
heaters and fan circuits (fig. C4-61). This technique involved raising
the tank pressure by external gaseous oxygen to approximately 300 psia
and then opening the fill line to induce rapid boil-off. After five
cycles, the oxygen tank quantity indicated zero.
Fan responses were observed to be normal throughout these opera-
tions. The temperature sensor on the quantity probe reached its indi-
cating limit (+84 F) halfway through the 6-hour heating period. No
observations of whether the heaters cycled on and off were made and
subsequent review of the power supply voltage recording showed no indi-
cation of heater cycling.
Concern developed over two alternate hypothetical tank no. 2 con-
ditions, a leakage path in the fill line within the tank or a clogged
fill line.
Gaseous flow tests were used in one attempt to evaluate the latter.
Both tank no. i and tank no. 2 were pressurized to approximately 240
psia and blown down through the fill lines with no significant differ-
ences in blowdown time (fig. C4-62).
A check of the Wintec filter in the GSE for oxygen tank no. 2 was
made by the Wintec Corporation. No significant foreign material was
found.
The alternate hypothesis, that the short segments of fill tube in
the top of the quantity probe of tank no. 2 had large gaps or had be-
come dislodged, was considered as were the operational difficulties
associated with the use of a tank in this condition. The concern here
was that the loading process might be hampered by the position of the
fill line parts. It was noted that the filling was normal for the CDDT.
To verify this judgment and to assure countdown operability, both
tanks were filled on March 30 to about 20 percent in approximately 2.5
minutes. Tank no. i detanked normally; tank no. 2 did not. Again the
procedure of applying heat at maximum voltage and the cyclic application
of gas pressure of approximately 250 psia and then venting was used.
Five cycles were applied in a 1-1/4 hour period and tank no. 2 was
emptied (fig. C4-63). The fan responses were observed to be normal and
no indications of heater cycling were observed.
During the countdown, April 8_ 1970, the pressurization of oxygen
tank no. 2 was hampered by a leak through the vent line pressure-operated
disconnect. Installation of the first cap stopped the leak and the
pressurization of tank no. 2 was normal with no anomalies noticed during
the completion of the countdown.
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Several items of overall tank test and checkout experience should be
noted.
Contaminants: Liquid, as well as gaseous, oxygen which entered tank
no. 2 was verified by sample analysis. Nothing indicates that contaminants
did enter the oxygen tanks. The samples taken from the vents during the
servicing met the specification requirements and did not give an indication
of tank contamination.
Quantity probe: Throughout all tests, during a period of ii months
resulting in 167 hours 8 minutes operating time including 28 fan on/off
cycles over the 17-day period of CDDT and launch count, the quantity gaging
system in tank no. 2 exhibited less sensitivity to noise and transients
than that of tank no. i.
Oxygen tank no. 2 pressure cycling: At no time during the testing
of oxygen tank no. 2, in systems and subsystems, were the specified
pressure limitations or allowable tank cycles exceeded.
Testing of oxygen tank fans: Test records were reviewed of all fan
motor operations at KSC for any indications of ac bus transients. Tank
no. 2 fans were powered _O times. No electrical transients were found
except those normally connected with fan starting or stopping. Fan motor
performance was considered normal.
Investigation and Supporting Work
Causes of detanking difficulties.- Review of information from the
Beech acceptance test logs and review with the Beech personnel in charge
of these tests does not indicate that the detanking was abnormal. Con-
trarywise, the data are not substantive to prove that the liquid was
expelled through the fill line. No weight or quantity measurement is
recorded at the completion of the liquid expulsion; however, the proce-
dure calls for continuing the application of vent line pressure until
both the weighing system and the quantity probe indicate the tank is
empty. The final tank empty condition is based on the final exit tem-
perature of the warm nitrogen gas purge. At the time, no one indicated
that the response of the tank to the procedures was anything but normal,
and today careful review of existing data, discussions with the responsi-
ble Beech Aircraft and North American Rockwell personnel, and a special
test at Beech Aircraft indicate that the detanking of the 0008 tank was
most probably normal.
Each oxygen storage tank is stored at NR, Downey, in its shipping
container until removal for installation in the assigned oxygen shelf.
Thus it is retained in a vertical position until any motion takes place
in the shelf assembly fixture.
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The shelf assembly fixture used at Downey (fig. C4-50) aligns tank
no. i so that the fill tube segments in the top of the quantity probe
assembly lie nominally in a plane transverse to the axis of fixture rota-
tion. Thus the fixture in the normal position holds the tubes upright
but otherwise can rotate them through a full circle, exposing them to
dislodging forces in the plane of their nominal location. The situation
for tank no. 2 is nearly a right angle to the tank no. i situation so
that the tube segment plane is nominally parallel to the trunnion axis of
the assembly fixture. Thus in all positions other than vertical or in-
verted, a lateral dislodging force exists relative to the plane of their
nominal location.
The highest elevation of the tank assembly, and thus the first area
of contact with the underside of the fuel cell shelf at the time of the
lifting fixture breakage and the shelf dent, was the cover over the upper
vacuum pinch-off tube (fig. C4-55). This point was to the left of the
mass centers and lifting forces involved as the counterbalance rotated
and broke away from the fork portion of the lifting fixture. (See
Appendix D.) Some rotation to lift the outer right corner of the shelf
(lower right in fig. C4-55) higher than the outer left would be expected
from this configuration. An uneven fall to the shelf supports would
follow.
In figure C4-55, showing the installation of the oxygen shelf in
SM 109, the condition of the farthest right tubing in the lower part of
the picture reflects the comments of two DR's that one tube had a "slight
bend" at the valve module and another (lower) was "badly bent." As the
highest tubes, farthest from the llth bolt and the high point of tank
no. 2, these two may have participated in the "shelf drop" incident.
Neither was found to be in need of repair after leak check.
No mention could be found in review of these DR's of any concern for
the condition of the tubes, wires, or motors internal to the oxygen storage
tank except as verifiable through routine external gas and electrical
testing with NR factory 0CP's.
Shipment of SM 109 from NR/Downey, with the SM axis horizontal during
ground and air transporation, afforded the next major opportunity for
fill tube segment lateral dislodgment.
It appears pertinent to this review to note that during SM transpor-
tation the fill tube segments within the upper portion of the oxygen tank
no. 2 quantity probe assembly lay with the tank-exit end of the fill tube
segments about 20 degrees above the horizontal, if they were still in
place after previous handling and the "shelf drop." Neither the wires
nor the feed line filter were below it to restrict rotation of the fill
tube about the central tube of the quantity probe (fig. C4-64).
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This history of exposure of the tank fill tube segments to an un-
usual dislodgment environment sequence was not recorded during the de-
tanking incidents at KSC nor during the presentation of CSM 109 history
reviews to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager through either reliabil-
ity and quality assurance or engineering channels at MSC. However, it
does corroborate the recorded real-time judgment of Beech_ MSC, and KSC
engineers that the tank fill line parts may have been out of place in
tank !O024XTAO008 during the detanking problems of March 23-30, 1970.
Since the fill tube parts have dimensional tolerances that could
allow these parts to fall out of place_ a calculation was made to attempt
to establish the configuration of the tank during the detanking operations
at KSC. The data from the first detanking attempt of March 27 were used
to test the hypothesis that the fill tube parts were disconnected such
that no liquid was expelled from the tank. A simple heat balance equation
of the tank from the initial condition to the end condition shows that all
the mass lost by the tank can be explained by vaporization and it is like-
ly that no liquid was expelled. Figure C4-58 and table C4-III show the
data upon which these calculations were based. At the initial and final
point the temperature indicated in the data is too warm for the pressure
indicated. The saturation temperature was used for each case.
Possible effects of special detanking procedures at KSC.- The use of
special detanking procedures at KSC to empty tank no. 2 of CSM 109 has
created concern these special procedures may have altered significantly
the condition of the oxygen tank.
A number of special tests have been run and other tests are yet to
be run in an attempt to determine the nature and degree of degradation
that may be expected to occur to the tank internal components and wiring
resulting from exposure of this type. The most significant finding to
date is the fact that the thermostats fail by welding closed almost im-
mediately when attempting to interrupt 65 V dc.
Several tests were run to determine the temperature that would occur
at various points on the heater tube as a result of operation at ground
power level as the liquid in the tank is boiled off. These tests were
run at MSC using a similar sized tank with an actual flight-type heater
fan assembly. The test setup is shown on figure C4-65. Liquid nitrogen
was used in the tank for safety reasons. The initial run was made with
a later model heater fan assembly that does not utilize thermostats;
however, it was felt that as long as liquid nitrogen _as present it _as
not likely that the thermostats would be called upon to operate. During
this test very high temperatures were encountered on many locations on
the heater tube (figure C4-66). These conditions were considered to be
very unrealistic, so the test was rerun using a heater fan assembly
equipped with thermostats. When the test was started_ one thermostat
indicated an open circuit at the initial fill condition. It was decided
that a satisfactory test could be run since an extra lead had been ex-
tended from the heater elements so that the heaters could be manually
operated to coincide with the functioning of the operable thermostat.
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TABLE C4-III.- THERMODYNAMIC BALANCE CALCUlaTIONS
Quantity, ib
Pressure, psia
Temperature, ° F
Temperature, ° R
Density of liquid, ib/ft 3
Volume of liquid, ft 3
Volume of gas, ft 3
Weight of liquid, ib
Weight of gas, ib
Enthalpy of liquid,
Btu/ib
Enthalpy of gas, Btu/ib
Total enthalpy of
liquid, Btu
Total enthalpy of gas,
Btu
Heat capacity of metal,
44 Ib
AT ° = 43.5° F,
sp. ht. 0.086
Heat capacity of boil-
off gas
62 ib at 156.5 Btu/ib
Total enthalpy, Btu/ib
Initial condition Final condition
274
178
-236.5
223.2
58.4
4.7o
.05
2?3.85
o,15
(83_ indic.)
88
158
24,112
24
(Reference Cond.)
212
36
-280
179.7
68.0
_.lO
1.65
210.9
1.1
68
155
14,341
171
0
24,136
-164
24,051
(65_ indic.)
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(a) Temperature sensor locations.
Figure C4-66.- Heater tube assembly temperature test.
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Figure C4-66.- Concluded.
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The test was started and after a few cycles in this modethe previously
nonfunctioning (oDen) thermostat started indicating normal function. At
this time it was decided to revert to the originally intended test config-
uration, i.e., the thermostats directly controlling the heaters. Data
from that point on indicated that the thermostats were not cycling the
heaters. The heater tube temperature data looked Just like the nonther-
mostat test run. The test terminated at this point and the thermostats
were removedand X-rayed. The X-rays indicated that the contact gap was
bridged. Onethermostat had its case carefully removedto examine the
conditions of the contacts (fig. C4-67).
A review of the thermostat design and the manufacturer's ratings
indicate that the thermostats are severely overloaded in current-
interrupting capability at the ground power condition. Opencontact
spacing at 65 V dc is such that a sustained arc can be established and
the contacts melted at this first attempt to interrupt power of this
magnitude.
Inasmuch as thermostat failure would be expected at the first attempt
to interrupt the ground power level, the conditions of heater tube temper-
ature measuredduring the first test of this series would be indicative
of those experienced during the KSCspecial detankings of March 27, 28,
and 30. Since a review of the heater ground power supply voltage re-
cordings madeduring the special detanking operations showedno indica-
tion of heater cycling, a special postflight test was conducted at KSC
which showedthat the cycled load equivalent to the heaters would cause
a cycling in the voltage recording. Figure C4-68 shows sections of motor
lead wire removed from the heater tube conduit.
Other tests run at AmesResearch Center (see Appendix F) indicate
that Teflon-insulated wires run at similar temperatures in an oxygen
atmosphere result in even more severe degradation.
A test is being run at Beech Aircraft to simulate all the tanking
and detanking conducted on XTA-0008 at KSC. A Block I tank modified to
the Block II configuration with the fill tube connecting parts rotated
out of position is being used for this test. Temperature measurements
on the electrical conduit in the vacuum dome area and posttest inspection
will be utilized to evaluate the effects on the wiring of the special
det anking operations.
At no time during standard checkout, prelaunch, and launch opera-
tions are these thermostats required to interrupt the 65 V dc ground
power supply current. As far as could be determined, the special de-
tanking operation was the only time that any thermostats were ever
called upon to interrupt this load.
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Figure c4-67.- Thermostat configuration and welded contacts. 
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PART DI
TASK ASSIGNMENT
The Design Panel was assigned the task of reviewing the design of
the systems involved in the Apollo 13 accident, including their qualifi-
cation history. The service history of the specific components flown
on Apollo 13 was also to be examined from a design point of view to as-
certain whether any abnormal usage experienced might have had a detri-
mental effect on the functional integrity of the components. The Panel
was also charged with review of other spacecraft systems of similar de-
sign or function to ascertain whether they contained potential hazards.
Finally, the Panel was to analyze, as required by the Board, proposed
failure mechanisms to the extent necessary to support the theory of
failure.
The Panel conducted its activities by reviewing design documentation
and drawings, historical records, and test reports; analyzing data; ex-
amining specimens of hardware; and consulting with other Board Panels
and with members of the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Investigation Team
and the contractors.
D-I
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PART D2
PANEL ORGANIZATION
Panel 3 was chaired L,v Dr. S. C. Hilmnel, Le<,JisResearch Center, and
tl_e Board Monitor was Mr. V. L. Johnson, Office of Space Science and
Applications, NASA ]{eadquarters. Panels Members were:
Mr. W. F. Bro<_n, Jr.
T ewis Research Center
Mr. R. N. Lindley
Office of Manned Space Flight
NASA Headquarters
Dr. W. R. Lucas
Marshall Space Flight Center
Mr. J. F. Saunders, ,Jr.
OFfice of Manned Space Flig]_t
NASA IIeadquarters
Mr. R. C. Wells
Langley Research Center
Specific assignments coverin£ such areas as materials selection,
fracture mechanics, materials compatibility, failure mechanisms, related
systems, and electrical systems were given to each Panel Member. All
Panel Members participated in the preparation of this report.
n-3
This page left blank intentionally.
D-4
PART D3
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
Early in the proceedings of the Board, it became evident that the
failure was centered in the cryogenic oxygen subsystem of the electrical
power system of the spacecraft, and, more specifically, in the no. 2
cryogenic oxygen tank. For this reason, detailed examinations of the
Panel were limited to this subsystem. Interfacing systems were examined
only to the extent required to understand the function of the oxygen
system and/or to relate data from flight or test to the operation or
design of the system.
In addition, the Panel had one of its members present at the
deliberations of the MSC Panel on Related Systems which conducted reviews
on other Apollo spacecraft pressurized systems.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The cryogenic storage subsystem supplies reactants to the fuel cells
that provide electric power for the spacecraft. The oxygen system also
supplies metabolic oxygen for the crew, command module (CM) cabin pressur-
ization, and the initial pressurization of the lunar module (LM). The
cryogenic storage and fuel cell subsystems are located in bay 4 of the
service module (SM). Figure D3-1 shows the geometric arrangement of
these subsystems within this portion of the SM. The system comprises
two oxygen tanks, two hydrogen tanks, and three fuel cells with their
associated plumbing, control valves, regulators, pressure switches, and
instrumentation.
The uppermost shelf contains the three fuel cells; the center shelf
contains the two oxygen tanks, the oxygen system valve modules, the fuel
cell oxygen valve module, and a ground service interface panel. The
lower shelf contains the two hydrogen tanks, one above and one below the
shelf, and a set of valve modules analagous in function to those of the
oxygen system.
A description of these components is contained in Appendix A of the
Board's report. Also provided are the operating and design parameters of
the components, materials of construction, etc.
A schematic of the oxygen system is shown in figure DB-2. The ground
service lines are capped off prior to flight. Figure D3-3 is a photograph
of the panel showing the terminations of these lines. The two tanks and
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their plumbing are identical except for one point in the feed line from 
tank no. 2, at which a ground service line tees into the feed line down­
stream of a check valve. This ground service line permits the operation 
of the fuel cells and the environmental control system (ECS) oxygen system 
from a ground source of oxygen without requiring the use of the flight 
tankage. This line terminates at the fitting designated OP in figure D3-3. 
The check valve prevents the pressurization of tank no. 2 from this ground 
source. 
The pressure transducer, pressure switch, and relief valve are lo­
cated in an oxygen system valve module external to the tank. A photograph 
of the module is shown in figure D3-4. Two of each of these components 
plus the check valve for tank no. 2 referred to in the previous paragraph 
comprise the module. Figure D3-4 shows the top of the oxygen shelf. There 
are approximately 19 feet of feed line from the tank pressure vessel to 
the valve module. 
The feed line exits the oxygen system valve module and branches, one 
going to the ECS and the other to the fuel cell valve module where the 
lines from tanks no. 1 and no. 2 are manifolded within the body of this 
assembly. This module contains the check valves at the feed line entrance 
points and three solenoid shutoff valves, one for each of the fuel cells. 
The cryogenic oxygen electrical system consists of the following 
items for each tank: 
1. Two electrical heaters, rated at 77.5 watts each, 28 V dc. For 
ground operation, the heaters are rated at 415 watts each, 65 V dc. Four 
wires exit the tank connector. The wiring of the heater leads at the 
pressure control assembly is such that the two heaters are connected in 
parallel to a single power source. Power to the tank no. 2 heaters is 
provided from main bus B through a circuit breaker and through an Dn-off 
automatic switch. Automatic operation is provided through the pressure 
control assembly actuated by the pressure switches. The control logic 
requires that both oxygen tank pressure switches be below the low set­
point to energize the heaters. Either switch sensing pressure above the 
high set-point will deenergize the heaters. 
2. Two motor-driven fans rated at 28.4 watts each (three-phase, 
200/115 V ac). Eight wires, one for each of the three power phases plus 
a neutral for each motor, exit the tank at the tank connector. They pro­
ceed to a fuse box assembly where each of the leads (except for the 
grounded neutrals) is individually fused by a l-ampere fuse. Upon leaving 
the fuses, the leads from like phases of the two motors as well as the 
neutrals are joined within the fuse box, and four wires leave this assembly. 
The three power leads then pass through individual switch contacts and 
thence to individual circuit breakers. Each breaker is rated at 2 amperes. 
The fans can be operated in either a manual or automatic mode. 
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3. A temperature sensor, a platinum resistance thermometer encased
in an Inconel sheath. It is attached to the outside of the quantity
probe. The resistance of the thermometer and consequently the voltage
drop across the unit changes with temperature. The signal conditioner
which serves as the reference voltage generator and amplifier is located
on the oxygen shelf and its input to the resistor is current-limited to
a maximum of i.i milliamperes. Four wires exit the tank connector and
are connected to the signal conditioner. The signal conditioner is
powered from ac bus 2 through a circuit breaker as a parallel load with
the quantity gage signal conditioner. Additional description is provided
in Appendix B.
4. A quantity gage, a capacitor consisting of two concentric alu-
minum tubes submerged in the oxygen. The dielectric constant of the
oxygen, and consequently the measured capacitance, changes in proportion
to its density. The signal conditioner, which serves as the reference
voltage generator, rectifier, and amplifier, is located on the oxygen
shelf. Two wires exit the tank connector and are connected to the signal
conditioner. The signal conditioner is powered from ac bus 2 through a
circuit breaker as a parallel load with the temperature sensor signal
conditioner. Additional description is provided in Appendix B.
5. A vac-ion pump assembly, attached to the dome of the tank, is
used only in prelaunch activities to maintain the tank annulus at the
required vacuum level. The pump functions by bombarding a titanium
cathode with ionized gas molecules and ion pumping results from the
gettering action of sputtered titanium particles. The high-voltage
power supply of the pump is an integral part of the pump assembly.
Leads for the vac-ion pump do not penetrate the pressure vessel and the
pump is not normally powered in flight.
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM CONFIGURATION AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
The electrical power system, in general, provides multiple power
busses with switching options for selecting an operating configuration.
At 55:53:21, the electrical system was configured in accordance with
reference i, as shown in figure D3-5, with fuel cells i and 2 connected
to main bus A and fuel cell 3 connected to main bus B. Inverter i was
connected to main bus A and powering ac bus i. Inverter 2 was connected
to main bus B and powering ac bus 2. Inverter 3 was not connected. Bat-
tery busses A and B were not connected to main bus A or B. The switches
controlling heater operation for both oxygen tanks were in the "auto-
matic" position, controlling heater operation through the pressure con-
trol assembly. Pressures in the oxygen tanks were at levels which did
not demand operation of the heaters. Temperature and quantity sensors
on oxygen tank no. 2 were energized from ac bus 2. The quantity gage
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had remained off-scale high from 46:40:06, indicating a probable short
circuit either on the leads or the probe assembly. Operation of the fan
motors in the oxygen tanks was accomplished throughout the mission using
manual control in lieu of the automatic operation afforded by the logic
of the pressure control assembly. A routine operation of the fans was
requested by the ground at 55:52:58 and acknowledged by the crew at
55:53:06. Energizing of the fans in oxygen tank no. i is confirmed by a
drop in voltage of ac bus i and an increase in total fuel cell current
at 55:53:18. Energizing of the fans in oxygen tank no. 2 is confirmed
by a drop in voltage of ac bus 2 and an increase in total fuel cell
current at 55:53:20. Data substantiating operation and operation times
are presented in Appendix B.
STRUCTURAL EVALUATION OF THE OXYGEN TANK
The oxygen tank consists of two concentric shells, an inner shell
(the pressure vessel) and an outer shell (fig. D3-6). The space between
the two shells is evacuated during normal operation and contains the
thermal insulation system, fluid lines, and the conduit which houses all
of the electrical wires entering the pressure vessel.
The oxygen tank is discussed from the standpoint of materials, pro-
cessing, welding, qualification program, stress levels, fracture analysis,
and environmental testing.
Materials, Processing, and Welding
Inner shell.- The pressure vessel is made from Inconel 718, a pre-
cipitation hardenable nickel base alloy having good strength, ductility,
and corrosion resistance over the range of temperatures from -300 ° F to
above 1400 ° F. The nominal composition of Inconel 718 is 19 percent
chromium, 17 percent iron, 0.8 percent titanium, 5 percent columbium,
0.6 percent aluminum, and the remainder nickel. The heat treatment
specified for Inconel 718 for this application was the following:
Hold at 1800 ° F ± 25 ° F for i hour
Air cool to 1325 ± 25 ° F and hold for 8 hours
Furnace cool to 1150 ° F and hold for 8 hours
Air cool
This treatment should produce typical ultimate tensile strength of
198,000 psi and yield strength of 170,000 psi at 70 ° F. Ultimate and
D-13
ii
I
i
Dome assembly
Outer shell
Inner shell Tank
mounting
Outer shell
I
I
Insulation
Figure D3-6.- Oxygen pressure vessel schematic.
D-14
yield-strength values increase with decreasing temperature and reach
228,000 psi and 189,000 psi, respectively, at -190 ° F. These values ex-
ceed those assumed in the design of the vessel, which were 180,000 psi
ultimate tensile strength and 150,000 psi yield strength at room tempera-
ture (ref. 2). After burst tests, tensile specimens were cut from test
vessels PV-I and PV-4, and strength measurements were made at room tem-
perature. Each specimen exceeded minimum requirements.
Inconel 718 is considered to be an excellent selection for use at
the temperatures required by this design and when properly cleaned is
compatible with liquid oxygen.
The pressure vessel is made by electron beam welding two hemispheres
at a weld land (fig. D3-7) that is 0.139 ± 0.002 inch thick. The weld
land is faired to a membrane of O.059-inch thickness over a distance of
about 2 inches. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., forges the hemispheres to a
wall thickness of 0.75 inch, and applies the complete heat treatment.
The hemispheres are X-rayed following forging. The Airite Company
machines the hemispheres to dimension and welds them together from the
outside. First, an intermittent tack weld pass is made, followed by a
complete tack weld. The third pass provides complete penetration, and a
fourth pass penetrates about one-third of the thickness. Finally, a
cover pass is made. Figure D3-8 illustrates the welding sequence. The
weldments are X-rayed and dye-penetrant inspected from the outside. In-
spection of the inside of the pressure vessel is by visual means only
and dye penetrant is not used. Use of one of the available liquid-
oxygen-compatible dye penetrants would enhance the detection of cracks
or similar weld defects inside the vessel.
The literature has very little data on electron-beam welding of
Inconel 718. However, it is frequently used in the aerospace industry
and there is no reason to question the practice in this instance. One
potential problem sometimes found when this nickel-base alloy is welded
is micro-fissuring in the heat-affected zone. Such fissures either do
not propagate to the surface, or are very difficult to detect. Unfor-
tunately, high-contrast X-rays of this material are difficult to obtain,
particularly in the configuration of this tank. No evidence of a weld
cracking problem has been found in the manufacture of these pressure
vessels. Thus there is no justification for postulating that micro-
fissuring was a factor in the accident being investigated.
A total of 59 data packages on oxygen pressure vessels were reviewed
and it was ascertained that only 12 vessels had had weld discrepancies.
Table DS-1 describes the weld discrepancies and their disposition.
Neither of the two Apollo 13 oxygen tanks flown (S/N lOO24XTAO008 and
S/N lO024XTAO009) appear on this list. There were no recorded weld dis-
crepancies during the manufacture of these tanks.
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TABLE D3-1.- AIRITE PRESSURE VESSEL WELD DISCREPANCIES
Serial no. Spacecraft Discrepancy
XTAO005 i01
XTAO010
XTAO013
XTA0016
XTA0022
XTAO017
103
1o6
107
ii0
ii0
Weld bead 0.005 inch concave by 0.600-inch
length. Remainder undercut 0.002 inch below
weld land parent metal. Accepted based upon
X-ray and comparison to qual. unit used in
burst. Beech MRR.
Undercut below weld land in one area 0.0015
inch deep by 0.750 inch length adjacent to
upper hemisphere. Due to heavy weld drop-
through. Accepted for unrestricted use by
NR MRD.
Hemisphere dimensional characteristics re-
suited in excessive weld mismatch. Units were
successfully welded after NR MRD. Finished
vessel met all requirements.
Four areas of concavity in center of weld
bead: no. i, 0.0025 inch depth; no. 2, 0.0055
inch depth; no. 5, 0.0045 inch depth; no. 4,
0.0025 inch depth. Concavity due to excessive
drop-through. Rewelded using two 360-degree
weld passes in accordance with NR MRD.
After rework of above, three areas of con-
cavity remained: no. l, 0.0025 inch below
parent metal; no. 2, 0.004 inch below parent
metal; no. 3, 0.0015 inch below parent metal.
Warpage occurred due to lack of constraint.
Accepted for unrestricted usage per NR MRD
based upon positive margins of safety.
Borescope showed entire weld land visible and
not consumed through 360-degree circumference
due to lack of penetration. Rewelded per NR
MRD instructions.
Borescope revealed lack of drop-through in an
area 1/2 inch in length. Rewelded by one 360-
degree pass per NR MRD.
Edge of weld on upper hemisphere undercut from
O.OO1 inch to 0.003 inch into parent material
for 360 degrees following rewelding per above--
reworked and accepted by NR MRD based upon
stress analysis.
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TABLE D3-1.- AIRITE PRESSURE VESSEL WELD DISCREPANCIES - Concluded
Serial no. Spacecraft Discrepancy
XTAO024 iii
XTA0021
XTAO033
XTAO019
XTAO003
XTAOO32
iii
Unassigned
Unassigned
Unassigned
Unassigned
Hemisphere dimensional characteristics out of
specification. Units successfully welded after
certification test specimens duplicating con-
ditions were acceptable. Discrepancies were
consumed during welding. Beech MRR.
Incomplete weld penetration for a distance of
17-3/8 inches. Rewelded per NR MRD.
Upper hemisphere dimensions out of specifica-
tion. Accepted for welding with fit up with
another hemisphere. Beech MRR.
Borescope revealed complete weld land (0.012
inch) still visible--repair welded per NR MRD.
Borescope and X-ray revealed incomplete pene-
tration major distance of weld. Rewelded per
Airite procedure. Beech MER.
Weld concavity from 0.001 to 0.0055 inch deep
on drop-through side of weld on upper hemis-
phere. Maximum width is 0.003 inch--accepted
for unrestricted use by NIR MRD.
Borescope revealed area approximately 0.600
inch long with incomplete consumption of weld
lands. X-ray indicated complete penetration.
Rewelded by Airite procedure. Beech MIqR.
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Outer shell.- The outer shell is made of Inconel 750, also a nickel
base alloy having the following nominal composition: 15 percent chromium,
7 percent iron, 2.5 percent titanium, 1 percent columbium, 0.7 percent
aluminum, and the remainder nickel. According to references 3 and 4, the
outer shell can be annealed. Typical strength values for the annealed
alloy are 130,000 psi ultimate strength and 60,000 psi yield strength.
This is more than adequate for this application. The wall thickness of
the outer shell is 0.020 ± 0.002 inch. When the space between the two
shells is evacuated, the outer shell preloads the insulation between the
two shells. The dome of the outer shell contains a burst disc designed
to vent the space between the shells to ambient pressure at a pressure
differential of 75 ± 7.5 psi.
Cryogenic tank tubing.- Three fluid lines (fill line, vent line, and
feed line), and an electrical conduit are fusion welded to the close-out
cap (tube adapter) that is screwed into the top of the pressure vessel.
The cap is secured to the pressure vessel by a circumferential seal weld.
The four lines are made of Inconel 750, annealed Aerospace Materials
Specification (AMS) 5582. The tubes traverse the space between the two
shells and exit the outer shell at the side of the tank coil cover. The
nominal strength of the annealed tubing is 140,000 psi ultimate, and
80,000 psi yields, which is more than adequate for the application, as
the stress level in the tubing is only about 17,000 psi.
After the tubes are welded to the cap, a visual inspection, helium
leak test (3 psi), and proof-pressure tests are used to assess the
quality of these welds (ref. 5). This is reasonable because of the low
stress levels involved. Liquid-oxygen-compatible dye penetrant inspec-
tion and subsequent cleaning would enhance the possibility of finding
surface cracks. X-rays of these welds would be difficult to obtain and
should be of dubious value.
The four lines extend only a few inches from the tank dome. When
the tank is assembled on the oxygen subsystem shelf, the fluid tubes are
joined by brazing to the 304L annealed corrosion resistant steel tubes
of the spacecraft systems. Although joining Inconel 750 and 304L steel
constitutes a bimetallic couple, it is satisfactory in this application
because of the dry environment that is maintained.
Qualification Program
The pressure vessel qualification program was conducted by Beech
Aircraft Corporation. Four pressure vessels were subjected to burst
tests as described in references 6 through 12.
Prior to each burst test, the vessel was subjected to an acceptance
pressure test at 1357 psig and checks were made for leaks. No leaks were
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observed in any of the vessels. In Appendix F of reference 9, there is
an analysis of the proof test of vessel PV-4. _ne following table lists
someof the strain gage readings taken during the qualification testing.
_ASUREDSTRESSLEVELSIN KSI
Tank
Tank PV-4
70° F
Tank PV-I
-320° F
Internal
pressure,
psig
1020
1357
I020
2.8 inches
from
upper pole
116.7
2.0 inches
from
girth weld
106.1
139.4
i13
Lower
pole
area
97,7
128.9
Membrane
(0.061-inch
thick)
105.8
aDesign value ii0 ksi
bDesign value 145 ksi
For the cryogenic burst tests, the vessels were filled with liquid
nitrogen and placed in an open dewar of liquid nitrogen. The ambient
temperature burst tests used water as the pressuring medium. The burst
pressures of the qualification vessels were as follows:
Tank Test condition Burst pressure, psig
PV-I Cryogenic (LN2, -320 ° F) 2233
PV-2 Cryogenic (LN2, -320 ° F) 2235
PV-3 Ambient temperature (70 ° F) 1873
PV-4 Ambient temperature (70 ° F) 1922
All ruptures were similar; the failures apparently started about
2 or 3 inches from the pole of the tank on the top at the transition
from the heavier section to the membrane section. The fractures pro-
gressed around the boss area, proceeded essentially perpendicular to the
girth weld, and then crossed the girth weld in both ambient tests and in
one of the cryogenic tests. In the other cryogenic temperature test
vessel, a large fragment came out of the upper hemisphere. In no case
was there violent fragmentation. After the burst of PV-1 at 2233 psig,
initial failure was judged to have occurred at the end of the neck taper
around the top pole. The rupture progressed downward, branching into a
Y. After coming into contact with the weld, the rupture followed the
weld fusion zone.
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The following is a quotation from reference 9:
"2.3.7 Conclusions - Based on the above analysis and
evaluation_ the following conclusions are made:
(i) Burs_ failure initiated at the end of the
boss taper in the upper hemisphere and resulted
from plastic deformation beyond the tensile
strength of the base material at _ent tem-
perature.
(2) Rupture was of a hydrostatic type.
(3) The appearance of all failed areas was
judged to indicate good ductility of the base
metal and weldments.
(4) No significant mismatch was observed on
the specimens investigated.
(5) All fractures across the weld were shear
fractures and of a secondary nature.
(6) The grain size throughout the vessel was
fine (ASTM-5 to 8) and relatively equiaxed.
(7) The ambient burst test was judged to be
completely successful by Beech Aircraft Cor-
poration Engineering, and the results of the
test indicate approximately i00 percent ef-
ficiency for the material at the test tem-
perature."
The data from these pressure vessel tests satisfy the qualification
requirement for an ultimate factor of safety of 1.5 at ambient tempera-
ture with adequate margins.
In 1967 North American Rockwell verified analytically the structural
integrity of the oxygen tank (ref. 13). An MSC structural analysis re-
port (ref. 14), also issued in 1967, confirmed the structural integrity
of these tanks and compared the analysis with the results of the burst
tests. This comparison showed good correlation between analytical and
test results. The MSC calculations were based on minimum guaranteed
sheet thicknesses and minimum material properties. Even better correla-
tion is obtained by using the actual thicknesses and material properties
of the test items.
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These analyses showthe maximumstresses in the tank during pressur-
ization to be in the upper spherical shell at the transition from the
constant thickness shell to the thickened area adjacent to the penetra-
tion port. Actual stresses determined from strain gage readings during
burst tests are consistent with the analyses.
FRACTUREMECHANICS
The design of the supercritical oxygen tank wasbased on conven-
tional elastic stress analysis which assumesa homogenousmaterial and
uses the conventional tensile properties for the calculation of safety
factors. In reality, all fabricated materials contain crack-like flaws
which maybe associated with weld defects or with metallurgical segrega-
tions which can transmit only negligible loads across their boundaries.
The load-carrying capacity of high-strength materials, particularly in
thick sections, maybe severely reduced by the presence of even small
flaws which can trigger a brittle catastrophic failure at loads well
below those considered safe by conventional design procedures. Further-
more, in manycases the type of flaw present cannot be found by non-
destructive inspection techniques and, for this reason, a proof test
must be dependedupon to identify those structures which might fail in
service•
At the outset it should be appreciated that linear elastic fracture
mechanics and the associated American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM)
Standard Method of Test for Plane Strain Fracture Toughness, Klc, are not
directly applicable to an analysis of the fracture of the oxygen pressure
vessel material in the thicknesses employed, or for that matter in very
much larger thicknesses. The evidence for this lies in early results
from a fracture test program nowunderway at Boeing. These results in-
dicate that specimens containing deep cracks in parent metal, or in
electron beamweld metal representative of the oxygen pressure vessel,
fail at net stresses very close to or slightly above the corresponding
yield strength whether they are tested at 70° F or -190° F. While the
plane strain fracture toughness, Klc, cannot be determined from the data
available, a lower bound estimate maybe madefrom test results reported
on 2-3/4 inch diameter notched round bar specimens (ref. 15). These
large specimenswere cut from forgings of Inconel 718 and tested at
-ii0 ° F. The corresponding yield strength was about 172 ksi and the
notch strength was 40 percent above the yield stren__h. Formal calcula-
• W! fT •
tions glve an apparent Klc value of 190 ksl -_/ in. which may be taken
as a lower bound for a yield strength of 172 ksi. This is approximately
equal to the 70 ° F parent metal yield strength of the oxygen pressure
vessel. Properly made electron beam weldments should have at least this
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high a Klc value since they are not heat treated after welding and there-
fore have a lower yield strength than the parent metal. At -190° F the
yield strength of the parent and weld metal will increase about iO per-
cent: however, for this austenitic alloy the corresponding change in
toughness would be expected to be negligible.
Failure Modes
While "apparent KIt" values should not be used to develop relations
between tank wall stress and critical flaw size, the lower bound value
of Kic can be used to showthat the pressure vessel would not fail in
a brittle manner. Whenthe parameter _Ic' the ratio of crack tip
plastic zone size factor to specimen thickness, is greater than l-l/2,
brittle fracture is very unlikely. This parameter is given by
K21 Ie
BIc = B 2
Fty
For the oxygen tank B the effective weld land thickness after welding
is 0.111 inch; the yield strength of the weld Fty is ll0 ksi at -190° F
(table D3-II), and the lower bound of KIe is 190 ksi - Vq-_.
TABLED3-II.- TYPICALPARENTMETALANDWELDTENSILEPROPERTIESa
Temperature, o F
-190
70
Parent metal
Ftu - ksi Fty - ksi
228 189
198 170
Weld metal
Ftu - ksi Fty - ksi
187 bllo
158 ioo
aDetermined by Boeing on inconel 718 forgings using same heat
treatment given the oxygen pressure vessel and on electron beam weld-
ments given no heat treatment.
bGage length equal to weld width.
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Using these values, _Ic = 27. A similar calculation for the parent metal
in the membrane yields _Ic = 16. On this basis, the mode of failure
of the pressure vessel would be expected to be ductile tearing rather
than shattering. However, it is not known whether this mode would lead
to a stable through-thickness crack, and a consequent slow leak into
the space between the pressure vessel and the outer shell, or to a
rapid tearing fracture with consequent destruction of the outer shell
and the quick release of a large volume of oxygen. Which of these two
possibilities is most likely depends in part on the flaw size giving
rise to the final fracture and on the rate of depressurization as compared
with the rate of crack propagation. To settle this matter would require
burst tests on intentionally flawed tanks.
If a local area of the pressure vessel wall or the tube adapter
were heated to a sufficiently high temperature by some internal or
external source, the tank would blow out at this local area. According
to data furnished by Boeing under contract to NASA, the strength of
Inconel 718 would degrade rapidly if the metal temperature exceeded about
1200 ° F. At lh00 ° F the tensile strength would be about 50 percent of
the room temperature value, and at 1600 ° F would be less than 30 percent
of this value. At a tank pressure of 1008 psi, the parent metal wall
stress based on membrane theory is about 108 ksi. A ductile rupture at
this stress would likely occur if the tank were at a uniform temperature
of 1400 ° F. The restraining effect of the cool surrounding metal would
raise the temperature required for a local blowout and this situation
is best evaluated by suitable experiments.
Effectiveness of the Proof Test
The proof test is the last, and should be the best, flaw detection
procedure applied to a pressure vessel. Ideally, the proof test should
cause failure if there are any flaws present that could grow to a critical
size during subsequent pressurization. For the oxygen tanks in question,
a fracture mechanics analysis cannot be made to assess the adequacy of
the proof test because of the high toughness of the material and the
thin sections used. These factors in themselves, of course, contribute
to the confidence that can be placed in the integrity of the pressure
vessel and, as discussed in the previous section, essentially rule out
the possibility of brittle failure. However, it is worthwhile to estimate
the effectiveness of the proof test in identifying those pressure vessels
which might develop leaks during pressure cycles subsequent to proof.
The failure model proposed considers the plastic instability fracture of
a ligament of material produced by incomplete fusion during electron
beam welding. The main features of this model are illustrated in fig-
ure D3-9. It essentially represents a long flaw in the tank wall at the
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I' '1
_L
Area of lack of fusion produces
an effective crack of depth A
& length 2C in tank wall of
thicknessB. 2C_'>A
Figure D3-9.- Ligament model for ductile fracture of pressure vessel.
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equatorial weld. It is postulated that the ligament will fail when its
stress reaches the tensile strength of the material. Calculations show
that the ligament stress _£ is related to the average wall stress
as follows :
g B
_£ = _g B - A
where the dimensions are defined in figure D3-9. The maximumrelative
flaw depth that can be sustained without failure is then
cI
a_ : 1- _z_ (1)
B Ftu
where Ftu is the ultimate tensile strength. Failure will occur by
tearing of the ligament accompanied by rapid decompression of the tank.
It should be appreciated that this is a rather crude model of ductile
fracture, and will probably overestimate the failure stresses in a
spherical vessel. However_ it should be useful in assessing the effec-
tiveness of the proof tests in light of subsequent service_ because of
tl_(:very large margins between proof and operating pressures.
The pressure cycles applied to the Apollo 13 oxygen tank no. 2
are shown in table D3-111. It should be noted that the oxygen tank no. 2
had several extra pressure cycles in addition to those normally applied.
These were associated with rechecks for heat leaks and with the "shelf
drop" incident. The additional cycles do not affect this analysis nor
should they have reduced the integrity of the tank during mission
servi ce.
The ratio of tank pressures necessary to cause ligament failure for
a given relative flaw size A/B at two temperatures will be equal to the
ratio of the tensile strength of the material at these temperatures. On
this basis, the maximum flaw size that could exist before CDDT is estab-
lished by the last high pressure helium proof specified as 1260 +50
- 0 psi
at ambient temperature (1276 psi for oxygen tank no. 2). From equation
(i), the corresponding value of A/B for the weld metal is 0.55, based on
a weld tensile strength of 158 ksi at room temperature, a weld land
thickness of about 0.Iii inch, and a nominal weld land stress of 71 ksi.
The question now arises as to whether a flaw of this size coul_
propogate through the wall during subsequent pressurization and produce
a leak. Flaw growth could occur by sustained loads or cyclic loads. In
the absence of an aggressive environment, it is generally recognized
that sustained load flaw growth will not occur at loads less than 90
percent of that necessary to produce failure in a continuously rising
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TABLE D3-III.- HISTORY OF PRESSURE CYCLES APPLIED TO APOLLO 13
SUPERCRITICAL OXYGEN TANK NO. 2
[ Record from North American Rockwell Space Division I
Organization
Beech
Beech
Beech
Beech
Beech
Beech
Beech
Beech
Beech
Beech
Beech
Beech
NAR-SD
NAR-SD
NAR-SD
StAR- sD
NAR-SD
NAR- SD
NAR-SD
NAR-SD
NAR-SD
NAR-SD
Test media
H20 + He
GN 2
LN 2
GN 2
Date
6-20-66
7-15-66
7-15-66
9-15-66
Peak pressure,
psi
(a), (b)
1336
134o
92o
c1333
Time,
hr:mln
00:24
0o:56
00:51
00:54
Test name
Pressure vessel,
acceptance
Internal leak check
on complete assembly
Cold shock
Internal leak check
LN 2
Helium
Helium
LOX
LOX
9-15-66
lO-19-66
lO-19-66
12-20-66
10-24 -66
c918
1303
888
1333
922
OO:51
09:49
01:00
40:05
25:04
Cold shock
Proof and leak
Proof and leak
dq/dm
dq/dm
Helium
LOX
LOX
Helium
Helium
Helium
Helium
Helium
Helium
Helium
Helium
Helium
LOX
1-31-67
2- 2-67
2- 3-67
4-29-68
5- 1-68
5- 1-68
5- 2-68
5-27 -68
5-28-68
i1-18-68
ii-18-68
7-17-69
4- 9-7o
C13o 5
c1321
c920
1262
1002
968
1104
c,d1262
cliO2
d1276
1002
1025
925
09:07
28:39
22:16
06:45
01:00
13:13
08:02
02:54
01:07
02:24
01:40
01:39
43:53
Proof and leak
dq/dm
dq/dm
Leak
Leak
Leak
Leak
Leak
Leak
Leak
Leak
Leak
Launch loading
apressure cycles below 400 psi not recorded
bit could not be determined whether pressure measurements represented psia or psig
Cpressure cycles not normally applied
d1260 +50
- 0 psi specification
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load test. Following the 1276 psi helium proof test, no subsequent
pressurization exceeds 85 percent of this pressure, and consequently
sustained load flaw growth is extremely unlikely. Confidence in this
conclusion can be obtained from the test results of a Boeing program
now underway. These results apply to specimens containing small but
deep cracks in both parent metal and electron beam weld metal of Inconel
718 forgings heat treated in the same way as the oxygen tank material.
The early data show no crack growth in 20 hours at -190 ° F for specimens
subjected to 160 percent of the nominal operating stress.
Cyclic loads during the flight operation would be caused by cyclic
operation of the heaters (about once per one-half hour). The associated
pressure cycles are very small with a minimum-to-maximum stress ratio
of about 0.95. Flaw growth due to these small cyclic loads is con-
sidered extremely unlikely during the mission for the following reason:
maximum nominal operating stress in the weld land (at 935 psi) is about
28 percent of the weld tensile strength at -190 ° F. Therefore, with a
flaw size of A/B = 0.55, the ligament stress would be only about 63 per-
cent of the weld tensile strength. On the basis of the known fatigue
behavior of Inconel 718 welds (ref. 16), it would be expected that
ligament failure due to cyclic loads induced by heater operation would
not be a consideration until hundreds of cycles had been accumulated.
Confidence in this conclusion can be obtained from the early results of
the previously mentioned on-going Boeing program. These results in-
dicate that parent and electron beam weld metal specimens of Inconel 718
containing small but deep cracks do not show crack growth at -19 O° F
after 15,000 cycles at minimum-to-maximum stress ratio of 0.95 and a
mean stress of about 170 percent of the nominal operating value.
While the conclusions based on the ligament model are consistent
with the Boeing data obtained from specimens with small flaws, these
test results cannot be used to prove the validity of the model because
it applies to large flaws. Therefore, it is planned to check the con-
clusions reached on the basis of this model by testing specimens at
MSC which will contain large, deep cracks. Specimens of both electron
beam welds and parent metal will be subjected at -190 ° F to the mean
and cyclic stresses encountered in flight operation of the oxygen tank.
In assessing the effectiveness of the proof test, no consideration
was given to the possibility of failure in regions remote from the welds
(e.g., the main membrane or neck of the vessel). Conventional stress
analysis (ref. lh) shows that the highest stresses occur in the transition
region between the weld lands and the uniform thickness membrane. Stresses
in the neck region are very low and comparable to those in the weld land.
The ligament model is not applicable to these regions of the vessel
remote from the weld since there is no clear mechanism by which a large
flaw could be introduced into the parent metal. Experience shows that
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crack-like imperfections are sometimes introduced by the forging process,
but these are relatively small and confined to the surface layers of the
forging. Such defects are easy to detect and are usually removed by
the machining process. It is the standard practice of the aerospace
industry to reject forgings that have cracks that cannot be removed by
machining. With this in mind, there is no reason to doubt the effective-
ness of the final high-pressure helium proof test insofar as the pressure
vessel main membrane area is concerned.
Possibility of Tank Failure During Apollo 13 Mission
On the basis of the foregoing information, it is extremely unlikely
that the oxygen tank no. 2 pressure vessel ruptured at the maximum record-
ed flight pressure of 1008 psi and temperature of -160 ° F because of crack
propagation. Based on the previously described ligament model, a
pressure vessel passing the last high-pressure helium proof test should
withstand a pressure load nearly twice that of the maximum flight
pressure at -160 ° F. As described previously, a high-temperature blowout
of the pressure vessel is entirely possible, and if this occurred the
fluid released could have caused rupture of the dome or of the outer shell.
DYNAMIC TESTING
During the development and qualification of the command and service
modules (CSM), a series of dynamic tests was conducted on major vehicle
elements as well as subassemblies. The following sections describe
those tests applicable to the cryogenic oxygen tank.
Oxygen Tank Assembly Dynamic Testing
Dynamic testing was accomplished during September 1966. Flight-type
oxygen tank assembly hardware, selected as a test specimen, successfully
completed this testing as documented in reference 17.
Vibration testing.- The test specimen was subjected to vibration
in each of three axes, and the vibration level was maintained for 15 minutes
in each axis. The specified test levels, representing the combined envelope
of the atmospheric and space flight conditions, were as follows:
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Frequency, Hz
i0
lO-9O
90-250
250-400
400-2000
0.OO3
0.003 to 0.025 at 3 dB/octave
0.025
0.025 to 0.015 at 3 riB/octave
0.015
The test spectrum is shown as the solid line in figure D3-i0. No signifi-
cant anomalies were recorded during these tests. These tests qualified
the oxygen tank assembly for the launch and space flight conditions.
Acceleration testing.- The oxygen tank assembly used in the vibra-
tion testing mentioned in the preceding paragraph was also tested for
acceleration in each of three axes for at least 5 minutes in each di-
rection. The acceleration was 7g in the launch axis direction and
3g in the other two orthogonal axes. These accelerations are greater
than those expected during normal ground handling or during flight. No
anomalies were recorded during these tests.
Apollo CSM Acoustic and Vibration Test Program
In addition to the dynamic testing previously described, the oxygen
tank and shelf assemblies plus other CSM subsystems were tested as part of
the Block II, Spacecraft 105/AV Certification Test Program conducted
during February and March 1968 (ref. 18). These tests qualified the
Block II CSM hardware against the acoustic and vibration criteria, and
confirmed the structural integrity of the CSM for vibration inputs which
enveloped the complete ground and flight environmental requirements as
specified in reference 19.
Figure D3-11 shows the transducer locations used for both the acous-
tic and vibration testing. Test instrumentation in the area of the
oxygen tank was as follows:
SA n0 (+x)
SA iii (-R)
SA 112 (-T)
SA n3 (+x)
Oxygen shelf on bracket, 18 inches from beam 4
Oxygen shelf on bracket, 18 inches from beam 4
Oxygen shelf on bracket, 18 inches from beam 4
Oxygen shelf on centerline
Note: R = radial, T = tangential
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0.001
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Frequency, Hz (cps)
Figure D3-10.- Service module data overlays and specified test spectrum.
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SAII41
SAIl5
SAI16
÷y _.__ -Z
÷Z ""_ I _ "Y
SAI32
BEAM 3
FUEL CELL
AFT HELIUM
FUEL CELL
O2
EAM 4
.OSA104
SA105
SAI06
LINE
BRACKET
DSAI10
5AIll
SAIl2
SA107
SA108
SAIO9
LINE
SUPPORT BRACKET
H2 TANI_
AFT BULKHEAD
A UNIAX ACCELEROMETER
• TRIAX ACCELEROMETERS
Figure D3-11.- Spacecraft I05/AV service module instrumentation, bay 4.
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Vibration testing consisted of sinusoidal sweeps in the 4- to 30-Hz
range, followed by sinusoidal dwells at the prominent resonance fre-
quencies. CSM vibration response was controlled to O.075-inch double
amplitude for the 4- to 8-Hz frequency range and 0.1g peak for the T-
to 30-Hz frequency range.
Acoustic tests were performed to measure the vibratory response
in the 20- to 2000-Hz frequency range. The acoustic spectrum of
interest for the oxygen tank was adjusted to obtain a test spectrum as
shown in figure D3-10.
The vibration and acoustic tests were completed without failures
or any pertinent anomalies in the oxygen tank or tank shelf. The
maximum observed accelerations during the tests are given in the
following table:
Inst. no.
SA ii0
SA iii
SA 112
SA 113
Vibration
X-axis
4- to 30-Hz sweep,
g (rms)
0.02
.5
.5
•15
Z-axis
4- to 30-Hz sweep,
g (rms)
0.05
.5
.6
.4
Acoustic
X-axis
4- to 30-Hz sweep,
g (rms)
O.OO5
.35
.6
.17
The responses of four transducers (SA 107 through SA 109 and
SA ll3) are shown in figure D3-10.
The tests confirmed the following:
i. Structural integrity of Block II CSM wiring, plumbing,
bracketry, and installed subsystems when subjected to the dynamic loads
resulting from spacecraft exposure to the aerodynamic noise environment
expected during atmospheric flight.
2. Structural integrity of the Block II CSM when it is
experiencing the low vibratory motions produced by atmospheric flight.
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Based upon the results, it is concluded that the tests were ade-
quate to qualify the CSM for flight on the Saturn V. Of course, this
qualification would not necessarily cover abnormal conditions such as
mishandling.
SHOCK TESTING
Although NR specification (ref. 20) requires qualification testing
of the oxygen tank assembly inside its shipping container for ground
handling and transportation conditions, further investigation revealed
that this requirement was deleted on January 8, 1965. This deletion is
documented in paragraph 3.8.4.3 of reference 21, which states, "Revised
Apollo Test Requirements, no testing of transportation and ground hand-
ling environments (shall be required). Packaging is designed to pre-
clude exposure of components to environments beyond transportation
levels." The shipping container (ref. 22) was reportedly shock tested
during the development program in 1964 and successfully sustained the
test environment described in reference 23. From these tests it was
concluded that the shock attenuation system in the shipping container
was acceptable. There was no requirement for shock testing of the
oxygen tank assembly outside its shipping container.
INTERNAL COMPONENTS
There are a number of components internal to the oxygen tank.
These are individually discussed in the following sections.
Qaantity Gage
The quantity gage capacitor (fig. D3-12) consists of two concentric
aluminum tubes which are adequately mounted and supported. The inner
tube of the capacitor constitutes the extension of the fill line. The
outer tube is perforated to insure access of the oxygen to the space
between the capacitor plates. The relative position of the two plates
is maintained by insulating Teflon separators. Shorting of the capaci-
tor at the plates within the tank requires bridging of the gap between
the tubes by a conductive material. Shorting could also be induced by
the contact of bare lead wires resulting from insulation damage. The
power input to the quantity gage is regulated and limited by the high
impedance source of the signal conditioner. The spark that could be
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Vent line and electrical
conduit also pass Fill
through this ada_ i_.I
Teflon adapte -_
Inc°nel tube_,_ / II
Teflon adapter
.224 dia holes, two
.232
places for heaterj
and motor wiring
Feed
II
Adapter cap inconel
_erature sensor
and quantity probe
elements of
capacitor (aluminum)
Hole for temperature
sensor wiring
Probe is manufactured
by Simmonds Precision
Products, Inc.
Glass-filled
teflon insulator
Temperature
sensor element
is mounted on
this insulator
Fixed insulator
Inner tank_
Figure D3-12.- Quantity gage.
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generated is at the 7- to lO-millijoule level. The evidence provided
by the data can be construed to indicate that the effects of the probe
failure during flight were limited to data loss.
Heaters
The two electrical heaters (fig. D3-13) are mounted to the heater
fan support tube. The heaters are nichrome resistance wire imbedded in
magnesium oxide insulation encased within a sheath of stainless steel.
The stainless steel sheath is spiralled and brazed to 12.0 inches of
the support tube length. The specifications established by North
American Rockwell for the Block II EPS cryogenic storage system (ref. 24)
provide a requirement for operation of the heater circuit at 65 V dc from
a GSE source for initial pressurization of the oxygen tank. For flight
the specification calls for operation from a 28 V dc source. The speci-
fications established by Beech Aircraft Corporation for the heater
(ref. 25) stipulate standby operation from an ac source, later estab-
lished as 65 V ac, for 50 minutes. While the heater is apparently
satisfactory for its intended use, the specifications are not compatible
with the intended use. The heater circuit is protected by a 15-ampere
circuit breaker. Individual thermostats for each heater are also
mounted on the inside of the support tube.
The thermostats were included in the heater circuit to prevent
raising the pressure vessel wall temperatures above 90 ° F, the design
temperature for the vessel walls. Such a condition (i.e., walls
reaching temperature above 90 ° F under operating pressure) might occur
if there was a very low quantity of oxygen left in the tank and it was
desired to maintain pressure. There is no known instance of the ther-
mostats ever having had to operate in flight.
A cross section of a thermostat is shown with the contacts in the
open position in figure D3-14. The contacts would assume this position
when the temperature of the thermostat reached 80 ° ± i0 ° F. When the
thermostat temperature is reduced to 60 ° ± 7 ° F, the differential con-
traction of the two metals of the bimetallic disc causes the disc to
snap through, assuming a convex up configuration. This forces the wave
washer and the attached thrust pin to move upward. The movable arm
containing the lower contact is pushed up by the thrust pin and the
contacts are closed. The wave washer acts as a spring to keep the
thrust pin bearing against the bimetallic disc. All of the moving
parts of the thermostat are enclosed in an hermetically sealed case.
The thermostats are rated by the manufacturer as follows.
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CURRENT RATING OF THERMOSTAT
Number of cycles
i00,000
50,000
25,000
i0,000
5,OOO
Applied
30 V ac or dc
5.0 amp
5.5 amp
6.0 amp
6.5 amp
7.0 amp
voltage
125 V ac
2.0 amp
3.0 amp
4.0 amp
5.0 amp
6.0 amp
250 V ac
i.0 amp
1.5 amp
2.0 amp
2.5 amp
3.0 amp
The specifications established by North American Rockwell for the
Block II EPS cryogenic storage system (ref. 24) provide a requirement
for operation of the heater circuit at 65 V dc from a GSE source for
initial pressurization of the oxygen tank. For flight, the specifica-
tion calls for operation from a 28 V dc source. The specifications
established by Beech Aircraft Corporation for the thermostat (ref. 26)
stipulate a current-carrying requirement of 7 amperes without specifying
voltage level or type of source (i.e., ac or dc). Acceptance test re-
quirements imposed on the supplier by this latter document include
dielectric testing, thermal shock, verification of operating tempera-
tures of the thermostat_ helium leak test, insulation resistance test,
and visual and dimensional inspection. No requirement is imposed for
acceptance test verification of the operational characteristics of the
thermostat with respect to current-carrying capability or ability to
open under load at any of the several voltages (65 V dc, 65 V ac, or
28 V dc) to which the thermostat will normally be subjected.
Qualification testing of the thermostats was accomplished as part
of the overall testing of the assembled oxygen tanks. These tests
included vibration, acceleration, and mission simulation. Operation
of the heater circuit at Beech during the oxygen tank qualification
program and for all normal acceptance testing is accomplished using
65 V ac for initial pressurization. Since this is done only when the
tank is filled with liquid oxygen, it is highly unlikely that tempera-
tures would be raised to levels that would cause operation of the
thermostats. One instance of a single thermostat operating to open a
heater was experienced in the First Mission Subsystem Qualification
Test (ref. 27). At this time, heaters were being energized from a
28 V dc bus.
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All qualification and acceptance tests identified were primarily
concerned with the repeatability of the thermostat actuation at the
specified temperatures. No qualification or acceptance tests have been
identified which would verify the ability of the thermostats to open
the heater circuit when energized at 65 V dc.
The combination of incomplete, unclear, and therefore inadequate
specifications of the thermostat with respect to voltage type and level
and a test program that does not verify the ability of the switch to
operate satisfactorily under service conditions constitutes a design
deficiency. The fact that the ratings for the thermostat by the manu-
facturer (preceding table) contains no entry for 65 V dc indicates that
service at this voltage was not intended.
At KSC, the heater circuits were intended to be operated at 65 V dc
only when the tanks were full of liquid oxygen. Under this condition,
the thermostats would not be required to actuate. A discussion of the
possible consequences of actuation of the thermostat under load at
65 V dc is presented in a later section of this Appendix.
Fans
At the time the tanks were first designed, the knowledge of the
behavior of fluids in zero-g was limited. It was believed that signi-
ficant stratification of the fluid would occur during flight. Under
these circumstances a number of difficulties could arise: a rapid
pressure drop in the tank would be induced by the acceleration resulting
from an SPS burn; the heaters might not be able to transfer heat uni-
formly to the oxygen; and, finally, serious errors in quantity measure-
ment could result. The occurrence of any of these conditions could
jeopardize flight safety or mission success. For this reason, the tanks
were provided with two motor-driven centrifugal fans to mix the fluid
and insure its homogeneity.
The two oxygen fan motors (fig. D3-15) are three-phase, four-wire,
200/l15-volt, 400-hertz, miniature, open induction motors, driving cen-
trifugal flow impellers. The minimum speed of the motors is 1800 rev-
olutions per minute at a torque output of 0.9 ounce-inches. The motors
are mounted at each end of the motor-heater support tube by a canti-
levered attachment joined to the motor back plate. The motor clearance
within the support tube wall is a nominal 0.01 inch. The stator windings
and bearings of the motors are exposed to oxygen.
The stator windings are fabricated with number 36 American Wire
Gage (AWG) wire, using a Teflon-coated ceramic insulation. The ceramic
insulation is brittle and subject to breakage if proper tension is not
used in fabricating windings or if sharp bends are made at the winding
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end turns. Acceptance testing of the wire is conducted on the first
i00 feet of each reel. The wire is considered acceptable if no more
than i0 breaks in insulation are exhibited in the sample whenpulled
through mercury at 25 feet per minute. The rejection rate for stator
winding faults for motors processed early in the production run was
substantial. Improved yield was achieved only by rigid adherence to
the winding tension process control used in fabricating the windings,
proper assembly techniques, and frequent in-process dielectric testing.
Phase-to-phase short circuits or shorted turns within a single phase
are more likely than phase-to-ground faults. A limited amount of in-
sulation is provided between windings and ground. Phase-to-phase in-
sulation is limited to the end turns. Considerable improvement was
accomplished in the acceptance rate of motors built after the fabrica-
tion control techniques were developed (Appendix C). Noproblem was
exhibited in the testing of the two motors finally installed for flight
in oxygen tank S/N XTAO008.
The motor design uses an insulation system in the windings which
is subject to failure unless carefully controlled. The individual
power leads to each fan motor are protected by 1-ampere fuses.
Temperature Sensor
The temperature sensor is a calibrated resistor, the resistance of
which is proportional to temperature. The sensor is mountedto the
upper glass-filled Teflon fitting of the capacitor probe. Since the
calibrated input to the resistor is current limited to i.i milliamperes
under fault conditions of the sensor, no problem would be anticipated
with this unit.
Wiring
Wire sizes and types of wire used within the oxygen tank are shown
in table D3-1V. The insulation used in all cases is Teflon with a
nominal thickness of 0.010 inch. Distribution and arrangement of the
wires is shownin figure D3-16.
The insulation on all wires within the tank is specified by
reference 28 to conform to MIL-W-16878, Type E. The insulation thick-
ness requirements of this specification establish the following:
Insulation Thickness I in.
Condition Minimum Nominal Maximum
Nominal 0.008 0.010 0.012
With out-of-center
tolerance 0.007 0.010 0.014
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The mechanical design of the tank with respect to provisions for
wiring is considered deficient. Damageto the wiring maybe either
insulation damageor conductor damage,portions of which cannot be
inspected or adequately tested during or after assembly.
The four number26 AWGwires for the fan motors are encased in
0.012-inch-thick shrink-fit Teflon tubing from the motor housing to a
point 0.3 inch outside the heater-fan tube. The 0.012-inch shrink-fit
tubing provides the protection for the wires at the point where the
four-wire bundle crosses the machined sharp edges of the access hole
in the heater tube (fig. D3-17). The shrink-fit tubing does not,
however, alleviate the strain on the 90-degree bend of the wires at the
motor housing. During assembly of the fan to the support tube, the
four-wire bundle in the shrink-fit tubing maybe forced against the
machined sharp edges of the support tube at point "A" of figure D3-17.
Two specimensof the support tube that have been examined showno re-
moval of burrs at this point. Betweenthe motor and the access hole in
the support tube, the wire bundle is restrained by a 0.010-inch thick
soldered copper clip.
The twisted lower fan motor leads (without shrink-fit tubing)
reenter the support tube and traverse a 3/16-inch-diameter conduit for
12.0 inches before again exiting the support tube. No specification
restraint on slack left in the bundle contained within the heater tube
conduit was noted. The motor leads are in contact with the conduit, at
least at the ends of the conduit, and exposed to local heat conditions
of the heater elements.
Design changeswere madebetween Block I and Block II configurations
to provide independent circuits to each motor and heater within the
oxygen tanks. Provision was madein the glass-filled Teflon separator
on the quantity probe for access of the extra six wires to the upper end
of the probe assembly. The conduit (i/2-inch 0Dx 0.015-inch wall) in
the domefor wiring to the connector wasnot, however, increased in
size.
During assembly of the tank, three bundles of six wires each are
sequentially pulled through the conduit. The first bundle, consisting
of the two quantity gage wires and the four temperature sensor wires,
is pulled through the conduit along with the pull wires for the other
bundles. The second and third bundles each consist of one set of motor
leads encased in 0.012-inch shrink-fit tubing and one set of heater leads.
The pull wires have a break-strength of 65 pounds. Since the third bundle
of wire must be forceably pulled through the conduit, damageto wires in
this bundle or the others mayresult which maynot be detectable without
physical inspection. Physical inspection cannot be accomplished with this
design.
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Figure D3-17.- Typical wire routing for fan motor (four times full size).
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The calculated break strength of a number 26 AWG nickel wire is
II pounds and elongation of 28 percent can be experienced before break.
If the number 26 AWG wires do not share the load associated with pulling
the bundle through the conduit, damage to the wire(s) will result be-
fore the pull wire breaks. Stretching of the wire results in local
neck-down of both the conductor and insulation. In subsequent operation
of the circuit, the locally smaller gage conductor can produce local
hot spots and progressive deterioration of the insulation.
Discussion
All electrical power system wiring is protected by fuses or
circuit breakers specified on the basis of wire size. Such devices
will transmit their rated current without opening the circuit to
either the load or a fault. The opening of the device to protect the
circuit on overload is determined by an inverse time to over-current
ratio that will open a large current fault in a short time, and a smaller
over-current fault in a longer time. The protection afforded is to the
wire and power system rather than to the connected end item.
The wiring in the oxygen tank has inherent potential for damage
in assembly due to inadequate support, inadequate clearances, and thin
Teflon insulation. It is well known (refs. 29 and 30) that Teflon in-
sulation cold flows when subject to mechanical stress. The design of
the tank internal installation exposes the insulation to potential pro-
gressive damage by cold flow where the wiring is placed near or at bends
around sharp corners.
COMPATIBILITY OF MATERIALS WITH OXYGEN
It is well known that virtually all materials except oxides will
react with liquid oxygen (LOX) under specific conditions. The tend-
encies to react and the rates of reaction vary widely. Most organic
materials and the more active metals are sufficiently reactive with
LOX to require careful attention to the condition under which they are
used. Spontaneous reaction does not usually occur upon contact between
a material and LOX; however, the sudden application of energy in the
form of mechanical shock or electrical spark to the combination of LOX
and a chemically active material will often result in violent reaction
or rapid burning.
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Classification Methods
A method commonly used to classify the relative reactivity of
materials with LOX is described in references 31 and 32. Based upon
this method, a specification, MSFC specification 106B, "Testing Com-
patibility of Materials for Liquid Oxygen Systems ," was developed to
establish acceptance criteria of materials for use in L0X and gaseous
oxygen (GOX) systems. Materials meeting the requirements of paragraph
3.3 of the specification are said to be compatible with LOX. In this
context it must be recognized that the term "compatible" describes only
the relative reactivity of a material and does not describe an absolute
sit uati on.
Materials for use with LOX are selected from the "compatible" list
of references 33 to 36 under the additional stipulation that the level
of any potential mechanical shock is less than that associated with the
impact test and/or that potential electrical energy sources are less
than the ignition energy of the material in LOX. If a material is used
with oxygen and a potential energy source, it must be determined by
test that the energy available is less than that required to initiate
the reaction. Furthermore, the test should represent the circumstances
of use as nearly as possible.
For example, the pressures and temperatures of the oxygen to which
the material will be exposed should be duplicated in the tests. Ad-
ditionally, thickness and surface area of the material, as well as that
of any backing material (such as may act as a heat sink, for example)
should be duplicated. The latter is important because there are ex-
amples of materials changing from an acceptable rating to an unaccept-
able rating solely because of a change in the thickness used in a par-
ticular application. For some proprietary materials and composites
whose composition may vary from batch to batch, it is necessary to re-
peat the compatibility tests for each batch. Elastomers are a good ex-
ample of the latter category. In summary, the methodology for determin-
ing compatibility must be adhered to scrupulously to preclude self-
deception.
Materials Internal to the Tank
The materials of the internal components of the oxygen pressure
vessel have been identified from the records (ref. 37) and assessed as
to suitability for use in the high-pressure oxygen environment. The
types and estimated quantities of materials in each of these components
within the oxygen tank are listed in tables D3-V through D3-1X.
Of the materials used in the tank, most have been subjected previ-
ously to compatibility testing in LOX in accordance with the methodology
of references 31 and 32.
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TABLE D3-V.- MATERIALS IN HEATER ASSEMBLY
Part name
Tube assembly
Upper and lower
motor support
Silver braze
Wire clamp
Thermostat doubler
Grommet
Shim
Bolts
Screws
Screws
Nuts
Washers
Washers
Rivets
Safety wire
Heat shrinkable tubing
Solder
Screw
Material
321 stainless steel
302 stainless steel
QQ-S-561, Class II
Tinned copper
QQ-A-327 (T6) aluminum alloy
Teflon (MIL-P-19462)
321 stainless steel
302 stainless steel
302 or 303 stainless steel
302 or 30h stainless steel
Silver-plated 303 stainless
steel
321 stainless steel
302 stainless steel
2117 aluminum
30h stainless steel
Teflon (TFE)
AWG no. 14 clear
AWG no. 14 white
QQ-S-571, type AR
Comp Sn 60-Fb40
Stainless steel pw QQ-S-763
Estimated
weight, Ib
1.39
.26
.O62
.001
.oo4
Negligible
.06
.03
.04
.02
.002
.O2
.007
.001
Negligible
.001
.001
Negligible
.0_
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TABLE D3-V.- Concluded
Estimated
Part name Material weight, ib
Clamp Negligible
Drilube 822
Wire
Wire insulation and
shrink fit tubing
Disk blank*
Stationary contact*
Movable arm*
Welding cap*
ilnsulator*
Stainless steel clamp with
teflon cushion
AWG no. 20, silver-plated
copper
Teflon
Bi-metal (21 percent Ni
7 percent Cr Balance Fe
and 36 percent Sn)
0.010 fine silver on monel
0.004 Permanickel
Monel
Alsimag 645 or Duco 9P-16
Thrust pin*
Mounting bracket*
Wave washer*
Cup*
Rivet contact*
(movable)
Base assembly*
Alsimag 35
302 stainless steel
Stainless steel
321 stainless steel
Fine silver
321 stainless steel base
Negligible
0.o278
.0278
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
*Thermostat parts
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TABLE D3-VI.- MATERIALS IN DENSITY SENSOR PROBE
Part name
Density sensor/assembly
Bracket
Spacer
Rivet
Rivet, solid
Grommet
Grommet
Sleeve
Spacer
Solder
Material
3003 A1 alloy
25% glass-filled TFE Teflon
II00-H-14 A1 alloy
2117, ll00 A1 alloy
Glass-filled Teflon
Glass-filled Teflon
Red tubing - TFE Teflon
Size 9 thin wall
25% glass-filled Teflon
Tin/Lead 60/40
Inner tube plug
Rivet-semi-tubular
Outer tube
Eyelet
Rivet
Terminal
Rivet, solid
Solder
Sleeve, insulator top
iRivet
25% glass-filled Teflon
II00-H-I4 A1 alloy
6063-T832 A1 alloy
Brass Comp 22 HD QQ-B-626
ll00-H-14 A1 alloy
Brass 1/2-H Comp.
1-QQ-B-613B
II0-H-14 or 2117 AI alloy
QQ-S-571 (60/40)
Glass-filled TFE Teflon (25%)
ll00-H-14 A1 alloy
Estimated
weight, lb
1.9
.07
.O1
.01
•01
.01
.O1
.05
•01
.01
.03
.01
.20
.01
.01
.01
Negligible
.01
.4
.01
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TABLE D3-VI.- Concluded
Estimated
Part name Material weight, ib
i
Sleeve support bottom
Insulator sleeve bottom
Rivet
Inner tube
Terminal coax
Wire
Wire, insulation and
shrink fit tubing
_MS-5542 inconel X annealed
Fiber-filled TFE Teflon
ll00-H-lh AI alloy
6063-T832 AI alloy
Brass I/2-H Comp I-QQ-B-613B
AWG no. 20, nickel, grade A
Teflon
0.o25
.01
.18
.01
.0115
.0263
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TABLED3-VII.- MATERIALSIN DENSITYSENSORPROBETUBEASSEMBLY
Part Name
Tube assembly
Sleeve connector
Electrical connector
Solder terminals
Tube
Adapter (fill) upper
Adapter (fill) lower
Mat eri al
Inconel X750
Inconel X750
Inconel X750
Gold-plated Inconel X750
Inconel X750
Teflon (TFE)
Teflon (TFE)
Estimated
weight, ib
1.35
.i
.25
.001
•005
•016
•016
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TABLE D3-VIII.- MATERIALS IN FAN MOTORS
Estimated
Part name Material weight, lb
Screw
Plate, end
Shim
Shim
Shim
Bushing, bearing
IBearing, ball
Bearing, ball
Spacer sleeve
Lamination
Insulator, stator slot
Insulator, cell cover
Terminal
Sleeving, heat
shrinkable
Compound, insulating
Wire, magnet
Housing
Ring yoke
18-8 stainless steel
2024-T4 AI alloy
302 stainless steel
302 stainless steel
302 stainless steel
303 stainless steel
440C & Rulon "A"
440C & Rulon "A"
303 stainless steel
Ludnum AI-4750-H no. 2
temp. RL fin.
Teflon impreg, glass cloth
Teflon impreg, glass cloth
Brass 1/2-H QQ-B-613
Teflon TFE
Liquinite Teflon FBC powder
Teflon overcoated ceramic
insulation over copper wire
2024-T4 AI alloy
Transformer grade A silicon
electrical steel
0.02
.04
.02
.02
.02
.04
.02
.02
.i0
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.2
.2
.02
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Part name
Retainer stator
Plate, bearing
Pin, spring
!Pin, spring
Insulator
Grommet
Strain relief
Sleeve, rotor
Shim, cover
Plate, front
Vane, impeller
Plate, back
Hub
Lubricant
Safety wire
Wire
Wire insulation and
shrink fit tubing
TABLE D3-VIII.- Concluded
Estimated
Material weight, lb
2024-T4 AI alloy
303 stainless steel
302 stainless steel
302 stainless steel
Teflon
Teflon
Teflon impreg, glass cloth
416 stainless steel QQ-5-763
302 stainless steel
3003 aluminum alloy
No. 12 brazing sheet
No. 12 brazing sheet
II00-F aluminum
Drilube no. 822
300 series stainless steel
AWG no. 26, nickel, grade A
Teflon
0.02
.16
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.002
Negligible
.0327
.0518
0-56
TABLE D3-1X.- MATERIALS IN FILTER
Part Name
Body
Nut
Washer
Disc
Seal
Material
Inconel X750
304 stainless steel
304 stainless steel
302 stainless steel
Teflon
Estimated
weight, Ib
o.o16
.oo6
.002
.021
.oo8
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Some of the materials in the tables, however, have a questionable
compatibility with LOX, under the criteria of MSFC specification I06B.
These are the following:
60-percent tin, 40-percent lead solder
Teflon (TFE) heat shrinkable tubing
Drilube 822
Rulon A
Colored Teflon
Teflon liquinite powder
The solder is listed as incompatible in the references 33 to 36. There
are no test results for heat shrinkable Teflon tubing in the references.
The last four materials have given inconsistent results in compatibility
tests and exemplify the "batch" problem previously discussed. In ad-
dition to the above, some of the materials within the sealed thermostats
(table D3-V) have apparently not been tested.
It must be emphasized that the data in the references cited are for
tests in LOX at relatively low pressures. The compatibility of the ma-
terials under the conditions of service in the tank is thus not neces-
sarily characterized by the referenced data.
The Teflon insulation used on the wiring within the tank is a prime
suspect substance that burned inside Apollo oxygen tank no. 2 (Appen-
dix F). Over many years of use, Teflon has been proven to be one of the
most satisfactory nonmetallic materials for use in LOX. It will not
react with LOX unless excited by energy sources such as extremely high
impact energy (above i0 Kg-M) or a spark. Adiabatic compression tests
up to pressure of the order of i0 to 12 ksi have failed to ignite Tef-
lon. However, additives to Teflon to produce color or other property
changes have been known to increase the susceptibility of Teflon to
react with LOX.
It must be noted that all oxygen compatibility tests are conducted
with the specimens in a scrupulously "LOX-clean" condition. Cleanliness
of materials within oxygen systems is vital. Something as innocuous as
the oils from a fingerprint can serve as the starting point for a chain
of chemical reactions that can lead to a catastrophic failure. For
this reason, the same standards of cleanliness employed in compatibility
tests must be applied to flight systems.
Although the quantities of incompatible materials may be small,
these materials can provide the mechanism for initiating other reactions.
For example, in a recent test at MSC, 2 grams of Teflon were ignited in
900 psi oxygen, temperature -190 ° F, by means of a hot wire. This, in
turn, ignited a piece of aluminum 0.006 inch by 0.75 inch by 0.75 inch
that was in contact with the Teflon.
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Titanium is not listed as a material used in the oxygen system;
however, a titanium clamp of the same drawing number, distinguished only
by a different dash number, is used in the hydrogen tank. The clamp is
made in two halves. The identifying number is stamped on only one half.
The titanium halves are matched, drilled, and bagged together at the
manufacturers. If a half clamp made of titanium had been placed in-
advertently in the oxygen tank, it could have contributed to the fire
and subsequent tank failure as the clamp is attached to the boss area
of the tank. Because of the bagging and other controls, it is unlikely
that a titanium clamp found its way into an oxygen tank. It is poor
design practice, however, to have dimensionally identical parts of
different materials that may be interchanged and then installed in a
potentially hostile environment.
Although not normally exposed to supercritical oxygen, the alum-
inized Mylar used in the oxygen tank vacuum annulus, and within the SM,
is of interest in the investigation. Aluminized Mylar is not compatible
with oxygen and were the pressure vessel or the tank internal tubing to
fail, the Mylar in the annulus and/or the SM would be exposed to con-
centrated oxygen. If an ignition source is present, the Mylar would
burn. If such burning were to have occured within bay 4, it could have
contributed to pressurization of the bay and consequent loss of the SM
panel.
OTHER DESIGN AND SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS
A number of other features and components of the oxygen tank system
and of other spacecraft systems are discussed in the following sections.
Oxygen System Relief Valves
The oxygen tank relief valve was designed to protect the oxygen
tank against the effects of potential malfunctions of the tank subsystem.
Specifically, the valve was designed to relieve a pressure build-up
resulting from the worst of the following three system malfunction con-
ditions:
1. Heaters on GSE power supply at ground-rated conditions with a
full tank and fans running with thermostats failing to open. This yields
a heat input of 3002 Btu/hr, which would require a valve flow of 18 lb/hr
to prevent exceeding 1010 psig.
2. Heaters on at spacecraft voltage level (28 V dc) and fans
running with tank filled such that minimum dQ/dm exists (i.e., most
critical condition for raising pressure). This yields a heat input of
685 Btu/hr and a valve flow requirement of 19 lb/hr.
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3. Loss of vacuum in the annulus with the tank filled such that
minimum dQ/dm exists. This yields a heat input of 935 Btu/hr which
requires a valve flow capacity of 26 ib/hr.
The third condition requires the largest relief valve flow capacity
and this was used to size the valve. It was also stipulated that the
valve must pass this flow with the fluid at +130 ° F. These criteria
were considered conservative because of the effects of flow through the
relief valve on the heat leak, dQ/dm_ and system temperatures.
A question arises from an examination of the three malfunction con-
ditions assumed: Why was the case of heaters powered by ground support
equipment (GSE) at critical dQ/dm not considered? Under such a circum-
stance, the heat input would be approximately 4-1/2 times that of
condition 2 with a flow requirement increase in the same proportion. It
was determined that it was not intended to ever use GSE power to the
heaters except when the tank was full.
The design philosophy of the relief valve thus contemplated single-
failure modes associated with anticipated malfunctions. It did not
contemplate a catastrophic failure mode such as would be produced by
combustion within the tank. This is not an uncommon design practice in
the sizing of relief valves. In ground systems, however, in addition to
relief valves, pressure vessels are frequently provided with large burst
discs or blowout patches to protect against pressure rises that would
result from conditions other than anticipated malfunctions.
The Block II relief valve was subjected to qualification testing
as part of an oxygen system valve module qualification test program
conducted by Parker Aircraft Company for North American Rockwell (NR)
in March of 1967. Reference 38 describes the test program and the results.
Briefly, the module, consisting of check valve (for no. 2 tank), relief
valve, pressure switch, and pressure transducer, was subjected to the
following tests: performance, vacuum, vibration, acceleration, humidity,
and endurance cycling. Random vibration excitation was applied for
15 minutes for each axis. The acceleration testing was for 5 minutes in
each of the +X, -X, +Y and +Z axes. During both vibration and acceleration
tests, the various module elements were operated. The pressurizing medium
was nitrogen at room temperature during all tests, except for one of the
endurance tests which was conducted at -230 ° F.
The only discrepancy recorded for the test program was out-of-
specification leakage of the check valve subsequent to the vibration test-
ing. This was ascribed to the fact that fluid was not flowing through
this normally open check valve during vibration which would be its con-
dition during flight. This absence of fluid permitted the valve poppet to
repeatedly strike the seat causing abnormal wear. Further, there was
contamination present in the valve from the flex line used in the test
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setup. This aggravated the problem. Because these factors were present,
the test conditions were considered not representative of actual service
conditions and the check valve performance was considered acceptable
(ref. 39). It should be noted that the Block I valve was tested using
oxygen as the fluid medium and that the changes from Block I to Block II
valves were such as to not invalidate the materials compatibility demon-
strated with the Block I systems.
A number of observations are warranted. No shock testing was required
for the qualification of the relief valve. In view of the fact that other
valves in the service module exhibited shock sensitivity during the
Apollo 13 flight and the fact that only a few thousands of an inch of
poppet travel is required to open the relief valve fully, it would be
valuable to determine whether the relief valve is sensitive to shock.
It is possible that the relatively slow decay of oxygen tank no. 1
subsequent to the accident might be the result of a relief valve that
failed to seat correctly after the shock.
In the qualification program there was no requirement for the relief
valve to vent or relieve into a hard vacuum as it would have to in space.
It is possible that under such conditions the oxygen would cool enough
to solidify, thus plugging the orifice-like passage of the valve or the
downstream lines that lead to the overboard exit, precluding further
relieving by the valve. This is particularly important because the exit
lines from both relief valves are manifolded prior to entering the
overboard line. Were the common line to be plugged by solid oxygen by
flow from one valve, it might prevent the second valve from relieving
should it be required to do so. An experiment would be required to
verify this.
Arrangement at Head of Tank
The head ends of the tank and the temperature sensor and quantity
probe are shown in figure D3-18. One of the more significant features
of the design is the arrangement of the connections in the fill line
which routes the cryogenic fluid to the bottom of the tank, via the
inner element of the quantity gage capacitor, and which permit the
fluid to flow from the bottom of the tank during ground detanking. The
manufacturing drawings of the elements of this connection, two Teflon
adapters and an Inconel tube, allow a tolerance stack which is excessive.
One combined worst case results in a connection which cannot reach from
the fill tube connection in the tank head to the center element of the
quantity gage capacitor. The other results in a connection length which
prevents assembly of the probe to the adapter in the head of the tank.
These are shown in figure D3-19. The tolerances on concentricity between
the inner element of the capacitor and the outer shell of the probe are
not known and are omitted from this figure. Inclusion would show an even
worse situation than shown.
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Figure D3-18.- Arrangement of head end of tank.
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The experience with the oxygen tank no. 2 in Apollo 13 (apparently
normal detanking at Beech, but normal detanking not possible at KSC)
suggests that the components used in the fill line connection were close
to a worst-case short situation. Tests conducted recently at Beech show
that near normal detanking is possible when considerable leakage is
present at the joints in the connection, and that a substantial dis-
placement of the top Teflon adapter relative to the fill line in the tank
adapter cap is necessary to reproduce the KSC situation.
The manufacturing drawing tolerances are such that parts conforming
to the drawings could result in an assembly which will not provide the
proper connection. However, the probability of a combined worst case is
extremely low. It is probable that the actual variations between pro-
duction parts are significantly less than the drawing tolerances would
permit, particularly the variations between parts within a common batch.
Data have been requested on other similar parts to determine whether the
variations from part to part are large or small, and whether the average
tolerance stack found in practice leads to long or short connection
assemblies.
The design is such that the task of assembling the probe to the
adapter in the head of the tank (the connection is by four tack welds)
is extremely difficult. All wiring must be loosely installed, and the
majority of this originates from the fan/heater assembly which must be
already installed within the tank shell. The fill line connection must
be steered into place simultaneously with the insertion of the probe
into the adapter, and this becomes a blind operation, complicated by the
fact that thermal expansion coefficients dictate very sloppy fits between
the Teflon adapters and the metal components of the fill line. This
problem is dealt with at greater length in Appendix C.
One way to obviate this problem would be to redesign the internal
components of the tank to permit bench assembly and thorough inspection
of a single assembly, embodying all internal components and their plumbing
and wiring, before introduction into the tank body. It is recognized
that a redesign of this magnitude would largely destroy the foundation
of experience, both ground and flight, with respect to the operational
characteristics of the tank, but it is difficult to see how the internal
details of the tank could be modified to provide the necessary degree
of post-manufacturing inspectability without abandoning the present side-
by-side arrangement of quantity probe and heater.
Dome Assembly
The tank dome assembly (fig. D3-20) forms a portion of the outer
shell of the tank and houses the fluid lines and electrical conduit connec-
ting the inner shell to the exterior of the tank. The upper surface of
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Figure D3-20.- Oxygen shelf showing location of tank dome assemblies. 
D- 65 

the dome contains the upper pinch-off tube, through which the annulus
is evacuated, and a burst disc (rated at 75 psi -+ 7.5 psi) that provides
burst protection for the outer shell in the event of leakage from the
inner shell into the annulus. The arrangement of the fluid lines and
electrical conduit within the dome is shown in figures D3-21 and D3-22.
The coiling of these lines provides the high impedance path for heat
leaks between the inner and outer shells of the tank. In the case of
the large diameter vent llne, this path is made longer by use of a
double-walled tube outside the dome, with connection between inner and
outer walls at the extremity of the projection of the tube from the
tank.
Tube sizes are listed as follows (all dimensions in inches):
Oxygen Tank Tube Sizing
Vent tube 1/2 0D x 0.015 wall
(inside coil cover)
3/40D x 0.028 wall
(outside coil cover)
Inconel 750 AMS 5582
Fill tube 3/80D x 0.022 wall
Inconel 750 AMS 5582
Feed tube* i/h OD x 0.015 wall
Inconel 750 AMS 5582
Electrical tube 1/20D x 0.015 wall
Inconel 750 AMS 5582
Vapor- coole d*
shield tube
3/16 OD x 0.015 wall
Inconel 750 AMS 5582
Pressure vessel to vapor*
cooled-shield tube
1/40D x 0.015 wall
Inconel 750 AMS 5582
*These three tubes are Joined sequentially to provide a single
feed line which is looped around the tank inner shell to provide
regenerative cooling for the vessel.
A total of 18 wires pass through the electrical conduit, eight AWG
no. 26's, four AWG no. 22's, and six AWG no. 20's. The conduit is shown
in figure D3-23. At the start of the investigation some members of
the Panel felt that the unorthodox detanking procedure used at KSC could
have resulted in unacceptably high temperatures in this electrical
conduit due to resistive heating of the heater wires. This possibility
is discussed in a later section.
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Figure D3-21.- Arrangement of tubing within tank dome assembly.
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Figure D3-22.- Arrangement of tubing within tank dome assembly.
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Figure D3-23.- Arrangement of electrical conduit.
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The design of this portion of the tank results in a configuration
in which it is not possible to perform visual inspection of wiring after
assembly. In consequence, the possibility of dama_e_in manycases un-
detectable by normal quality assurance procedures, is significant.
Filter
The filter, which is welded onto the supply line projection into the
tank, is located within the top of the quantity gage adapter whenthe
tank is assembled. It consists of a series of thin washers stacked on
a tube-like mandrel containing relatively large holes communicatingwith
the interior of the tube. The washers have a series of raised projections
on one surface arranged in concentric circles. The projections in each
circle are staggered with respect to those adjacent circles. Whenstacked
on the mandrel, the spacing between the washers provided by the projections
present a tortuous path for the fluid to traverse in order to enter the
center of the mandrel and thus provides a filtering action. The filter
is rated at 175 microns and is intended to prevent particles greater than
this size from entering the feed line.
The filter is of simple and reliable construction, and should provide
only very small restriction to flow out of the tank. In the application,
the two componentsprotected by the filter are the relief valve and the
check valve in the tank no. 2 valve modu/e, both of which have moving
poppets that must seat properly in order not to leak.
In normal circumstances the filter location is appropriate. Under
abnormal circumstances, such as the combustion in tank no. 2 experienced
on Apollo 13, the filter might becomeclogged with solid combustion
products and thus preclude flow to the relief valves. Considering its
construction, and ample flow area, this is not very probable. Tests are
to be conducted to verify this.
Caution and Warning Provisions
Becauseof their design, the caution and warning system and the
switch-controlled indicators ("talkbacks") did not present correct
systems status to the crew during the Apollo 13 accident. As described
in Appendix B, the following items are noted as examples:
i. The loss of oxygen to fuel cells i and 3 occasioned by closure
of the oxygen shutoff valves was not indicated. The series logic used
in the information system required that both the hydrogen shutoff valve
and the oxygen shutoff valve be closed to activate the warning system.
Simultaneous operation of the valves is appropriate to a deliberate
shutdown of a fuel cell which should require no warning indication.
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2. The crew was not alerted to the abnormal rise and subsequent
loss of oxygen pressure in tank no. 2 because a normal out-of-limits
operational signal (low hydrogen pressure) was in e_istence.
3. When power was lost to main bus B, the "talkback" indicators
designed to indicate the state of RCS valves were no longer energized
and could not properly indicate valve position.
Thus, accurate information as to the state of spacecraft systems,
which is vital in time of emergency, was not provided by the caution
and warning system.
ABNORMAL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE OXYGEN TANK
The oxygen tank which failed during the Apollo 13 mission had been
subjected to two abnormal incidents prior to launch. The first occurred
during spacecraft assembly. The oxygen shelf was "dropped" and the
tank zubJected to a shock load. The second abnormal condition occurred
at KSC. An unorthodox detanking technique was used when the tank failed
to empty during the normal procedures. The possible consequences of
those incidents are discussed in the following sections.
Oxygen "Shelf Drop" Incident
The oxygen shelf which flew in Apollo 13 (Spacecraft 109) orig-
inally was installed in Spacecraft 106. On October 21, 1968, this shelf
was in process of being removed from Spacecraft 106 for a rework of the
vac-ion pumps. During the removal, the sling adapter (ground equipment)
broke. The cause for the failure was traced to failure to remove one of
the bolts attaching the shelf to the service module. At the time of the
incident, it was assumed that the failure permitted the shelf outboard
edge to fall back about 2 inches, at which point the shelf motion was
stopped by the supports in the service module. An analysis of the stiff-
ness of the oxygen shelf led to the prediction of a shock load of the
order of lOg. The incident is reported in more detail in Appendix C. An
analysis of the incident is contained in the files of the Board. The
general conclusions are as follows:
i. The Apollo 13 oxygen "shelf drop" incident can be explained by
assuming that the counterbalance weights on the 9EH-1275-100 sling were
run out in an attempt to "balance" the effect of the shelf attach bolt
(which was inadvertently not removed) to a point at which they caused
the sling adapter to fail in bending.
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2. The geometry and loading of the system at the time of failure
would rotate the oxygen shelf about the remaining shelf attach bolt un-
til the top of oxygen tank no. 2 impacted the underside of the fuel cell
shelf, causing the observed dent in the shelf.
3. Tests to reproduce the dent in the fuel cell shelf have been
conducted by striking a specimenof the shelf aluminumhoneycombma-
terial with an appropriately weighted tank pinch-off tube cover. The
test results indicate that in order to reproduce the observed dent, a
maximumacceleration of 7g was required.
4. On the basis of these data, it does not appear that the loads
transmitted to the internal componentsof the tank during the "shelf
drop" incident were of sufficient magnitude to cause any structural
failure. Onepossible effect, however, could have been the displacement
of a marginally secured connection between the fill line and the inner
element of the quantity gage capacitor. Should this have occurred, it
could have been the cause of the detanking anomaly experienced at KSC
with oxygen tank no. 2 during the preflight operations on Apollo 13.
Detanking at KSC
The difficulty with the detanking of oxygen tank no. 2 subsequent
to the countdowndemonstration test (CDDT)is described in Appendix C.
As noted in the preceding section, the inability to detank maybe as-
cribed to a displacement of the short Inconel tube in that portion of
the fill line located in the top of the quantity probe or the absence
of this tube. Tests conducted at BeechAircraft Corporation subsequent
to the flight have demonstrated that if the tube is displaced laterally
about 0.090 inch from its mating Teflon adapter, it is not possible to
detank in normal fashion. The manufacturing tolerances for this sub-
assembly have been discussed previously, and it is apparent that it is
possible for such a displacement to occur if the parts are at appropriate
extremes of the tolerances.
The nonstandard procedure used to detank oxygen tank no. 2 involved
continuous power application to the heaters at GSEpower supply voltage
for 8 hours and i0 minutes. The fans were operated for all but the
first hour and 20 minutes of this period. There is no conclusive evi-
dence that either of the thermostats ever operated to open the heater
circuits during this period. This occurred, despite the fact that the
tank temperature sensor output, indicating ullage space temperature
under the conditions of this procedure, was still rising whenthe instru-
ment reached its readout limit of 84° F.
During this detanking, the GSEpower supply wasproviding approxi-
mately 6.0 amperesto each of the two heaters at approximately 65 V dc
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at the spacecraft. Tests conducted at MSCsubsequent to the flight
showedthat whena thermostat attempted to interrupt a 6.0-ampere
current at 65 V dc, the contacts welded shut. Whereassuch contacts
are rated by the manufacturer to interrupt at least a 6-ampere alter-
nating current, under direct current conditions a considerable arc will
be drawn and welding of the contacts will frequently result. At the
time of this writing, three thermostats have been tested under voltage
and current conditions like those experienced during the nonstandard
detanking. All three failed by welding closed. Werethe contacts in
oxygen tank no. 2 thermostats to have failed in this manner, which
seemshighly probable, the heaters would have drawn current for the
total period that the circuits were energized. There are a numberof
possible consequencesof this condition. These are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
Because the wiring in the conduit in the tank domeis of relatively
small diameter for the current carried, it might lead to excessive wire
temperatures by resistance heating, as this conduit represents a stagnant
region with poor heat paths for removal of the heat generated. Were the
temperatures to rise sufficiently, it could degrade the insulation to
the point that the wire might be exposed. Preliminary calculations in-
dicated that the temperature of the wires might rise to the point of in-
sulation degradation and/or melting of soldered connections. A pre-
liminary test using an actual conduit has indicated the temperature
would not rise above about 325° F, which is well below the threshold
temperature for wire insulation and solder damage. More definitive data
on this possibility will be provided by a test planned for the near
future at Beech Aircraft Corporation. A flight-type tank will be sub-jected to a reproduction of the nonstandard detanking process to deter-
mine, amongother things, how hot the wiring in the conduit would get.
The second possible modefor damagingthe wiring during the de-
tanking is related to the pressure pulsing employed during the latter
part of the de_anking operation. Whenthe tank is pressurized and
quickly vented, the cryogenic oxygen will boil violently, probably pro-
ducing "slugging" or "geysering" at the liquid-vapor interface. This
action could easily flex the large unsupported loop of wire that results
from the assembly process and thus could induce mechanical damageto the
wire. This, too, must be confirmed by test before it can be considered
as more than a possibility.
The third possibility for inducing wire damageapplies primarily to
the wiring in proximity to the heaters--especially the fan motor leads
that are routed through the 12 inches of 3/16-inch diameter conduit that
runs internal to the heater probe (see fig. D3-16). If the thermostat
contacts failed by welding closed, as seemsprobable from the results of
the thermostat tests described earlier, the heater probe metal tempera-
tures would continue to rise, limited only by the heat balance between
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that being generated by the heater and that being absorbed by the liquid
and gaseous oxygen in the tank. Were the heater probe temperatures to
rise above about 500 ° F, the wire insulation in its proximity would
begin to degrade.
A test simulating prolonged application of power to heaters and
fans with a heater probe half immersed in liquid nitrogen at one atmos-
phere pressure was conducted at MSC. After 8 hours_ a thermocouple
mounted directly on the outer casing of a heater element at a location
where it was in contact only with the gaseous nitrogen in the ullage
indicated a surface temperature of about i000 ° F. At the same time, the
temperature of the conduit wall reached 735 ° F.
Posttest inspection of the wiring indicated that the insulation had
been seriously degraded (fig. D3-24). The insulation had become rela-
tively brittle and had cracked in numerous places. Upon any subsequent
flexing of the wire, the insulation would either break off or shift to
widen the cracks, in either case exposing the conductor. Such an ex-
posure would set the stage for a future short circuit. The state and
nature of the degradation of the insulation depends on the temperature
it reaches. It should be noted that this test was conducted in a nitro-
gen atmosphere, whereas the actual prolonged heater operation occurred
in an oxygen environment. An oxygen environment is less benign chemi-
cally than one of nitrogen, and greater degradation than that observed
might occur. The all-up test at Beech should provide more definitive
information on this matter.
In summary, the nonstandard detanking procedure probably provided
the mechanism for initiating the flight failure by causing sufficient
damage to wire insulation to expose the conductor(s) of the fan motor
leads. This would permit a short circuit to occur and initiate com-
bustion within the tank. It is also possible that some solder was
melted during the prolonged heating. Under the normal gravity conditions
on the launch stand, it would be possible for a drop(s) of solder to fall
free and solidify and remain in the tank. This could possibly lead to
the subsequent shorting of the capacitor gage.
Discussion
As described in the preceding sections, the design of the oxygen
tank as a pressure vessel is very adequate. It is constructed of a
tough material well chosen for the application. There is no evidence
of substandard manufacture of the particular tank involved, nor has any
evidence been found of subsequent damage that would result in degrada-
tion of the structural integrity of the pressure vessel (as distinguished
from the internal components of the tank).
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If the telemetered pressure data truly represent the pressure the
tank experienced at the time of the accident, it should not have failed
structurally. The qualification burst test results indicate that the
pressure vessel is capable of withstanding over twice the maximum pres-
sure indicated at the temperatures recorded. The tubing is capable of
withstanding even greater loads.
There was, as described in Appendix B, an observed abnormal in-
crease in pressure and temperature in the tank. As has been discussed
previously, there are combustibles, both metallic and nonmetallic_ within
the tank_ as well as potential energy sources to provide ignition, es-
pecially of the Teflon insulation of the internal wiring. The method of
assembling the tank system and the details of construction of the tank's
internal components provide an opportunity for wiring damage. Also,
there is an even greater probability that, in this instance, the non-
standard detanking process created bare conductors. With such damaged
wiring, a mechanism for creating a spark is provided and a consequence
would be a fire within the confines of the tank. This would result in
increases in the pressure and temperature within the tank.
There is sufficient Teflon within the tank to cause the internal
pressure to rise above the burst strength of the pressure vessel were it
all to be consumed. However, the locations of the Teflon components are
such that igniting all of them is not very probable. The energy available
from the combustion of the aluminum within the tank also exceeds that
required to burst the tank. Tests conducted during the investigation
indicate that enough electrical energy was available to initiate a
combustion process within the tank under electrical fault conditions
(Appendix F).
Among the possible ways that the tank integrity could have been
lost, two are worthy of special mention. First, should combustion have
existed within the electrical conduit, a relatively stagnant region with
an intentionally poor heat conduction path, the conduit walls would have
been heated quite rapidly. The conduit contains the greatest concentra-
tion of wiring and wire insulation within the tank. It was estimated
that raising the conduit temperature to about 1500 ° F under the pressures
prevailing during flight would cause the conduit walls to fail. This
has subsequently been demonstrated in a test at MSC wherein the wiring
insulation in an actual conduit was intentionally ignited under conditions
simulating the conduit environment within the tank. In this test, local
heating caused the conduit to fail a short tlme after initiation of
combustion within the conduit. Such a failure would result in pressuriza-
tion of the tank vacuum dome, leading to actuation of the blowout patch
and loss of oxygen tank pressure.
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The second possibility is associated with the reaction of aluminum
with oxygen. This process has been described as quite violent (see
Appendix F). Were the al_mninum to have been ignited and if its reaction
rate under the conditions within the tank were sufficiently high, the
pressure could rise very rapidly and lead to pressure vessel failure at
burst pressure levels. Such a pressure rise might not have been evidenced
in the data because of the low sampling rate of the pressure sensor
telemetry signal. Tests are required to verify this hypothesis.
A number of observations were made during the course of the Panel's
activities that gave rise to further questions. It is recognized that
many of these matters are of a subjective nature. Nonetheless, they are
considered worthy of comment in this report.
Oxygen tank no. i lost pressure subsequent to the failure of tank
no. 2. The mechanism of damage to tank no. 1 has not been established.
It is asstuzed to be the result of a line or valve failure in the tank
no. 1 system. The two tanks and their associated hardware represent,
to a large degree, redundant systems. They are, however, in great part
colocated. For example, the tanks are adjacent to one another, the system
valves are grouped in a common housing, the fluid lines and wiring are
routed parallel to one another in close proximity. Systems other than
the oxygen subsystems have similar configurations. Such practice provides
the possibility of inducing failure in a redundant system by a failure
of its companion. This is a most complex subject and difficult to assess.
It is also recognized that much of the hardware for Apollo has already
been built. There appears to be a need for a review and evaluation of
this matter.
No evidence has been found that indicates that shock testing of
components and/or subsystem assemblies is a normal qualification require-
ment for Apollo service module hardware. The flight environment contains
shocks of a considerable magnitude during events such as staging of the
latmch vehicle. That the effects of such environments on system components
were recognized is evidenced by the use of holding current on the fuel
cell reactant shutoff valves, for example. Shocks can be applied to
hardware during shipment and normal handling, even though elaborate
precautions in the form of special shipping containers, labels, and
cautionary tags to alert transportation groups to the sensitivity of
the shipment are employed. Good design and development practice includes
experimental determination of margins against damage under such circum-
stances. Again, there appears to be a need for a review and evaluation
of the susceptibility of the components in the spacecraft to all credible
shock levels they may encounter in their service life so that the margins
of safety inherent in their design may be established.
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RELATEDSYSTEMS
As a result of the Apollo 13 accident, a critical examination of
other Apollo systems is being conducted by MSCto insure that the potential
for a similar modeof failure does not exist elsewhere in the spacecraft.
A memberof the Design Panel was present at the MSCreview meetings. The
following is a summaryof the activity and a status of the MSCeffort.
The review was limited to selected systems in the following major
Apollo elements:
Commandand service module
Ascent and descent stage of the lunar module
Governmentfurnished equipment
Ground support equipment
As an aid in determining which subsystems should be reviewed, a
tabulation of all pressure vessels in these major elements was assembled
(table D3-X). The cryogenic oxygen tank, which is reviewed in earlier
sections of this report, was excluded from this review. Table D3-XI
lists those systems and major elements that were selected for review.
All vessels and oxygen and propellant line componentsin the selected
systems are to be analyzed. The primary emphasis during the review is
on the oxygen and oxidizer systems and the identification of all sources
of energy--both internal and external to the system--that could result
in an excessive pressure rise and possibly result in the failure or
degradation of a system. Sources of energy which were considered were
electrical, mechanical, and solar.
Pressure Vessels
The pressure vessels are of concern in that they represent large
energy sources in the event of their catastrophic failure. Qualification
records were reviewed and analyzed to determine the actual factors of
safety demonstrated by burst test, as well as the characteristics of the
failure modes. The failure modesof the pressure vessels have been cate-
gorized as explosive, uncertain, and benign. With these data, an assess-
ment was madeof those componentsthat might be damagedby the explosion
of a tank and the effect of this explosion on the vehicle systems and
the crew.
0-78
o
o
o
o
o
o
_
,
_
_
_
,
o
.
_
_
c_F-_
r_c_cOI
¢J
.
.
_
_
_
,o
o
o
o
o
o
o
_0
_0
_
_
_
_
o,-
-t
0
_8
_
_8
_
o
°
_
_
_
_
_
.m
.
_
.m
.
_
.
_
.
_
.
.m
5_0o_._._
_
o
o
_
_
.o
.o
.o
o
o
o
_
o
_
o
_
_
°
_
°o_
_bbb_
_
.
_
_
]3.-'79
_
,
o
>
°
,-I
.
_
_
_
:,I
:2,
_
_
o
-_
.:,I
o
=
o
_
'_
'_
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
_
_
_
_
_
'_
0
o
o
ci
o
',D
_
,D
_
-
-
b-
t'--
•,
-I
•
•
_
,
,
'-I
,
-
-I
,
-
-I
-
-
o
o
_
o
o
o
_
o
o
0!coc_I
g:,Il-i¢1P-Io0
_fi-
_
0
_
-t
_t"
CO
_000
CO
u
m
u
m
_
-
_
,
-
-t_
_
-I
0
aid
u
m
,
-I
D
...80
,
-
_
_
4-_
oO
,
-
-4
_
_1
.
,4
q3q_oc,,I
_qr_r,.,")
03f_>u?i
MA
4_©
_
o
'-
-
_
.
_
o
_
_
_
.
_
.
,
_
_
o
=
=
,
_&
<
:.I
o
o
_
'%
0
04
O
J
o°
_
_
°
E-4
0
0
a
_
_
_
_
0
0
_
0
D
-81
TABLED3-XI.- SubsystemsSelected for Reviewby MSC
Command module
Environmental control
Reaction control
Electrical power
Mechanical
Lunar module des cent st age
Environmental control
Descent propulsion
Electrical power
Service module
Service propulsion
Reaction control
Electrical power
Government furnished equipment
Crew equipment
Lunar surface experiments
Scientific instrument module
Lunar module ascent stage
Environmental control
Reaction control
Ascent propulsion
Electrical power
Ground support equipment
Hydrogen servicing dewar
PAD emergency air pack
High-pressure oxygen line components
Oxygen/fuel line components with
electrical interface
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The explosive failure of a pressure vessel on the spacecraft, depend-
ing upon the energy stored in the vessel, could result in effects ranging
from localized damage to loss of spacecraft and crew.
The following approaches were considered to provide protection to
the spacecraft and crew from the catastrophic explosion of a major
pressure vessel:
i. Isolation of the pressure vessel by separation.
2. Controlled failure provisions by changes to the vent or
relief system to permit rapid depressurization.
3. Containing the blast by the addition of shielding by heavier
or strengthened walls.
It was concluded that it would be theoretically possible to provide
increased, but not total, protection for the spacecraft against the
catastrophic explosive failure of a pressure vessel if major vehicular
and pressure vessel changes were made. There are many practical limita-
tions which preclude the provision of total protection against the cat-
astrophic explosive failure of a pressure vessel. To determine the
effect on the spacecraft of a nonexplosive or a benign leakage-type
failure of a pressure vessel, the components and materials in the im-
mediate vicinity of the tank in question were identified. Both the LM
and CSM have nonmetallic materials which probably would not survive if
they were exposed to propellants as the result of a pressure vessel
failure. It is not feasible to use materials throughout the spacecraft
which are totally compatible with all fluids that they could encounter
following a primary failure. Considering the vehicle and systems effects
of a pressure vessel failure (leakage or explosive), it is clear that
neither containment nor complete nonmetallic material compatibility can
be provided in the form of practical or reasonable solutions for space-
craft and crew protection against all tank failures. A tank failure
would result in at least the abort of a mission, even through the damage
from a pressure vessel could be contained.
The review of the pressure vessels of table D3-X identified a direct
electrical interface or exposed wiring in the media as follows:
i. Propellant quantity gaging systems in the lunar module descent
stage tanks and in the service module service propulsion system (SPS)
tanks.
2. Capacitance gage, heaters, motors, and temperature sensor in
the cryogenic hydrogen tanks in the service module.
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3. Quantity gage in the potable and waste water tanks in the
command module.
4. Quantity sensing gage in the GSE hydrogen dewar.
The MSC is conducting an analysis and plans to perform tests on
the quantity gaging systems to insure that the combination of fuel and
energy potential for ignition are understood and represent no hazard.
Associated with this is a review of the circuitry and circuit protection.
The waste and potable water tanks are being reviewed to determine the
hazards, if any, of the electrical circuit and the advisability of de-
leting the quantity gage.
The cryogenic hydrogen gas pressure vessel was reviewed and it was
verified that the manufacturing and assembly techniques, as well as the
arrangement of the internal components, are very similar to those of
the oxygen tank. The same potential for an electrical malfunction in
the hydrogen tank exists as did in the oxygen tank. Mission rules have
been reviewed and it was determined that the minimum failure in a hydro-
gen tank which would result in a mission abort would be the loss of two
heaters and one fan. The MSC is planning to conduct tests to determine
if an electrical malfunction can induce a sustained reaction between
hydrogen and materials contained within the tank. Tests will also be
conducted to determine if both heaters would fail following an electrical
malfunction. Structural and materials compatibility analysis and re-
views dndicate that the titanium alloy (5 AI, 2-1/2 Sn) as used does not
experience hydrogen embrittlement.
The remaining pressure vessels were reviewed to determine those
that had internal components, which could expose an electrical interface
to the contained media following a single failure. In addition, the non-
metallics that might be exposed following such a single failure are being
identified to insure that they are compatible with the media at operating
conditions.
The review of the LM pressurized tanks disclosed that helium and
oxygen tanks are isolated from their relief valves during the translunar
coast period. Under normal flight conditions at ambient temperatures
the pressure rise in the tanks is relatively insignificant. If protec-
tive thermal blankets on the LM should be lost or damaged_ the pressure
rise could be significant. A Grumman study indicates that if the com-
plete loss of thermal blankets occurred in the areas of the following
tanks they could reach burst pressures during translunar coast:
Ascent stage oxygen
Ascent propulsion system helium
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Reaction control system helium
Descent propulsion system helium
Loss or damage of a thermal blanket could probably be determined
during transposition and docking on all except the descent helium
tank. It should be noted that no rational failure mode has been identi-
fied which could result in the loss or damage of a thermal blanket.
Line Components
The line components that are integral to the systems in table D3-XI
are also being examined to determine those with and those without an
electrical interface. The electrical interfaces are of two types, direct
exposure to the media and exposure following a single failure. In addition,
all nonmetallics near a potential ignition source will be identified
and evaluated.
The only component which has been identified as of this date as
having nonmetallics and a direct electrical interface in high-pressure
oxygen is the fuel cell reactant shutoff valve. The Teflon-coated wires
internal to this valve, when energized, carry steady-state currents of
2 amperes and transients of I0 amperes in a 900 psi oxygen environment.
The circuit protection consists of a 10-ampere circuit breaker. During
the launch and boost phase, a current limited circuit, approximately
0.5 ampere at 9 to i0 volts, is applied to the "open" coil to insure
that the valve remains in the open position. The valve position sensor
switch, which is also internal, is continuously energized during the
entire mission from a 28-volt circuit protected by a lO-ampere breaker.
This valve is now the subject of an intensive review by MSC and the
contractor. There is no indication that this reactant valve had any
internal malfunction during the Apollo 13 accident other than the shock
closure.
Components without direct electrical interfaces are also being
examined to identify those in which nonmetallic materials are normally
exposed to the media and those in which nonmetallic materials could be
exposed following a single failure. To determine the probability of a
single failure in static components such as temperature and pressure
transducers, the acceptance and certification testing of critical elements
is being reviewed. It has been ascertained that component elements such
as bellows, probe cases, and internal diaphragms are designed and tested
for pressure levels far in excess of system usage. The reliability
reports confirmed that leakage failure of these elements has not occurred
on Apollo flight hardware.
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In addition to normal material compatibility determinations, those
components which have nonmetallics used in impact applications are being
identified and it is planned that, where necessary, additional testing
will be conducted in the media at appropriate operating conditions to
determine that there are no impact-sensitive applications.
Low Pressure Oxygen Systems
Following the Apollo 204 accident, the metallic and nonmetallic
materials in the cabin of both the command module and lunar module were
subjected to an intensive review. As a result of the research and
testing, the materials within the LM and CM were modified or changed to
reduce the probability of an ignition and to minimize the combustion
or propagation of fire in the cabin. Considering the redesign that was
accomplished and the continuing rigorous control of materials added to
the spacecraft cabins, the low-pressure oxygen systems (less than 25 psi)
were not reevaluated during this current investigation by MSC.
Electrical Power System--Batteries
Both the LM and the CSM use the same type battery to initiate the
pyrotechnic functions. A review of the records indicated that the G-10
laminated glass epoxy battery case had not been qualified as a pressure
vessel. The case is protected by a relief valve which operates at
30 + 5 psi. In the event of a relief valve failure, and case pressuriza-
tion to rupture, potassium hydroxide could be released. A certification
program will be conducted to establish the strength of this battery case
and procedures established for the acceptance proof testing on all flight
batteries prior to each mission.
Ground Support Equipment
This review is structured to identify all pressure vessels and
line components in propellant and high-pressure oxygen systems with
direct electrical interfaces and the associated metallic and nonmetallic
materials. All high-pressure oxygen, gaseous and liquid, valve seat
material will be identified as well as any other application of nonmetallic
material in an impact loading application. This MSC review is limited
to equipment supplied by North American Rockwell and Grumman.
During the review of the GSE, it was also established that cleaning
and filtering techniques used have been generally effective in limiting
contamination. Shock-sensitive materials have been detected in the
liquid hydrogen dewar in small quantities (less than 1 mg/liter), which
are within specification limits for nonvolatile residuals. The source
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and quantity of the shock-sensitive materials should be identified, as
well as the potential for a buildup in concentration. It is recognized
that contamination is not considered as a candidate cause for the
Apollo 13 accident.
Certi fi cation
The certification records for all pressure vessels and components
of the subsystems that were considered have been reexamined during this
MSC review. It was established that all certification requirements were
adequately met, that all discrepancies were adequately explained, and
that all components were qualified for flight. It should be noted that
a c_nparison of the certification requirements with the expected flight
and ground environment was not part of this review.
Apollo J-Missions
Both the CSM and LM systems are being modified to support the
extended lunar stay time and lunar orbit experiments for later Apollo
missions. The MSC review included the nitrogen bottle being added to
the scientific instrument module of the service module for the Pan
camera. The other system changes and additions to the LM and CSM for
the J-Mission consist of the addition of more pressure vessels and
components of the types already installed in the spacecraft and examined
during this review. No new pressure vessels or components are planned.
Lunar Module "Lifeboat"
Associated with the Related Systems Review, MSC is also analyzing
how the "lifeboat" capability of the LM could be enhanced. The LM,
CSM, and PLSS/uPS are being reviewed to determine what minor modifications
to the concerned systems and/or changes in procedures should be incor-
porated. The intent of the changes would be to enhance the ability of
the crew to interchange or transfer oxygen, water, electrical power,
and lithium hydroxide cannisters between spacecraft and to increase the
probability of crew survival following multiple failures in the command
module.
DISCUSSION
As a result of the MSC Related Systems Reviews that have been
completed and are still in progress, the following observations are
offered.
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A fracture mechanics analysis was madeof all Saturn-Apollo pressure
tanks by the Boeing Companyfor NASAin 1968-1969 (ref. 40). However,
most of these tanks were designed without consideration of fracture
mechanics. Consequently, at the time of the Boeing analysis, somepertinent
data were not available. For example, sustained load and cyclic load
flaw growth data were not available for Inconel 718 electron besmwelds
such as are used in the supercritical oxygen tanks and in the GOXtanks
of the LM ascent stage. These data are nowbeing generated in a current
program at Boeing, sponsored by NASA. It is also understood that sustained
load flaw growth data are not available for a D6aCsteel GOXtank in the
IM descent stage. Until very recently (ref. 41) sustained load flaw
growth data were not available for the cryoformed 301 GOXtanks used in
the PLSSand the PADpack. It is entirely possible that the new data
will not change the conclusions derived from the original fracture
mechanics analysis; however, it is advisable to reexamine the Boeing
analysis of the spacecraft pressure vessels with a view to incorporating
the latest information. As an example, particular attention is warranted
for the 6AI-hV-Ti tanks containing nitrogen tetroxide, since nitrogen
tetroxide is a potentially aggressive environment for titanium. It is
recognized that elaborate precautions are presently being taken to
control the service conditions of these tanks in such a way that sustained
load crack growth should not occur during a mission.
To assure that no unsatisfactory materials are used in oxygen/
oxidizer systems in future spacecraft, it is advisable to examine all
componentsand/or elements for compatibility (including dynamic applica-
tions) in their media. Wherecompatibility data at the appropriate
service conditions are not available, tests should be conducted.
It appears appropriate to conduct tests with typical hydrogen
tank materials in hydrogen, at system operating conditions, to determine
if an exothermic reaction can be initiated by electrical fault.
It would be appropriate to expand the MSCinvestigation to include
a review of the manufacturing processes used in the fabrication of
critical tanks and componentsto insure that the processes used are not
conducive to inducing failures.
A reevaluation of the filtration, sampling, and analysis of the
gases and fluids used is considered appropriate to insure that the
requirements for cleanliness and purity in the servicing of spacecraft
systems are being satisfied.
It maybe advisable to conduct investigations of the compatibility
of the nonmetallics in the launch vehicle oxygen and oxidizer systems,
as well as spacecraft and launch vehicle GSE(with emphasis on impact
sensitivity at operating conditions).
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PART D4
SUMMARY
The Design Panel conducted a review and evaluation of the design
of those elements of the Apollo spacecraft systems that were implicated
as contributing to the Apollo 13 accident. These comprise primarily the
oxygen tanks of the service module, the associated valves, plumbing, and
electrical systems. In addition, the Panel surveyed other systems with-
in the spacecraft to determine whether their designs contained potential
for failures similar to those of the oxygen tank.
During its considerations, the Panel examined the tank in two con-
figurations. The first was in the configuration as defined by the draw-
ings and other controlling documentation. The second configuration was
what might be termed the "as flown" condition, that is, containing such
variations from standard as may have resulted from unusual events in the
history of oxygen tank no. 2. The following were the two most signifi-
cant such events:
i. The oxygen "shelf drop" incident during spacecraft manufacture.
2. The unorthodox detanking procedure employed at KSC made necessary
by inability to detank in the standard manner.
The following observations result from this review:
i. As a pressure vessel, that is, from a structural viewpoint, the
tank is adequately designed. The pressure vessel is constructed of a
tough material well chosen for this application. The stress analyses
and results of the qualification burst test program confirm the ability
of the tank to exhibit adequate structural performance in its intended
application.
2. From a systems viewpoint, the design of the oxygen tank is
unsatisfactory. The design features of the tank system are such that:
(a) It is difficult to install the internal components of the
tank. The design is such that this operation is "blind" and not amenable
to visual inspection after completing the installation.
(b) There is power wiring internal to the tank exposed to
supercritical oxygen.
(c) There is great potential for damage to internal wiring
during assembly. There are sharp corners on metal parts in proximity
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to the wires; the wiring is routed over rather tortuous paths; the
wiring is located in close proximity to rotating components and to the
heater elements ; and the wiring is free to be flexed by moving fluid
during fan operation and/or during filling or emptying of the tank with
gaseous or liquid media.
(d) The rating of the thermostats in the heater circuits is
not compatible with the voltages that are (and in this instance were for
a prolonged period) applied to these circuits at the launch site.
(e) There are combustible materials within the tank, such as
Teflon, solder, aluminum, and drilube 822.
3. The combination of combustible materials and potential ignition
sources, including the use of unsealed electric motors, constitutes a
hazard that can lead to a fire within the tank.
4. The manufacturing tolerances of the Teflon adapters, short
Inconel tube, and quantity gage center tube that comprise the tank fill
and drain tube are such that extremely loose fit can occur. If these
elements were at or near the appropriate dimensional extremes in tank
no. 2, it is possible that mechanical shock could cause a disengagement
of these parts that could have led to inability to detank. Such might
have been caused by the "shelf drop" incident.
5. The nonstandard detanking of oxygen tank no. 2 at KSC probably
led to the degradation of the insulation of the internal wiring. The
insulation probably became brittle, and flexing of the wire either during
or subsequent to the detauking could cause it to break off, exposing
the conductor. This would provide a means for creating an electrical
short that could initiate combustion of the insulation. The planned
all-up test reproducing the detanking should provide data to conclusively
verify this.
6. The fuel cell oxygen shutoff solenoid valve has power wiring
and combustibles exposed to a 900 psi oxygen environment and is protected
by a 10-ampere circuit breaker. The combination of combustibles,
potential ignition source, and oxygen within this device constitutes a
hazard similar to that prevailing within the oxygen tank.
7. The caution and warning indicators in the CM for the fuel cell
reactant shutoff valves use series logic. This logic requires that both
the hydrogen and oxygen reactant valves be closed in order that a warning
indication may be given. Therefore, it is possible for a fuel cell to
be deprived of one of its reactants because of a closed valve and thus
suffer irreversible damage without the crew being made aware of this
state via the caution and warning indicators.
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8. Loss of a main bus deprives some of the talkback indicators
of actuating power. In such an eventuality, misinformation as to the
state of certain valves may be presented to the crew when valid informa-
tion as to status of system components is most vital.
9. The logic of the master alarm feature of the caution and warning
system is such that preexistence of an operationally expected signal
(within a given subsystem) such as "hydrogen pressure low" prevents
receipt of a master alarm for a second, and possibly dangerous, condition
such as high oxygen pressure.
As a result of these observations, it is the consensus of the Design
Panel that the Board should give consideration to including the following
among its recommendations.
The internal components of the oxygen tank system should be
redesigned. The requirement for the functions performed by these
components should be reevaluated carefully. If it is determined that
some or all of these components are mandatory for accomplishing the
mission, the redesign should be of such nature as to minimize the amount
of potentially combustible material within the tank. The installation
of any wiring that must be within the tank should be so designed as to
preclude direct contact with the oxygen if at all possible. As a
minimum, wiring must not be in contact with the oxygen if, under fault
conditions, sufficient energy is available to ignite proximate materials.
Determination of what constitutes sufficient energy for ignition should
be based on data from tests conducted under all conditions that would
be encountered in service. It would be preferable that any redesign of
the internal components permit assembly of these components into a
total subsystem outside the tank. This would permit thorough inspection
and test prior to installation within the pressure vessel.
The fuel cell reactant shutoff valve should either be redesigned
to eliminate electrical wiring in contact with high-pressure oxygen
or a suitable substitute valve be found.
The logic of the caution and warning system should be reviewed with
a view towards eliminating lack of a warning indication for a single
malfunction that can cause irreparable loss of a mission-critical
component. The logic of the master alarm feature of the caution and
warning system should also be reviewed with the view towards eliminating
the feature that precludes the receipt of a second alarm in the presence
of a preexisting alarm from the same system or subsystem. The possibility
of providing a redundant power supply to permit proper functioning of
talkback type indicators in the event of loss of the main bus normally
supplying power to the indicators should also be examined with a view
to providing a valid indication to the crew in the event of such a mal-
fun cti on.
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The ability of componentsto perform their appropriate functions
without damagewhen exposed to shock loading levels in excess of those
anticipated to be encountered in flight or in ground handling should be
demonstrated by tests. Componentsfound wanting in this respect should
be either modified or replaced.
The comprehensive review initiated by the MSCApollo 13 Investiga-
ting Teamof all CSMand LMtanks, valves, and associated system elements
in which oxygen or oxidizers are stored, controlled, or distributed
should be prosecuted vigorously. The acceptability of materials within
such componentsshould be established by tests conducted under fluid
conditions like those that will be encountered in service both on the
ground and in flight. In addition, the review should be expandedto
include the manufacturing and assemblyprocedures employed in the
fabrication of those of the previously noted componentswhich are
determined to contain hazards.
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PART E1
TASK ASSIGNMENT
The Project Management Panel was established by the Apollo 13
Review Board to review those management systems in the Apollo Program
which were pertinent to the Apollo 13 accident. In effect, this task
required the review of all appropriate design, manufacturing, and test
procedures covering vehicle systems which may have failed in flight,
including the means by which various organizations coordinated their
individual efforts in the total process. The Panel took special care
to evaluate carefully the safety management system which was applicable
to Apollo 13.
Principal questions addressed by the Management Panel focused on
the organization, procedures, and systems used to monitor and control
CSM design, manufacturing, test, assembly, and final certifications of
flight equipment, and particularly of the cryogenic oxygen system used
in the service module electric power system and environmental control
system.
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PART E2
PANEL MEMBERSHIP
Panel 4 was chaired by Mr. E. C. Kilgore, Deputy Chief, Engineering
and Technical Services, Langley Research Center. The Board Monitor was
Mr. Milton Klein, Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office.
Panel members were:
Mr. R. D. Ginter, Director, Special Program Office
Office of Advanced Research and Technology (OART)
NA_, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Mr. Merrill Mead, Chief, Programs and Resources Office
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
Mr. James B. Whitten, Asst. Chief, Aeronautical and Space
Mechanics Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
In addition, Mr. R. C. Puffer of MSC Security assisted the Panel by
preparing the section of the report on Security.
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PART E3
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
The Management Panel carried out a detailed in-depth review of the
Apollo Spacecraft Program Office organizational structure and the manage-
ment system used to control both command and service module (CSM) hard-
ware development and decision-making processes. The review examined the
system for Apollo and focused attention on the specific cryogenic oxygen
tank directly involved in the Apollo 13 accident. Key management per-
sonnel at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC), and Apollo contractors and subcontractors were interviewed. These
interviews were specifically aimed at understanding what decisions were
made regarding the oxygen tank system for Apollo 13, who participated in
these decisions, what information was available from the management
system, how effectively the organizational elements functioned in review-
ing, communicating, and carrying out assigned responsibilities, and
whether management system changes are required in view of the oxygen
tank accident. Records of the oxygen tank reviews, discrepancy reports,
failure reports, and procedures were examined to determine if the review
systems and configuration control system functioned as they were intend-
ed. Separate reviews were made of the Security, Safety, and Reliability
and Quality Assurance (R&QA) management systems to determine effectiveness.
Visits were made to the CSM prime contractor, North American Rock-
well (NR), Downey, California, and to the oxygen tank subcontractor,
Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, during which discussions were held
with key design, test, and manufacturing personnel. Reliability inspec-
tion, safety, configuration-control and process-control procedures and
systems were reviewed and examined in detail. KSC operations were re-
viewed and discussions were held with key test and launch operations
personnel regarding their responsibilities, procedures, and controls.
Similar discussions were held with MSC Apollo CSM key management and
engineering personnel. Throughout its analysis, the Panel devoted par-
ticular attention to the history of the Apollo 13 cryogenic oxygen tank
no. 2 including design and manufacturing waivers, discrepancies, and
anomalies and how these were handled by the Apollo management team.
General Technical Capability
The Panel found key Apollo personnel to be technically capable and
dedicated to producing a reliable and safe spacecraft system. Although
there have been cutbacks in the total number of Apollo personnel, the
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morale of the remaining Apollo team is considered by officials inter-
viewed to be high. Reductions in personnel complements as the flight
rate has been reduced have not detrimentally impacted the experience
level within the Program to this point. Moreover, critical flight and
ground system personnel requirements have been carefully reviewed by
project officials to insure adequate manning. During the Apollo Program,
there have been changes in key management personnel. The Panel found
that attention was given to maintaining continuity of experience by
essentially promoting from within the Apollo Program. Some technicians
with considerable CSM experience have been replaced at NR-Downey by
technicians from other programs with more seniority, but no CSM experi-
ence. This was recognized as a potential problem and an intensified
training program was instituted. Continued surveillance of the con-
tractor technician experience level and capability is necessary.
Division of Responsibilities
The Apollo spacecraft organization involves a large number of con-
tractor, subcontractor, and Government organizations. It was found
that these organizations understand their individual responsibilities
and that necessary coordination processes were in effect. This process
provides a system of checks and cross-checks to assure that detailed
consideration and attention is given to problems by the right organiza-
tions prior to final flight commitment.
Cryogenic Oxygen Tank Design
Apollo oxygen tank no. 2 was designed in the 1962-1963 time period
by Beech prior to the formation of the formal design review and sub-
system manager systems which now exist at MSC. During the design phase,
there was limited participation by MSC technical personnel in the early
design. The primary emphasis at this time by both the prime contractor
and MSC was on the thermodynamic performance of the oxygen system. The
tank did receive informal design reviews primarily by NR and Beech per-
sonnel. Even though these reviews were made, it was found that the
final design resulted in a complex assembly procedure with a wiring
cluster which cannot be inspected after assembly in the £ank. However,
the complexity of the assembly and the inability to inspect the tank
interior components after assembly was recognized by Government, NR,
and Beech personnel. Consequently, a detailed step-by-step manufactur-
ing and assembly procedure was established and carried out with checklist-
type Beech inspections, supplemented by NR and Government inspections
at defined critical points. A First Article Configuration Inspection
(FACI) was held on the oxygen tank in 1966 which was jointly signed off
by MSC and contractor subsystem managers. No subsequent formal design
reviews were held.
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A thermostatic switch (thermal switch) was incorporated into the
Block I oxygen tank heaters to avoid overheating while using 28 V dc
spacecraft power. After receipt of the Block II oxygen tank specifica-
tions from NR in February 1965, which required the tank heater to oper-
ate not only on 28 V dc spacecraft power but also with 65 V de GSE for
rapid tank pressurization during launch operations at KSC, Beech did not
require their Block I thermal switch supplier to make a change in switch
rating. NR never subsequently reviewed the heater assembly to assure
compatibility between the GSE and the thermal switch. This resulted in
NR, MSC, and KSC personnel subsequently assuming that the tank was pro-
tected from overheating while using the 65 V dc power supply.
Configuration Control Procedures
The Panel found that a strict and rigorous management system exists
on the CSM for configuration control, problem reporting, customer accept-
ance readiness reviews, and flight readiness reviews. Both contractors
and Government CSM organizations participate in this system. R&QA or-
ganizations independently monitor, record, and report all problems and
approved resolutions. Examination of documentation, such as failure
reports, discrepancy reports, and waivers generated in the management
system and applicable to the Apollo 13 oxygen tank, demonstrated to the
Panel that the management system was being followed closely. Closeouts
were being accomplished with authorized approvals.
Oxygen Tank Handling Incident at Downey
In the case of the Apollo 13 oxygen tank handling incident at NR-
Downey, the Panel found that a Discrepancy Report was written and func-
tional tests were made by NR Engineering. The incident was Judged to
have caused no tank damage by the contractor's systems engineers and
representatives of the RASPO at Downey. Also, the oxygen tank subsystems
manager at MSC was made aware of the incident. Subsequent functional
tests were successfully passed. The Discrepancy Report was closed out
in the authorized manner. Although the handling incident was not re-
ported to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager, it should be noted that
such reporting of Discrepancy Report closeouts is not required in all
cases. Once this incident was closed out in the manner prescribed by
the Apollo management control system, it was not reopened as a possible
factor relating to the later detanking problem at KSC.
KSC Detanking Problems
In the case of the detanking problem at KSC_ it was found that
all authorized Discrepancy Reports were filed and signed off. The
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change from normal detanking procedures was made to use the tank heaters
and fans in an attempt to boil off the liquid oxygen in the tank. This
was unsuccessful and the normal procedure was further altered by use of
a pressure pulsing method. These changes to the test procedures were
made by the KSC Systems Engineer and NR Systems Engineer who were on
station. They obtained concurrence of the NR lead systems engineer at
KSC. This is in agreement with the present requirements for test pro-
cedural changes. After the pressure pulsing method was used to detank
oxygen tank no. 2, the problem received further attention, including
additional analyses and test. The Apollo team problem-solving effort
that resulted was led by the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager and
the KSC Director of Launch Operations. NR and Beech personnel were also
involved. The MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Office formulated a check-
list of analyses to be made and questions to be answered prior to making
the flight decision on the tank.
This included:
i. Details and procedures for normal detanking at Beech and KSC.
2. Details of abnormal detanking at KSC on March 27 and 28.
3. Hazards resulting from a possible loose fill tube in the
oxygen tank.
4. Can the tank be X-rayed at KSC?
5. Could loose tolerances on the fill tube cause detanking
problem?
6. Should a blowdown and fill test be made on the tank?
7. Disassemble an oxygen tank on Service Module 2 TV-I and
examine components.
A detailed analysis, including possible failure modes, was made at
Beech. Tests were run which indicated that even in the event of a loose
metal fill tube (which was concluded to be the most likely cause of the
detanking problem), a resultant electrical short would provide only 7
milliJoules of energy and it was Judged that this energy level could
cause no damage except loss of the quantity gage indication. All of the
checklist requirements were met by test or analysis prior to making the
decision to fly without a change in the oxygen tank. It was Jointly
concluded by the Beech Apollo Program Manager, the NR CSM Program
Manager, the KSC Director of Launch Operations, and the MSC Apollo
Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) Manager that the tank was flightworthy.
Further examination of this event since the Apollo 13 accident, however,
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has revealed that incomplete and, in some cases_ incorrect information
was used in the decision process. This included:
i. Neither the KSC Launch Operations Director nor the MSC ASPO
Manager knew of the previous tank handling incident at NR-Downey and
neither knew that the oxygen tank internal heaters were on for $ con-
secutive hours during detanking at KSC. Key personnel at ?R-Downey
knew of both events. No personnel at MSC_ KSC, or _ knew that the tank
heater thermal switches would not protect the tank from overheating.
2. A portion of the normal detanking process at Beech is similar
to the normal detanking process at KSC. The KSC Launch Operations
Director and MSC ASPO Manager were mistakenly informed that they were
different. (If they had known of the similarity in detanking processes,
they possibly would have concluded that some change took place in the
tank between Beech and MSC.)
3. The KSC Launch Operations Director, the MSC ASPO Manager, and
key personnel at Downey mistakenly understood that the oxygen tank on
previous test Service Module 2 TV-I had similar detanking problems
which led to the decision to disassemble the 2 TV-I tank and examine
the components. That examination was interpreted as evidence that a
loose-fitting metal fill tube probably was causing the detanking diff-
culty. Further examination has revealed, however, that 2 TV-I oxygen
tank probably detanked normally.
Although none of the principals in making the oxygen tank decision
(NR, MSC, KSC) can say with certainty that the availability of informa-
tion in i, 2, and 3, above would have altered their decision, each con-
curs that the availability of such information could have altered their
decisions.
On the basis of its review, the Project Management Panel feels the
following observations to be pertinent:
i. Launch operations personnel did not fully understand the oxygen
tank internal components or fully appreciate the possible effect of
caanged detanking procedures on the reliability of such internal
components.
2. The hazard associated with the long heater cycle was not given
consideration in the decision to fly this tank.
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5. Problem solving during launch operations utilized telephone
conferences among knowledgeable parties, but without subsequent written
verification, which would have permitted more deliberate consideration
and review.
4. Deviations from test procedures during tests at KSC were made
in accordance with the established approval process. This does not
require prior approval or concurrence of NR-Downey or MSC subsystem
specialists.
5. It was found that insufficient consideration was given to the
tank internal details such as sharp edges, internal wiring, and heater
thermal switch ratings during the design reviews.
6. An historical record of the oxygen tank existed in the manage-
ment system files. However, it was not referred to in making the flight
decision.
7. Dependence upon memory of personnel led to erroneous data
being reported to higher management levels.
8. Key Apollo management personnel made several suggestions dur-
ing the Panel interviews:
(a) Provide total background history on subsystems which have
problems or anomalies during launch operations.
(b) Launch operations personnel need more knowledge of the
internal details of subsystems.
(c) NR (Downey) and MSC Subsystem Managers should review
KSC test procedures and subsequent procedure changes.
(d) Verification of data is needed in problem solving.
(e) Follow-up documentation of information exchanged during
telephone conferences on key problems is recommended.
Materials Compatibility
The compatibility of oxygen tank materials with oxygen received
consideration in the original design. Beech reviewed and selected the
tank materials in accordance with the published material knowledge that
existed in the 1962-1963 time period. No data on hot-wire tests or
ignition tests were available to Beech at that time. Beech ran special
tests on the fan and motor assembly which was tested at i000 psia in
oxygen gas at 300 ° F. The motor passed this test with no evidence of
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ignition. Someattention was paid in the assemblyprocedures to avoid
pulling wires over threads or sharp corners and to provide protective
sleeving. However, most sharp corners were not eliminated and as was
previously mentioned, the tank design necessitated a blind assembly
with no way for subsequent inspection for damage. After the original
design, Beech was not requested by NRto makeany further materials
compatibility study or tests. In April 1969, NRwas directed by MSCto
review the nonmetallic materials in the cryogenic oxygen subsystemand
document them in accordance with the COMAT(Characteristics of Materials
System). All nonmetallic materials in the oxygen tank were evaluated
and documentedby NR. All nonmetallic materials met the requirements of
the materials control program. These materials criteria were specifi-
cally formulated for the lunar module and commandmodule, where non-
propagation of fire was a requirement even if a fire started.
These COMATrequirements do not adequately cover the 900 psi cryo-
genic oxygen tank. No electrical ignition testing of any materials was
madefor the oxygen tank. NRreviewed the service module systems to
provide electrical circuit protection such as breakers and fuses in 1967
in an effort to avoid electrical fires in case of shorts.
Security Program
During its review, the Panel also investigated the physical secur-
ity at Beech, NR-Downey,and KSCfor adequacy during the times the
Apollo 13 oxygen tank was in custody at these locations. T_e security
program at each location was found to be satisfactory and adequate to
provide the physical protection of the oxygen tanks. A determination
was madeas a result of the survey that no evidence was discovered that
the failure of the oxygen tanks on Apollo 13 was the result of any will-
ful, deliberate, or mischievous act on the part of an individual at the
facilities surveyed.
Safety and Reliability and Quality Assurance
A detailed managementreview was madeof both the Safety and R&QA
organizations as applicable to the Apollo CSM. Safety Offices at NASA
Headquarters Office of MannedSpaceFlight, MSC,and KSChave safety
responsibilities regarding Apollo which are clearly established and
implementedby both Governmentand support contractor personnel. Safety
audits by NASAHeadquarters teams and participation by MSCand KSCper-
sonnel in panels, boards, and program reviews demonstrates continuing
organizational attention to safety. Safety studies are being madeto
identify hazards associated with the Apollo spacecraft during ground
tests and for each mannedmission. NR-Downeyhas a safety organization
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with specific responsibilities for the Apollo CSM. The NRsafety func-
tion is integrated into the Engineering, Manufacturing, and Test Opera-
tions with its objectives to eliminate or control risks to personnel
and equipment throughout the manufacture, checkout, and flight missions
of the Apollo CSM. Even though the NRsafety effort, as written in their
Safety Plan, is fragmented over several organizational units, it appar-
ently is working effectively. In all cases, the safety organizations
report to a sufficiently high organizational level to provide them a
desirable independence of safety surveillance.
Failure Reporting
The Panel found that the Apollo Reliability and Quality Assurance
organizations at MSC,KSC, NR, and Beech have an effective independent
failure-reporting and failure-correction and tracking system. Documen-
tation from this system was observed to be both rapid and accurate.
The Reliability Groupprovides special studies such as Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Suspect Flight Anomalies Report, and con-
figuration change tracking. In the case of the Apollo 13 oxygen tank,
a Single Point Failure Summarywas madein 1968. Amongthe failure modes
considered was fire in the CSMexternal to the oxygen tanks which might
lead to the loss of them. This was considered an acceptable risk be-
cause of control of ignition sources and low probability of occurrence.
Rupture of the oxygen tanks was also considered and accepted due to the
redundance of the oxygen supply and low likelihood of failure occurrence.
For Apollo 13, as for previous missions, a System Safety Assessmentwas
madeon February 19, 1970, as an additional review from previous mis-
sions, and it was concluded that there were no open safety items to
constrain the Apollo 13 flight.
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PART E4
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
Relating organizational and management structures to an event of
the kind now under consideration is particularly difficult inasmuch as
the time period of importance includes the entire history of the Program,
in this case some 9 years, during which these structures have undergone
many significant changes. With this in mind_ the approach adopted for
this study was (i) to examine and document what exists today, (2) to
trace the history of events that might have had a direct bearing on the
failure, (3) to examine the management inplications of those specific
events, and (4) to try and assess whether those implications are still
pertinent to management as it exists today and whether, therefore, cor-
rective measures of any kind are indicated. To accomplish even this
limited objective has required an early focusing of attention on just
those organizations and functions directly involved, or potentially
involved, in the events under consideration. Thus, following a brief
description of tae overall organizational and management relationships
applicable to the Program as a whole_ this report concentrates on those
organizations responsible for the particular elements of the Apollo
spacecraft in which the failure occurred.
BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE
The Apollo Program has represented the largest single research and
development program ever undertaken by the United States Government; at
its peak (in 1966) it involved about 300_0OO persons. The Government-
industry team responsible for the Program has included 25 prime contrac-
tors and more than 4_000 subcontractors and vendors.
In its simplest terms, the Apollo Program has two major objectives:
(i) to develop a vehicle capable of landing men on the surface of the
Moon and returning them safely to the surface of the Earth, and (2) to
operate that vehicle in an initial series of manned lunar landing missions.
These two objectives have, in a gross sense, dictated the major division
of responsibilities among NASA organizations in the management of the
Apollo Program. With overall responsibility vested in the NASA Head-
quarters organization, responsibility for producing the vehicle was
assigned to two NASA field installations:
i. For the spacecraft, to the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston,
Texas.
2. For the launch vehicle_ to the Marshall Space Flight Center_
Huntsville, Alabama.
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The responsibility for operating the vehicle in the series of
flight missions which constituted the second objective was also assigned
to two field installations:
i. For launching the space vehicle, to the KennedySpace Center,CapeKennedy, Florida.
2. For all postlaunch operations, to the MannedSpacecraft Center,Houston, Texas.
These two major objectives also serve to classify the two major
time periods into which the 9-year history of the Programcan be
divided. Thus, the first 7 years, from 1961 to 1968, constituted the
development stage of the Program in which all componentsof the space
vehicle, supporting equipment, and operational facilities were designed,
developed, manufactured and tested; the last 2 years, from 1968 to the
present, have constituted the beginning of the "operations" stage of
the Program, with two successful mannedlunar landing missions already
achieved. The significance of distinguishing between these two periods
of time lies in the inevitable shift of emphasis that accompaniedthe
transition between the two from engineering problems to operational
problems.
NASA- APOLLOMANAGEMENTORGANIZATION
Two classical approaches to project managementwere available to
NASAwhenthe Apollo Programbegan in 1961. The first approach, often
used by Governmentand the aircraft industry in the early years of air-
craft development, would place in a single organization and under the
total control of the project managerall of the skills and specialities
required to managethe project. Thus, the project organization would
provide for itself all the support necessary in engineering, procurement,
program control, financial management,reliability and quality assurance,
etc., and would operate virtually independently of the institutional or-
ganization of which it was a part. The second approach, which was rapidly
gaining acceptance during the 1940's and 1950's, was the so-called "ma-
trix" concept in which skeletal project managementorganizations were
superimposed on an institutional organization containing elements and
subelements in all of the specialities neededby the projects. Thus
the institutional organization would provide the basic capabilities
required by the projects in engineering, procurement, program control,
etc., and the project managerswould draw upon those as required. The
advantages of this approach for multi-project organizations are apparent.
Costly duplication of support activities is minimized, the overall effi-
ciency of manpowerutilization is maximized, and the quality of support
provided is enhancedby consolidation.
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_SA a]opted the matrix approach to project managementfor the
A_ollo Program. In _SA Headquarters, and in each of the three princi-
_)al NASAfield centers involved, Apollo ProgramOffices were established
from v_ich virtually all of the direction for conduct of the Program
has emanated. At each location, however, these ProgramOffices are
essentially managementorganizations and dependheavily on the line
elements of the host institution's organization for support. Continuity
in lines of authority between the Apollo Program Director in Headquarters
and the Apollo Programorganization in the field has been assured through
the delegation by each Center Director to his Apollo ProgramManagerof
full authority for conduct of that Center's part of the Program. Thus,
for purposes of program direction and authority, there exists throughout
the A_<encya single pyramidal managementstructure cutting across
institutional lines and tying together all elements of the Apollo Program
organization. This relationship is illustrated in figure E4-1.
_he organizations of the principal NASAinstitutions involved in
the Apollo Programare illustrated in figures E4-2 through E4-6, in
which the locations of offices with primary responsibility for Apollo
are indicated by heavy lines.
NASAHeadquarters Organization
The Associate Administrator for MannedSpaceFlight, who heads the
Office of MannedSpaceFlight, is the Administrator's executive agent
for the general managementof all mannedspace flight programs. His
authority flows directly from the Administrator and is broad, covering
all aspects of all mannedspace flight programs. He also exercises
institutional line authority over the three mannedspace flight field
centers which report directly to him.
Office of MannedSpace Flight Organization
Fi_ure E4-2 showsthe organizational structure within the Headquarters
o_fice of MannedSpaceFlight. The Associate Administrator for Manned
S_ace _light has assigned the responsibility for managementof all
aspects of the Apollo Program to the Apollo ProgramDirector, and has
delegated to him full authority to carry out that responsibility. The
Apollo ProgramDirector is the highest Agency official whoseresponsi-
bility is exclusively for the Apollo Program. There are counterpart
ProgramDirectors for other mannedspace flight programs with similar
responsibilities to their ownprograms, and there are a numberof func-
tional offices which_ consistent with the matrix managementconcept_
provide support to all on-going programs. Shownalso in figure E4-2
are the direct lines of program authority between the Apollo Program
Director and his subordinate program managers in the three field centers.
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Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)
The organization of the Manned Spacecraft Center is shown in fig-
ure E4-3. The permanent functional organizations are represented by the
five technical directorates (Engineering and Development, Science and
Applications, Medical Research and Operations, Flight Crew Operations,
and Flight Operations) and the institutional Directorates and Staff
Offices (e.g., Administration, Program Control and Contracts, Public
Affairs, Legal, etc.). The program management organizations presently
include the Apollo Spacecraft, Skylab, and Space Shuttle Program Offices,
and the Advanced Missions Program Office, which is responsible for studies
and planning potentially leading to new flight programs.
Responsibility for managing all aspects of the Apollo Program as-
signed to the Center is vested in the Manager of the Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office (ASPO). Under the matrix-management concept, a rela-
tively small percentage of the Center's staff directly employed in the
Apollo Program reports to him organizationally. Virtually all of the
Apollo tasks done in-house at MSC (component testing, instrumentation
development_ flightcrew training, operations planning, etc.) are per-
formed by the Center's line organizations (the functional Directorates)
under the overall direction and coordination of the ASPO Manager.
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
This Center is responsible for the development, manufacture, and
testing of the launch vehicles used in the Apollo Program. The organi-
zation of the Center is shown in figure E4-4. As at MSC, this Center
employs the matrix-management concept in which the basic organization,
represented by the Program Development, Science and Engineering, and
Administration and Technical Services Directorates, is functional and
the program-management organization, represented by the Program Manage-
ment Directorate, is made up of program offices for individual launch
vehicles or stages.
Although the Saturn Program Office represents the Apollo Launch
Vehicle Program Office for purposes of full-time management, the Director
of Program Management has been designated the Apollo Launch Vehicle Pro-
gram Manager. He manages and directs all aspects of the Apollo Program
assigned to MSFC, drawing on technical support from the Science and
Engineering Directorates.
Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
The KSC responsibility in the Apollo Program includes the assembly,
checkout, and launch of the space vehicle.
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The organization of the Center is shown in figure E_-5. Again the
basic organization is functional, consisting of those major operational
activities necessary to the launch of all space vehicles. The program-
management organization is similar to that at MSC and is made up of an
individual program office for each active flight program. Overall re-
sponsibility for managing all aspects of the preparation, checkout, and
launch of the Apollo space vehicles is assigned to the Manager of the
Apollo Program Office (APO). All functional organizations at the Center
participate in those activities under the overall direction of the APO
Manager. Direct responsibility for launch and checkout is delegated to
the Director of Launch Operations.
x CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS
The oxygen tank in which the failure occurred was a component of
the cryogenic gas storage subsystem (CGSS), which serves both the
electrical power system (EPS) and the environmental control system (ECS)
of the spacecraft service module (SM). The contractors and contractual
relationships involved in the manufacture of the tank are illustrated in
figure E4-6. North American Rockwell (formerly North American Aviation),
prime contractor for the command and service modules (CSM), subcontracted
with Beech Aircraft Corporation for manufacture of the CGSS. Beech, in
turn, purchased certain parts for the subsystem from the three vendors
shown: the oxygen pressure vessel (inner tank) from Airite Products
Division of the Electrada Corporation; the oxygen quantity and temperature
sensor probe from Simmonds Precision Products, Inc.; and the fan motors
from Globe Industries, Inc. Pertinent organization charts for North
American Rockwell and Beech Aircraft are shown in figures E4-7 through
E4-11. The organizations of the vendor companies were not considered
pertinent and are not shown.
North American Rockwell (NR)
The Apollo CSM contract is held by the Space Division of North
American Rockwell and the organization of that Division is shown in
figure E4-7. North American Rockwell also applies the matrix-management
concept in their current organization with program offices (Saturn S-If,
Space Station, CSM,' Space Shuttle, etc.) superimposed on a basically
functional organizational structure which includes Manufacturing,
Research, Engineering, and Test; Material; Quality and Reliability
Assurance; and the conventional administrative-support functions. The
Apollo contract is managed for NR by the CSM Program Office headed by
a division vice president. Figure E4-8 shows the organization of that
Office. Within the CSM Program Office the principal suborganization
for program management is Engineering, headed by an Assistant Program
Manager and Chief Program Engineer. On the functional side of the Space
Division, referring again to figure E4-7, line responsibility for
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performance (as opposed to management) under the Apollo contract falls
under the functional support organization for Research, Engineering, and
Test, also headed by a division vice president. The organization of that
Office is along systems/subsystems lines. At the subsystem level, the
engineer in charge in this organization also acts as the subsystem
manager for the program management organization, in a manner quite
analogous to the technique used by the MSC organization described ear-
lier. The relationship at North American Rockwell is illustrated in
figure E4-9.
North American Launch
Operations Space Division (KSC)
All NR CSM operations at KSC are conducted in accordance with the
provisions of Supplement KSC-I to MSC contract no. NAS9-150 with NR.
The Supplement contains a statement of work prepared by KSC and KSC is
responsible for technical direction to the NR personnel. The NR Apollo
CSM Operations at KSC supports KSC in CSM checkout and launch and is a
part of the NR Launch Operations Space Division under the NR Vice Pres-
ident and General Manager who is located at Cocoa Beach, Florida. He,
in turn, reports to the Space Division President, NR.
Beech Aircraft Corporation
The subcontract from North American Rockwell, for manufacturing of
the cryogenic gas storage subsystem, is held by the Boulder Division of
the Beech Aircraft Corporation. The organization of that Division is
shown in figure E4-10. Beech also uses the matrix-management concept
with management responsibility for the Apollo subsystem contract vested
in the Apollo Program Manager and performance responsibility in the
Manager, Engineering. Figure E4-11 shows the breakdown of management
responsibilities within the office of the Apollo Program Manager.
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PART E5
RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPERATING RELATIONSHIPS
The specific responsibilities assigned to most of the NASA organi-
zational elements involved in management of the Apollo Program are
described in some detail in the series of documents titled NASA-Apollo
Program Management. Where those descriptions are still pertinent, they
are incorporated here by reference or are paraphrased as necessary to
maintain the continuity of this document. The following discussion is,
for the most part, confined to those organizations and responsibilities
that are germane to the present study.
NASA ADMINISTRATOR
The Administrator of NASA reserves to his own office the authority
for establishing and enforcing Agency policy, for establishing overall
program policy and objectives, for approving mission plans and schedules,
for mission funding and major procurement actions, and for insuring ad-
herence to functional management policies. Apollo Program policies,
objectives, and management systems are reviewed and approved by the
Administrator, as are significant schedule and budget decisions. Man-
agement directives relating to the Program are issued within the
Agency-wide NASA Issuance System, with special provisions for specific
instructions and directives to be issued by the Apollo Program Director
to participating program elements in the Manned Space Flight Field
Centers.
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
As described earlier, the Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight, serving as the Administrator's executive agent for the general
management of all manned space flight programs, shares full responsi-
bility with the Administrator for all aspects of these programs. In
this capacity, he is advised by three major policy bodies: the Manned
Space Flight Management Council, the Science and Technology Advisory
Committee, and the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board. The respon-
sibilities of these groups are summarized as follows.
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MannedSpaceFlight ManagementCouncil
The Council consists of the Associate Administrator for Manned
SpaceFlight as Chairman and the Directors of the three MannedSpace
Flight Centers. The Associate Administrator for MannedSpace Flight
establishes program policy guidelines and program plans in consultation
with the Council. For the Apollo Program, the Council reviews policy,
progress, and performance to assure that goals are being met, that
technical problems are being dealt with properly, and that adequate
resources are available for conduct of the planned program. The
Council also acts as the Design Certification Board in examining the
entire Program for proof of development maturity prior to each manned
flight of a new configuration. To insure flightworthiness and manned
flight safety, the Council assesses the design of the space vehicle
launch complex, the Mission Control Center, the MannedSpaceFlight
Network, and the launch instrumentation for mannedApollo missions. A
Mission Design Certification Document, executed by the entire member-
ship of the Council, serves as the approval authority for proceeding
with specific flight missions designated for mannedflight.
Science and Technology Advisory Committee
The Committee is madeup of leading scientists and engineers from
universities, industry, and Government. The Committee functions in an
advisory capacity to the Associate Administrator for MannedSpace Flight
on major technical and scientific questions. They perform independent
evaluations and make recommendationsto the Associate Administrator for
MannedSpace Flight.
MannedSpaceFlight Experiments Board
The Board consists of the Associate Administrator for MannedSpace
Flight as Chairman, the Associate Administrators for Space Science and
Applications and for AdvancedResearch and Technology, and representa-
tives from the Department of Defense and the Air Force. The Board's
responsibility is to advise and recommendto the Associate Administrator
for MannedSpace Flight which experiments should be included in manned
space flight missions.
APOLLOPROGRAMDIRECTOR
Full responsibility and authority for managing all aspects of the
Programwithin the constraints of budget, schedule, and performance
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approved by the Administrator are delegated to the Apollo ProgramDirec-
tor by the Associate Administrator for MannedSpace Flight. It is the
Program Director's responsibility to define or approve mission require-
ments, technical requirements, program specifications, and reliability,
quality assurance, and safety standards. His office is organized into
the five functional Directorates shownin figure E5-1. The Apollo
Program Offices in the three MannedSpace Flight Centers have organiza-
tional structures similar to that of the Program Director's, thus
providing parallel responsibilities for managersat the two levels. The
responsibilities of four of the five Directorates in the Apollo Program
Office are described in the following paragraphs.
Test Directorate
The Test Directorate is responsible for planning and coordinating
development of test programs for all phases of design, manufacture, and
checkout of launch vehicles, spacecraft, experiment hardware, and ground
support equipment. The Directorate coordinates requirements for test
facilities, and prepares and justifies budget requests for test programs
and facilities.
Operations Directorate
The Operations Directorate is responsible for operations plans and
schedules; operations documentation; mission test plans; flight plans;
trajectory design and analysis; crew operations and training; premission
operations checkout, mission safety, and hazard probabilities; and
mission operations support.
SystemsEngineering Directorate
The Systems Engineering Directorate is responsible for developing
the Apollo Program Specifications; developing flight mission assign-
ments (including mission objectives and overall flight profiles); re-
viewing program to define technical interfaces; establishing control
weights for vehicle stages and spacecraft modules; and verifying that
system performance requirements are achieved.
Program Control Directorate
The Program Control Directorate is responsible for integrated plan-
ning; preparation of Program DevelopmentPlans; maintaining interrelated
schedules; logistics; specifications; performance analysis and control
system management;configuration management;data managementsystems;
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preparation of budget and cost information; and operation of the Apollo
Action Center.
Reliability and Quality Assurance (R&QA) Directorate
The R&QA Directorate is responsible for initiating program-wide
R&QA policies and procedures; preparing program development plans for
the Manned Space Flight Centers; developing R&QA training programs;
establishing R&QA reporting requirements; and evaluating the effective-
ness of R&QA programs in the Centers.
Support Contractors
The Apollo Program Director also has the services of three support
contractors available to him:
i. Bellcomm, Inc. (AT&T), which provides systems engineering sup-
port consisting of studies, technical evaluations, analytical investi-
gations, and technical consulting services.
2. The Boeing Company, Space Division, which performs the techni-
cal integration and evaluation function for the Program Director. This
includes analyses and evaluation of program management, interface con-
trol, configuration management, logistics, engineering, manufacturing,
testing, launch operations, and information systems.
3. General Electric Company, Apollo Systems Development, which
provides general engineering support, including data management,
management information systems, and R&QA investigations.
MSC APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM OFFICE (ASPO)
As in the Headquarters organization, the Apollo Spacecraft Program
Manager at MSC acts for the MSC Center Director as general manager of
all Apollo-related activities at the Center. In that capacity he is
the official technical interface between NASA and the spacecraft con-
tractors. He is responsible for managing the accomplishment of all
Apollo tasks at the Center, even though many of those tasks are per-
formed by Center personnel not organizationally responsible to him.
His functional responsibilities essentially parallel those of the
Apollo Program Director, but are applicable to the spacecraft only
while those of the Program Director encompass all aspects of the Program.
His Program Office organization is also essentially parallel to that of
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the Program Director's, as shownin figure E5-2. He has delegated to
three subordinate Managers (for the CSM,the LM, and Experiments and
GFE)the following responsibilities:
i. Directing the design, development, and fabrication programs
carried out by the contractors.
2. Directing and planning systems engineering and systems inte-
gration functions, including review of engineering design and systems
engineering studies conducted by the contractors.
3. Developing the ground- and flight-test programs to be conducted
at White Sands, MSC,and KSC.
4. Monitoring contractor operations to assure adherence to speci-
fications and to identify and solve problems in the development and
fabrication of systems and subsystems.
5. Chairing the Configuration Control Board (Level 3).
Assistant Program Manager for Flight Safety
There is also within the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office an Assist-
ant Program Manager for Flight Safety, whose responsibility is to assure
that the policies and procedures of MSC's Safety Office are adhered to
in all Apollo Program activities relating to the spacecraft. He is the
Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager's Safety representative to KSC and
the spacecraft contractors. He oversees all program activities from a
flight safety viewpoint and is an advisor to the Program Manager on
the flightworthiness of all systems.
Systems Engineering Division
Referring again to figure E5-2, there are six functional divisions
reporting to the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager. Two of these per-
form functions that have a direct bearing on the development and manu-
facture of the cryogenic gas storage subsystem. The Systems Engineering
Division is responsible for the coordination and control of the design
and development of all spacecraft systems. The Division determines the
technical requirements, and develops technical specifications (with the
contractor) for systems and subsystems, and is responsible for assuring
that all program elements (crew, hardware, and software) are successfully
integrated into each system design. This Division plays its major role
during the design and development stage of the spacecraft and its
systems. It is responsible for organizing and conducting all Prelimi-
nary Design Reviews and Critical Design Reviews. It is also responsible
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for definition and implementation of the nonmetallic materials program.
Mission definition and planning are also major responsibilities.
CSM Project Engineering Division
This Division, which has counterpart Divisions for the LM and for
Experiments and GFE, plays its major role during manufacture and test
of the spacecraft. From this Division two engineers, designated as
Project Engineers, are assigned to each spacecraft as it begins manu-
facture. The Project Engineers are the Program Manager's representatives
for his particular spacecraft and are responsible for assuring that that
particular spacecraft is ready for launch on schedule, that it has suc-
cessfully passed all tests, inspections, and reviews, and that all asso-
ciated ground support equipment is on schedule. Their responsibility
extends up to launch and resumes after recovery for postflight testing.
Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Offices (RASPO)
There are Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Managers at the North
American Rockwell plant, Downey, California (for the CSM prime contract),
at Bethpage, New York (for the LM prime contract), and at the Kennedy
Space Center (for launch activities). The Managers of the RASPO-Downey
and the RASPO-Bethpage act for the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager in
all spacecraft activities taking place at their locations. Their re-
sponsibilities encompass program control, manufacture, test and checkout,
and configuration management. The Manager at the RASPO-Kennedy repre-
sents the Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager in all operations at KSC
which relate to the spacecraft. Specific responsibilities include:
i. Liaison with the KSC Spacecraft Operations Director on all
matters relating to spacecraft preparation and checkout for launch.
2. Submission to KSC of MSC's prelaunch test and checkout require-
ments for the spacecraft.
3. Approval of KSC's Test and Checkout Plans.
4. Approval of w_ivers and deviations to MSC's test and checkout
requirements.
5. Restricted change approval related to GSE and test operations.
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MSC RELIABILITY A_ QUALITY ASSURANCE (R&QA) OFFICE
The R&©_ Office at MSC is an independent functional office reporting
to the Director of the Center and responsive to the ASPO. It has over-
all responsibility for planning, coordinating, and directing all R&QA
activities at the Center. Specific responsibilities include:
i. Establishing reliability, quality, and inspection requirements
and criteria for spacecraft, systems, subsystems, and supporting
equipment.
2. Insuring implementation of R&QA requirements and criteria at
contractor plants and at MSC.
3. Developing MSC engineering design standards and criteria.
L. Establishing certification test criteria and approving certi-
fication test plans and reports.
5. Establishing and enforcing policies governing parts and materials
identification, usage, and qualification information for critical space-
craft hardware.
MSC SAFETY OFFICE
The Safety Office at MSC is also an independent functional office,
reporting to the Center Director. It is responsible for establishing
safety policies, standards, and procedures in the fields of industrial
operations and manned space flight. Specific responsibilities include:
i. Review and evaluation of the safety of operations in all Center
organizations.
2. Advising the Center Director and Center Management on all
matters relating to industrial and flight safety.
3. Reviewing and evaluating the effectiveness of contractor
safety programs against MSC safety standards and criteria.
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MSCENGINEERINGANDDEVELOPMENTDIRECTORATE
The Engineering and DevelopmentDirectorate is the principal en-
gineering componentof the Center functional organization. This
Directorate, organized into Divisions by technical discipline, conducts
most of the Center's supporting research and technology, develops con-
cepts for advanced systems, and provides technical support to all on-
going flight programs. This support roughly subdivides into three
major categories:
i. Systems analyses and definition of new techniques applicable
to space flight programs.
2. Subsystemand componenttests.
3. Technical managementof the design, manufacture, and testing
of subsystemsby the Program contractors.
This latter function represents a major element of the Apollo
Programmanagementsystem and is described as follows:
The three subordinate Managersin the ASPO(for CSM,LM, and Experi-
ments and GFE)rely heavily on the matrix managementconcept for carry-
ing out their responsibilities. They receive technical support from
subsystem managersappointed from the technical Directorates of the
Center's line organization. There are between 40 and 50 subsystemmana-
gers, most of them located in the Engineering and DevelopmentDirectorate(fig. E4-4). The SubsystemManager for the cryogenic gas storage sub-
system is organizationally located in the Propulsion and PowerDivision
of that Directorate. Thesemanagersremain assigned to their permanent
organizations, but assumeprogram responsibility for the design, develop-
ment, and manufacture of particular subsystems. In this role they report
to the Module Manager (e.g., Managerfor the CSM)in the Program Office.
For all other purposes they report through normal organizational lines.
The subsystemmanager's responsibility for his subsystem is continuous
from preliminary design through operations. He is the Program Office's
technical managerof all work done on the subsystem (although contractor
direction is given through the Project Officer or Contracting Officer)
and is responsible for assuring that the subsystem is built on schedule,
within budget, and to specifications.
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KSCAPOLLOPROGRAMMANAGER
The Apollo ProgramManagerat KSCrepresents the Center Director
in all matters relating to the launch of an Apollo space vehicle. He
develops all necessary plans for work to be accomplished at KSCfor
the Apollo Program and issues "requirements" to the line organizations
of the Center. The line organizations then assumefull responsibility
for conducting their parts of theProgram, and the role of the Apollo
ProgramManagerbecomesone of monitoring, assessing, and modifying
requirements as necessary. The organization of the KSCApollo Program
Office is shownin figure E5-3.
KSCDIRECTOROFLAUNCHOPERATIONS
This organization has the principal functional responsibility for
conducting the launch of the Apollo space vehicle. The Director of
Launch Operations is responsible for the managementand technical di-
rection of preflight operation and integration, assembly, test, check-
out, and launch of all space vehicles. He initiates, supervises, and
coordinates the preparation of preflight and launch operations test
plans and assures their effective execution. He assists the Apollo
ProgramManagerin negotiating test and operational sequences, methods,
and standards with the two development Centers (MSCand MSFC).
INTER-CENTERRELATIONSHIPS
Becausethe day-to-day managementof the Apollo Program, from
design through launch, requires close coordination of activities under-
way at three lield Centers and in NASAHeadquarters, formally docu-
mented Inter-Center Agreementshave been drawn to specify how
responsibilities are divided and how the activities at each location
relate to those at the others. Additionally, a series of Inter-Center
Coordination Panels has been established which recommendsolutions to
technical interface problems involving the responsibilities of two or
more Centers. There are eight such panels, covering: Crew Safety,
Electrical, Flight Evaluation, Mechanical, Instrumentation and Commu-
nications, Flight Mechanics, LaunchOperations, and Flight Operations.
All panels operate under the cognizance of a Panel Review Board made
up of representatives from the three MannedSpace Flight Centers and
the Headquarters Office of MannedSpaceFlight.
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Apollo Program Directive No. 33A, issued in August 1968, defines
in considerable detail the responsibilities of each of the three Centers
in the Apollo Program. It is reproduced on the following pages in its
entirety for reference.
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OFFICEOF.AN_EOSP,_CEF_I_"T M- D MA 1400.O95 "I DAT_PROGRAI_ DIRECTIVE -- ,n,........ _ .... __AU__.1568 _
APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTIVE NO. 33A
APOL-I]O PROGRAM DIR_TOR
SUBJECT: Center Responslbilitles in the Apollo Program
OFFICE OF PRIME RESPONSIBILITY: MAP
I. PURPOSE
The :_urpose of this Directive is to assign responsibility
and functions and define Inter-Center relationships for
the conduct of the Apollo Program.
III.
II. SCOPE
ThlS Directive assigns responsibilities and functions to MSF
Centers for accomplishment of the Apollo Program Jn amplifi-
cation of and in consonance with NMI 1142.1 Functions and
Authority - Manned Spacecraft Center, NMI 1142.3 Functions
and Authority - Goorge C. Marshall Space Flight Center, and
NMI 1142.2 Functions and Authority - John F. Kennedy Space
Center.
RESPONSIBILITY
A° The Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center Is responsible
for design, development, fabrication, qualification,
acceptance te_t and delivery of Apollo spacecraft; associ-
ated ground support equipment and assigned experiments; for
the planning of all Apollo Missions; for the control of the
flight phase of Apollo Missions including the development of
ground equipment necessary for mission control and not pro-
vided by other centers in the execution of their missions;
for the selection, training and assignment of flight crews;
for the development of software as needed for spacecraft
guidance, checkout, and mission control; for establishing
prelaunch requirements for test, checkout and inspection of
Apollo spacecraft; and for the planning and implementation of
a lunar science program to support the Apollo Program.
Be The Director of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Is
responsible for the design, development, fabrication, quall-
flcatlon, acceptance test and delivery of the Saturn launch
vehicles including engines, associated ground support equip-
ment and assigned experiments;, providing mission planning data
from the standpoint of overall vehicle performance; providing
launch vehicle data and software for launch vehicle guidance
and checkout; for establishing prelaunch requirements for test,
checkout and inspection of Saturn launch vehicles; and ::up-
portlng launch and flight operations as requested by KSC and
_C.
....i or16 ......
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PROGRA_,t DIRECTIVE (Prolecf)
DATE
5 AUG 196B
IV.
C. The Director of the John F. Kennedy Space Center is responsible for
development and operation of launch and industrial facilities and associated
ground support equipment required to support the Apollo Program and the
assembly, test, inspection, checkout and launch of Apollo-Saturn _pace
vehicles at KSC.
D. Center Directors will retain ultimate responsibility for Apollo Program
functions delegated within the Center, and will supervise their perforn_ance.
Significant changes in delegation of functions will be discussed with the
Apollo Program Director prior to i_)le_nentation.
FUNCTIONS
A. Manned Spacecraft Center
The Manned Spacecraft Center is assigned the following functions for
the Apollo Program:
l, Hardware
a. Providing for the detailed specifications, design, manufacture,
checkout, test, reliability and quality, qualification, and
acceptance of MSC d_veloped hardware. This does not include the
test and checkout functions accomplished at the launch site by KSC.
b. Developing and delivering to KSC spacecraft which has been qualified
for flight along with associated software, data and support equ_ment.
c. Providing for the detailed specifications, design, development,
fabrication, qualification, acceptance test and delivery of
experiments flight hardware and associated specialized ground
equipment for those experiments approved by the Manned Space
Flight Experiments Board and assigned by the Apollo Program
Director.
d. Providing logistic support planning and implementation at
factory, test and launch sites for MSC developed hardware_
e. Controlling receipt and stowage of flight crew personal
equipment at KSC _ich is scheduled for flight and providing
to KSC a list of equipment which is considered flight crew
personal equipment.
2, Configuration Control
a. Establishing and controlling configuration of spacecraft
hardware, associated software and support equipment (designed
or provided by MSC) at each stage of preparation or test in the
factory, test or launch site, including approval of changes at
KSC.
.... 2 o_16 .....
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b. Providing and .L,_i[tkaining a list of acceptable items and materials
that _pay entt, r the spacecraft for checkout and for flight.
3. Test and Checkout
a. Establishing and maintaining test and checkout requirements and
test and checkout specifications and criteria for factory or test
site acceptance and latmch site preparation of 1_C developed hardware
(including Ground Support Equipment and software).
b. Providing test and checkout requirements and test and checkout
speciiications ;_nd criteria for launch site preparation of MSC
developed hardware, software and Ground Support Equipment.
c. Reviewing factory, test site and launch site test requirements
and test and checkout plans and procedures as necessary to
assure that adequate testing is beinR accomplished without unnecessary
overlap and duplication between testing conducted at different ]ocations.
d. Providing written approval of KSC test and checkout plans in
consonance with paragraphs IV.A.3b and IV.A.3e.
e° Providing Center approved factory or test site test and checkout
procedures to KSC for use as a baseline in the development of
similar procedures required at the launch site.
f. Reviewing at the option of MSC, the adequacy of KSC test
procedures at the launch site.
g°
Providing requirements and criteria to KSC for assuring flight
readiness of _xperi_::cnts flight hardware, unless KSC and MSC on
the basis of written agreement for a specific experiment make
other arrangements for flight readiness determination.
h, Determining functional performance and flight readiness of
flight hardware closed out at the factory or test site and not
accessible for inspection or not included in test and checkout
requirements for evaluation of functional performance at KSC.
i. Providing such technical assistance or data as may be required
by KSC in preparation of hardware for flight.
j- Assuring that }_SC personnel participating in KSC tests are
responsive to KSC direction during conduct of the tests and
attend pre-test briefings and participate in training exercises
as required by KSC in accordance with responsibilities outlined
herein.
k° Providing an assessment of flight readiness of the spacecraft and
associated software at the Flight Readiness Review in accordance
with Apollo Program Directives.
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4. Reliability and Quality Assurance
a. Providing quality control requirements and inspection
criteria for MSC developed hardware for use at the
factory, test site and launch site.
b. Conducting audits to evaluate contractor factory and
test site performance in accordance with MSC quality
control requirements and inspection criteria for MSC
developed hardware, and participating at the option of
MSC in audits conducted by KSC at the launch site.
c. Determining corrective action and disposition of MSC
developed hardware which fails, malfunctions or performs
outside the performance limits contained in test and
checkout specifications and criteria during checkout at
KSC. This responsibility does not include routine
trouble-shooting or maintenance of MSC developed ground
support equipment operated by KSC.
5. Systems Engineering
Providing I_C technical representation on design and operations
inter-Center panels or working groups as established by Apollo
Program Directives.
6. Operations
a. Developing flight techniques for mission control and
hardware and software for the Mission Control Center.
b. Developing mission objectives, plans and rules to support
Apollo mission assignments.
c. Conducting flight operations.
d. Obtaining from KSC the operational requirements pertain-
ing to checkout and launch which need to be incorporated
into MSC designed hardware.
e. Planning jointly with the Department of Defense the
provision of recovery support.
f. Providing input to and comment on KSC launch rules.
g. Identifying MSC operational support requirements according
to approved procedures and evaluating support implementation
of said requirements.
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8.
9.
Flight Crew
a. Providing trained flight crews and personal equipment for manned missions.
b. Directing all astronaut activities except during the time they are
participating in F_C flight hardware tests.
c. Developing and operating flight crew simulators and training equipment at
_C and KSC.
Sciei_ee
a. Planning and impleme_tation of a lunar science program to support Apollo,
including site selection, lunar science operations_ thu Lunar Receiving
Laboratory operation and lunar sample analys_s.
Ma na _zeme nt
This section contains general management responsibilities for the conduct of
the Apollo program at ._._SCas well as some specific management requirements
which need to be hi_hlighted.
General
a. Assuring that Apollo program requirements for manpower or for
institutional support from other elements of MSC are properly conveyed
to those elements and that Apollo program institutiomal support
requirements arc reflected in Center resource requirements plans,
schedules, and budgets.
b. Assuring that Apollo program requirements for institutional support
are met on an effective and timely basis.
c. Developing and operating Center facilities required for the Apollo
Program.
d. Developing and implementing adequate security procedures.
e. Establishing detailed schedules (Levels 2, 3 and 4) for MSC hardware,
software and associated equipment and operations activities consistent
with the basic schedules (Level I) approved by the Director, Apollo
Program, and the Director, Mission Operations.
f. Providing contract authority for KSC control of spacecraft contractor's
test and checkout activities at KSC through a supplemental contract
under KSC administration.
Medical
_dical support for the Apollo program will be provided in accordance with
NMI 8900.1. In acldition, the following specific requirements will be met
on the Apollo program.
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a. Providing for the medical surveillance and support of the astronauts
during all phases of the Apollo Program at any location including
test and checkout operations.
b. Providing for the evaluation of medical data obtained during manned
tests, to insure that the interpretation of such data regarding
the acceptability of equipment performance is properly reflected
in post flight mission reports.
e. Providing for the development and implementation of medical disaster
plans associated with the test of Apollo hardware at FZC.
Safety activities in the Apollo program will be conducted in accordance
with instructions provided by the Apollo Program Director and directives
issued by the Manned Space Flight and NASA Safety Directors. In addition
the following specific requirements will be met on the Apollo program.
a. Providing written approval of KSC criteria for determining hazardous
operations at the launch site.
b. Reviewing and approving any KSC test and checkout procedure in which
the flight crew participates.
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The George C. Marshall Space Flight Center is assigned the following functions for
the Apollo Program.
i. Hardware
a. Providing for the detailed specifications, design, manufacture, checkout,
test, reliability and quality, qualification and acceptance of MSFC
developed hardware. This does not include the test and checkout functions
accomplished at the launch site by KSC.
b. Developing and delivering to KSC launch vehicles which have been qualified
for flight along with associated software, data and support equipment.
c. Providing for the detailed specifications, design, development, fabrication,
qualification, acceptance test and delivery of experiments flight hardware
and associated specialized ground equipment for those experiments approved
by the Manned Space Flight Experiments Board and assigned by the Apollo
Program Director.
d. Providing logistic support planning and implementation at factory, test and
launch sites for MSFC controlled hardware.
2.
3.
Configuration Control
a. Establishing and controlling configuration of launch vehicle hardware, asso-
ciated software and support equipment (designed or provided by MSFC) at each
atage of preparation or test in the factory, test or launch site, including
approval of changes-at KSC.
b. Providing criteria to KSC for controlling tools, equipment and materials that
enter and leave the launch vehicle stages and instrument unit during
operations at KSC.
Test and Checkout
a. Establishing and maintaining test and checkout requirements and test and
checkout specifications and criteria for factory or test site acceptance and
launch site preparation of MSFC developed hardware (including Ground Support
Equipment and software).
b. Providing test and checkout requirements and test and checkout specifications
and criteria for launch site preparation of MSFCdeveloped hardware, software
and Ground Support Equipment.
c. Reviewing factory, test site and launch site test requirements and test and
checkout plans and procedures as necessary to assure that adequate testing
is being accomplished.
d. Providing written approval of KSC test,and checkout plans in consonance with
paragraphs IV.B.3_ and IV.B.3c.
e. Providing Center approved factory or test site test and checkout procedures
to KSC for use as a baseline in the development of similar procedures
required at the launch site.
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f. Reviewing at the option of MSFC, the adequacy of KSC test procedures
at the launch site.
g. Providing requirements and criteria to KSC for assuring flight
readiness of experiments flight hardware, unless KSC and MSFC on
the basis of written agreement for a specific experiment make other
arrangements for flight readiness determination.
h. Determining functional performance and flight readiness of flight
hardware closed out at the factory or test site and not accessible
for inspection or not included in test and checkout requirements
for evaluation of functional performance at KSC.
i. Providing such technical assistance or data as may be required by
KSC in preparation of hardware for flight.
j. Assuring that MSFC personnel participating in KSC tests are responsive
to KSC direction during conduct of the tests and attend pre-test
briefings and participate in training exercises as required by KSC
in accordance with responsibilities outlined herein.
k. Providing an assessment of flight readiness of the launch vehicle and
associated software at the Flight Readiness Review in accordance with
Apollo Program Directives.
4. Reliability and quality Assurance
a. Providing quality control requirements and inspection criteria for MSFC
developed hardware for use at the factory, test site and launch site.
b. Conducting audits to evaluate contractor factory and test site performance
in accordance with MSFC quality control requirements and inspection
criteria for MSFC developed hardware, and participating at the option
of MSFC in audits conducted by KSC at the launch site.
e. Determining corrective action and disposition of MSFC developed hardware
which fails, malfunctions, or performs outside the performance limits
contained in test and checkout specifications and criteria during
checkout at KSC. This responsibility does not include routine trouble-
shooting or maintenance of MSFC-developed ground support equipment
operated by KSC.
5. Systems EnKineering
a. Providing MSFC technical representation on design and operations inter-
Center panels or working groups as established by Apollo Program
Directives.
b. Providing the overall integrated space vehicle systems analysis and
criteria for operational requirements and limitations for handling_
checkout, launch and flight as required by MSFC, MSC and KSC.
c. Operating the Manned Space Flight Interface Documentation Repository.
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6, Operations
a. Developing mission objectives and plans to support Apollo mission
assignments.
b. Providing real time mission support as requested by _C and KSC both on
site and at Huntsville.
c. Providing input to and comment on KSC launch and _SC flight mission rules.
d. Obtaining from KSC the operational requirements pertaining to checkout and
launch which need to be incorporated into MSFC designed hardware.
e. Identifying MSFC operational support requirements according to approved
procedures and evaluating support implementation of said requirements.
7. Fli_ht Crew
Providing instructions and material for training and familiarization of flight
crews with the Saturn vehicle.
8. Science
None
9. Management
This section contains general nmnagement responsibilities for the conduct of
the Apollo program at _FC as well as some specific management requirements
which need to be highlighted.
General
a. Assuring that Apollo program requirements for manpower or for insti-
tutional support from other elements of MSFCare properly conveyed to
those elements and that Apollo program institutional support requirements
are reflected in Center resource requirements plans, schedules, and
budgets.
b. Assuring that Apollo program requirements for institutional support
are met on an effective and timely basis.
c. Developing and operating Center facilities required for the Apollo
Program.
d. Developing and implementing adequate security procedures.
e. Establishing detailed schedules (Levels 2, 3 and 4) for MSFC hardware,
software, and associated equipment consistent with the basic schedules
(Level i) approved by the Apollo Program Director.
f. Providing liquid hydrogen management for MSFC and KSC.
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g* Providing contract authority for KSC control of launch vehicle
contractor's test and checkout activities at _qC through a supplemental
contract under KSC administration.
Medical
Medical support for the Apollo program will be provided in accordance
with NMI 8900.1. In addition, the following specific requirement will
be met on the Apollo program.
a. Providing for the development and implementation of medical disaster
plans associated with the test of Saturn hardware at MSFC.
Safety activities in the Apollo program will be conducted in accordance
with instruction provided by the Apollo Program Director and directives
issued by the Manned Space Flight and NASA Safety Directors. In addition
the following specific requirement will be met on the Apollo program.
a. Providing written approval on KSC criteria for determining hazardous
operations at the launch site.
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C. John F. Kennedy Space Center
The John F. Kennedy Space Ccnter is assigned the followlng functions for the
Apollo Program.
I. Hardware
a. Providing for detailed specifications, design, manufacture, checkout,
test, reliability and quality, quallfication and acceptance of KSC
developed hardware.
b. Developing and delivering qualified ground support equipment associated
with launch facilities and not provided by HSC or MSFC.
c. Developing and operating ground conmunlcatlons, computation, and instru-
mentation systems and equipment for the conduct of launch operations.
d. Taking measures to protect flight hardware and associated Ground
Support Equipment from contamination, corrosion or damage which may
result from environment, housekeeping, procedure or human erro* and
reporting incidents to MSC and MSFC as appropriate.
e. Providing logistics support planning and implementation at the factory
test or at KSC for KSC developed hardware.
2, Confl_uration Control
a. Establishing and controlling configuration of KSC developed launch
facilities and ground support equipment at each stage of preparation
or test at the f_ctory, test site or at KSC.
b. Maintaining configuration control of MSC and MSFC developed hardware and
software after delivery to KSC in accordance with the configuration
requirements established by MSC and MSFC. Assuring that prior approval
is secured from MSC and MSFC before any changes in configuration are
made in spacecraft, launch vehicle, or associated GSE furnished by MSC
or MSFC.
c. Securing, after the flight readiness test, the prior approval of MSC
or MSFC for the replacement of failed parts.
d. Controlling everything that enters and leaves the spacecraft during
checkout at KSC in accordance wlth the MSC llst of acceptable items
and materials that may be taken into the spacecraft for checkout and
for flight.
e. Controlling tools, equipment and materials that enter and leave the launch
vehicle stages and instrument unit _urlng operations at KSC in accordance
with criteria provided by MSFC.
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Provide total logistics support planning and management for all
KSC equlp_:cn_. Plan for the utilization at KSC of equipment pro-
vided by other design cognizant centers, using the Inter-center
coordinated support planning provided by those centers.
Provide logistics products and services to meet the valid intent
of NHB 7500.1 for KSC designed equipment. Utilize logistics
products and services provided by other centers to support equip-
ment under their design cognizance, unless stipulated otherwise
In Inter-center logistics agreements.
c. Receive, store, issue and dispose of spare parts for all Apollo
Program equipment operated at KSC in accordance wlta inter-center
coordinated plans and directions from the design cognizant centers.
d. Provide reports of Zcglstics requirements, status and spares con-
sumption as required.
e. Establish, implement and control a logistics discrepancy reporting
system.
Test and Checkout
a. Conducting the assembly, checkout, and launch of flight hardware
for Apollo missions and assembly, checkout and operation of re-
quired ground support equipment.
b. Providing control of all personnel participating in test and
checkout activities, including representatives from MSC and i_FC,
and assuring that personnel attend pre-test briefings and parti-
cipate In training exercises as necessary to assure personnel
safety and proper conduct of the tests.
c. Provldln_ recuirement_ speciflcattona and criteria, and pro-
cedures for test and :[eckout of KSC de_loped suppor_ equipment
whose perforz_nce must be verified for each launch.
d. Providing test _.nd checkout plans _ acccz_snce _Ith !:SC and r_FC
test and c_ecke_-_ re_uLrements plus _ny aSdit!onal KSC test re-
quirements necessa_" to verify launch facility, [____nnedSpace Flight
Network and launch crew readiness or to saclsfy range _d safety
requirements.
e. Securing MSC and MSFC uritten approval ou te_t and checkout plans
and changes thereto b_fore the plans are _pproved or !zplemented.
f. Developing and providing to MSC or M_FC test and checkout pro-
cedures adapted to the KSC environment using as a baseline the
development center approved factory test and checkout procedures.
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Making final determination that test and checkout procedures
are adequate, safe and in accordance with MSC and MSFC test
and checkout requirements and test and checkout specifications
and criteria.
Obtaining approval on deviations and waivers from MSC and MSFC
concerning test and checkout requirements, test and checkout
specifications and criteria and inspection criteria when unable
to meet requirements.
Determining ftmctlonal perfon_ance and flight readiness of flight
hard_are and software in accordance with test and checkout re-
quirements and test and checkout specifications and criteria
provided by MSC and MSFC except for that which is closed out at
the factory and not accessible for inspection or not included
in test and checkout requirements for evaluation of functional
performance at KSC.
J° Determining flight readiness of equipment associated with Inflight
experiments in accordance with MSC or MSFC (as appropriate) speci-
fications and criteria unless specifically excluded by written
agreement with MSC or M_FC.
k. Controlling receipt and storage, and assuring flight readiness of
all Government Furnished Equipment, other than flight crew personal
equipment, which is scheduled for flight and which is not processed
to KSC through a contractor responsible to KSC.
i. Providing routine trouble shooting and maintenance for MSC and
MSFC developed equ{pment in accordance with MSC and MSFC require-
ments, specifications and criteria.
m° Providing an assessment of the flight readiness of the launch
complex, flight hardware and software at the Flight Readiness
Review in accordance with Apollo Program Directives.
Reliability and Quality Assurance
a. Providing quality control requirements and inspection criteria
for KSC developed hardware for use at the factory, test site and
KSC.
b. Conducting audits to evaluate contractor factory and test site
performance in accordance with KSC quality control requirements
and inspection criteria for KSC developed hardware.
c. Determining corrective actidn and disposition of KSC developed
hardware which fails, malfunctions, or performs outside the per-
formance limits contained in test and checkout specifications and
criteria during checkout at KSC.
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d. Generating approval from the appropriate development center (MSC
or MSFC) to disassemble or open any flight hardware closed out
at a factory or test site.
ee Securing MSC and MSFC written approval of quality control _lans
insofar as development center responsibilities are concerned
before the plans are approved or implemented.
f, Conducting quality control inspections and audits of contractor
activities at KSC and inviting MSC and MSFC participation as
applicable.
g, Obtaining approval from the appropriate development center (MSC
or MSFC) to disassemble or open any flight hardware closed out at
a factor, or test site.
h. Advising MSC or MSFC of any problem arising during prelaunch
preparation concerning flight worthiness of flight hardware.
i. Conducting failure analysis as required by MSC and MSFC.
J . Participating in MSC and MSFC flight hardware acceptance reviews
and providing recommendations to MSC or MSFC and the Apollo
Program Director, concerning the acceptance of the hardware for
shipment to KSC.
6. Systems Engineering
Providing KSC representation on design and operations inter-Center
panels or working groups as established by Apollo Program Directives.
7. Operations
a. 'Identifying KSC operational support requirements according to
approved procedures and evaluating implementation of support
planning.
b, Providing data to MSC and MSFC in accordance with approved Program
Support Requirements Documents.
c. Conducting launch operations.
d. Developing launch plans and rules.
8. Flisht Crew
Coordinating and directing astronaut activities during the time they
are actively participating in KSC tests of flight hardware except that
the flight crew may take any action necessary for their safety.
Science
None
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Th_s section contains %_neral management responsibilities for the
conduct of the Apollo program at KSC as well as some specific _anage-
ment requirements wh.lcn need to be highlighted.
General
a. Assur]_L, that ,',r_rile program requirements fqr manpower or
for i>st]tutio:,_] support from other eleme_i'_s of KSC are
propcr'ly conv,,)-_d to those elements and that A:)ollo program
instJt<_ticna± s q_port requirements are reflected in Center
resource re_uire:nents plans, scbedu]es, and 'budcets.
b. Assuring that A!'::>llo program requirements for institutional
support arc mgt o:J an effective and t]me]y _:;asls.
C, Providing contz_ol of all activities of Apollo contractors
at KSC other t!_:n those directly associated with astronaut
training.
d. Developing a.'_d operating Center facilities rcqilred for
the Apollo Proi3ram.
e. Developing and implementing adequate security procedures.
fo Establis_ing detailed schedules (Levels 2, 3 and 4) for
KSC hardware, software and associated equipment consistent
with the basic schedules (Level l) approved by the Director,
Apollo Program'and the Director, Mission Operations.
Medical
Medical support for the Apollo program will be provided in
accordance with NMI 89OO.1. In addition, the following specific
requirement will be met on the Apollo program.
ao Providing fo;. the development and implementation of _ned_cal
disaster plans associated with the assemtly, checkout and
prelaunch operations of Apollo fl_ght hardware at KSC.
Safety
Safety activities in the Apollo program will be conducted in
accordance with instructions provided by the Apollo Program
Director and directives issued by the Manned Space Flight and
NASA Safety Directors. In additlom the following specific
requirements will be met on the Apollo program.
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Performing as the NASA single point of responsibility
for safety in the Merritt Island and Cape Kennedy area
and for NASA range safety inputs to the Eastern Test
Range.
Developing criteria for determining hazardous operations
at the launch site and securing written approval of MSC
and MSFC.
V. PRECEDENCE
This Directive takes precedence over any inter-Center agreements on
Apollo program responsibilities.
VI. CONCURRENCE
This Program Directive has been revlewed and concurred in by the
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight and the Associate
Administrator for Organization and Management. Any proposed sub-
stantive changes in the responsibilities defined in this document
will be submitted for review and concurrence in the same manner.
.... 16 o_16 ......
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PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONTINUITY
The Panel considered the question of continuity of experience in
certain key positions at MSC, KSC, E-Downey, and Beech, and found
that it has been good.
At MSC, three different men have held the Subsystem Manager posi-
tion for the cryogenic gas storage subsystem since November 1963. The
first held the position for nearly 3 years during the later design
phases and through most of the oxygen tank development period. The
second Subsystem Manager was in the position from 1966 through 1968 and
was then succeeded by the present incumbent, who had been his assistant.
In the MSC ASPO, there have been five Program Managers, two during
the design and development of the oxygen tank. Additional continuity
in this position was provided from 1961 through 1966, by the fact that
the first Program Manager became the Deputy Program Manager in 1962 and
served in that position, under two successive Program Managers, through
1965. In 1967, when the Program Manager next changed, the position was
taken by the then Deputy Director of the Center, who had been associ-
ated with the Program from that position. The present Program Manager,
who took over last year, had been an astronaut with detailed famili-
arity with the manned space flight program since 1962.
At KSC, the persons with principal responsibility for the test,
checkout, and launch of all Apollo spacecraft are the Director of Launch
Operations and, reporting to him, the Director of Spacecraft Operations.
Continuity in these positions has been good. The present Director of
Launch Operations was the Deputy Director for the prior 2 years, approxi-
mately. Before that he had been the head of the MSC Resident Apollo
Spacecraft Office at KSC. The present incumbent of the Spacecraft
Operations position has occupied that position for 5 years. Prior to
that time he served as the Assistant Manager for Gemini, MSC Florida
Operations.
At North American Rockwell the position with direct responsibility
for overseeing design and manufacture of the cryogenic gas storage
system (CGSS) by the subcontractor, Beech, is the Manager, Fuel Cells
and Cryogenic Systems (fig. E4-10). The present incumbent of that
position has held it since 1962 and has been NR-Subsystem Manager for
the Apollo CGSS over that entire period. The present Apollo Program
Manager at NR succeeded to that position last year when the former
Program Manager was appointed NASA Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight. Prior to his promotion, the present Program Manager had
been the Assistant CSM Program Manager for about 4 years.
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At Beech-Boulder Division, the samemenhave occupied one or
another of the key positions in the CGSScontract to NRover the life
of the contract. There has been turnover in manufacturing personnel
at the technician and trades levels but the principal managersand
supervisors have not changed. It is noteworthy that whenmembersof
the Apollo 13 Review Board visited Beech for a demonstration of the
assembly of an Apollo oxygen tank, the technician who performed the
assembly demonstration was the samemanwho had assembledApollo 13
tank no. 2 in 1966.
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PART E6
APOLLO SPACECRAFT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
The various organizational relationships and the management philos-
ophy for Apollo are defined in reference i. This document defines the
relationship and functioning of the various organizational elements
which have been described in Parts E4 and E5 of this Appendix. In
addition, there are several other documents which provide implementing
details concerning the management control systems and their intended
operation.
A general understanding of the management systems which are being
used and their relationship to the program progress is helpful in deter-
mining or appreciating the extent of the review which is applied to all
phases of the program throughout design, manufacturing, test, checkout,
and operation.
It is also considered important to recognize that some of the re-
view and control systems are primarily concerned with the entire scope
of a module program and that others concentrate on individual modules
by serial number.
The systems which have been implemented by MSC are generally simi-
lar for both the CSM and the LM. Due to the nature of this review, the
CSM only is considered and all subsequent reference to a vehicle means
the CSM or more particularly the service module.
There are three management systems which directly impact all CSM's
at various points in time:
(a) Design Reviews
(b) Configuration Management
(c) Readiness Reviews
Throughout the entire management process the Reliability and Qual-
ity Assurance system maintains a continuing surveillance of all problems.
DESIGN REVIEWS
The contractor initiates the design phase of the contract based upon
the general specifications and the performance requirements established
by the ASPO. These requirements and broad specifications are developed
by the MSC technical organization and approved by the ASPO prior to the
contractor initiating activity.
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Preliminary Design Review
The general requirement is for a Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
to be conducted on the CSMwhenthe design concept has been determined
by the contractor and prior to the start of detail design. The ASPO
SystemsEngineering Division normally organizes and conducts these reviews
which are chaired by the Apollo Spacecraft ProgramManager. Various
subsystemsmay reach a design concept stage earlier than others and a
series of PDR'smaybe conducted. The result of the PDRis to establish
the design requirements baseline from v_hich engineering control can be
exercised. Uponthe completion of the review, the ASP0managerauthor-
izes Part I of the end-item specification to be inserted in the contract,
alon_ with any necessary design modifications.
Critical Design Review
The Critical Design Revie_v(CDR), also organized and conducted by
ASPOSystemsEngineering Division and chaired by the ASPOManager_is
held whenthe contractor has released or completed between 90 and 95
percent of the engineering. At this point there is sufficient informa-
tion for the ASPOand the appropriate subsystemmanagersto adequately
review the engineering and to determine if the objectives of the design
concept have been achieved. Again, because the engineering for different
subsystems is not all completed at the sametime, a series of CDR'smay
be conducted. At the completion of the CDRa drawing baseline is
established and the strict Configuration Control System is implemented.
CONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENT
A primary document, in addition to reference i which defines the
Configuration ManagementControl System, is the "Apollo Spacecraft
ProgramConfiguration ManagementManual," (ref. 2). This documentde-
tails the various change control levels, defines the categories of
change, and establishes the membershipof the various boards and
panels which are involved. Figure E6-1 depicts this total relationship
amongthe five change control levels. This documentcontains the de-
tailed instructions which are necessary to implement the intent of the
"Apollo Configuration ManagementManual" as modified by the MSCSupple-
ment No. i (ref. 3).
As shownby figure E6-1, there are actually five functioning levels
of changecontrol for the CSM. The Configuration Control Board (CCB),
Level II, is responsible for the CSM_LM, and affected subsystems.
The Chairman of the CCBis the Apollo Spacecraft ProgramManager;
and the ASPOManagers for CSM,LM, the Experiments and GFE, the Assis-
tant ProgramManager for Flight Safety, and the MSCDirectors of the
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five technical Directorates are principal members. The CCB is respon-
sible for approval or disapproval of changes in the following major
categories:
(a) Changes which affect an interface among two or more Configu-
ration Control Panels (CCP).
(b) Changes which affect spacecraft mass properties.
(c) Change resulting in contract cost increases in excess of
$300,000.
(d) Changes which affect end-item delivery dates.
It should be noted that change control is established for more than
merely hardware or specification baselines. Also included are software
items, such as mission timeline, math models, consumables, and schedules.
Configuration Control Panels (CCP) are established at Level IIl by
the authority of the CCB Chairman and are designated as the approving
authority for all Class I changes not designated for CCB action. Class
I changes are defined in general as those affecting the specification,
performance, cost, quality, safety, or interchangeability. Configura-
tion Control Panels are established for the CSM, LM, and GFE. The CSM
CCP is chaired by the ASPO Manager for CSM. Panel membership is obtained
primarily from the same organizations as indicated for the CCB; however,
the members are Division Chief level or designees rather than Directors.
The Level IV CCP is at the Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Office
(RASPO) at Downey. This panel is chaired by the Resident Manager.
Generally, the panel can approve changes which concern test procedures
but not hardware configuration. An exception to this is made during
final checkout of a specific vehicle or during field test or launch
preparation. These are classed as compatibility or make-operable changes,
are restricted to single modules only, and must be reported to the CSM
CCP within 24 hours.
A fifth level of change control exists because all changes whether
Class I or Class II must go through the North American Rockwell (NR) CCB.
This board is chaired by the NR Program Manager. It approves all Class I
changes for submission to the appropriate NASA authority as previously
defined and has the authority to approve Class II changes for implementa-
tion. The definition of Class I and Class II changes is that contained in
ANA Bulletin 445 (ref. 4) which is considered to be a standard reference.
Some subsequent modification of ANA 445 occurred during the course of the
NR contract. However, the effect of these modifications or clarifications
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was to make the procedures and definitions more restrictive. It is
noted that all Class II changes which are approved by the contractor
are submitted to the RASPO for information. This provides an opportunity
for review. Also, the NR control system is such that each Class II item
is picked up and reported to R&QA. Class II changes include those not
defined as Class i.
Although the CCB may be concerned with a change to a specific
vehicle, in most instances the changes involve all of the remaining vehi-
cles to be manufactured or which have not flown. That is, a major part
of the effort of the CCB is devoted to assuring that the overall config-
uration is appropriate and that the procedures are compatible with all
elements of the system. In general, the CCB is concerned about the
configuration of the basic CSM. Readiness Reviews, which are discussed
in the following section, are concerned with the exact configuration of
a specific CSM.
With regard to subcontracts like that for the oxygen tanks, there
is actually an additional level of configuration control by the Beech
Aircraft Corporation. Their Configuration Control Board reviews all
changes, both Class I and Class ii. Class I changes are sent to NR for
processing through the system and Class II changes may be approved by
Beech for implementation. In actual practice there are only a few Class
II changes and all of these are sent to NR for information and recorded
in the system.
READINESS REVIEWS
The Readiness Reviews are conducted for each specific vehicle.
These reviews are concerned with the manufactured subsystems that have
been assigned to a specific CSM.
Customer Acceptance Readiness Reviews
The basic objective of the Customer Acceptance Readiness Review
(CARR) is to evaluate the readiness of the CSM for delivery to KSC for
launch preparation. The CARR Plan for Apollo command and service mod-
ules was revised in January 1969. This plan is referenced in the Apollo
Spacecraft Program Configuration Management Manual (ref. 2) and has gen-
erally been applicable throughout the Apollo Program. The plan defines
the detailed requirements for preparation of documentation, subsystem
reviews, items for review and general procedures. Definition of the
review teams, their composition, function, and tasks are also contained
in the CARR Pls_
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A complete C_RRfor a specific CSMis conducted in three phases:
(a) Phase I - To be conducted by the ASPOimmediately prior to
the initiation of installed subsystemcheckout of the assembled CSMto
identify constraints of subsystemtests. This includes firm identifica-
tion of constraints to system tests.
(b) Phase II - This phase was a formal review until changedby
ASPOletter of January 28, 1969, which authorized the RASPO-Downeyto
approve the start of CSMintegrated test by the contractor.
(c) Phase III - Conductedby the Director, MSC_immediately prior
to shipment to identify constraints to acceptance/shipment. It is a
review of additional data from Phase I.
Systems SummaryAcceptance Documents(SSAD)are compiled and used
by Governmentand contractor subsystemreview teams in the PhaseI CARR.
There are 44 of these documentsprepared to cover the subsystemscon-
tained in the launch escape system_ commandmodule, service module, and
the spacecraft-LM adapter (SLA). Of these, 14 involve the service mod-
ule (SM) and there are separate documentsfor the environmental control
system and the electrical power system and wiring, which include the
cryogenic oxygen tanks.
SSADbooks becomethe complete and official historical documents
for each specific CSMsubsystem. Included in the books are specific
signed statements from both the responsible contractor engineer and the
NASASubsystemManagercertifying the readiness of the specific subsystem
for the particular phase which is being reviewed.
The Phase !II CARRis concerned only with documentedchanges since
Phase I. This concept provides a meansof concentrating on only those
items which are different from the last review and avoids the effort which
would be necessary to conduct each review from the beginning of the CSM
history.
At the completion of the PhaseIII CARR,the CSMis ready for ship-
ment to the KSC.
Flight Readiness Reviews
A Flight Readiness Review (FRR) for the CSM,LM, and GSEis con-
ducted at MSC. In general, this review is similar to the review described
in the CARRplan. The samesystems are reviewed by similar review teams
and the SSADbooks are continued. However, nowthere are additional
items addeddue to the inclusion of the ground support equipment and the
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SLA. Primary continuity is obtained by use of the SSADbooks, their
updating during the formal FRRand subsequent special tests.
An FRRData Review is held at KSCto prepare for the formal FRR
Board meeting at MSC. The FRRBoard is chaired by the Director of the
MSCor his deputy and includes key managementpersonnel from NASAHead-
quarters, MSC_and KSC. The review objectives are to determine any
action required to bring the CSM/LM/GSEto a condition of flight readi-
ness.
The final FRRis conducted by the Office of MannedSpaceFlight at
KSCapproximately 5 weeksbefore the scheduled launch. This FRRis
chaired by the NASAHeadquarters Apollo ProgramDirector and includes
review of all elements of the mission.
Launch Minus 2-Day Review
This review is chaired by the Apollo Mission Director with all the
senior mannedspace flight officials in attendance. This review is held
to review all elements of the mission and to assure closeout of all items
since the final FRR.
LAUNCHCHECKOUTPROCEDURES
As shownby figure E6-2_ technical control of the hardware remains
with MSCduring the checkout and test operations at KSC. However_the
KSCis specifically responsible for conducting the tests and for develop-
ing appropriate test procedures to fulfill the test requirements estab-
lished by MSC.
A Test Requirements Documentis prepared and approved by MSC(ref. 5).
This documentspecifically defines the following:
i. Test Constraints - the test sequencing which must be completed
prior to accomplishment of particular test requirements and any specific
test constraints.
2. Primary Mission Test Requirements Matrix - matrices are listed
by system, identifying mandatory test requirements that must be satis-
fied during the course of spacecraft checkout at KSC. Indication is
given of the GSEand facility locations and the desired test guidelines
are referenced.
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3. Retest Requirements - the general requirements for spacecraft
or GSE reverification in the event of test invalidation because of
equipment removal, disconnecting_ repair, etc.
4. Contingency Test Guidelines - requirements.
5. Safety Requirements.
6. Test Guidelines - these specific sheets reflect the desired
test contents, objectives, and test prerequisites.
7. Alternate Mission Test Requirements - matrices are identified
for the mandatory test requirements that must be satisfied if a CSM is
designated to perform an alternate mission.
Upon receipt of the Test and Checkout Requirements Document from
MSC, KSC prepares a Test and Checkout Plan. This plan contains the out-
line for accomplishing the test requirements defined by MSC at the launch
site and additional tests which the KSC considers necessary to verify
launch facility, manned space flight network, and launch crew readiness
or to satisfy range safety requirements. The Test and Checkout Plan
(TCOP) is the master test document and is approved by both KSC and MSC.
Changes to this plan and also changes to the facility are reviewed and
approved by the KSC and MSC.
Based on the TCOP, detailed Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP) are
prepared and approved by KSC. These are the implementing documents which
assure that correct detailed information is available prior to the con-
duct of any test. Changes to these procedures are processed on control-
led change request forms which are signed by the appropriate authority.
The details for preparation, release, and execution of the TCP are con-
tained in Apollo Preflight Operations Procedures No. 0-202 and 0-221.
Test deviations which may be necessary just prior to the start or
during the test are authorized. However, the deviation must be fully
documented. Review in this case takes place after the completion of the
test, but it is still reviewed and the appropriate levels of authority
are provided with the opportunity to modify, change, or to have the tests
rerun.
Approximately 2 weeks prior to the scheduled launch date, two sepa-
rate countdown demonstration tests (CDDT) are conducted. The first of
these, called the "wet" CDDT, involves the booster and tanking of all
cryogenic systems in all modules. This countdown runs to a simulated
lift-off and is then concluded.
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A second, or "dry," CDDTis conducted shortly after the "wet" CDDT.
This CDDTis primarily concerned with the crew functions. The cryogenic
tanks are partially detanked during this CDDT.
The results of the CDDT,"wet" and "dry," are reviewed by the Mis-
sion Director and the decision is madeto initiate the final countdown.
A final review is conducted with all of the senior Manned Space Flight
officials at the Launch Minus 2-day Review. At this point the mission
is firmly committed.
E-72
PART E7
OXYGEN TANK MANAGEMENT REVIEW
GENERAL TANK HISTORY
This part will review the management process described previously
as applied to the design, production, test, and checkout of the cryo-
genic gas storage system oxygen tank.
North American Rockwell (NR) established tentative requirements
for a cryogenic gas storage system and issued a request for proposal
to interested companies in the spring of 1962. In the summer of 1962,
Beech Aircraft Corporation was awarded a letter contract to design,
develop, and qualify the Block I Apollo cryogenic gas storage system.
This contract was awarded after evaluation of the proposals from Beech
and a number of other companies with cryogenic experience. The origi-
nal contract for Block I was scheduled to be completed by January 1964,
and was covered by NAA Specification MC 901-0005 (ref. 6).
A considerable amount of the early effort was expended in develop-
ment of a spherical heater pressurization system which was both heavy
and electrically complicated. In late 1963, a program was established
to design an alternate cryogenic fan motor and heater system which was
developed and approved for production early in 1964.
The primary vendors for Beech on production hardware were Parker
Aircraft for valve modules; Cameron Iron Works for oxygen tank Inconel
forgings; Globe Industries, Inc., for the tank motor fans; Simmonds
Precision Products, Inc., for instrumentation; Airite Division of
Sargent Industries for pressure vessel tank welding; and Metals and
Controls Corporation for the tank heater thermal switches.
In 1964, the state-of-the-art for insulation of supercritical
oxygen tanks was thoroughly investigated and an improved concept using
dexiglass paper and aluminum foil was tested and found satisfactory.
Also, the boilerplate BP-14 tanks were completed and shipped to NR in
1964.
Block II competition was held in early 1965, and Beech was awarded
this contract in October 1965. Beech made delivery of the first Block I
tank in December 1963, and the last one in 1966. There was therefore
some overlap of these contracts.
Preliminary Design Reviews were held in May and July of 1965 by NR
and Beech. A Program Review was held in December 1965 for the MSC
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Apollo Spacecraft Program _Tanager. Because of the tight delivery
schedule, it was decided at the Program Review to assign an NR team to
Beech to assist in assuring meeting tank delivery schedules. The con-
figuration control baseline was established by the Critical Design
Review held in March 1966 attended by NASA, NR, and Beech representa-
tives. The first Block II oxygen tanks were delivered in July 1966.
A First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) was conducted November
16-18, 1966, with NR, Beech and NASA participating. The FACI confirmed
the configuration baseline.
The original specification (ref. 6) from NR to Beech for procure-
ment of the oxygen tank and heater assembly was dated November 1962.
No reference is made in this specification to other than design for
28 V dc. Beech issued a specification in 1963 to Metals and Controls
Corporation for procurement of the thermal switches for the tank heater
assemblies. These thermal switches were to limit the t_k temperatures
and prevent overheating and were built to interrupt the 28 V dc space-
craft current. The heater GSE was subsequently designed and built by
NR with a 65 V dc power supply for use at KSC in initial pressurization
of the oxygen tanks. The 65 V dc current was used in order to pres-
surize the oxygen tank more rapidly than could be done with the 28 V dc
spacecraft power supply. NR issued a revised Block II specification
(MC-901-0685) to Beech in February 1965 which specified that the oxy-
gen tank heater assembly shall use a 65 V dc GSE power supply for
tank pressurization.
Beech issued a specification (14L56) in July 1965 to Metals and
Controls Incorporated for the thermal switches for the Block II tanks.
This revised Beech specification did not call for a change in the ther-
mal switch rating in order to be compatible with the 65 V dc GSE power
supply. (The thermal switch, which remains closed in the cold liquid
oxygen, will carry the 65 V dc current but will not open without dam-
age with 65 V dc applied.)
NR or Beech never subsequently caught this discrepancy in the GSE
and thermal switch incompatibility. The incompatibility had not caused
problems previous to Apollo 13 since the thermal switch had never been
called upon to open with 65 V dc applied. The extended heater o_eration
using 65 V dc GSE power during the March 27 and 25 detanking at KSC
raised the tank temperature to 80 ° F and called for the thermal switches
to open for the first time under these conditions (for which they were
not designed or tested). The switch malfunctioned and during the sub-
sequent operation did not provide the tank overheating protection which
the KSC test personnel assumed existed.
During the development cycle the following technical problems were
encountered.
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Tank Vacuum and Heat Leak Problems
Poor vacuum, difficulty in acquiring good vacuum on initial pump-
down, and degradation of vacuum from outgassing under vibration were
encountered early in the program. These resulted in a high heat leak
and caused excessive rates of flow and pressure rise. Early failures
to attain satisfactory initial vacuum, including two on qualification
tests, were corrected by revisions to test procedures to extend the
heat leak stabilization period and upgrade methods of vacuum acquisi-
tion.
Vacuum pumping equipment was also modified and improved. A speci-
fication change was approved by NR to permit an adequate but more real-
istic value of heat leak.
Design changes were made in order to correct continued difficulty
in securing and retaining good vacuum, and vac-ion pumps were incor-
porated as an integral part of the tank assembly. Use of the vac-ion
pump prevented further gross degradation of vacuum from outgassing.
Part of the heat leak was attributed to variation in density of the
load bearing insulation in the tank annulus. The insulation was re-
designed to reduce the allowable weight and control the overall
density of the insulation.
Heat leak did, however, remain slightly over specification on some
tanks, and these minor deviations were waived.
Fan Motors
The fan motors for the cryogenic oxygen experienced a number of
failures during their production history. A review of these motors was
conducted by Globe Industries, Inc., and Beech Aircraft Corporation.
The report was issued in January 1967.
The complete manufacturing, handling, and usage of the fan motors
at Globe, Beech, and NR was reviewed and the failures that had occurred
were grouped in the following nine failure classes:
i. Contamination failures
2. Bridge ring failures
3. Bearing failures
4. Phase-to-phase shorts
5. Grounds
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6. Leadwire damage
7. Speed
8. Coastdown
9- Miscellaneous
Other failures, including tolerance build-ups, were reported which
could not be classified in the other groups. These are listed under
the miscellaneous classification. The corrective actions taken as a
result of this review significantly reduced the numberof failures.
Oneapparent flight failure in an oxygen tank fan motor occured on
Apollo 6. The failure was analyzed as a single-phase short to ground
in the heater fan motor circuit. Subsequently, the circuit was re-
vised to include individual fuse protection for each motor and single-
phase circuit breakers in each phase.
Vac-ion Pumpand Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Problems
During qualification test there was arcing to the vac-ion pump
harness at a mounting screw. Increased clearance was provided. A
continuity check was added to verify wiring. Dielectric leakage between
the pumpand the tank shell also occurred at the vendor plant. A de-
sign changewas incorporated adding insulation spacers to provide
increased clearances, with satisfactory results.
The use of the vac-ion pumpled to EMIwith other systems on the
spacecraft. Coronadischarge and arcing of the high voltage lead and
connector occurred. This was identified during altitude chambertest
of spacecraft i01 at KSC. The fix initiated was to modify the shield-
ing of the high-voltage lead and improve the potting in the connector.
The vac-ion pumpis normally not used during flight. It has only
been used during vehicle assembly and checkout to assure that the
proper vacuumis maintained on the oxygen tank annulus. The circuit
breakers for these pumpsare openedprior to flight.
Heater Failures
Electrical shorting in the heater circuit occurred twice. A heater
element caused a short during acceptance test of a Block I tank at the
vendor's plant. A circuit breaker tripped 20 minutes after power was
applied. The short was causedby damageto the insulation of the heater
lead wires. It was apparently scraped during installation of the wires
into the tank or during handling prior to installation. Improved in-
spection and installation procedures and a pin-to-pin insulation
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resistance test were initiated. During qualification testing the heater
lead wire was burned and a circuit breaker was tripped by overload. The
cause was faulty solder Joints madeduring installation. Improved fab-
rication techniques were put in effect, and applied to all Block II
tanks.
During this period of design, development, test, and manufacture,
there had been coordination meetings of Beech personnel with the NRand
NASArepresentatives. By the end of 1966, the tanks had completed the
major cycle of development and qualification and about 30 tanks had been
delivered. In 1967, 17 additional tanks were delivered, three were de-
livered in 1968, and six were delivered in 1969. These deliveries es-
sentially completed the contract except for eight tanks remaining at
Beech. In addition, ll tanks were used during the early development
period for qualification and tests, making 75 tanks in all. Of these
75 tanks, 28 were in Block I and 47 in Block II.
CHRONOLOGYOFAPOLLO13 OXYGENTANK
The specific tank assembly of interest in this review is oxygen
tank no. 2 of CSM109. This tank is identified as ME282-0046-008
serial number10224XTA0008.The other tank on the oxygen shelf of
CSM109 was serial number10024XTA0009.
The end-item acceptance data package (ref. 7) contains the config-
uration and historical data relative to this particular tank. Using
these data and pertinent spacecraft review data, it is possible to trace
this tank through its manufacture, reviews, discrepancies, and tests to
launch as a part of an approved flight system.
The CameronIron Works madea rough forging of top and bottom tank
hemispheres in accordance with Beechspecifications and provided the
required microstructure analysis of Lhe grain size of the Inconel 718
hemisphere and evidence of satisfactory ultrasonic and radiographic
inspection. The forgings were shipped to the Airite Division of
Electrada Corporation, E1 Segundo, California, for machining and
welding. After machining, pressure vessel wall thickness measurements
were madeon the upper and lower hemispheres at about 300 points to
establish that girth and membranemeasurementswere within specified
tolerances. The two hemispheres were then welded together, X-rayed for
weld inspection, and shipped to Beech Aircraft Corporation on June 15,
1966. BeechAircraft installed the probe, quantity and temperature
sensor, furnished by SimmondsPrecision Products, Inc., and cryogenic
fan motors furnished by Globe Industries, Inc. Beechalso installed
the tank insulation and outer Inconel shell.
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During the manufacture and testing of the tank 0008 at Beech, a
numberof discrepancies recorded as Material ReviewRecords were reported
and corrected. These discrepancies included:
i. The upper fan motor was noisy and drew excessive current. Cor-
rective action was to remove both fan motors and replace them with new
motors serial numbers 7C30 and 7Chl.
2. The vat-ion pump assembly insulator was found to have two small
cracks along the weld bead. Corrective action was to grind off the pump
assembly and insulation weld, to remove and replace the insulator and
reweld the assembly.
3. During the minimum flow tests, the oxygen flow rate was found
to be 0.81 lb/hr as compared to 0.715 lb/hr specified as maximum in the
NR specification. A waiver was requested for this and three other tanks
that exhibited similar flow rates. Waiver CSM 00hh was approved by
Apollo Project Engineering at NR and by the Acting Manager, Resident
Apollo Program Office (RASPO) in accordance with standard procedures.
The tank was subjected to the specified end-item acceptance check,
including vac-ion functional test, heater pressurization test, electrical
insulation resistance tests, dielectric strength tests, proof and purge
tests, and minimum oxygen flow tests. These tests were all satisfactorily
completed, with the exception of the slightly excessive oxygen flow rate
previously discussed, and are documented in the End-Item Acceptance
Data Package Book (ref. 7).
Handling Incident
The tank was shipped to NR, inspected, and then installed on an
oxygen shelf in June 1968. This shelf was subsequently installed in
CSM 106. The vac-ion pump modification, previously discussed, could
not be performed with the tank-shelf assembly installed in a service
module. For this reason, the oxygen shelf was removed from CSM 106.
During the removal sequence the shelf handling fixture broke and the
shelf was dropped approximately 2 inches. After the modification
and appropriate inspections, the shelf assembly was reassigned to CSM
lO9.
DR's were written to require inspection and test of the shelf
assembly for recertification. These inspections and tests revealed
no major discrepancies. It was reported by NR that an engineering
analysis was performed to determine the forces which might have been
imposed on the tanks due to the "shelf drop." This analysis indicated
that the loads were within the design limits of the tanks and that no
internal damage should have been sustained. This informal report is
not now available from existing files.
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To verify that the internal componentsof the tanks were functional,
a series of tests were conducted. The tanks were given a repeat of the
acceptance and verification tests which are normally conducted by NR
prior to installation of an oxygen shelf in a service module. All of
these tests were passed successfully, with no significant changes from
the previous test results. NRdoes not fill the tanks with liquid oxygen
during their test, assembly, and checkout activities at the plant.
At the completion of the required vac-ion pumpmodifications and
with the successful test results obtained, the shelf assembly condition
was reviewed by NRengineering, R&QA,and the RASPOand installed in
CSM109. All appropriate signatures were obtained on the DR's, copies
of these were provided to the SubsystemManagerat MSC,and copies were
also included in the SubsystemSummaryAcceptance Document(SSAD)book
for spacecraft 109.
At the Phase I CARRfor CSM109, November18-19, 1968, the incident
was again discussed by the CARRsubsystemteam with NRengineering and
NASA/RASPO.Documentsand NRtest results were reviewed and the shelf
was accepted. It had passed all required tests, the analysis indicated
that estimated loads had not exceededdesign limits, and the entire
record had been properly reviewed. The incident had been explained in
accordance with all of the managementcontrol systems in effect.
The Phase III CARRon May26-28, 1969, verified that the shelf was
installed in CSM109 and that test data verified satisfactory oxygen
shelf performance in accordance with the test DRwritten by NRand
NASA/RASPO.
The information concerning the handling incident was included in
the SSADbooks for spacecraft 109. It was not reviewed by the Flight
Readiness Review (FRR)Board. Equipmentwhich has successfully passed
all tests and has been certified as flightworthy does not require
additional reviews unless additional problems are discovered. As no
problems were encountered, the CSM109 FRRon January 15-16, 1970,
considered the oxygen shelf checkout as having been satisfactorily per-
formed and recommendedthe system as flight ready.
Becausethe handling incident had occurred early in the review
cycle for spacecraft 109 and had been closed out, it was not recon-
sidered in any detail during the decision process regarding the
detanking incident. NRpersonnel at Downeywere aware of the handling
incident. However, Beech, KSC, and senior MSCManagementwere unaware
of the incident.
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The R&QA reporting and data retrieval system is designed to enable
records to be readily obtained. However, this is not an automatic
action. It is necessary for the concerned people to initiate the
action; t_at is, request the record search. By virtue of the general
concept that is applied to Apollo, this search of the records is
seldom done. Flight equipment is either flightworthy or not. There
is no gray area allowed between good and bad equipment.
Det anking Incident
After shipment to KSC, build-up checkout activities proceeded
normally until the countdown demonstration test (CDDT) sequence where-
in the tanks were pressurized, checked, serviced with liquid oxygen,
and then detanked. Detanking difficulty developed during sequence 29-
009 of Test and Checkout Procedures (TCP), TCP-K-0007V2, at 10:55 p.m.
on March 23, 1970, when oxygen tank no. 2 did not decrease to about
50 percent quantity as expected.
The problem was first attributed to a faulty filter in the asso-
ciated ground support equipment (GSE) and an Interim Deficiency Report
(IDR 023) was initiated for evaluation of the filter.
Troubleshooting of test sequence 29 was continued by the NR
Systems Engineers, the NASA (KSC) Systems Engineers, and the NR Sys-
tems Specialist with the actions monitored by a KSC reliability
specialist and a KSC safety specialist in accordance with specified
KSC procedures.
A decision was made on March 23, 1970, at 11:37 p.m. that TCP-K-
0007V2 test procedures could be continued. This decision was made by
the NR Systems Engineer, NASA (KSC) Systems Engineer, and the NR Systems
Specialist.
TCP-K-0007V2 was continued through sequence 29-014 by 2:55 a.m. on
March 24, and the IDR 023 was upgraded to a GSE/Discrepancy Report (DR)
for filter evaluation on March 24, 1970.
The TCP-K-0007V2 test sequence 29 was reinitiated on March 27, 1970,
at which time it was known that the suspect GSE filter was not malfunc-
tioning. An Interim Discrepancy Report (IDR 040) was written to inves-
tigate detanking and change detanking procedures to assist in detanking.
After substantial time was spent in the detanking attempt, the IDR 040
was changed to a spacecraft DR 0512.
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A conference including MSC subsystems engineers and KSC Apollo CSM
Manager was held and a Beech engineer was contacted by telephone to
discuss the problem. It was decided that the difficulty was caused by
allowable looseness in a fill line fitting and it was decided to try
detanking using fans and heater on oxygen tank no. 2. This was started
on March 27, 1970, during the second shift.
DR O512 was signed by the NR Systems Engineer, the NASA Systems
Engineer, and the NR Systems Specialist (all of whom are assigned to
KSC), and varied the procedures of the basic TCP. This variation did
not result in satisfactory detanking.
DR 0512 was further amplified on March 28, 1970, at about 4 a.m.,
to provide for a pressure pulsing technique whereby the tank vent was
closed and the tank was pressurized to 300 to 340 psig, allowed to sta-
bilize for 5 minutes, and then vented through the fill line. This pro-
cedure was concurred in at the time by NR Systems Engineer, NASA Systems
Engineer, NR Systems Specialist, and NR Systems Manager, all of whom
are assigned to KSC. This procedure was followed for five pressure cy-
cles and the tank was emptied.
The decision to be made by KSC in consultation with NR and MSC was
whether to leave the oxygen shelf in the spacecraft or to exchange it
for a different one. This was a critical decision because changing a
major unit such as the oxygen shelf at the KSC is not a normal practice.
It can be accomplished, but it must be done manually at some risk of
damage to adjacent components. At the NR factory, there is a specifi-
cally designed item of GSE with which to remove the shelf.
Many telephone calls were made concerning the detank problem, and
several of them were conference hookups so that most of the participants
could hear the entire conversation. The KSC Director of Launch Opera-
tions and the MSC Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager led the ensuing
investigation which included key technical experts at Beech, similar
experts at NR_ and the subsystems managers at MSC.
During the weekend beginning March 27, MSC developed a comprehen-
sive checklist of questions which had to be answered prior to making a
decision concerning the oxygen tank:
i. Details and procedures for normal detanking at Beech and KSC.
2. Details of abnormal detanking at KSC on March 27 and 28.
3. Hazards resulting from a possible loose fill tube in the oxygen
tank.
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4. Canthe tank be X-rayed at KSC?
5. Could loose tolerances on the fill tube cause the detanking
problem?
6. Should a blowdownand fill test be madeon the tank?
7. Disassemble both oxygen tanks from Service Module 2TV-I and
examine components.
All of the checklist questions were answeredby test, analysis,
and inspection. The report of the Beech investigation, contained in
reference 8, included the following conclusions:
i. "Based on manufacturing records, the Teflon tube fill line
assembly was installed.
2. Total gap areas in the assembly after cooldown could vary from
0.004 in 2 to 0.09 in 2 from tank to tank.
3. Based on allowable tolerances, gap areas on tanks could approach
the area of 3/8 inch fill line, thus accounting for the inability to de-
tank per methods used at KSC.
4. Normal stresses on the Teflon plug are not sufficient to cause
cracking or breakout of the plug.
5. The assembly, fabricated to print dimensions, cannot comeapart
in the installation.
6. Tank X-rays are not clear enoughto showthe fill assembly.
7. The delta pressure across the coil assembly and disconnect
is very small.
8. Energy level developed by shorting capacitance plates on probe
is too low to cause a problem."
In addition to these conclusions, Beech also provided NRa copy of
their detanking test procedures and the calculations used to reach their
conclusions.
Basedupon the Beech information, the condition of the 2TV-I oxygen
tank fill line determined by direct inspection and the understanding
that the detank procedures at the KSC and at Beech were different, it
was concluded that the tank was flightworthy. The primary participants
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in reaching this conclusion were the NRCSMProgram Manager, the KSC
Director of Launch Operations, and the MSCASPOManager. The fact that
these people did not have complete or correct information to use during
the decision process was not determined until after the accident.
The information which subsequent 9eview determined to be incomplete
or incorrect included the following:
i. Neither the KSCLaunch Operations Director nor the MSCASPO
Managerknew about the tank handling incident which had occurred at
NR-Downey.
2. The last portion of the detanking procedure at Beech is similar
to that used by KSC. No one appearedto be aware of this similarity be-
tween the procedures. At one time during the early portions of the pro-
gram they were, in fact, different.
3. All of the key personnel thought that the oxygen tank on Service
Module 2TV-I had experienced detanking problems similar to those experi-
enced at KSC. As this tank was available, it was disassembled and in-
spected. The examination of the internal tank parts showeda loose-
fitting metal fill tube and it was concluded that this loose fit was
the cause of the detanking problem. Subsequent review has revealed
that the 2TV-I tank probably detanked in a normal manner.
4. The senior managerswere not aware that the tank heaters had
been left on for a period of 8 hours. It appears this information was
provided to NR-Downeyby telephone during a long conversation. However,
it was not considered during the decision process. No one at MSC,KSC,
or NRknew that the tank heater thermostatic switches would not protect
the tank from overheating.
The managementsystem alerted the right people and involved them
in providing technical information to the responsible program managers.
Communicationswere open, unrestricted, and appear to have been nearly
continuous. All of the modified KSCdetank procedures were correctly
documentedand other reports were correctly filled out. The problem
was that inaccurate and misleading information was provided to the
managers.
Any consideration of whether managementdecisions would have been
different if the correct data had been provided is highly speculative.
However, it is likely that requests for additional tests or data may
have been considered during the discussion if the correct information
had been available.
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PART E8
OXYGEN TANK MATERIAL SELECTION
The original design of the cryogenic oxygen storage system was
based on state-of-the-art existing in 1962 and subsequent developments
during the course of the contract test and evaluation phase. The tank
contractor, Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, started the design using
materials considered compatible based on existing cryogenic knowledge.
A limited program was followed in qualifying components, such as the
Globe fan motors in the company's test facilities.
The first formal application of Nonmetallic Materials Selection
Guidelines was imposed on NAA by CCA 1361 dated April 17, 1967. This
Change Authorization required that the contractor implement ASPO-RQTD-
D67-5A dated April 17, 1967, and recommend a detailed plan for analysis,
application testing, selection, and approval of nonmetallic materials to
assure that all potentially combustible applications are identified and
controlled. In addition, the contractor was required to recommend any
design and/or material changes necessary to meet these criteria. This
change was effective on Spacecraft 2TV-I, I01, and subsequent.
The cryogenic oxygen gas storage system was categorized as Category
D--Material Applications in High Pressure Oxygen System--for material
selection and control purposes.
Requirements for Category D are as follows: This category shall
include those materials used in greater than 20 psia oxygen systems.
Materials shall have prior use history in oxygen service, with no fire
or explosion experience.
FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
Materials for such applications as filters, seals, valve seats, and
pressure bladders shall be covered by these criteria.
Material Property Requirements
Propagation rate.- No test required.
Thermogravimetric analysis and spark ignition test_ reference 9.-
This test is designed to determine the weight loss and outgassed vapor
spark ignition characteristic of materials under test. A material evolv-
ing significant vapors verified by weight loss and having a visible flash
at a temperature less than 400 ° F is unacceptable. A material that shows
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evidence of charring or sustaining combustion at a temperature less than
450 ° F is unacceptable. A material that shows evidence of charring or
sustaining combustion at a temperature less than 450 ° F is unacceptable
for use in crew bay areas.
Odor, carbon monoxide, and organics_ reference 9.- Materials shall
be tested for carbon monoxide and total organics. If the material yields
over 25 micrograms of carbon monoxide per gram of material or over i00
micrograms of total organics per gram, it will be rejected. If it passes
this test, it will be evaluated for objectionable odor by a test panel
of 5 to i0 members. If the odor is objectionable, the material will be
unacceptable.
Friction and impact ignition_ reference 9.- This test is to deter-
mine the sensitivity and compatiability of nonmetallic materials with
pure oxygen for use in the high-pressure oxygen system. Only materials
that have passed other required tests will be subject to this test. The
material will be subjected to three successive tests at 1.5 kilogram
meters impact testing at successively higher gaseous oxygen pressures
until a reaction is observed by discoloration, evidence of combustion,
or.detonation. To be acceptable, the material must not show a reaction
at the maximum use pressure plus 2000 psi.
Friction and impact ignition.- Materials shall not ignite when
tested to the requirements of Appendix D of reference i0.
The presently applicable contractual specification (ref. 9) was
published and placed on contract by CCA 2147 to record the criteria and
requirements actually in force for the Apollo contract. Modifications
to the basic document are made as the knowledge increases, and it was
last revised in November 1969.
The contractor is primarily responsible for the selection of mate-
rials in contractor furnished equipment (CFE) as prescribed by contract.
NASA publishes materials selection requirements and reviews materials
selected by the contractor. A Material Selection Review Board is estab-
lished at the contractor's facility to review material selection and to
approve or reject all deviation requests. The contractor board submits
all decisions to the Material Review Selection Board at MSC for review
and approval. The prime board, MSC, indicates concurrence or noncon-
currence to the contractor board within 5 days of receipt of the lower
board's decisions.
Present requirements for material selection are essentially the
same as those previously cited and are listed in detail in reference i0.
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Materials Listing
A listing of materials was prepared by Beech and furnished to NR.
The listing was checked at NR for completeness and compatibility and
entered into the Characteristics of Materials (COMAT) list and forwarded
to MSC in October 1969. This COMAT package was transmitted to the
MSC/GE Materials Engineering Support Unit where it was reviewed and
signed off as complete and accurate by the Materials Engineering Unit
Manager. All materials are shown to be compatible for the use contem-
plated except Drilube 822 which is an assembly lubricant used in very
small quantities. The MSC COMAT shows this material classed as requir-
ing the submission of a Material Usage Agreement (MUA) for approval.
The Drilube was judged acceptable for the use contemplated in
accordance with the blanket waiver given for outgassing of materials
tested at MSC on the 2TV-I and CSM I01 vehicles.
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PART E9
SAFETY AND RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE (R&QA)
INTRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION
General
The Apollo Program has a firmly established safety requirement in
the basic program objective. The original objective of the program was
to land men on the Moon and return them safely to the Earth. The pro-
gram management, design, review, and monitoring procedures described in
previous sections of this Appendix are designed to assure that all
program problems, including safety, are presented to the appropriate
management decision makers at selected program maturity points.
The safety system and organization is designed to provide an inde-
pendent specialized monitoring and evaluation function for the program
line management. The following figures and descriptions of responsi-
bilities outline the safety organization of NASA as it applies to the
Apollo Program, and the contractor-subcontractor organization as it
applies to the Apollo Program generally, and the cryogenic gas storage
system specifically.
NASA Headquarters
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is established to provide a
direct, nonorganizational overview on safety for all programs for the
Administrator (fig. E9-1). The charter for this panel specifies access
to any program information necessary for their safety audit function
and full support of their requirements by the NASA Safety Officer and
other elements of the organization.
The NASA Director of Safety is responsible for exercising functional
management authority and responsibility over all NASA safety activities.
This includes development of policy, procedures to implement policies,
and review and evaluation of conformance to established policy. He is
also charged with supporting Program Directors and Instutional Directors
in discharging their safety responsibilities. His review and concurrence
are required for the safety portion of each Project Plan and Project
Approval Document.
The NASA Director of Safety reports to the Associate Administrator
for Organization and Management.
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The office of the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
(MSF) (fig. E4-3) has several offices with either a primary or secondary
responsibility for safety.
The Director, Manned Space Flight Safety Office, has a dual organi-
zational responsibility to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight (AA/MSF) for program guidance and policy direction. He also
serves in the office of the NASA Safety Director as Assistant Safety
Director for Manned Space Flight Programs, assisting in the development
of overall NASA-wide safety policy, guidance, and professional safety
standards. In this NASA Assistant Safety Director assignment, he is
under the cognizance of the Office of Organization and Management. In
accomplishing his responsibility as Manned Space Flight Safety Director,
he advises the MSF Program Directors and the AA/MSF on all matters in-
volving manned flight safety and develops and documents appropriate
safety policy for these programs. He audits the program offices and
MSF Field Centers to insure compliance with established policy and de-
velops accident investigation and reporting plans for use in the event
of flight anomalies. He also develops the Manned Space Flight Awareness
Program.
Bellcom, Inc., is under contract to AA/MSF to perform studies,
technical fact finding and evaluation, analytical investigations, and
related professional activities in support of Manned Space Flight Pro-
grams. In support of the Apollo Program, this contract capability is
available under the direction of the Director, Apollo Program, for safety
studies or analyses as required in support of his responsibilities to
systematically identify hazards and risks and take all practical meas-
ures to reduce risks to acceptable levels.
Manned Space Flight Mission Directors are assigned as Deputy Program
Directors for specific missions and are responsible for insuring thorough
inter-Center/OMSF coordination for that mission. The Mission Director
insures that consideration is given to all problems and proposed changes
affecting safety and to advise the Program Director of any disagreement
with proposed actions from the standpoint of assuring quality hardware
and flight safety.
The Director, Mission Operations, is responsible for directing and
evaluating the development of the total operational capability necessary
for the conduct and support of Manned Space Flight missions. These
responsibilities are performed in support of the Manned Space Flight
Program Directors under the cognizance of the Associate Administrator
for Manned Space Flight. In accomplishing this operational responsibil-
ity, the Mission Operations Director works with the MSF Director of
Flight Safety to insure development of operation safety plans.
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The Director of Reliability and Quality Assurance is responsible to
the Assistant Administrator for Industry Affairs to formulate and develop
reliability and quality assurance policies and to prescribe guidance and
procedures to implement approved policies. He is also responsible for
assessing the effectiveness of these programs throughout the Agency and
for keeping the management informed of the status of the program. He
participates in investigations of major accidents and mission failures
whenever reliability and quality assurance could have been a contribut-
ing factor. He also initiates and conducts special studies of problems
affecting the reliability and quality of NASA hardware.
The Director, Manned Spacecraft Center, under the supervision of
the AA/MSF_ manages the development activities of the Apollo Program_
with emphasis on providing spacecraft, trained crews, and space flight
techniques. In carrying out these functions, he procures spacecraft
systems and monitors and directs contractor activities. He also selects
and trains flightcrews_ establishes mission and test requirements, and
plans and executes missions under the direction of the Mission Operations
Director.
The Director, John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), under the super-
vision of the AA/MSF_ develops, operates, and manages the Merritt Island
Launch Area (MILA) and assigned programs at the Eastern Test Range (ETR)
and insures that KSC operations meet the requirements of NASA Safety
Standards.
Manned Spacecraft Center
The Safety Office is the focal point for the development_ implemen-
tation, and maintenance of a safety program at MSC. The office implements
requirements established by NASA Headquarters, maintains a current MSC
Safety Plan and Manual, and participates as an advisor to the Director,
MSC, in major spacecraft reviews. The office assesses the effectiveness
of contractors in their safety functions and assists MSC directorates,
program offices, and contractors in safety matters.
The Safety Office is functionally divided into a number of sub-
divisions to accomplish their assigned duties, as shown in figure E9-2.
The Manned Flight Awareness Office is responsible for developing a
motivational program to instill in each individual associated with
manned space flight a personal awareness of their responsibility for the
lives of the astronauts and mission success of space flight missions.
This responsibility is largely accomplished by development and publica-
tion of motivational literature and by scheduling and coordinating astro-
naut and management official visits to contractor and subcontractor
plants in support of the Manned Flight Awareness Program.
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The Program ManagementSafety Office develops and applies a system
safety program for flight hardware contracts. System safety guidelines
are identified to MSCprogram offices and directorates and through them
to contractors. The ProgramManagementSafety Office represents the
Manager, Safety Office, on program major milestone reviews and evaluates
contractor and MSCsystem safety requirements for particular programs.
This office also provides for identification and tracking of hazards
throughout the life of a system. In accomplishing this responsibility_
the office assesses mission rules, flight plans, and crew procedures to
identify potential hazards and assure that they are eliminated or con-
trolled. They also evaluate design and procedure changes for safety
implications and monitor space flight missions in real time to appraise
the Manager_Safety Office, of safety-related amonalies. They maintain
close interface with MSCprogram elements to provide inputs for trade-
offs involving safety and performance.
The Test Operations Safety Office is the subdivision of the Safety
Office that establishes a safety program to insure the safe conduct of
hazardous tests involving humansubjects, tests of GFEastronaut equip-
ment, and special tests of spacecraft. The office evaluates test facili-
ties and operations to determine hazardous activities and provides test
officers for activities considered to be of an extremely hazardous
nature. They compile and evaluate reports and findings of Operational
Readiness Inspections (ORl's) and distribute these reports as required.
The System Safety Office develops, implements, and maintains a
system safety program for mannedspacecraft efforts involving prelimi-
nary analysis_ definition, and design phases. The office also provides
system safety support for other elements of the Safety Office. Speci-
fically, this office assists in the preparation of system safety plans
from the initial purchase order or request for proposal through the
procurement stage and then audits the system safety activities of the
contractor or MSCorganizational element throughout the program.
The Industrial Safety Office directs and coordinates comprehensive
industrial, public, and traffic safety programs, including a fire preven-
tion and protection program and an ordnance safety program covering MSC
operations and activities including test facilities; develops and coor-
dinates the MSC/contractor industrial safety program; and evaluates the
effectiveness of all MSC-directed industrial safety activities.
The Reliability and Quality Assurance Office at MSC(fig. E9-3) is
a fundamental element in the safety system. The office is co-located
with the Safety Office and the samemanheads both offices. The R&QA
office develops and implements the reliability and quality assurance
programs for the Center to assure that spacecraft, spacecraft systems_
and supporting systems are designed and built to perform satisfactorily
in the environment for which they are designed. This office also reviews
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and evaluates R&QA information and activities of contractors and provides
onsite monitoring. The office also provides specialized studies for
safety reviews and provides direct support to program managers for design
reviews, configuration management change control, flight readiness re-
views, and real-time mission support.
The MSC Safety Plan establishes the organized MSC system safety pro-
gram. The plan applies to Center activities and contractors under NASA/
MSC direction. The plan is oriented toward spacecraft systems and crew
safety and does not cover all elements of a total safety program.
The general intention of the safety program is to establish the pri-
mary responsibility for safety of spacecraft and GSE hardware and soft-
ware with the program office/contractor. The responsible directorates
are recognized as having the primary responsibility for the safety of
mission operation and crew procedures. The MSC Safety Office has the
primary responsibility for assessing manned safety of spacecraft flight
and ground testing and acting to insure system safety consideration by
all MSC and program contractor elements.
The MSC offices and directorates with prime system safety responsi-
bilities are shown in figure E9-3 with their functional relationships
with the Safety Office indicated by the dashed lines. Each of these
offices and directorates has established a single point of contact for
all safety matters. This contact interfaces directly with the Safety
Office and has unimpeded access to top management of his directorate or
office on safety matters. The spacecraft hardware and operations safety
responsibilities of each of these offices are as follows:
i. Program offices manage the design, test, and manufacture of
spacecraft systems and related GSE to assure proper contractual safety
requirements. They implement Safety Office policies and procedures and
resolve incompatibilities between mission requirements, mission profiles,
operational constraints, and spacecraft capabilities. They also provide
the basis for certifying design maturity and manned flight safety.
2. Flight Operations Directorate is responsible for:
(a) Trajectory and flight dynamics analysis.
(b) Mission control requirements.
(c) Mission rules and spacecraft systems handbooks.
(d) Ground instrumentation requirements.
(e) Emergency real-time procedures.
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(f) Landing and recovery testing and operations. Coordinating
recovery operations with DOD.
(g) Coordinating safety matters with Air Force Eastern Test
Range.
(h) Providing the basis for certifying design maturity and
manned flight safety.
3. Flight Crew Operations Directorate:
(a)
(b)
constraints.
Assures the adequacy of flightcrew selection and training.
Establishes crew procedures and spacecraft operational
(c) Conducts mission planning.
(d) Establishes crew station design requirements.
(e) Conducts simulations (nominal operations and abort).
(f) Develops operations handbooks and general flight procedures.
(g) Approves all KSC test and checkout operating procedures
involving flightcrews.
(h) Conducts and supports tests with aircraft where they are
used to develop and evaluate operational capabilities of space-related
hardware and operations.
(i) Provides the basis for certifying design maturity and
manned flight safety.
4. The Engineering and Development Directorate:
(a) Assures the adequacy of design, manufacture, and test of
equipment and the cognizance of this Directorate.
(b) Assures that safety is properly integrated and that system
safety requirements are provided in contractual requirements.
(c) Provides technical support to MSC programs through sub-
system management programs.
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5. The Science and Applications Directorate:
(a) Performs flight experiments and special experimental tasks.
(b) Assures proper integration of system safety policies and
requirements into design and operation of all space science experiments.
(c) Coordinates with Safety Office on safety requirements for
special experiments.
(d) Assures that safety requirements are properly implemented
in the design and operation of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory.
(e) Provides the basis for certifying design maturity and
mannedflight safety.
6. The Reliability and Quality Assurance Office:
(a) Supplies failure modeand effect analysis of spacecraft
systems_ subsystems_GFE_and experiments.
(b) Provides failure trends.
(c) Determines safety categories.
(d) Coordinates with Governmentinspection agencies to insure
that safety-critical items satisfy established requirements.
(e) Approves failure closeout statements.
7. The Medical Research and Operations Directorate:
(a) Provides world-wide medical support for mannedmissions
and provides flight surgeons during missions.
(b) Provides medical coverage for all tests involving human
subjects.
(c) Monitors the physical condition of humanparticipants
with the authority to stop testing if continuation might result in
injury or death to the test subject.
(d) Ascertains by physical examinations the satisfactory phy-
sical condition of the test personnel or flightcrews and certify their
satisfactory physiological condition.
(e) Participates in test planning and approves all physiologi-
cal test standard procedures involving humanparticipants.
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(f) Establishes the physiological limits to which mancan be
subjected.
(g) Reviewsplans and changes for construction of test facili-
ties involving humans.
(h) Has responsibility for biological safety during Lunar
Receiving Laboratory operations.
The Safety Office also maintains a safety interface betweenNASA
Headquarters, MSC,other centers, and other Governmentagencies as shown
in figure E9-4. The areas of safety coordination with these organiza-
tions are described as follows. In the event problems arise at these
interfaces, interagency panels will be convened for problem resolution.
MSC/KSCinterface in eight areas that are safety oriented or
related:
1. Test operations at KSC.
2. Flight hardware management.
3. Flightcrew activities at KSC.
4. Configuration control.
5. Quality control and inspection at KSC.
6. Safety at KSC.
7. Experiment management.
8. Launch and flight operations.
Any problems which arise are resolved through the formally orga-
nized intercenter panels.
MSC/DOD Safety Regulations are primarily at the Air Force Eastern
Test Range Facility. DOD provides the following functions:
1. Safety-related base support as required:
(a) Fire protection and control
(b) Explosive ordnance disposal
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(c) Bioenvironmental engineering
(d) Security
2. Missile ground safety as required.
3. Range safety.
4. Search and sea recovery.
John F. Kennedy Space Center
The Kennedy Space Center takes the test and checkout requirements
and test and checkout specifications and criteria documents prepared by
the development centers and develops plans and procedures for the hand-
ling and launch of spacecraft. To accomplish this responsibility, KSC
prepares and coordinates Test and Checkout Plans and implementing Test
and Checkout Procedures.
The KSC Safety Office.- This office plans and manages an integrated
hazard-assessment and risk-reduction program for all activities at KSC
and for all NASA activities at both Cape Kennedy Air Force Station
(CKAFS), Florida, and Vandenburg Air Force Base (VAFB), California.
This program includes:
1. Handling, storing, and transporting hazardous items such as
missile propellants, ordnance, high-pressure gases, toxic fluids, and
radioactive devices.
2. Insuring safety requirements are included in all contracts
initiated or administered by KSC and that contractor performance is
periodically evaluated.
3. Performing engineering system safety studies to assure inclu-
sion of safety requirements in engineering design of space vehicle test
and checkout (launch complex and ground support equipment/facilities and
operations).
4. Insuring that safety controls and required support are in effect
during performance of all operations.
5. Approving siting, construction, and modification plans for safety
aspects.
The office conducts safety surveillance while selected operations
are actually in progress, with authority to halt activities under speci-
fied circumstances.
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Prior to publication of a test and checkout procedure (TCP) for(a) operational checkout of flight hardware, (b) functional verification
and operational control of GSE,and (c) operational instructions to ser-
vice, handle, and transport end-item flight hardware during prelaunch
and launch operations, the KSCSafety Office reviews and approves these
procedures to assure that operations are compatible with KSCsafety
criteria and use appropriate safety personnel, techniques, and equipment.
Prior to publication of a technical procedure involving hazardous
operations to (a) authorize work, (b) provide engineering instructions,
and (c) establish methods of work control, the KSCSafety Office re-
views and approves the procedure to assure that operations are compat-
ible with KSC safety criteria and use appropriate safety personnel,
techniques, and equipment.
During selected operations that involve hazardous sequences, the
Safety Office has representatives on site. In the case of major inte-
grated tests, i.e., CDDT, the number of representatives can be as high
as 12_ with three people on station in the Launch Control Center firing
room and the remainder at various positions on the launch pad. The
safety representative insures that safety requirements are implemented,
approves or disapproves on-the-spot changes to Category I procedures
made either by Procedure Change Request (PCR) or Deviation Sheets and
assists the test supervisor in obtaining resolution on matters that
have safety overtones.
North American Rockwell Corporation - Space Division
The NR System Safety Plan for the Apollo CSM program is the imple-
menting document for the program required by MSC specification under the
basic CSM contract.
The objective of the system is the elimination or control of risks
to personnel and equipment throughout the manufacture, checkout, and
flight missions of the Apollo CaM. To achieve this objective the CSM
system safety program has an organization as shown in figure E9-5. The
CSM System Safety Office reports directly to the CSM General Manager
and is headed by the Assistant to the General Manager for CSM System
Safety. The Assistant to the General Manager for CSM System Safety acts
for the General Manager in the conduct of activities relating to all
facets of safety for the CSM programs, and is a permanent member of the
Space Division Safety Committee. He directs and monitors program activ-
ities necessary to assure an effective system safety program. He is
responsible for preparation and compatibility of the CS_4 system safety
programs at all sites with the exception of Launch Operations at KSC.
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Specific responsibilities of the NR CSM Safety Office include:
i. Develop and direct the system safety program for the CSM
programs.
2. Participate in Customer Acceptance Readiness Reviews (CARR's)
and Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR's) and assess problems submitted for
flightcrew safety impact.
3. Supervise the three CSM functional departments relative to
system safety and interface with other agencies and divisions of NR
concerning CSM safety.
4. Participate as a member of the NR Change Control Board (CCB)
to review proposed changes and assure changes do not jeopardize ground
and flightcrew safety.
5. Maintain status report system on all safety problems and design
changes affecting safety.
The Engineering Division System Safety Office:
i. Reviews and evaluates safety effect of all Engineering Design
Change (EDC) packages.
2. Reviews and assesses engineering analyses such as FMEA's, SPF's_
and similar documents for identified hazards which jeopardize crew
safety. Evaluate their corrective action and disposition.
3. Participates in postflight evaluations when requested by MSC
for evaluation of crew safety problems.
The Manufacturing Division System Safety Office:
i. Provides safety checklists to aid manufacturing personnel in
preparing documents and conducting safety surveys.
2. Assures that CSM manufacturing test, handling, and transport
procedures and work documents contain appropriate system safety
provisions.
3. Assures that operations defined as safety-critical are ade-
quately planned and monitored.
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The Test Operations System Safety Office is responsible for protec-
tion of the operational integrity of the C_{ during checkout at Downey
and testing at field sites. This office:
i. Generates system safety checklists for preparing Test Operations
and conducting safety surveys.
2. Reviews all test, checkout, and operations procedures for ade-
quate system safety requirements.
3. Reviews all safety-critical operations to assure adequacy of
test set-up_ documentation, and personnel qualification. Assures that
adequate emergencyplans and procedures are established and in use for
these safety-critical operations.
4. Coordinates crew safety provisions and requirements and, when
appropriate, recommendscorrective action for identified hazards
associated with crew procedures.
The Safety Plan appears to be operating satisfactorily according
to the most recent MSCaudit. The multiple safety offices and fragmen-
ted responsibilities warrant a critical review aimed at evaluating the
expected effectiveness of a more centrally managedprogram.
The Reliability and Quality Assurance function, as shownin figure
E9-5, has a functional responsibility to the corporate quality office
and a program managementresponsibility to the CSMProgramManager.
They are responsible for monitoring the manufacturing orders for proper
R&QAcallouts, verification inspection callouts, planned inspection
callouts_ and proper implementation of R&QArequirements in the planning
operation. They also compile the SystemSummaryAcceptance Documents
(SSAD's) for CustomerAcceptance Readiness Reviews (CARR's) and Flight
Readiness Reviews (ERR's). They conduct quality inspections on manufac-
turing processes and testing operations and participate in design re-
views. They also verify material usage and make and dispose of failed
hardware.
The reliability function monitors design specifications and pre-
pares failure effects and criticality analyses. They develop and super-
vise maintainability analyses_ perform failure reporting analyses and
recommend corrective action, support end-item reviews_ perform problem
investigations, and support the problem items.
Beech Aircraft Corporation
The overall organization of the Beech Aircraft Corporation, Boulder
Division, is shown in figure E4-11, and a functional breakdown of the
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office of the Apollo Program is shown in figure E4-12. The Beech Quality
Control Plan establishes the detailed methods and procedures for accom-
plishing the positive quality control required by NASA of its contrac-
tors and subcontractors in the Apollo Program. The Beech plan does
comply with the NASA requirements of NPC-200-2_ "Quality Program Pro-
visions for Space Systems Contractors" (ref. ii), and is applicable to
the material, parts_ components, subassemblies, installations, and sys-
tem and subsystems purchased, tested, and manufactured for the Apollo
supercritical gas storage system.
The system operates to assure maintenance of the basic approved
configuration baseline by reviewing and documenting materials, processes,
vendor-provided equipment, testing procedures, and manufacturing opera-
tions.
The Beech Reliability Program Plan provides for management and opera-
tion of the reliability system. It provides for the monitoring and
reporting of all tests, and maintenance of a complete record of action
on discrepancies and failures; and participates in corrective action and
research required for Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) analyses,
logic diagrams, math models, and reliability predictions and apportion-
ments. Documentation of these efforts are furnished to the NR and NASA
to fulfill contract requirements. The Beech Aircraft reliability and
quality assurance organization and operation appear to be adequate and
in compliance with contract and NPC-200-2 requirements. Manufacturing
procedures and process control were surveyed and found in good condition
and documentation such as the FMEA's was examined and found to be
satisfactory.
SAFETY AND R&QA AUDITS
Regular audits of the Safety and R&Q_ functional areas are made of
the field centers by NASA Headquarters teams. The Centers, in turn,
make similar audits of their prime contractors. These contractors con-
duct audits and survey visits with their subcontractors and suppliers.
In addition, the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has reviewed cer-
tain aspects of the manned space flight safety program. These reports
are included in the Apollo 13 Review Board files.
Consideration of these audits and reviews by the Management Panel
showed no significant items relative to the Apollo 13 accident. The
general functioning of the overall Safety and P_QA programs was found
to be consistent with good practices.
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MSCSAFETY/R&QAPARTICIPATION
The MSCSafety Office is responsible for implementing safety poli-
cies and assuring safety in design, development, and operation of space-
craft. The R&QAfunction is responsible for assuring that spacecraft
and supporting systems are designed and built to perform in the environ-
ment for which they are built. The two functions, Safety/R&QA, are
mutually dependent, have manycommoninformation and data requirements,
and have manyreview and monitoring functions that support them both.
Safety/R&QAare closely involved in the entire design, development,
test, and flight phase of all spacecraft components, systems, and sub-
systems. This includes participation in formal reviews such as the
Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR), Critical Design Reviews (CDR), First
Article Configuration Inspection (FACI), and CustomerAcceptance Readi-
ness Reviews (CARR)conducted by the Program Office. Safety/R&QAalso
participates in Design Certification Reviews (DCR)and Flight Readiness
Reviews (FRR).
These offices implement general policy and establish specific pro-
grams for contractors. They then monitor these programs throughout the
contract period to assure safety and quality of performance by the
contractor.
This review considered someof the activities of these two offices
from the CARRthrough the post-touchdown phase of the commandand ser-
vice module of Apollo 13.
CARR'sare held in two phases at present: PhaseI prior to the
initiation of subsystemtesting and Phase III prior to shipping the
assembled vehicle. MSC R&QA reviewed documentation for Phase III CARR
for CSM 109 with the following specific results.
Phase III CARR for CSM 109
1. No hardware will exceed its allowable operational storage limits
during KSC operation and flight.
2. No known parts problems exist that will constrain shipment of
CSM 109.
3. There are 854 Certification Test Requirements (CTR's) for equip-
ment applicable to CSM 109. Testing is incomplete for six and certifi-
cation will not be complete at time of delivery. This status is sig-
nificantly better than previous CSM's, however, and shows an improving
trend.
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4. An improving trend in spacecraft quality was shownby a review
of NR-Downeydiscrepancy reports on CSM109.
5. Verification of nonmetallic materials has been accomplished and
establishes that all exposed nonmetallic materials have been identified
and approved or deviations written and accepted.
6. All known single-point failures applicable to CSM109 have been
reviewed and are acceptable.
A comparison of data shownin the R&QAreview for CSM109 and pre-
vious CaMspacecraft showsthat CSM109 has shownsubstantial improve-
ment in most R&QAand safety categories and no decrement in safety in
any area.
FRRR&QASummary
The next formal review was the Apollo 13 Flight Readiness Review(F_).
i. All limited-life items adequate to support flight.
2. No knownelectrical, electronic, or electromechanical problems
exist that would constrain launch.
3. No Certification Test Requirements constrain flight, since all
have been approved except one which will be certified by analysis prior
to flight.
4. All known single-point failures have been reviewed and are
considered acceptable.
5. The overall quality of CSM109 showsa favorable trend relative
to previous spacecraft.
The Flight Safety assessmentat the FRRwas:
6. The system safety assessment of planned mission flight activi-
ties and spacecraft functions disclosed no safety concerns that would
constrain the Apollo 13 flight scheduled for launch on April ii, 1970.
7. Four changes from previous missions have been madewhich
reduced flight risks.
8. The risks unique to Apollo 13 involve: (a) programmingS-IVB
stage for lunar impact during translunar coast; (b) performing lunar
descent orbit insertion with CSM/LMdocked; (c) operating power drill on
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lunar surface; and (d) performing PLSScommunication degradation test
during lunar surface EVA. These risks are not of constraining magnitude.
Weekly Safety/R&QAReport
In addition to the formal CARR,FRR, and other reviews, information
is furnished to the Apollo Program Office and the Director, MSC,on a
weekly basis of the activity of Safety and R&QArelative to particular
spacecraft through the WeeklyActivity Reports. Abbreviated mention of
someitems from this WeeklyReport from January 1970 to April lO, 1970,
concerning the Apollo 13 and CSM109 follows.
January 8-15_ 1970.- Thirteen open certification items for Apollo 13
were reported. Pacing items are four lunar camera items scheduled to be
closed in February.
January 15-22_ 1_70.- CSM 109 FRR data review generated lO R&QA
Review Item Dispositions (RID's). CSM 109 FRR subsystem working session
was conducted at KSC on January 15-16. FRR RID's were generated and
submitted for preboard action on January 25. Readiness statements were
prepared for CSM 109.
January 22-28_ 1970.- An assessment of CSM 104 through 109 failures
at KSC was conducted. Detailed assessment will be made to determine
reasons failures were not discovered at NR before shipment.
Safety Office briefed Astronaut Conrad on proposed procedure change
for Mode 4 abort. Conrad will review with other astronauts, including
Apollo 13 Commander.
January 30-Februar_ 4_ 1970.- Ground support equipment (GSE) at
KSC supporting CSM 109 is defective and may provide a countdown demon-
stration and countdown constraint unless the situation is remedied. NR
is studying the problem. The Apollo 13 Safety Assessment Study of Mis-
sion Phases from translunar injection through CSM descent orbit injec-
tion has been completed and will be distributed by February 4, 1970.
The biweekly meeting of MSC Safety/Boeing System Safety on Apollo mission
concerns was held January 30. Seventeen Apollo 13 safety concerns were
reviewed. Eight of the seventeen were closed.
February 12-18 a 1970.- R&QA and Apollo Test Division met to discuss
anomaly reporting effort. The discussion disclosed no duplication of
effort and agreement was reached that the Apollo Mission Anomaly Test
would be the guide for anomaly investigations. As of this date, only
one GSE problem is open. It is expected to be resolved by the CDDT.
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February 19-26 t 1970.- The Safety Offices Assessment Report for
Apollo 13 has been prepared. There are no constraining items in the
report.
February 26-March 5_ 1970.- The Apollo 13 R&QA Flight Readiness
Assessment Report was completed February 26, 1970. R&_A agrees with the
data and conclusions drawn. Of the five items listed as requiring veri-
fication, only one (referring to LM-7 rate gyro) is still active and
should be resolved March 6. The Safety Office Assessment Report was
presented at MSC's FRR on February 26, 1970. No constraining items
exist. Two items are to be presented involving crew procedures.
March 20-26_ 1970.- An R&QA review will be held during the after-
noon and evening before the Apollo 13 launch to reaffirm launch, and
results will be discussed with the CSMManager. The mission plan and
information notebook for the Apollo 13 mission is being prepared for
Safety and R&QA mission support. The Safety Office provided the Deputy
Manager with a written assessment of an R&QA single-point OPS/PLSS
leakage failure. The Crew Systems Division is aware of the problem and
is developing a work-around procedure.
April 3-9_ 1970.- Open problems with potential Apollo 13 effectiv-
ity continue to be worked. Last planned status report to ASPO is sched-
uled for April iO, 1970. It is anticipated that all open problems will
be closed or explained by that time.
April i0-16_ 1970.- Final Apollo 13 Single Failure Point Summary
was made during this time and approved by subsystem manager. All re-
ported problems effective against Apollo 13 were closed or explained
prior to launch. Also, all ALERTS for Apollo 15 were closed prior to
launch. R&QA and Safety activities have been mainly to support changes
in the mission brought about by loss of the oxygen supply.
Apollo 13 Mission Real-Time Activities
The Safety/R&QA functions support the premission and mission activ-
ities of Apollo flights in real time. The purpose of this support is
twofold. First, the Safety/R&QA personnel, both in-house and contract,
provide a contact for the mission group to call on for specialized sup-
port at any time during the mission from launch minus 9 days through
splashdown. There are also specialized R&QA/Safety personnel available
at the contractor's plants, NR and Grumman, for consultation as required.
Secondly, the Safety/R&QA people are monitoring mission activities to
make independent safety assessments and evaluations for future crew safety
and mission readiness purposes. For this purpose, the monitoring team
maintains a log of problems and occurrences that is used to prepare a
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support anomaly list that is later resolved with the Project Test
Division in the preparation of the Mission Anomaly list. The Safety/
R&QAsupport operation for the Apollo 13 mission included the following
activities:
Prelaunch. -
Daily problem closeout meeting: Meetings were held daily to review
the status of hardware problems, certification tests, limited-life
items, and other pertinent reliability concerns to assure that all
potential problems had been properly evaluated and resolved. Head-
quarters R&QA was also represented at these meetings.
R&QA/Safety status meeting: A meeting of R&QA and Safety per-
sonnel was held on Friday evening, April lO, 1970, to review the
status of all known and potential problems on Apollo 13. The meeting
was chaired by the Manager, Safety and R&QA Offices. Following the
meeting, the CSM Project Manager was informed of the results of the
meeting. Headquarters R&QA was represented at the meeting.
Daily launch readiness problem report: This was initiated
February 9, 1970, and the final report was issued on the morning
of April ll, 1970, indicating no open problems against Apollo 13
hardware.
Daily bulletins: Apollo 13 bulletins were issued daily by the
Control Center to keep personnel informed as to the status of Apollo
13 as it neared launch.
Countdown monitoring: Monitoring activities at MSC were initiated
at T - 2 days and continued through the mission. Headquarters personnel
maintained 24-hour monitoring of countdown activities at KSC up until
launch.
Quality data review: MSC quality personnel at KSC reviewed IDR's
DR's, etc., at KSC as the problems occurred to assure immediate evalua-
tion of these problems.
Problem review and evaluation: Safety/R&QA participated in review
and evaluation of hardware problems to determine potential mission im-
pact. These included the lunar module cryogenic helium tank pressure
rise problem and the oxygen tank umbilical quick-disconnect leakage
occurrence.
Launch to accident. -
Monitoring activities: Real-time monitoring of Apollo 13 was
maintained at MSC and in the GE Mission Evaluation Room offsite. A
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control center was also mannedby contractor personnel on a 24-hour
basis to provide a central focal point for all Safety/R&QAmissions
activities.
Daily bulletins: Bulletins reporting the mission status were
issued daily.
Flight anomalies: As suspect flight anomalies occurred, they
were posted in the Control Center. R&QApersonnel were requested to
review and evaluate these occurrences as soon as feasible after the
events were reported.
Requests for support: Requests for R&QAsupport for Test Division
or other NASAgroups were received and were worked as required. Three
such requests were received prior to the accident. These requests were
for failure histories, failure modeevaluations, etc., on the cryogenic
helium tank pressure rise problem, the ECSsuit pressure transducer,
and on the oxygen tank no. 2 quantity gaging probe problem.
Postaccident.-
Safety/R&QA activities immediately following the Apollo 13 accident
concentrated on compilation of subsystem data to determine the factors
involved in the safe return of the crew--including single failure
points. It included:
Safe-return factors: Each spacecraft subsystem was reviewed to
identify those areas and concerns affecting the safe return of the
crew in the emergency Apollo 13 configuration. A "Safe Return Factors"
book was compiled and made available for reference in the Planning
Room (GE).
Quality data: The quality control data on the CSM 109 oxygen
tank no. 2 was compiled and a search of these records for any question-
able items was initiated.
Historical data: The historical data, including failures, on
similar oxygen tanks were searched for evidence of significant problem
areas, as was the test and checkout history of the CSM 109 cryogenic
and EPS systems.
Flight data review Safety/R&QA: Personnel participated in the
review of flight data as a part of a team.
Configuration review: A review of the equipment and its relative
location in bay 4 of the SM was made.
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Single failure points: A study was prepared listing all
Criticality I SFP's in both the CSMand the LMbased upon the emer-
gency configuration of Apollo 13.
Unexplained anomalies: A review was madeof each of the explained
anomalies approved for Apollo 13 to determine any potential connection
with the Apollo 13 accident.
Daily review meeting: An R&QA/SafetyReview meeting was held
daily at 4 p.m.c.s.t, on April 14-17, 1970, to review the status and
progress of the activities listed in the preceding paragraphs. The
Manager, Safety and R&QA,strongly emphasizedduring these meetings
the need to concentrate on thos@activities affecting the safe return
_f the astronauts. The activities designed to determine the cause of
the accident were pursued only whenthey did not interfere with this
primary concern.
CONCLUSION
The MSCSafety/R&QAplans and procedures appear to be adequate and
complete for their assigned responsibilities. Their maintenance of
equipment and system records, identification of suspect and failure
areas, and followup corrective actions through the Governmentand
contractor organization are adequate. Monitoring of contractors is
presently accomplished with onsite personnel and visits rather than
by formal audits. This appears adequate at present but should be
supplementedby formal audit visits whenever possible.
The preflight System Safety Assessments made for each flight of
the Apollo Program are thorough and timely and the flight monitoring
support of Safety/R&QA is good. The postflight anomaly identification
and tracking system is good.
The Safety/R&QA area appears to be generally adequate with
proper procedures_ good organization, and well-motivated personnel.
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PART EIO
SECURITY
Security surveys were conducted at Beech Aircraft Corporation,
Boulder Division, and North American Rockwell Corporation, Downey,
California, during the time period of April 27, 1970, through May 5,
1970.
The purpose of these investigations was to evaluate the adequacy
of the security programs at each location during the time periods that
the Apollo oxygen tanks were in custody at the respective industrial
plants. An extension of the accident investigation involved recon-
structing the security systems and procedures applicable to the oxygen
tanks from the time of shipment from NR to KSC and through launch of
Apollo 13 on April ll, 1970. To fulfill the stated purpose of this
inquiry involved evaluation of security programs at Beech, NR, and KSC
from April 1,. 1966, through April ll, 1970.
The security programs at each contractor location were found to be
satisfactory and adequate to provide for the physical protection of the
oxygen tanks. The security procedures provided at KSC were found excel-
lent and assured the integrity of all Apollo 13 hardware from initial
receipt on June 26, 1969, through launch on April ll, 1970.
Federal and local agencies acquainted with the security programs
at NR and Beech were contacted and gave favorable evaluations of each
contractor's performance during the pertinent time period.
Industrial security files were reviewed for incidents involving
the oxygen tanks at Beech and spacecraft 106 and 109 at NR. The results
at Beech were negative, and the incidents located at NR have been re-
ported for technical evaluation in the preliminary report submitted
May 8, 1970, to the Review Board Chairman and Manager, Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office.
The determination reached as the result of this survey is that no
evidence was discovered that the failure of the Apollo 13 oxygen tanks
was the result of any willful,_deliberate, or malicious act on the part
of an individual at the contractor facilities surveyed or at KSC. Phys-
ical security measures were sufficiently designed, implemented, and
monitored so as to preclude unauthorized access to the hardware associ-
ated with this investigation.
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